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
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


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Twenty-sixth President of the United States



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


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A History of the Great War

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT WILSON TO CONGRESS ON FEBRUARY 11, 1918, CONCERNING WAR-AIMS AND PEACE-TERMS

Accordingly, on February 11, 1918, President Wilson continued his political offensive against Germany by another address to Congress on war-aims and peace-terms:

Gentlemen of the Congress: On the eighth of January I had the honor of addressing you on the objects of the war as our people conceive them. The Prime Minister of Great Britain had spoken in similar terms on the fifth of January. To these addresses the German Chancellor replied on the twenty-fourth and Count Czernin, for Austria, on the same day. It is gratifying to have our desire so promptly realized that all exchanges of view on this great matter should be made in the hearing of all the world.

Count Czernin's reply, which is directed chiefly to my own address on the eighth of January, is uttered in a very friendly tone. He finds in my statement a sufficiently encouraging approach to the views of his own government to justify him in believing that it furnishes a basis for a more detailed discussion of purposes by the two governments. He is represented to have intimated that the views he was expressing had been communicated to me beforehand and that I was aware of them at the time he was uttering them; but in this I am sure he was misunderstood. I had received no intimation of what he intended to say. There was, of course, no reason why he should communicate privately with me. I am quite content to be one of his public audience.

Count von Hertling's reply is, I must say, very vague and very confusing. It is full of equivocal phrases and leads it is not clear where. But it is certainly in a very different tone from

that of Count Czernin, and apparently of an opposite purpose. It confirms, I am sorry to say, rather than removes, the unfortunate impression made by what we had learned of the conferences at Brest-Litovsk. His discussion and acceptance of our general principles lead him to no practical conclusions. He refuses to apply to them the substantive items which must constitute the body of any final settlement. He is jealous of international action and of international counsel. He accepts, he says, the principle of public diplomacy, but he appears to insist that it be confined, at any rate in this case, to generalities and that the several particular questions of territory and sovereignty, the several questions upon whose settlement must depend the acceptance of peace by the twenty-three States now engaged in the war, must be discussed and settled, not in general council, but severally by the nations most immediately concerned by interest or neighborhood. He agrees that the seas should be free, but looks askance at any limitation to that freedom by international action in the interest of the common order. He would without reserve be glad to see economic barriers removed between nation and nation; for that could in no way impede the ambitions of the military party with whom he seems constrained to keep on terms. Neither does he raise objection to a limitation of armaments. That matter will be settled of itself, he thinks, by the economic conditions which must follow the war. But the German colonies, he demands, must be returned without debate. He will discuss with no one but the representatives of Russia what disposition shall be made of the peoples and the lands of the Baltic Provinces; with no one but the Government of France the "conditions" under which French territory shall be evacuated; and only with Austria what shall be done with Poland. In the determination of all questions affecting the Balkan States he defers, as I understand him, to Austria and Turkey; and with regard to the agreements to be entered into concerning the non-Turkish peoples of the present Ottoman Empire, to the Turkish authorities themselves. After a settlement all around, effected in this fashion, by individual barter and concession, he would have no objection, if I correctly interpret his statement, to a league of nations which would undertake to hold the new balance of power steady against external disturbance.

It must be evident to everyone who understands what this war has wrought in the opinion and temper of the world that no general peace, no peace worth the infinite sacrifice of these years

of tragical suffering, can possibly be arrived at in any such fashion. The method the German Chancellor proposes is the method of the Congress of Vienna. We cannot and will not return to that. What is at stake now is the peace of the world. What we are striving for is a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice,—no mere peace of shreds and patches. Is it possible that Count von Hertling does not see that, does not grasp it, is in fact living in his thought in a world dead and gone? Has he utterly forgotten the Reichstag Resolutions of the nineteenth of July, or does he deliberately ignore them? They spoke of the conditions of a general peace, not of national aggrandizement or of arrangements between state and state. The peace of the world depends upon the just settlement of each of the several problems to which I adverted in my recent address to the Congress. I, of course, do not mean that the peace of the world depends upon the acceptance of any particular set of suggestions as to the way in which those problems are to be dealt with. I mean only that those problems each and all affect the whole world; that unless they are dealt with in a spirit of unselfish and unbiased justice, with a view to the wishes, the natural connections, the racial aspirations, the security, and the peace of mind of the peoples involved, no permanent peace will have been attained. They cannot be discussed separately or in corners. None of them constitutes a private or separate interest from which the opinion of the world may be shut out. Whatever affects the peace affects mankind, and nothing settled by military force, if settled wrong, is settled at all. It will presently have to be reopened.

Is Count von Hertling not aware that he is speaking in the court of mankind, that all the awakened nations of the world now sit in judgment on what every public man, of whatever nation, may say on the issues of a conflict which has spread to every region of the world? The Reichstag Resolutions of July themselves frankly accepted the decisions of that court. There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages. Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. "Self-determination" is not a mere phase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. We cannot have general peace for the asking,

or by the mere arrangements of a peace conference. It cannot be pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful states. All the parties to this war must join in the settlement of every issue anywhere involved in it; because what we are seeking is a peace that we can all unite to guarantee and maintain; and every item of it must be submitted to the common judgment whether it be right and fair, an act of justice, rather than a bargain between sovereigns.

The United States has no desire to interfere in European affairs or to act as arbiter in European territorial disputes. She would disdain to take advantage of any internal weakness or disorder to impose her own will upon another people. She is quite ready to be shown that the settlements she has suggested are not the best or the most enduring. They are only her own provisional sketch of principles and of the way in which they should be applied. But she entered this war because she was made a partner, whether she would or not, in the sufferings and indignities inflicted by the military masters of Germany, against the peace and security of mankind; and the conditions of peace will touch her as nearly as they will touch any other nation to which is entrusted a leading part in the maintenance of civilization. She cannot see her way to peace until the causes of this war are removed, its renewal rendered as nearly as may be impossible.

This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine their own allegiances and their own forms of political life. Covenants must now be entered into which will render such things impossible for the future; and those covenants must be backed by the united force of all the nations that love justice and are willing to maintain it at any cost. If territorial settlements and the political relations of great populations which have not the organized power to resist are to be determined by the contracts of the powerful governments which consider themselves most directly affected, as Count von Hertling proposes, why may not economic questions also? It has come about in the altered world in which we now find ourselves that justice and the rights of peoples affect the whole field of international dealing as much as access to raw materials and fair and equal conditions of trade. Count von Hertling wants the essential bases of commercial and industrial life to be safeguarded by common agreement and guarantee, but he cannot expect that to be conceded him if the other matters to be deter-

mined by the articles of peace are not handled in the same way as items in the final accounting. He cannot ask the benefit of common agreement in the one field without according it in the other. I take it for granted that he sees that separate and selfish compacts with regard to trade and the essential materials of manufacture would afford no foundation for peace. Neither, he may rest assured, will separate and selfish compacts with regard to provinces and peoples.

Count Czernin seems to see the fundamental elements of peace with clear eyes and does not seek to obscure them. He sees that an independent Poland, made up of all the indisputably Polish peoples who lie contiguous to one another, is a matter of European concern and must of course be conceded; that Belgium must be evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and concessions that may involve; and that national aspirations must be satisfied, even within his own empire, in the common interest of Europe and mankind. If he is silent about questions which touch the interest and purpose of his allies more nearly than they touch those of Austria only, it must of course be because he feels constrained, I suppose, to defer to Germany and Turkey in the circumstances. Seeing and conceding, as he does, the essential principles involved and the necessity of candidly applying them, he naturally feels that Austria can respond to the purpose of peace as expressed by the United States with less embarrassment than could Germany. He would probably have gone much farther had it not been for the embarrassments of Austria's alliances and of her dependence upon Germany.

After all, the test of whether it is possible for either government to go any further in this comparison of views is simple and obvious. The principles to be applied are these:

First, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent;

Second, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power; but that

Third, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states; and

Fourth, that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world.

A general peace erected upon such foundations can be discussed. Until such a peace can be secured, we have no choice but to go on. So far as we can judge, these principles that we regard as fundamental are already everywhere accepted as imperative except among the spokesmen of the military and annexationist party in Germany. If they have anywhere else been rejected, the objectors have not been sufficiently numerous or influential to make their voices audible. The tragical circumstance is that this one party in Germany is apparently willing and able to send millions of men to their death to prevent what all the world now sees to be just.

I would not be a true spokesman of the people of the United States if I did not say once more that we entered this war upon no small occasion, and that we can never turn back from a course chosen upon principle. Our resources are in part mobilized now, and we shall not pause until they are mobilized in their entirety. Our armies are rapidly going to the fighting front, and will go more and more rapidly. Our whole strength will be put into this war of emancipation,—emancipation from the threat and attempted mastery of selfish groups of autocratic rulers,—whatever the difficulties and present partial delays. We are indomitable in our power of independent action and can in no circumstances consent to live in a world governed by intrigue and force. We believe that our own desire for a new international order under which reason and justice and the common interests of mankind shall prevail is the desire of enlightened men everywhere. Without that new order the world will be without peace and human life will lack tolerable conditions of existence and development. Having set our hand to the task of achieving it, we shall not turn back.

I hope that it is not necessary for me to add that no word of what I have said is intended as a threat. That is not the temper of our people. I have spoken thus only that the whole world may know the true spirit of America,—that men everywhere may know that our passion for justice and for self-government is no mere passion of words but a passion which, once set in action,

must be satisfied. The power of the United States is a menace to no nation or people. It will never be used in aggression or for the aggrandizement of any selfish interest of our own. It springs out of freedom and is for the service of freedom.

FORCE TO THE UTMOST

But the indirect peace negotiations of the winter of 1917-1918 were rudely halted by the opening of the great German drive on the western battle-front in the spring of 1918. Germany was casting peace negotiations to the winds and to end the war was relying only upon the force of her armies; the United States, with her comrades in the struggle against the military might of the Imperial German Government, accepted the challenge. On April 6, 1918, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the entrance of the United States into the Great War and the opening of the Third Liberty Loan, President Wilson, in an address at Baltimore, Maryland, thus met the test of strength:

The reasons for this great war, the reason why it had to come the need to fight it through, and the issues that hang upon its outcome, are more clearly disclosed now than ever before. . . . The cause we are fighting for stands more sharply revealed than at any previous crisis of the momentous struggle. The man who knows least can now see plainly how the cause of justice stands, and . . . men in America may be more sure than they ever were before that the cause is their own, and that, if it should be lost, their own great nation's place and mission in the world would be lost with it.

I call you to witness, my fellow-countrymen, that at no stage of this terrible business have I judged the purposes of Germany intemperately. I should be ashamed in the presence of affairs so grave, so fraught with the destinies of mankind throughout all the world, to speak with truculence, to use the weak language of hatred or vindictive purpose. We must judge as we would be judged. . . .

We have ourselves proposed no injustice, no aggression. We are ready, whenever the final reckoning is made, to be just to the German people, deal fairly with the German power, as with all others. There can be no difference between peoples in the final judgment, if it is indeed to be a righteous judgment. To

propose anything but justice, even-handed and dispassionate justice, to Germany at any time, whatever the outcome of the war, would be to renounce and dishonor our own cause, for we ask nothing that we are not willing to accord.

It has been with this thought that I have sought to learn from those who spoke for Germany whether it was justice or dominion and the execution of their own will upon the other nations of the world that the German leaders were seeking. They have answered—answered in unmistakable terms. They have avowed that it was not justice, but dominion and the unhindered execution of their own will.

The avowal has not come from Germany's statesmen. It has come from the military leaders, who are her real rulers. Her statesmen have said that they wished peace, and were ready to discuss its terms whenever their opponents were willing to sit down at the conference table with them. Her present Chancellor has said—in indefinite and uncertain terms, indeed, and in phrases that often seem to deny their own meaning, but with as much plainness as he thought prudent—that he believed that peace should be based upon the principles which we had declared would be our own in the final settlement. At Brest-Litovsk her civilian delegates spoke in similar terms; professed their desire to conclude a fair peace and accord to the peoples with whose fortunes they were dealing the right to choose their own allegiances. But action accompanied and followed the profession. Their military masters, the men who act for Germany and exhibit her purpose in execution, proclaimed a very different conclusion. We can not mistake what they have done—in Russia, in Finland, in the Ukraine, in Roumania. The real test of their justice and fair play has come. From this we may judge the rest. They are enjoying in Russia a cheap triumph in which no brave or gallant nation can long take pride. A great people, helpless by their own act, lies for the time at their mercy. Their fair professions are forgotten. They nowhere set up justice, but everywhere impose their power and exploit everything for their own use and aggrandizement, and the peoples of conquered provinces are invited to be free under their dominion!

Are we not justified in believing that they would do the same things at their western front if they were not there face to face with armies whom even their countless divisions cannot overcome? If, when they have felt their check to be final, they should propose favorable and equitable terms with regard to Belgium and

France and Italy, could they blame us if we concluded that they did so only to assure themselves of a free hand in Russia and the East?

Their purpose is, undoubtedly, to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and ambitious nations of the Balkan Peninsula, all the lands that Turkey has dominated and misruled, subject to their will and ambition, and build upon that domination an empire of force upon which they fancy that they can then erect an empire of gain and commercial supremacy—an empire as hostile to the Americas as to the Europe which it will overawe—an empire which will ultimately master Persia, India, and the peoples of the Far East. In such a program our ideals, the ideals of justice and humanity and liberty, the principle of the free self-determination of nations, upon which all the modern world insists, can play no part. They are rejected for the ideals of power, for the principle that the strong must rule the weak, that trade must follow the flag, whether those to whom it is taken welcome it or not, that the peoples of the world are to be made subject to the patronage and overlordship of those who have the power to enforce it.

That program once carried out, America and all who care or dare to stand with her must arm and prepare themselves to contest the mastery of the world—a mastery in which the rights of common men, the rights of women and of all who are weak, must for the time being be trodden underfoot and disregarded and the old, age-long struggle for freedom and right begin again at its beginning. Everything that America has lived for and loved and grown great to vindicate and bring to a glorious realization will have fallen in utter ruin and the gates of mercy once more pitilessly shut upon mankind!

The thing is preposterous and impossible; and yet is not that what the whole course and action of the German armies has meant wherever they have moved? I do not wish, even in this moment of utter disillusionment, to judge harshly or unrighteously. I judge only what the German arms have accomplished with unpitying thoroughness throughout every fair region they have touched.

What, then, are we to do? For myself, I am ready, ready still, ready even now, to discuss a fair and just and honest peace at any time that it is sincerely proposed—a peace in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike. But the answer, when I proposed such a peace, came from the German commanders in Russia and I cannot mistake the meaning of the answer.

I accept the challenge. I know that you accept it. All the world shall know that you accept it. It shall appear in the utter sacrifice and self-forgetfulness with which we shall give all that we love and all that we have to redeem the world and make it fit for free men like ourselves to live in. This now is the meaning of all that we do. Let everything that we say, my fellow-countrymen, everything that we henceforth plan and accomplish, ring true to this response till the majesty and might of our concerted power shall fill the thought and utterly defeat the force of those who flout and misprize what we honor and hold dear. Germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether justice and peace shall reign in the affairs of men, whether right as America conceives it or dominion as she conceives it shall determine the destinies of mankind. There is, therefore, but one response possible from us: Force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant force which shall make right the law of the world and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust.

INDEPENDENCE DAY, 1918

With the military fortunes of the Allies gloomier than at any other period since the outbreak of the War and with fear in the breast of every American that a final and complete German victory was in sight, the dawning of July 4, 1918 presented a well-nigh unparalleled occasion for the United States to reaffirm its faith and to declare anew its purposes in the struggle. At Mount Vernon, Virginia, the home of the commander-in-chief of the American colonies in their struggle for independence from British rule, who later became the first President of the republic which rose from that struggle, President Wilson once more analysed the issues involved in the greatest of all wars, and the ends for which the Allies were fighting and which had to be attained before peace was possible:

. It is significant—significant of their own character and purpose and of the influences they were setting afoot—that Washington and his associates, like the barons at Runnymede, spoke and acted, not for a class, but for a people. It has been left for us to see to it that it shall be understood that they spoke and acted, not for a single people only, but for all mankind. They were thinking, not of themselves and of the material interests which centered in the little groups of landholders and merchants and men of affairs with whom they were accustomed to act, in Virginia and the colonies to the north and south of her, but of a people which wished to be done with classes and special interests and the authority of men whom they had not themselves chosen to rule over them. They entertained no private purpose, desired no peculiar privilege. They were consciously planning that men of every class should be free and America a place to which men out of every nation might resort who wished to share with them the rights and privileges of free men. And we take our cue from them—do we not? We intend what they intended. We here in America believe our participation in this present war to be only the fruitage of what they planted. Our case dif-

fers from theirs only in this, that it is our inestimable privilege to concert with men out of every nation who shall make not only the liberties of America secure but the liberties of every other people as well. We are happy in the thought that we are permitted to do what they would have done had they been in our place. There must now be settled, once for all, what was settled for America in the great age upon whose inspiration we draw today. This is surely a fitting place from which calmly to look upon our task, that we may fortify our spirits for its accomplishment. And this is the appropriate place from which to avow, alike to the friends who look on and to the friends with whom we have the happiness to be associated in action, the faith and purpose with which we act.

This, then, is our conception of the great struggle in which we are engaged. The plot is written plain upon every scene and every act of the supreme tragedy. On the one hand stand the peoples of the world—not only the peoples actually engaged, but many others, also, who suffer under mastery but cannot act; peoples of many races and in every part of the world—the people of stricken Russia still, among the rest, though they are for the moment unorganized and helpless. Opposed to them, masters of many armies, stand an isolated, friendless group of Governments, who speak no common purpose, but only selfish ambitions of their own, by which none can profit but themselves, and whose peoples are fuel in their hands; Governments which fear their people, and yet are for the time being their sovereign lords, making every choice for them and disposing of their lives and fortunes as they will, as well as of the lives and fortunes of every people who fall under their power; Governments clothed with the strange trappings and the primitive authority of an age that is altogether alien and hostile to our own. The Past and the Present are in deadly grapple, and the peoples of the world are being done to death between them.

There can be but one issue. The settlement must be final. There can be no compromise. No halfway decision would be tolerable. No halfway decision is conceivable. These are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must be conceded them before there can be peace:

I.—The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.

II.—The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

III.—The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct toward each other by the same principles of honor and of respect for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens of all modern states in their relations with one another; to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed; no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right.

IV.—The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the people directly concerned shall be sanctioned.

These great objects can be put into a single sentence. What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.

These great ends cannot be achieved by debating and seeking to reconcile and accommodate what statesmen may wish, with their projects for balances of power and of national opportunity. They can be realized only by the determination of what the thinking peoples of the world desire, with their longing hope for justice and for social freedom and opportunity.

I can fancy that the air of this place carries the accents of such principles with a peculiar kindness. Here were started forces which the great nation against which they were primarily directed at first regarded as a revolt against its rightful authority, but which it has long since seen to have been a step in the liberation of its own people as well as of the people of the United States; and I stand here now to speak—speak proudly and with confident hope—of the spread of this revolt, this liberation, to the great stage of the world itself! The blinded rulers of Prussia

have roused forces they knew little of—forces which, once roused, can never be crushed to earth again; for they have at their heart an inspiration and a purpose which are deathless and of the very stuff of triumph!

GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF TELEGRAPH, TELEPHONE AND CABLE SYSTEMS

In the summer of 1918, the Government decided that for the more effective prosecution of the war against the Central Powers the telephone and telegraph systems of the country, like the railroad systems, should be placed in the possession and control of the Government. To that end, President Wilson issued on July 22, 1918, the following proclamation:

Whereas the Congress of the United States, in the exercise of the constitutional authority vested in them, by joint resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives, bearing date July 16, 1918, resolved:

That the President during the continuance of the present war is authorized and empowered, whenever he shall deem it necessary for the national security or defense, to supervise or to take possession and assume control of any telegraph, telephone, marine cable, or radio system or systems, or any part thereof, and to operate the same in such manner as may be needful or desirable for the duration of the war, which supervision, possession, control, or operation shall not extend beyond the date of the proclamation by the President of the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace: Provided, That just compensation shall be made for such supervision, possession, control, or operation, to be determined by the President; and if the amount thereof, so determined by the President, is unsatisfactory to the person entitled to receive the same, such person shall be paid seventy-five per centum of the amount so determined by the President and shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further sum as, added to said seventy-five per centum, will make up such amount as will be just compensation therefor, in the manner provided for by section twenty-four, paragraph twenty, and section one hundred and forty-five of the Judicial Code: Provided further, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to amend, repeal, impair, or affect existing laws or powers of the States in relation to taxation or the lawful police regulations of the several States, except wherein such laws, powers, or regulations may affect the transmission of Government communications, or the issue of stocks and bonds by such system or systems.

And whereas it is deemed necessary for the national security and defense to supervise and to take possession and assume con-

Upper Left-Hand Corner—Edward M. House, Personal Representative of President Wilson in Europe, 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917; United States Representative, Inter-Allied Conference of Premiers and Foreign Ministers and Supreme War Council at Versailles, 1917-18; United States Delegate, Paris Peace Conference, 1919.

Upper Right-Hand Corner—Thomas A. Edison, President, Naval Consulting Board, July, 1915—.

Center—Carter Glass, Chairman, Banking and Currency Committee, House of Representatives, Sixty-Fifth Congress; Secretary of the Treasury, December 17, 1918—.

Lower Left-Hand Corner—Anna Howard Shaw, Chairman Women's Committee, Council of National Defense, 1917-1919.

Lower Right-Hand Corner—Joseph P. Tumulty, Secretary to the President of the United States, March 4, 1913—.

trol of all telegraph and telephone systems and to operate the same in such manner as may be needful or desirable;

Now, Therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, under and by virtue of the powers vested in me by the foregoing resolution, and by virtue of all other powers thereto me enabling, do hereby take possession and assume control and supervision of each and every telegraph and telephone system, and every part thereof, within the jurisdiction of the United States, including all equipment thereof and appurtenances thereto whatsoever and all materials and supplies.

It is hereby directed that the supervision, possession, control, and operation of such telegraph and telephone systems hereby by me undertaken shall be exercised by and through the Postmaster General, Albert S. Burleson. Said Postmaster General may perform the duties hereby and hereunder imposed upon him, so long and to such extent and in such manner as he shall determine, through the owners, managers, boards of directors, receivers, officers, and employees of said telegraph and telephone systems.

Until and except so far as said Postmaster General shall from time to time by general or special orders otherwise provide, the owners, managers, boards of directors, receivers, officers, and employees of the various telegraph and telephone systems shall continue the operation thereof in the usual and ordinary course of the business of said systems, in the names of their respective companies, associations, organizations, owners, or managers, as the case may be.

Regular dividends hitherto declared, and maturing interest upon bonds, debentures, and other obligations, may be paid in due course; and such regular dividends and interest may continue to be paid until and unless the said Postmaster General shall from time to time, otherwise by general or special orders determine; and, subject to the approval of said Postmaster General, the various telegraph and telephone systems may determine upon and arrange for the renewal and extension of maturing obligations.

By subsequent order of said Postmaster General supervision, possession, control, or operation, may be relinquished in whole or in part to the owners thereof of any telegraph or telephone system or any part thereof supervision, possession, control, or operation of which is hereby assumed or which may be subsequently assumed in whole or in part hereunder.

From and after twelve o'clock midnight on the 31st day of July, 1918, all telegraph and telephone systems included in this order and proclamations shall conclusively be deemed within the possession and control and under the supervision of said Postmaster General without further act or notice.

On November 2, 1918, just a few days before the armistice with Germany was signed, President Wilson issued a similar proclamation with regard to the cable systems operated by companies in this country.

Government operation of the telephone, telegraph and cable systems, through Postmaster General Burleson, was marked by much dissatisfaction in the country at large. Labor troubles were frequent, and the trade unions directly involved were supported by the entire membership of the American Federation of Labor in their antagonism and opposition to Mr. Burleson. Wages had to be raised and with wage-increases came rate increases. There were many disputes arising from the conflict of jurisdiction between the several states and the Federal Government, and in addition there were appeals at law to prevent the Government from operating the cable systems. The cable systems were returned to private control and management in May, 1919 and the telephone and telegraph systems, on July 30, 1919; and by that time plans were being matured for returning the railroads also before the end of the year.

THE WAR, 1914

The results of the war let loose upon Europe in August, 1914 were more stupendous and far-reaching than those of any other military struggle of modern times. Perhaps in actual loss of life, including deaths from disease and from privation among civilians as well as among belligerents, the Thirty Years' War of 1618-1648 surpassed the Great War of 1914-1919; for medical and general scientific advance in three hundred years had greatly decreased the proportion of deaths not due directly to battle. But the Great War of the twentieth century resulted not only in military decisions—before its conclusion, it had carried in its wake revolutionary alterations without precedent in well-nigh every field of human endeavor, alterations in one-half a decade which without the War might never have been realized or might have required many decades for realization.

Before an armistice was declared, the War had involved countries from each of the six great continents. South America was the only continent which did not pour forth khaki-clad hordes to burrow down into the miles and miles of irregular trenches in northern France and Belgium which marked the line of struggle between Central Powers and Entente Allies. And even countries which managed to remain neutral throughout the holocaust felt the hand of the War upon them no less heavily than if they had been actually engaged in the conflict.

In military and naval operations proper, the War utilized methods which were a striking medley of the new and the old. For the first time, airplanes played a decisive rôle in the final determination of the struggle on land, while on the sea the submarine for the first time struck vigorously at the strength of the nations against which it was utilized. Huge dirigible balloons (Zeppelins) and captive bal-

loons were used in new ways, and the development of the war in the air led to the employment of new methods of combating air attacks, while the threat of submarine war led to new methods of repelling attacks from under the surface of the seas. Poison gas, the wireless telegraph, cameras, these were but a few of the weapons of warfare used in the Great War for the first time on a large scale, and the size and range of the great guns surpassed all previous artillery records.

On the other hand, trench warfare was no new idea to the students of military history, although the great intricacy, complicated communications, vast extent and elaborate provisions for comfort of the trenches in the Great War would have astonished the earlier resorters to military trenches. Although barbed-wire is a modern invention, its use in the Great War reflected one of the most ancient of all usages in martial combats. Before the end of the war, the old method of sending messages by carrier pigeons was in vogue and the function of the tanks was that of the ancient chariots. Hand grenades, liquid fire and steel helmets could hardly be described as modern inventions, and the bayonet duels were but an echo of the spear encounters of ancient and mediaeval days.

But the revolutionary transformations wrought by the Great War were more marked in the domestic processes of the belligerent nations than even in military and naval procedure. The outbreak of the War found natural resources, industrial plants, and systems of communication, of invaluable assistance to the war programs of the various nations, chiefly under private ownership and management. Even in Germany, where public ownership and supervision had made the greatest advances, the system of private control was still in the saddle. The War made necessary the national systematization of the production and distribution of the military and the non-military materials necessary to the efficient prosecution of the war. For purposes of increasing the production of essentials and decreasing the production of non-essentials, of preventing waste, of co-ordinating parallel activities, of preventing strikes and lockouts, of conserving labor power, of preventing duplication, of guaranteeing and yet of checking profits, of stabilizing wages, of utilizing the most helpful methods of production and discarding the most wasteful,—in a word, for purposes of greater

efficiency, the time-hallowed principle and practice of individual ownership and management had to be abandoned in time of war for the principle and practice of state ownership and management—state socialism or, more accurately, state capitalism. The revolution in the economic activities of the belligerent countries during the five years of war had been unapproached in significance since the industrial revolution.

The leading belligerents entered the Great War as follows:

Austria-Hungary	July 28, 1914
Belgium	August 3, 1914
Bulgaria	October 14, 1915
France	August 3, 1915
Germany	August 1, 1914
Great Britain	August 4, 1914
Italy	May 24, 1915
Japan	August 23, 1914
Montenegro	August 8, 1914
Portugal	May 19, 1915
Roumania	August 27, 1916
Russia	August 1, 1914
Servia	July 28, 1914
Turkey	November 23, 1914
United States	April 6, 1917

The entire list of belligerents in the Great War was as follows:

ENTENTE ALLIES

Belgium	Guatemala	Panama
Brazil	Haiti	Portugal
China	Honduras	Roumania
Costa Rica	Italy	Russia
Cuba	Japan	San Marino
France	Liberia	Servia
Great Britain	Montenegro	Siam
Greece	Nicaragua	United States

CENTRAL POWERS

Austria-Hungary
Bulgaria

Germany
Turkey

In addition, the following countries severed diplomatic relations with Germany in the course of the War:

Bolivia
Ecuador

Peru
Uruguay

A detailed list of the declarations of war is as follows:

- Austria against Belgium, August 28, 1914.
- Austria against Japan, August 27, 1914.
- Austria against Montenegro, August 9, 1914.
- Austria against Russia, August 6, 1914.
- Austria against Servia, July 28, 1914.
- Brazil against Germany, October 26, 1917.
- Bulgaria against Servia, October 14, 1915.
- China against Austria, August 14, 1917.
- China against Germany, August 14, 1917.
- Costa Rica against Germany, May 23, 1918.
- Cuba against Austria, December 16, 1917.
- Cuba against Germany, April 7, 1917.
- France against Austria, August 1, 1914.
- France against Bulgaria, October 16, 1915.
- France against Germany, August 3, 1914.
- France against Turkey, November 5, 1914.
- Germany against Belgium, August 4, 1914.
- Germany against France, August 3, 1914.
- Germany against Portugal, March 9, 1916.
- Germany against Roumania, September 14, 1916.
- Germany against Russia, August 1, 1914.
- Great Britain against Austria, August 13, 1914.
- Great Britain against Bulgaria, October 15, 1915.
- Great Britain against Germany, August 4, 1914.
- Great Britain against Turkey, November 5, 1914.

Greece (provisional government) against Bulgaria, November 28, 1916.

Greece (provisional government) against Germany, November 28, 1916.

Greece (Government of Alexander) against Bulgaria, July 2, 1917.

Greece (Government of Alexander) against Germany, July 2, 1917.

Guatemala against Austria, April 22, 1918.

Guatemala against Germany, April 22, 1918.

Haiti against Germany, July 12, 1918.

Honduras against Germany, July 19, 1918.

Italy against Austria, May 24, 1915..

Italy against Bulgaria, October 19, 1914.

Italy against Germany, August 28, 1916.

Italy against Turkey, August 21, 1915.

Japan against Germany, August 23, 1914.

Liberia against Germany, August 4, 1917.

Montenegro against Austria, August 8, 1914.

Montenegro against Germany, August 9, 1914.

Nicaragua against Germany and her allies, May 7, 1918.

Panama against Austria, December 10, 1917.

Panama against Germany, April 7, 1917.

Portugal against Germany, November 23, 1914. (Resolution passed authorizing military intervention as ally of Great Britain.)

Portugal against Germany, May 19, 1915. (Military aid granted.)

Roumania against Austria, August 27, 1916. (Allies of Austria also considered it a declaration.)

Russia against Bulgaria, October 19, 1915.

Russia against Turkey, November 3, 1914.

San Marino against Austria, May 24, 1915.

Servia against Bulgaria, October 16, 1915.

Servia against Germany, August 6, 1914.

Servia against Turkey, December 2, 1914.

Siam against Austria, July 21, 1917.

Siam against Germany, July 21, 1917.

Turkey against Allies, November 23, 1914.

Turkey against Roumania, August 29, 1916.

United States against Austria, December 7, 1917.

United States against Germany, April 6, 1917.

The most significant severances of diplomatic relations were announced as follows:

Austria against Portugal, March 16, 1916.

Austria against Servia, July 26, 1914.

Austria against United States, April 8, 1917.

Bolivia against Germany, April 14, 1917.

Brazil against Germany, April 11, 1917.

China against Germany, March 14, 1917.

Costa Rica against Germany, September 21, 1917.

Ecuador against Germany, December 7, 1917.

Egypt against Germany, August 13, 1914.

France against Austria, August 10, 1914.

Greece against Turkey, July 2, 1917 (government of Alexander).

Greece against Austria, July 2, 1917 (government of Alexander).

Guatemala against Germany, April 27, 1917.

Haiti against Germany, June 17, 1917.

Honduras against Germany, May 17, 1917.

Liberia against Germany, May 8, 1917.

Nicaragua against Germany, May 18, 1917.

Peru against Germany, October 6, 1917.

Russia (Bolshevist Government) against Roumania, January 28, 1918.

Turkey against United States, April 20, 1917.

United States against Germany, February 3, 1917.

Uruguay against Germany, October 7, 1917.

Never before had so many men been under arms at one time. It is estimated that almost 60,000,000 soldiers were included within the armies of the belligerents. They were distributed as follows:

ENTENTE ALLIES

Russia	12,000,000
France	7,500,000
British Empire	7,500,000
Italy	5,500,000
Japan	800,000
Roumania	700,000
Servia	700,000
Belgium	250,000
Greece	225,000
Portugal	100,000
Montenegro	50,000
United States	4,270,000
Total	39,595,000

CENTRAL POWERS

German Empire	11,000,000
Austria-Hungary	6,500,000
Turkey	1,500,000
Bulgaria	400,000
Total	19,400,000

Grand Total..... 58,995,000

These figures do not include the naval personnel of the belligerents, which would raise the grand total several millions, to over 60,000,000.

Many of these troops, of course, did not actually see fighting, but their presence under arms was nevertheless a factor in determining the final result of the War. For the War was primarily a test of resources rather than of mere fighting strength on the battle-lines; and any troops merely guarding their country's fields of supplies rendered a service of vital importance. Thus troops stationed in Egypt and Morocco and Tripoli were making it impossible for these countries to revolt against British and French and Italian rule and were thus making it possible for Great Britain and France and Italy to continue

to obtain raw materials in those regions. In the leading European belligerent countries the entire populations were mobilized for war purposes and every man under arms behind the battle-lines released another soldier for those lines. Only the hundreds of thousands of American troops who did not reach Europe may be said to have had little influence upon the final verdict; and even in this case the knowledge that they were trained and ready to come permitted Allied movements in the last days of the war which might otherwise not have been made, and similarly had a definite effect in raising Entente and in lowering German morale.

The British Secretary of State for War has announced in the British Parliament that the leading belligerents' forces actually under arms when the armistice was signed on November 11, 1918 were as follows:

ENTENTE ALLIES

British	5,680,000(a)
French	5,075,000
Italian	3,420,000
American	3,707,000

CENTRAL POWERS (estimated)

German	4,500,000
Austro-Hungarian	2,230,000
Bulgarian	500,000(b)
Turkish	375,000(c)

(a) Including the contingents from the dominions of the British Empire, the Indian army, and forces maintained in various sections of the British colonies; (b) September 1, 1918; (c) October 30, 1918.

These figures, naturally, include troops at home as well as on the fighting fronts.

The populations of the countries directly involved as belligerents were as follows:

ENTENTE ALLIES

Great Britain.....	46,000,000
British Self-Governing Dominions—Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, Newfoundland	15,600,000
France	40,000,000
Belgium	8,000,000
Italy	36,000,000
Portugal	6,000,000
Russia	180,000,000
Servia	3,000,000
Roumania	8,000,000
Montenegro	300,000
Greece	2,600,000
United States	110,000,000
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Total	455,500,000

ENTENTE ALLIES

Germany	68,000,000
Austria-Hungary	53,000,000
Turkey	21,000,000
Bulgaria	5,000,000
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Total	147,000,000

THE PLANS OF CAMPAIGN

THE GERMAN PLAN

Germany's military program was determined by her position between her two chief military foes. With Russia on her east and France on her west, Germany was compelled to divide her forces and to win two campaigns instead of one sweeping victory. The man-power of Russia was far greater than that of Germany, although far less adequately equipped and trained; but the ability of the vast and undeveloped Russian Empire to mobilize and then to concentrate its man-power was a matter of many weeks. With an inefficient government, a poorly-trained army administration, a general lack of supplies and equipment, an absence of carefully-prepared facilities for mobilization and especially for transportation, Russia could present to Germany no *immediate* fear of invasion.

Germany's distribution of her forces was thus fore-ordained. The vast bulk of her army she could throw against France, dispatching but a small force to stop Russia on the Russo-German frontier. The army of Austria-Hungary would invade Russia and thus assist Germany in holding in check the forces which Russia could command within the first weeks of war. With France crushed, Germany could then turn her undivided attention to Russia; and after Russia had been crushed, there would be ample time to attend to Great Britain.

Germany and Austria-Hungary presented a solid block of territory through Central Europe, and could shift their forces from one country to the other without interruption; and the magnificent net-work of military railroads within the German Empire made for extreme rapidity in transposing her forces from the French to the Russian frontier, a distance of little more than 500 miles. On the other hand, it was well-nigh impossible for France and Russia to exchange troops; and in case Great Britain should be involved, the concentration of her

small army in France would be determined by the availability of naval transports.

An aggressive rather than a defensive military campaign was thus superimposed on Germany by her geographical position. Aggression was demanded also by the military creed of the German General Staff, which had long taught the advantage of offense as against defense. But rapidity was superimposed upon Germany no less than aggression. If her campaign against France should consume too long a period of time, Russia would be able unmolested to collect a force which would either overwhelm the German troops on the eastern frontier of Germany, or else require the diversion of strong German forces from the west to the east. Germany's program called for the overthrow of France within six weeks, or at the utmost, two months.

Germany had therefore prepared all her plans for mobilization and concentration with the extreme material efficiency characteristic of the Imperial German Government, and had rehearsed them again and again. Each member of the German army, active and reservist; each sub-officer and commander; each official of the German Government; each cog in the transportation and supply systems of Germany, ~~all had received minute instructions for their disposition when the time for the invasion of France should arrive.~~ No detail was too minute to be overlooked and none was too complicated to be left to the occasion. The brains back of the German army had taken every step necessary to assure a functioning of the German war machine as smooth as that of clockwork. Germany's preparations were aided, moreover, by the fact that Germany would assume the offensive—she knew the course which the early campaign would take; her opponents would be compelled to wait for Germany to disclose the course of her campaign before maturing their own plans.

Germany's plans were aided by the position of Paris. Paris was far to the north of France. It was but 170 miles from the nearest point on the Franco-German frontier. It was but 115 miles from the nearest point on the Belgian frontier. Moreover, Paris was much more than the capital of France—it was the hub of all French activity. It was the seat of finance, the centre of transportation. France was a highly-organized land; unlike a country of the nature of Russia,

France would be well-nigh helpless if its capital were to fall. Furthermore, the chief material resources and mineral wealth of France were in the region between Paris and the Franco-German and Franco-Belgian frontiers; even if the French armies were to elude a capture like that of 1870, and were to retreat south of Paris, German occupancy of Paris would threaten to bring France to her knees with hardly less thoroughness than in 1870.

There were three roads to France open to Germany—through Switzerland; through Alsace and Lorraine; and through Belgium and Luxemburg.

Switzerland lay too far to the south of Germany to be readily available for an invasion of France. A considerable delay would ensue in dispatching German troops the depth of the German Empire. The country between Paris and Switzerland was less valuable in resources than the country between either Paris and Alsace-Lorraine or that between Paris and Belgium. It could be more easily defended. Vast hordes of German troops could not pour from Switzerland toward Paris without reducing at least two of the very strong French forts along the Alsace-Lorraine frontier. Moreover, the Swiss army was capable of opposing a determined resistance, aided by the ruggedness of the country, which would still further delay the German advance. The only element of strength favoring the Swiss route would be its availability to the forces of Austria-Hungary, but the German General Staff had long since determined that the Austro-Hungarian forces must be used to hold Russia in check.

An invasion of France via Alsace-Lorraine then seemed the most practicable plan. The German fortifications in Alsace-Lorraine were very strong, and the German troops could march directly into Germany without delaying to crush the resistance of either a Belgium or a Switzerland. But there were serious drawbacks to the choice of the Alsace-Lorraine route. In the first place, the Vosges Mountains stretched along almost the entire Franco-German boundary in five high ridges which would render assistance of incalculable value to defenders and would present great difficulties to invaders. In the second place, so probable had been the Alsace-Lorraine route, in view

of the German guarantee of Belgian neutrality and the certainty of strong Belgian resistance to a German invasion, that France had expected and had prepared for a German invasion by this route; and Germany would be aided immensely by the surprise and the consequent disarrangement of the French plans occasioned by the choice of any other route. In the third place, in anticipation of an invasion by way of the Franco-German frontier, France had fortified it heavily. To the north lay Verdun, near the Luxemburg border; and to the south, near the Swiss border, lay Belfort; and between them lay Épinal and Toul, four fortresses strengthened by every device known to the French High Command and prepared for the very purpose of resisting such an attack as Germany was contemplating. Finally, remembering that speed was necessary to the German plan of campaign, as much as possible of the German fighting strength had to be rushed into France with the minimum delay, and there was at least the possibility that the Alsace-Lorraine frontier was too narrow to permit the dispatch of so many troops in so short space of time as was necessary to the German program.

The chief factor militating against an invasion of France by way of Belgium was a moral one. In 1839, Germany had joined with the other great Powers in guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, and German violation of Belgian neutrality would be a violation not only of international law but also of international morality. But, as has been seen, Germany was under the domination of that system of thought which maintains that necessity knows no law and that the ends justify the means; and the availability of Belgium for the German attack upon France presented itself to the German Government as a problem of a merely material nature. Conceivably, violation of Belgian neutrality would involve Great Britain in the war; but developments in 1905 and 1911, as well as the secret agreement between France and England in 1912, of which Germany was doubtless cognizant, must have convinced Germany that England would rally to the support of France irrespective of the violation of Belgian neutrality. Moreover, the army which England would be able to throw into the field at once would be puny in comparison with the vast invading hordes of Germans; and if Germany succeeded in overwhelming France within

six weeks or two months, the direct military opposition of England might well be disregarded as being outweighed by other factors favoring invasion of France by way of Belgium.

Similarly, the Belgian army numbered only between 100,000 and 150,000, and was poorly trained. True, there were several Belgian fortresses of reputed strength, but Germany understood that in reality their defences were antiquated, and recent artillery experiments had convinced the German General Staff that even the strongest fortresses could oppose but a feeble resistance to the huge German field pieces.

Again, it would be necessary to violate the neutrality of the independent duchy of Luxemburg to pass through Belgium on the way to France; but Luxemburg maintained no army whatsoever, and could not delay the advance of the German army for one minute.

There were other telling factors favoring the choice of the Belgium-Luxemburg route. In the first place, the country was, on the whole, low and level, and was hence admirably suited for the manipulation of great forces on a great scale. The German plan called for a wide sweep of the German cavalry to cover the operations of the infantry, and cavalry could be manipulated over level country as it could not be manipulated over hills and mountains. And through and from Belgium, two great river valleys led almost directly to Paris—the valleys of the Meuse and the Oise. (See Map, page 471.)

In the second place, the invasion of Belgium, with the resistance of King Albert's forces, would give Germany the pretext necessary to annex Belgium after the war, provided that the German plans should be carried to fruition. The possession of the Belgian sea-coast would not only enable Germany to establish submarine bases along the extreme southern shore of the North Sea, but would also serve as points of departure from which to attack England after France and Russia should have been crushed. The possession of Antwerp would be of invaluable aid to German commerce. And with Holland thus surrounded, Germany would be able after the war to enter into negotiations forcing The Netherlands to surrender control over the mouth of the Rhine.

In the third place, Germany in recent years had been developing an extensive net-work of military railroads leading directly to the

CHURCH RUINS

An excellent idea of the devastation wrought by German shells upon some of the stateliest cathedrals of Europe is given in the accompanying illustration. The upper panel shows the interior of a church at Cambrai after bombardment. In the large central panel is given a striking evidence of the effect of bombardment, in the mass of stone and brick which is all that is left of the once magnificent cathedral at Albert. The lower interior is that of the cathedral at Arras, and the remnants of the church in the lower picture are those of the largest house of worship in Vancourt.

Belgian frontier. From all parts of the German Empire, German forces could be rushed to and discharged on the very soil of Belgium with a rapidity which France could not hope to equal. Moreover, both in Belgium and in northern France there were extensive railroad lines and highways which could be used for the transportation of German troops as soon as Germany should overrun those regions and should repair whatever damage might have been done to the railroads and their rolling stock by the retreating Belgian and French forces.

In the fourth place, there were practically no military strongholds on French soil near the Belgian frontier which could impede the progress of the German army. Trusting that a German advance would be launched via Alsace-Lorraine, France had established on the Belgian frontier only one fortress of considerable strength, Maubeuge. (The other two fortresses to the north, Dunkirk and Lille, were too far to the west to impede the German advance.) Even if the German field-guns should be unable to reduce Maubeuge, the German army could surround it and with only brief interruption proceed "nach Paris." Moreover, there were none of the protecting connections between the Belgian and the French fortresses to the north that existed between the four strong fortresses on the Alsace-Lorraine frontier.

In the fifth place, much of France's mineral strength, especially coal, lay in northern France. If the first drive for Paris should fail, and if the war should settle into a struggle of attrition, Germany would be able to utilize France's mineral resources. And even if in the end the German armies should be unexpectedly driven out of France, there would still be opportunity to destroy many of the mines, factories and farms from which French succor would be drawn.

Germany was playing for big stakes—her conception of her campaign was on a fitting scale.

THE FRENCH PLAN

As geographical considerations imposed an aggressive plan of campaign upon Germany, they would seem to have imposed a defensive campaign upon France. Despite the careful preparations made by the French military commanders to withstand a German onslaught,

France realized that her mobilization and concentration would be appreciably less rapid than the German. France's hope lay in Russia, and France's salvation hence lay in preserving merely a strong resistance until Russia should be able to bring her full force into play. At all events, Paris must be safeguarded; and since the Franco-Prussian War a formidable string of fortifications had been erected around the French capital. Similarly, at all hazard, the French armies must avoid being surrounded as they had been surrounded in 1870 and 1871; and they must retreat in good order rather than risk surrender. Realizing no less vividly than the German General Staff the value of speed to Germany's plans, France's policy must be one to delay the German advance as long as possible, and to postpone decisive action to the last possible minute.

To the southeast and southwest, France was bounded by Switzerland, Italy and Spain. An invasion by way of Switzerland was by no means impossible, and France could not leave the Swiss frontier undefended. Even more possible was an invasion by Italy. France hoped that Italy would remain neutral at least in the early days of the war; but, after all, Italy was nominally a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria, and there could be no telling how long Italian neutrality would be maintained. Italy would have an eye chiefly to the interests of Italy; and although she might throw her weight into the scales against Germany and Austria if thereby her ambitions regarding Italia Irredenta and the Adriatic Coast might be realized, yet if the Central Powers should unmistakably prove themselves victorious, Italy might join them at the last moment to gain what she could from the defeat of France and Russia and to avoid punishment for not joining Germany and Austria at the very outset of the war. The French were realists, and could point to all modern European history for support of a contention that every European Power would strive to benefit by the plight of the vanquished, no matter what nations might be the vanquished. A considerable French force would have to safeguard the Franco-Italian frontier.

On the other hand, there was little danger of an attack from Spain. The Spanish army was inconsiderable, and in Spain there was always smouldering a social and political revolution which would be fanned

by war. Nevertheless, France had learned to her cost how unexpected might be the alliances which the German Foreign Office had formed, and she could not leave the Pyrenees absolutely unguarded.

France's policy was determined also by reliance upon British and Belgian help in case the German army should advance through Belgium and Luxemburg. France seems not to have realized how helpless the Belgian fortresses would be against the huge German field guns, and to have counted upon a much greater delay to Germany than Belgium was actually able to inflict. France seems, furthermore, to have anticipated a German advance through Alsace-Lorraine; at all events, when the War actually broke, France threw the bulk of her military strength toward Alsace-Lorraine and left her northern frontier comparatively undefended. Doubtless the French longing for Alsace-Lorraine and the hope of assistance from the oppressed inhabitants of that region helped to determine a French sortie in this direction, especially since the presence of the four great French fortresses on the Alsace-Lorraine frontier would prevent the French forces from being flanked.

THE AUSTRIAN PLAN

The course pursued by the Austro-Hungarian army was determined by the nature of the quarrel which had directly resulted in war. Since the Central Powers claimed that their stand was determined by the necessity of ending the pan-Serbian agitation against Austria-Hungary, it was impossible for the Austrian armies to withdraw from their attack against Servia. Accordingly, one branch of the Austrian army had to continue its Serbian advance.

Austria could count upon Italian neutrality even less than France. Italy's ambitions for territorial expansion were cherished at the expense of Austria, and Austria was compelled to keep her Italian frontier well-guarded, lest Italy take advantage of the situation to occupy the Austrian territory desired by the government of Victor Emmanuel.

For the rest, Austria had to come to Germany's assistance and to hold off the Russian armies as best she might until Germany had

finished with France. The disaffection in Russian Poland dictated an advance into that region, with the hope that the inhabitants, inspired by hope of freedom for Poland and hatred of their Russian masters, would turn against Russia. The rest of Austria's forces were concentrated in an advance against Russia in the direction of Kiev.

THE ENGLISH PLAN

The chief immediate assistance rendered by Great Britain, of course, would be the absolute control of the sea and the imposition of a blockade on Germany. The English fleet had been mobilized, and was fully prepared at the outbreak of war to clear the seas of all vessels flying the German and Austrian flags.

The English government had discussed with the French and Russian governments the form of assistance which the British army also would render in case of an invasion of France, and it had been agreed that as strong a British force as possible would be dispatched to France immediately upon the declaration of war by England. Obviously, the area in France assigned the British forces would be along the sea-coast and the extreme west.

THE RUSSIAN PLAN

Russia was naturally to get together as rapidly as possible a vast force for the invasion of Germany. Nevertheless, she was bound to render assistance to Servia, and if possible, prevent Austria from completely overrunning the land of King Peter; and Russian assistance to Servia would be best rendered by a counter-attack upon Austria. At the same time, the threat of the Austrian advance through Galicia and Poland could not be disregarded, and had to be met even before the advance against Germany could be put into effect. The early mobilization of the Russian army, which the Russian Government seems to have tried to keep secret from both the friends and the enemies of Russia (see page 125), had enabled Russia to strengthen the garrisons of Warsaw and other Russian forts along the Vistula.

The German territory contiguous to Russia was comprised within

the three German provinces of East Prussia, Posen and Silesia. East Prussia projected the farthest into Russia, but its border on Russia was a mass of lakes and swamps which would make an advance into East Prussia most difficult. By natural position, Posen presented the more available road into Germany, but Germany had fortified it with a strong net-work of fortresses against which the Russian advance, stronger in man-power than in artillery, would be shattered. Silesia therefore was the most practicable road for the final Russian attack upon Germany, especially since the Oder Valley was a natural avenue of advance and since an invasion through Silesia would menace Vienna as well as Berlin.

The predominating anxiety of Russia was that of overcoming natural obstacles. Only seven railroads ran from Russia to Germany, and their intercommunication, both by rail and highroad, was scant. Many sections from which the army was to be recruited were without telephone and telegraph, and the notices of mobilization were hence greatly delayed. Supplies had to be transported enormous distances, and the inefficiency of the Russian government also hindered the effective mobilization of the Russian man-power. Under the circumstances, Russia seems to have mobilized more rapidly than had been expected.

THE GERMAN INVASION OF BELGIUM

NOTE—It will be many years after the final signing of the peace terms of the Great War before all the important details of its military and naval campaigns will be known. When the Great War officially ended, only general information was available concerning many of its greatest battles; and much of the strategy, many of the events on the battlefields, many of the results of campaigns were still shrouded in mystery and concealment. Only the more obvious events can be presented by a historian writing near the time of the proclamation of peace.

Indeed, detailed accounts of only the campaigns in the first year and the last year of the War would be of engrossing interest to most readers after the signing of peace. For after the German army had been halted at the Marne and had retreated to entrench itself along the Aisne in the fall of 1914, until the German General Staff launched its tremendous blows in the spring of 1918, the history of the War in northern France and Belgium was the tedious and duplicating history of trench warfare. From the North Sea to the Swiss border, the battle-line was marked by intricate systems of trenches which did not develop any flanking movements, any surprise attacks on a large scale, any enveloping manoeuvres, or any other spectacular methods of warfare. On the Russian front, in Palestine and Mesopotamia, in Africa, in the Balkans, doubtless the campaigns were dazzling in their brilliancy; but less is known of these than even of the campaigns in France and Belgium; and although they were assuredly of tremendous indirect influence upon the final result of the War, yet the final result itself was determined directly by the struggle in the west. Naturally, information concerning the earlier years of the War is more available than information concerning the later years; but enough data are at hand to furnish an account of the entire war elaborate enough to satisfy any but the military expert.

The German plan of attack upon Paris was roughly as follows:—

About fifteen days would be needed for complete mobilization and concentration. Germany would then have available for war purposes some 2,000,000 well-trained men, of which number about 300,000 would be needed on the Russian frontier to hold back the first Russian advance and a similar number in Alsace-Lorraine to check any French advance in that region. But on each day of mobilization, certain sections of the army would be ready to pour into Belgium and Luxemburg, and they were sent on their way at regular intervals and without

delay. There were always certain bodies of soldiers stationed near the Belgian frontier, and these were dispatched immediately into Belgium, being followed each day by those who were next available for the invasion of King Albert's land.

Obviously, if each quota of the German army to cross the Belgian frontier on a given day were to make straight for Paris, the French army would be enabled to defeat one section of the German army after the other as they came up to the main body of the French troops. The German task was hence to concentrate all the German troops upon Paris at the same time. To this end, instead of heading straight for Paris, the German forces marched across Belgium almost due west, and then suddenly wheeled at almost a right angle, and headed south. The first troops to enter Belgium marched the farthest west; the next troops, not quite so far west; and the last troops marched only slightly into Belgian territory before heading south for France. Thus the plan was so nicely calculated that when the last troops to enter Belgium turned to the south, the first troops to enter Belgium had completed their longer march through Belgium and were also headed south, so that the entire invading German army was marching in an unbroken line upon Paris at one time. (See Map, page 471.)

The first troops to enter Belgium were under the command of von Emmich, to whom was assigned the task of reducing Belgium. The forces attacking France were then subdivided into seven great armies, of which the first five were to march through Belgium and Luxemburg, the others functioning along the Franco-German frontier from Luxemburg to Switzerland. The German armies were commanded as follows:

First, by von Kluck.

Second, by von Bülow.

Third, by von Hausen.

Fourth, by the Duke of Württemberg.

Fifth, by the Crown Prince of Germany.

Sixth, by Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria.

Seventh, by von Heeringen.

In addition, an eighth army was organized, under the command of von Deimling, to act on the defensive in Alsace-Lorraine against French aggression in that section.

In the direct attack against Paris, the Sixth and Seventh Armies were held by the French near the frontier east of Verdun, and the direct blow at the French capital was delivered by the first five armies. The First Army marched through Belgium west of Louvain, heading south from that point. The Second marched west to a point between Namur and Charleroi, and thence headed south. The Third wheeled from Belgium toward France at a point west of Dinant. The Fourth and Fifth Armies advanced through Luxemburg, and headed south from Charleville and Virton, respectively.

A well-prepared German cavalry force, about 500,000 strong, preceded the infantry. It swept through Belgium at high speed, waiting only for the fall of Liège, and stationed itself in a north and south line paralleling the northwest sea-coast of France so as to act as a screen for the movements of the German army, as well as to act as a reconnoitering force. Much of the secrecy attending the first month's activities of the German army in France and Belgium was due to the effectiveness of this cavalry screen. It is a striking coincidence that the first German troops crossed the Belgian frontier on the same day of the same month and at about the same hour as the first German troops to cross the French frontier forty-four years previously.

There were three great fortresses in Belgium—Antwerp, Liège and Namur. Of these, the first was too far to the northwest of Belgium to be in the way of the advancing German army, and could be disregarded; but Liège and Namur, both on the Meuse, were in the direct line of the German advance, and would have to be reduced before the Germans could pass beyond them.

THE FALL OF LIÈGE

Liège was a kind of natural key-hole into Belgium and France. It was a point at which many great railroad lines converged, including the line leading directly to Paris. It was also a centre of canals and high-roads. It was the outlet of the great plain of the northern German-Belgian frontier, and the inevitable passage-way for large bodies of troops.

Liège had been fortified in 1886 by six primary outlying forts and

six subsidiary ones. Each of the forts lay about four miles from the town, and two or three miles from one another, altogether forming a perimeter of some thirty miles. The forts had permanent garrisons and heavy equipment, as equipment was considered on August 1, 1914; and the fortress enjoyed a high reputation for military strength. For Liège, accordingly, the first invading German army, consisting of some 200,000 men under von Emmich, made all possible speed; and arrived before the gates of the city and demanded its surrender on August 5, 1914.

For Liège, similarly, the Belgian army made all possible speed. Belgian mobilization had begun on August 1, and was almost completed by August 5; so that a Belgian force, under the direct command of King Albert, with headquarters at Louvain, was available as assistance to the Liège garrison. Belgium had divided its army of some 125,000 men into six divisions. One division was to remain stationary with Liège as centre and another was to remain stationary around Namur. With these two divisions as pivots, the other four divisions were to advance as follows:—

The First, from Ghent to Tirlemont.

The Second, from Antwerp to Louvain.

The Third, from Mons to Perwez.

The Fourth, from Brussels to Wavre.

The Belgian army was to hold its positions as long as possible, in the hope of gaining enough time to be reinforced in Belgium by British and French troops. If compelled by the superior force of the German invaders to retreat before British and French assistance could reach it, the Belgian army was to keep its lines of communication into France open and to retreat in good order, to join the French and British forces in France. But in any event, the fortresses of Liège, Namur and Antwerp were to be defended with the utmost vigor, even if completely surrounded and isolated.

Von Emmich's demand for surrender being rejected, the German commander undertook to obviate delay by carrying the town by storm. But the garrison, aided by a large section of the regular Belgian army, was able to drive back the Germans, and von Emmich was compelled

to await the arrival of his heavy artillery on the following day. On August 6, the second day's quota of the invading German army also caught up to von Emmich, and the combined German forces succeeded in flanking the city and threatened to cut off the retreat of the supporting Belgian army. While the German field-guns played upon the forts, great masses of infantry were hurled against the Belgian troops defending the ground between the forts. The Belgians inflicted heavy losses upon the attackers, but the German General Staff had given orders that speed was more precious than life, and the Germans continued to press on. The defenders were greatly outnumbered, and had to be hurried from one gap to the other as the German attacks continued through August 6. Finally, the Belgians were driven between Forts Evegnée and Fléron, and the latter was completely demolished by the following day. The supporting Belgian troops therefore retired and left the defense of Liège solely to its garrison.

Before the heavy German guns, the forts of Liège were helpless. Indeed, one of the revolutionizing military lessons of the Great War was that of the helplessness of fortresses before heavy field guns. Verdun itself, months later, was successfully defended against the German attack only by diverting the defence from the fortifications themselves to heavily-protected trenches in front of them. And Liège was no Verdun. Its forts were largely isolated and unconnected, and their equipment had not kept pace with the latest developments in artillery science; and the German guns were using shells of a destructiveness previously unknown. The garrison, at the utmost numbering 30,000 men, was outnumbered by odds of almost five to one. General Leman, the heroic Belgian commander, soon withdrew his garrison to the forts on the west bank of the Meuse, as the Germans had already crossed the river below the forts. On August 7, the Germans occupied the town, from which the further attack on the forts was directed. The bridges across the Meuse thus fell into German possession. The passage-way south was now open to all the German troops invading Belgium, and von Emmich's forces could proceed with greater deliberation to reduce the rest of the Liège forts. The final attack was opened in earnest on August 10. One after one the forts yielded to the devastating German fire, the garrisons withdrawing to the forts

remaining intact. Fort Boncelles was silenced on August 14, and several days later, the last and strongest of the forts, Fort Loncin, capitulated.

The Belgians had fought with the utmost bravery against overwhelming odds. They had held back the German invaders for almost forty-eight hours, but such delay had not been unforeseen in the German plans. Indeed, it is probable that the reduction of Liège had occurred in less time than had been allowed in the original calculations of the German General Staff. Complete German mobilization and concentration were not completed before August 12, and the full German advance did not get under way until August 14 or August 15; so that, despite the sternness of the resistance at Liège, it can hardly be said to have delayed the German campaign. The true value of the defence of Liège was a moral rather than a military value.

THE FALL OF BRUSSELS AND NAMUR

After the occupancy of the town of Liège by the German forces on August 7, the German cavalry proceeded far into Belgian territory. A number of skirmishes ensued between these forces and the Belgian troops, in some of which the Germans suffered temporary setbacks; but none of the skirmishes was of sufficient importance to be termed a battle. The sharpest took place at Tongres, Tirlemont, Haelen, Diest, Eghezée, Landen, Waremmé.

By this time, the Belgian army had completed its concentration, and took up a position behind the Greete River, between Diest and Namur. It was joined by the troops which had fled from Liège, and King Albert cherished ardent hopes that he would be joined also by considerable French and British forces before the full force of the German drive fell upon his small army.

The next Belgian fortress of any strength in the path of the German army was Namur. Namur is southwest of Liège, and is situated nearer the French than the German frontier, whereas Liège is almost on the very border of Germany. Namur is at the junction of the Meuse and the Sambre Rivers, and hence was probably the most valuable strategic position in all Belgium. It was defended by a circle

of four large forts and five smaller ones, which were supposed to be stronger than even the forts of Liège. The garrison had been reinforced against the German advance, had spent a number of days in preparing for defence, was supported by the entire Belgian army; and Namur was expected to give a far better account of itself than had Liège. Belgium had defended her neutrality as staunchly as could have been expected; if she should now yield to superior force and surrender passage-way without further resistance to the German army in order to avoid complete destruction, there would have been none to condemn her; but Belgium was more intent upon saving her soul than upon saving her material goods, and for several days Albert's army succeeded in standing its ground.

By August 18, however, the advance guards of the German Second (von Bülow's) Army had reached the Belgian lines. Of the forces of the Entente Allies, only some French cavalry had been able to join the Belgian army, and Albert had only some 125,000 men to oppose 500,000. Flanking movements of the Germans threatened both to surround the Belgian army and to sever its lines of communication with the French and British; so that only annihilation would result from further resistance before Namur. Accordingly, on August 18 and 19, the Belgian army withdrew, leaving Namur's defence to its garrison and one division of the Belgian army and surrendering Brussels without a blow, and by August 20, the bulk of the Belgian army was safe within the fortifications of Antwerp—safe, but no longer in the path of the German armies marching upon Paris.

Again the German forces had met no unexpected obstacle on their road. On August 19, Louvain was occupied by the German First (von Kluck's) Army, to the north and west of Namur, and on the following day, Brussels, the capital of Belgium, was also occupied. When they reached Brussels and Louvain, the forces of von Kluck had completed their scheduled march due west through Belgium; leaving a force to surround and reduce the forts of Namur, they turned sharply to the south and made directly for France.

The Germans had learned a lesson at Liège, and did not attempt to capture the forts of Namur until the heavy German field guns were in readiness. Indeed, it is possible that the heaviest German guns

had not been used at all upon Liège, but had been shipped directly to Namur. At all events, when the bombardment opened on August 20, it required but several days to silence the Namur guns. Throughout the evening of August 20 and the day of August 21, a terrific steel rain poured down upon the Belgian defenders. The Namur guns were outranged and could not answer the German fire with any effectiveness. During the first evening's bombardment, one fort was blown up by the shell-fire of the attackers, and when dawn broke on the twenty-first, it was seen that several other forts were but a mass of smoking ruins. The losses among the forces within the forts of Namur were terrific. So heavy was the fire and so impossible any effective resistance that the defenders could inflict little retaliatory punishment upon the besiegers. On the twenty-first, the advance guard of some French troops rushing up to relieve the city arrived in sight of the town, and attacked the Germans; but German flanking movements prevented the arrival of any further French troops and those which had arrived at Namur were compelled to withdraw almost immediately to avoid being surrounded. On the twenty-third, the commander of the Namur garrison ordered a retreat of the troops of the Belgian division which had been assigned to remain at Namur, and with difficulty they succeeded in making their way to Antwerp. Resistance at Namur was feeble by the evening of the twenty-third; on the twenty-fourth, the Germans occupied the town; and by the twenty-sixth, not one gun of the forts of Namur was able to answer the German fire.

Namur was a decided German victory. The fortress had been counted upon by the Allied strategists for a much longer period of resistance, and their plans were hindered by the fall of the fortress within two days and the complete abandonment of further Belgian resistance to the German advance by August 18. The Belgian defeat had been so rapid that there had not been time to destroy much of the Belgian rolling stock or many sections of the Belgian roads and railroads; and the rapidity of the German drive on Paris was all the more accelerated.

THE FRENCH COUNTER-OFFENSIVE IN ALSACE-LORRAINE

The French mobilization began practically at the same time as the German, proceeded with almost equal rapidity, and ended on practically the same day (August 16). The disorder which had characterized French mobilization in 1870 was largely absent from the French mobilization in 1914. Of course, France was not prepared to mobilize with quite the efficiency of Germany, but especially in the soldiers of the first class the mobilization of the French High Command was highly creditable. If there was any untoward delay, it occurred in the mobilization of shells for the large guns and of the second-class reserves. Much of the greater speed of the German mobilization was due to the extensive German use of motor trucks.

It must be remembered, again, that even at full war strength the French army was considerably inferior in numbers to the German army at full war strength. Alone, France could not hope to defeat Germany; France's salvation lay in Belgian, British and especially in Russian support.

To withstand the first shock of the German invading forces of some 1,500,000 men, France had almost 1,000,000 well-trained soldiers; and by the time of the Battle of the Marne, when the German forces had increased almost to 2,000,000, there were more than 1,500,000 French soldiers on the battle-lines. France's forces at the beginning of the war were divided into five great armies, commanded and located as follows:—

First, under Dubail, from the Swiss border to Donon.

Second, under Castelnau, from Donon, to a point opposite Metz.

Third, under Ruffey, from a point opposite Metz to and through Thionville.

Fourth, under de Cary, on the Belgian frontier.

Fifth, under Lanrezac, on the Belgian frontier.

With the declaration of war, France threw her chief strength along the Franco-German frontier. Even after it had become apparent that the German drive through Belgium and Luxemburg would be more serious than any German advance through Alsace-Lorraine against Verdun, Toul, Épinal and Belfort, France used a large section of her army in an offensive on the northeastern French border. Doubtless this strategy was due to political purposes—the French people would be stirred to unparalleled enthusiasm by the news of the French occupancy of the provinces lost in 1870. Probably the French High Command had considered that Belgium, with the support of the British Expeditionary Force, would be able to hold back the German army until the danger of a French advance in Alsace-Lorraine and the first blow delivered by Russia in the east would compel Germany to withdraw troops from Belgium to Alsace-Lorraine and to the Russian frontier. The strength of the German advance to the north seems also to have been underestimated. The destructiveness of the heavy German field guns had not been foreseen, and Belgium had been counted upon for a more effective resistance and a longer delay to the invading Germans.

At all events, by using large numbers of her men in an advance through Alsace-Lorraine, France left far too weak a force to hold off the German thrust through Belgium and Luxemburg. France realized her mistake only when the German troops had actually crossed from Belgium into France. A rapid re-arrangement of the French forces had then to be consummated; the advance through Alsace-Lorraine had to be abandoned; and an extensive retreat almost to the walls of Paris itself was necessary before the full French force could finally oppose the German drive from the north.

Even while French mobilization was in its first stages, a French advance into Alsace-Lorraine was consummated. On August 7, a large number of troops from Belfort, with certain of the first French divisions to be mobilized, crossed the German border. On August 8, they reached Altkirch, where their advance was opposed by a German force. The French, however, drove back the Germans and proceeded to occupy Mülhausen, the second largest city in Alsace-Lorraine, with

the result of arousing great jubilation in Paris. Jubilation, however, was destined to be the chief result of the advance into Alsace-Lorraine. On August 9, the German forces, reinforced, launched a counter-attack, which, after severe fighting, succeeded in driving the French out of Mülhausen.

To continue the attack, it was then necessary for France to divert more troops to Alsace-Lorraine, and the strengthened army was placed under the command of General Pau. On August 14, Pau's forces again drove ahead and were supported by an advance in the Vosges from Nancy by General Castelnau's army on the eighteenth. Mülhausen was re-taken, and on the following day Saarburg, an important railroad centre, was reached. The French were almost 20 miles into German territory. But on August 20, the French came into contact with the main German Sixth and Seventh Armies, the armies of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria and of von Heeringen; and the first great battle of the war occurred. The battle is called by the French the Battle of Morhange and by the Germans the Battle of Metz.

The French armies were drawn up in front of Morhange, extending from the Seille to a point south of Saarburg. The French took the offensive and advanced to the attack against strong German positions, which had been fortified with extreme care and supported by cleverly concealed guns and gun positions. As the French cavalry troops advanced, they were met by a hail of shrapnel which drove them back in confusion. Then the infantry set out, only to be mowed down in hundreds by the German fire. The French heavy guns now got into action, but as the German siege-guns had outranged the guns of the fortresses of Liège and Namur, the German field-guns outranged the field-guns of the French army. For several hours the battle raged. All the new equipment of warfare, including airplanes, got into action. The French troops displayed great bravery, but were helpless before the fire of the German howitzers. After several hours, an entire French army corps retreated in confusion; and the initiative passed to the Germans. The retreating French corps was relentlessly pursued until its retreat threw the entire French force into confusion. By this time, the Germans had been reinforced by troops from the garrison

at Metz, and undertook a flanking movement on the French right. The French were unable to stop the Germans, and Castelnau ordered a general retreat. Certain sections of the French troops retired in good order, especially a section commanded by General Foch; but other sections broke badly, and the Germans captured many prisoners and a number of guns. So rapid was the French retreat that within two days the army which had advanced into Alsace-Lorraine was back on French soil; and by August 23, the Sixth and Seventh German armies were upon French soil. But Castelnau's retreat had been managed skilfully, and the French lined up in good order before Nancy in condition to offer serious resistance to the Germans. The German army had succeeded in advancing with little delay on the west as well as to the north. And by this time France had awakened to the full danger of the German drive from the north through Belgium and from the northeast through Luxemburg.

THE GERMAN ADVANCE UPON PARIS

In Luxemburg and southeastern Belgium, as well as in Alsace-Lorraine, the French tried an advance. The Third French (Ruffey's) Army, holding the centre of the entire French line, advanced north of Verdun, supported by an advance of the French Fourth (de Cary's) Army north of Sedan. On the day after the defeat at Morhange in Alsace-Lorraine, these forces came into contact with the advancing German forces. In the Ardennes, Ruffey's army met the army of the German Crown Prince near Virton, and de Cary's army met that of the Duke of Württemberg near Neufchateau. In both cases, engagements were fought along the extreme southeastern Franco-Belgian border and in both cases stronger German forces and heavier artillery were again victorious. The French fought vigorously, but were helpless before superior strategy; and were soon compelled to retreat to avoid being surrounded. (Ever since 1870 all French commanders had resolved to take utmost measures to avoid encirclement.) The heavy German forces immediately pressed forward to gain the fruits of the French reverse. The French were driven back into French territory, to take up positions on the south bank of the Meuse. But the withdrawal of the Fourth French Army had uncovered the right flank of the Allied forces in Belgium, which had moved up to give battle to the German troops marching south from Namur and Brussels; and in the gap thus formed between the retreating French Fourth Army and the stationary French Fifth Army, an entire German army, the Third German Army of von Hausen, was able to proceed unopposed and to threaten to turn the right flank of the Allied forces in Belgium. (See Map, page 465.)

THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

The army of the British Empire in 1914 in most respects was different from the armies of the other great European Powers. In

the first place, it was small. The total number of white troops under arms in the British Empire at the outbreak of war was less than 150,000, of which at least half were being maintained in India and in other British dominions to prevent revolts for independence from British rule. In addition to the regulars, there was a British reserve force of some 135,000, many of whom were in a position to join the colors almost immediately after the outbreak of war. In the second place, service in the army was voluntary—England was not for many months even after the invasion of Belgium to adopt a policy of forced military service. In the third place, enlistment in the British army was for a period of seven years, so that the British regular was not only a professional soldier, but also a well-trained soldier.

Immediately after England declared war, steps were taken to dispatch to France and Belgium as large a force as possible. Estimates of the number of troops shipped at once to France in order to make up the extreme left wing of the Allied Army in France and Belgium range from 75,000 to 150,000. Probably the British Expeditionary Force was nearer the former figure by the time of the fall of Namur and nearer the latter by the time of the Battle of the Marne. The points of embarkation were Folkstone, Bristol, Newhaven, Southampton and Cork; and the ports of disembarkation, Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Dieppe, and Havre. A great British base of supplies was established at Amiens. Sir John French was the commander-in-chief, with Sir Douglas Haig and General Smith-Dorrien in command of the First and Second Armies, respectively, into which the infantry was divided. The cavalry was under the command of General Allenby. Lord Kitchener, "Kitchener of Khartoum," had accepted the post of Secretary of State for War, and the military administration of the British Empire was under his general direction.

By August 15, the first quota of the British Expeditionary Force had landed safely in France and was being re-assembled at Amiens. It was then moved northward across the Belgian frontier to positions west and east of Mons, forming the extreme left wing of the combined Franco-British forces, supported on its right by the French Fifth Army, and opposing the advance of the German First (von Kluck's) Army, marching southward from Brussels and Louvain. By August

21, concentration was completed and the British army in France was fully prepared for battle.

THE BATTLE OF MONS-CHARLEROI

The French as well as the British had advanced into Belgium to dispute further German progress, and had penetrated to Charleroi and other points on the Sambre and Meuse just below Namur. Doubtless it would have been better military strategy for the French to await the German attack on French soil, but France would not leave Belgium unsupported against the invading German armies. The position of the belligerents in Belgium was accordingly as follows after the fall of Namur: On the extreme Allied left, the British at Mons, opposite the German First Army, and joined at Charleroi to the French Fifth Army, which was opposite the German Second Army. Southeast of the French Fifth Army, the German Third Army was making all speed southwest, and the retreat of the French Fourth Army left the German Third Army practically unopposed by forces qualified to stop it. Indeed, it is possible that the very existence of the German Third Army (under von Hausen) was unknown to the French High Command, for at this time the French Intelligence Department was far inferior to the Intelligence Department of the German Army. Farther to the southeast, the French Fourth Army was faced by the German Fourth Army, and was thus prevented from either coming to the assistance of the French Fifth Army or preventing the advance of the German Third Army.

The French Fifth Army was facing the German lines in a triangular formation, with the apex pointed toward the junction of the Meuse and Sambre at Namur and with the two supporting sides along the rivers. The British were separated from the French by the Sambre, although the British lines were parallel to the French. The French Fifth Army numbered roughly about 125,000 men and the British forces could hardly have been stronger than 75,000; against them the First and Second German Armies were bringing some 350,000 men, and the Third German Army certainly amounted to no less than 150,000.

THE GERMAN ADVANCE ON BELGIUM AND FRANCE

I—Von Kluck	V—Crown Prince	A—British	E—Castelnau
II—Von Bülow	VI—Bavarians	B—Lanrezac	F—Dubail
III—Von Hausen	VII—Von Heeringen	C—de Cary	G—Pau
IV—Württemberg	VIII—Von Deimling	D—Ruffey	

With Namur, which had been counted upon for a resistance of many days, falling almost immediately upon the German onslaught, the Allies were in no position to dispute the river crossings at and just below Namur. The ground just below the junction of the rivers and facing the apex of the French position, of enormous strategic importance, thus fell in the hands of the German Second Army, which then assumed the offensive, as well it might, with so overwhelming a superiority in man-power. The fighting was of the fiercest, especially in the streets of Charleroi. Charge after charge was launched, sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully.—Soon the town was practically razed to the ground, both by German fire and by French dynamite, and it no longer served as protection to the French forces.

By this time, the advance guard of the Third German Army was threatening to flank the French, and the French line had to be extended to meet this danger on its unprotected right flank. Messages from Sir John French on the west told that the British were having their hands full with the German First Army, and could not be counted upon for reinforcements. Fighting each inch of the way, the French were step by step driven out of Charleroi into the open, where the German heavy field-guns got at them, and completed their defeat. The Third German Army had crossed the Meuse at Dinant, against the French resistance, and was advancing to the west to cut off the French line of retreat to the south and east. Lanrezac had to choose between retreat and encirclement, followed by either complete annihilation or surrender; and naturally the French commander ordered a general retreat. The day following the beginning of the attack on August 23, the French forces hastily beat a retreat toward Beaumont and Philippeville, succeeded in avoiding the enveloping movement of the German Third Army, and waited for news of the British at Mons before determining upon a stand near the Franco-German border.

While the fighting in the streets of Charleroi was at its height, the small British army to the west was being attacked by von Kluck's First German Army. The British position was behind a canal, extending west from the Sambre, where it adjoined the French position, to Condé. Throughout the afternoon of August 23, the British held on, although at various points they retired in order to straighten their

line. Bit by bit the positions along the canal were abandoned. There can be only two reasons why the small British force courted disaster by sticking fast to their positions—either they were unaware of the strength of the forces opposed to them or else they counted upon support from new French or English troops upon their left, which was totally unprotected. Late on the afternoon of the twenty-third, Sir John French learned of the retreat of the French army from Charleroi, which thus left him unprotected on his right and exposed him to the danger of being surrounded on both flanks. While the German forces pursuing Lanrezac were preparing to swing behind Mons on the British right, a corps of the German First Army was rapidly getting into position to swing behind Mons on the British left.

THE FRENCH AND BRITISH RETREAT

Sir John French immediately ordered a rapid retreat about fifteen miles due south. The British forces made all haste, but were punished severely in their retreat by the pursuing Germans, until on the evening of the next day (August 24), they took up new positions with the French fortress of Maubeuge on their right and Bavay on their left.

But the British retreat made impossible an immediate stand by the Fifth French Army after its retreat from Charleroi. As the British might have been flanked by the troops pursuing the French, so the French were now in danger of being flanked by troops pursuing the British. Both the French and the British were being driven in on Maubeuge; and if they were there surrounded, Maubeuge would become a second Sedan.

The Fifth French Army accordingly realized the impossibility of making a further stand against the pursuing German Second and Third Armies near the Belgian frontier, and a further retreat was ordered. Eager for success in encircling the French troops and aided by their splendid motor transportation, the German forces pressed closely on the heels of Lanrezac. For five days, from August 25 to August 30, and for seven days from the defeat at Charleroi, the French retreated hurriedly, and not always in orderly alignment nor

without losses, upon Paris; and it was not until the French Fifth Army reached the Oise at Guise, less than one hundred miles from Paris, that a further stand could be made against the onrushing German cohorts.

The further retreat of the French Fifth Army inevitably compelled a further retreat of the British Army. Sir John French would have been surrounded by superior forces and driven to surrender if he had remained an isolated Allied oasis in a German desert. The British had not only to escape capture themselves, but had also to prevent the First German Army from flanking the French armies to the British right, thus cutting them off from Paris. The British commander therefore did not attempt to make a stand along the Maubeuge line, but ordered a further retreat south into France. His men were tired after a day's severe fighting, the weather was hot, much equipment was lacking, they were in a strange country, their pursuers were prepared to move with greater speed, the British were greatly outnumbered, and the Allied strategy had been thrown into confusion. The British retreat, like the French, was hampered also by the hordes of civilian fugitives on all the roads. Indeed, on the night of August 25, the First Corps of the British Army was reached by its pursuers and attacked. The British finally managed to repulse the German onslaught, but lost heavily in the fight, and after ceaseless marching and fighting night and day were in a state of complete exhaustion. On the following day, the Second Corps was also attacked around Le Cateau, although the battle is usually called the Battle of Cambrai; and after many hours' fighting, aided by a fresh division just arrived from Amiens, the British succeeded in opening up a line of retreat to the south. By this time the Germans had driven a wedge between the two corps of the British Army, and they could render no assistance to each other. It seemed that only by a miracle could the entire field force of the British Empire in France avoid complete disaster. Not one moment could be spared for rest. Throughout the night of August 26 and the day and night of August 27, the British plodded steadily on, until they won the test of human endurance. The German troops finally found themselves unable to keep up with the fast pace of the retreating English, and on the night of August 28, the British were

able to rest on the Oise, utterly exhausted and unfit for further fighting, but soon to be joined on their right by the retreating French Fifth Army. Several detachments had been wiped out; many of the soldiers, professionals that they were, had been unable to keep up and had dropped out along the roads, trusting to their individual efforts to avoid capture and to rejoin their regiments later; and the base at Amiens had to be abandoned, and a new base established at Le Mans. The two British corps were now re-united, and their position stretched from Noyon to La Fère.

But the rest on the twenty-eighth brought the Germans nearer, and a further retreat was necessary, until new French forces could come up as reinforcements. By September 1, the British Army was established in positions stretching from Crépy-en-Valois to Villers-Cotterêts, again on the extreme left of the French forces under the commander-in-chief, General Joffre, and again in a condition to offer battle. Paris was now hardly fifty miles away, and the Germans were still coming on.

We have seen that the French Fifth Army had retreated after its defeat at Charleroi until by August 27 it paused to rest and to decide upon further action. One division had been left in Maubeuge, which was thus left to its fate, and which was promptly invested by a German besieging force. The French position was along the south bank of the Oise from Guise to Rumigny. But as the retreat of the French Fifth Army had uncovered the right flank of the British army, the retreat of the British army had now uncovered the left flank of the French Fifth Army. Therefore, both to be supported by and to support the British right, the French Fifth Army, on August 28, moved due west, with Guise now on its right instead of on its left wing. The left wing extended to Virvins and to La Fère, where it joined the British, now on the line Noyon-La Fère.

THE BATTLE OF GUISE

From this Guise-La Fère position, the French Fifth Army launched an offensive on August 29, in order to afford some relief to the British. Doubtless the French hoped for some assistance from Sir John

French's troops, but the latter were too hard-pressed and march-weary to do aught but retreat and avoid flanking movements. The French goal was the strategically important town of St. Quentin, and early on the morning of August 29, the French crossed the Oise in the direction of the German position. But again the Germans had recourse to flanking movements, and exerted dangerous pressure on the French right to the east of Guise, driving back the French troops in that section. The approach upon St. Quentin had then to be abandoned, but nevertheless the French fiercely attacked the German centre, drove it back east of Guise and inflicted severe punishment upon the overconfident German troops. On the French left, however, as well as upon the French right, German flanking movements were successful, and Lanrezac was forced to call back his victorious centre. The British were still retreating; driving a wedge between the British and French, the Germans captured La Fère, and the French were forced to accompany the British in their retiring movement. As the Fifth French Army had moved to the west to support the British, it now retreated to the east, and then to the south, until it was on a line with the British position from Crépy-en-Valois to Villers-Cotterêts. The line of the position taken up by the Fifth French Army was southeast of Soissons and stretched through Fère-en-Tardenois toward Rheims.

By this time, the danger and futility of the French advance into Alsace-Lorraine and of the diversion of the main strength of the French Army to the east instead of to the north had become all too apparent. Commander-in-chief Joffre frantically began the withdrawal of large French forces from the east to support the fast-retreating French and British armies on the north. But the French railroad system did not permit all these forces to shift directly to their new positions. In many cases, they had to proceed to Paris and then be re-directed northward. The French therefore were compelled to call back even farther the Allied northern armies until they should be met by reinforcements from the east and from Paris.

The overwhelming superiority of the German forces which had struck at France through Belgium and Luxemburg had inflicted upon their opponents defeats too decisive to permit of an orderly retire-

ment. If the French forces had been arranged in a continuous line, a withdrawal at one sector would have necessitated merely a withdrawal from the neighboring sectors to straighten out the line, which would thus be again ready to give battle. This was the condition which obtained in most of the later trench warfare—the attack had

THE GERMAN ADVANCE TO THE MARNE

I—Von Kluck III—Von Hausen V—Crown Prince VII—Von Heeringen
II—Von Bülow IV—Württemberg VI—Bavarians

to be frontal and the supporting wings of an attacked sector could come to its rescue in time to halt its retreat. But the line of French resistance to the north and northeast had been shattered and pierced in a number of places. Although the retreat of the British and the French Fifth Army had been conducted with a skill remarkable under the untoward conditions facing Sir John French and General Lanrezac, nevertheless the entire French plan of battle had to be re-organized. Joffre, never forgetting the lessons of 1870, consistently resorted to retreat rather than to a hopeless fight of which surrender might be the result. He therefore determined to retreat until the new

reinforcements would allow the French to establish a uniform battle-line, even though it might be necessary to retreat until such a battle-line were under the very walls of Paris. It would be one last stand on which everything would depend, and in which France could put forward her greatest strength, rather than a series of engagements in which the French would not be so strong as in one reunited army north of Paris.

When the French Fifth Army fell back, a retreat of the French Fourth and Third Armies, to the southeast of the Fifth Army, was therefore ordered. For the retreat of the Fifth Army had exposed the left flank of the Fourth Army, which was thus threatened with encirclement. The Germans were using clever military strategy. By throwing large forces between various sections of the French and British defense, they were threatening to use them as flanking forces on either their left or their right, and were compelling the withdrawal of the French forces on both the left and the right flanks of such German wedges.

When the Third German (von Hausen's) Army thus found itself unable to get between Paris and the Fifth French Army on its right, it turned to the east and threatened to flank the Fourth French (de Cary's) Army on the latter's left. The Fourth French Army was already, as we have seen, being frontally attacked by the Fourth German (Würtemberg's) Army, so that the Third Army was virtually an unopposed wedge driving into the French line. On the twenty-sixth the Germans succeeded in occupying Longwy. On the twenty-seventh, the French held their ground, but on the twenty-eighth, near Sedan itself, the Germans succeeded in driving back a French corps. Von Hausen's Army was now getting uncomfortably far to the south, and de Cary was compelled to leave the Meuse and retreat to the south. Besides Longwy, the subsidiary fortresses Montmédy, Hirson, Givet and Mézières were thus abandoned. The French Fourth Army, however, retreated in much better order than had the Fifth Army, and was a powerful fighting force when, on August 31, it took up a position around Rethel, on the Aisne, some twenty miles to the northeast of Rheims.

Similarly, the withdrawal of the French Fourth Army threatened to

allow the German Fourth Army to flank the French Third (Ruffey's) Army on the latter's left, so that Ruffey was also compelled to retreat, until on the 'thirty-first he was in the Forest of the Argonne, east of the Aisne and west of Verdun. West of Verdun the Allies' forces were once more contiguous, and new armies were being formed and rushed up to support them. Within one month of the declaration of war, Germany had occupied much of northern France and was driving back the French forces upon Paris itself.

THE BATTLE OF NANCY

We have seen that the Second French (Castelnau's) Army had taken up a position around Nancy, after having been driven out of Alsace-Lorraine at Morhange. The line of Castelnau's forces stretched from St. G  n  vi  ve through Nancy to Gerb  ville. Nancy is surrounded by a chain of hills known as the Grand Crown of Nancy, and in addition Castelnau was supported by the fortress of Toul in his rear, so that the position of the French Second Army to the east of Paris was a strong one. On August 24, the German Sixth and Seventh Armies, strengthened by troops from Metz, fiercely attacked Castelnau's forces on the right. The German attack was a frontal one, since Verdun was between the right of the French Third Army and the left of the French Second Army, and Verdun was too dangerous to be in the German rear without being invested. At the same time, severe German attacks were launched upon the French left and centre.

On the right and left centre, the Germans were decisively defeated. France now showed that her field guns also were formidable weapons and they wreaked terrible vengeance upon the attacking Germans. On August 24, the German attack on the right was stopped, and on the two next days the Germans were driven back and the French right advanced. On the left centre, a terrific German attack on the evening of the twenty-fourth was vainly renewed three times, and that same night the Germans withdrew toward Pont-  -Mousson, leaving thousands of dead upon the field of battle. On other sections of the line, French counter-attacks were driven back with heavy loss, but the French line remained in its position. Thus foiled in their

direct attack, the German forces attempted no further action in this sector until heavy guns were brought up against Nancy on September 1.

To the south, also, the Germans were driven back. Their forces in Alsace-Lorraine were not so strong as their forces to the northwest of France, and the French had withdrawn many of their troops from the Alsace-Lorraine frontier to support the troops retreating upon Paris from the north, so that fighting along the Alsace-Lorraine frontier became quiescent. Between Verdun and Switzerland, at least, the Germans had been held close to the Franco-German frontier.

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

Accordingly, by September 1 the Franco-British forces were once more facing the enemy in a continuous line and in a strong position. But the French High Command was in no mood to attempt to check the Germans as yet. The Franco-British forces in the west were connected only loosely with the French forces to the east, along the Alsace-Lorraine frontier; the fortifications of Paris were still too far away to act as support and to prevent dangerous flanking movements on the part of the German Army; a delay in action in France would give the Russians a chance to strike a decisive blow, which would compel Germany to withdraw some troops from the French to the Russian battle-fields; and, above all, the French forces shifting from the east to the west had not yet been able to join the Franco-British line in sufficiently large numbers to counteract the German numerical superiority. Accordingly, a still further retreat on the Allied left was ordered, a retreat to the Marne river, where Joffre had determined to make the last stand in a position in accordance with which he had conceived a skilful counter-attack.

After a stand, then, for little more than a day along the Aisne, a further Allied retreat was ordered. General Ruffey was replaced by General Sarrail and General Lanrezac by General d'Esperey, in command of the French Third and Fifth Armies, respectively. From Verdun to the Somme the Allied forces withdrew slowly and in good order, although not without some sharp rear-guard engagements. At Villers-Cotterêts and at Nèry the British were sharply punished before they drove off their assailants. By September 2, the French government had removed its seat from Paris to Bordeaux, and Paris had been prepared for a siege. On September 3, the British reached the Marne, crossed it, blew up the bridges behind them, and withdrew some ten or fifteen miles farther south along the Grand Morin River. They were now both east and south of Paris. The oncoming Germans immediately threw bridges across the Marne and succeeded in attacking

the British at several points before the British took up their final positions. The British lines were to the southeast of Paris and left the city open to attack upon the northwest, since the British formed, or were supposed by the Germans to form, the extreme left of the Allied line. The German First Army was thus sorely tempted to march straight upon Paris; but von Kluck withstood the temptation, as such a plan would have removed his points of contact with the German Second Army to the east, and would have enabled the British army to become a wedge between the German First and Second Armies, able to attack the former on its left flank and the latter on its right flank. The tide of battle thus turned to the east of Paris, and the student of the Battle of the Marne must never forget that it was fought due east of Paris and that the entire German drive upon Paris threatened that city only from the east.

The French Fifth Army, now under the command of d'Esperey, followed the British in turning to the southeast and by September 4 had taken up positions to the east of the British. The French Fourth Army had swung even farther to the east, thus leaving a space between the French Fifth and Fourth Armies. Into this space, a force of the French troops removed from the Alsace-Lorraine frontier was marched up. It was placed under the command of General Foch, and thus became a new French Army, the Seventh. The right of the French Fourth Army, next to the left of the French Third (Sarrail's) Army, swung northward toward Verdun and the right of the French Third Army was supported by Verdun itself. (See Map, page 479.)

But Joffre had formed more than one new army. And the second new French army was the army destined to turn the whole tide of battle. The formation of Foch's army was evidently known to the German General Staff, but the formation of the other new French army seems to have caught the Germans unawares. Indeed, it seems probable that the German General Staff, intoxicated by its victories in the first three weeks of the war, had rashly concluded that the French armies had been thrown into as complete disorder as had the British, and that the rout was complete, with only spasmodic and hopeless last-ditch sorties open to the Allies.

The new army formed by Joffre, the French Sixth Army, was



REPLACEMENT TROOPS

In the upper panel are shown American soldiers hurrying to the front-line trenches to take the places of comrades worn out by the strain of modern-day warfare and sadly in need of rest and recuperation.

AT FULL SPEED ACROSS NO MAN'S LAND

In the centre panel is shown a remarkable photograph of British soldiers hurrying from the shelter of their own trenches across No Man's Land to the German lines.

THE OUTPOST SENTRIES

In the lower panel is shown one of the Allies' sentry posts in a forest in France. The photograph has additional interest in the fact that this post was destroyed by enemy fire a few minutes after this picture was taken.

placed under General Manoury. Formed in Paris, it was recruited largely from troops hastily withdrawn from Africa, and later also from detachments from the Paris garrison. The dispatch of this force was made possible by von Kluck's refusal to turn aside to attack Paris, and by his march parallel to the northern forts of Paris in order to drive at the British left flank. Von Kluck rightly had placed the encirclement of the Allied force above even the capture of the French capital. The French Sixth Army marched out to take a position northeast of Paris and due west of Meaux. Von Kluck's Army had passed through Meaux, and was hurrying to the southeast to get at the British forces, so that Manoury was now on von Kluck's right. There was no German army to the west of the German First (von Kluck's) Army, since the German cavalry force, which had been at the extreme west of the German line, had fulfilled its first assignment and had been withdrawn from its first positions. True, von Kluck had left a reserve corps to the north of Meaux and northeast of Paris, both to watch the city and to protect his right flank, but this reserve corps was too small to dispute the advance of a whole army such as had been formed under Manoury. Von Kluck, in his anxiety to surround the Allied forces, was now between two fires himself. While he was attacking the British on his left and front, he was open to attack on his rear and right. The flanker had been flanked.

The fact cannot be emphasized too strongly that it was the formation of this new army on the extreme Allied left which saved the day for the Allied armies and made impossible a complete German victory within the first six weeks of the war. Despite the strength of the new position to which the French and British had retreated, they were still outnumbered; and there is no evidence that further German attacks could have been finally repulsed, although they would have certainly been resisted far more vigorously than had been the earlier attacks in Belgium, northern France and Alsace-Lorraine. Indeed, the seriousness of the Allied position was manifested by the necessity of leaving the defence of Paris only to its garrison, despite the evidence at Liège and Namur of the inability of even the best defence guns to stand up against the heavy guns and high explosives of the Germans.

But the flanking of the German First Army definitely gave the

offensive to the Allies. On September 5, with Manoury's forces in readiness, Joffre ordered a general advance.

The line of action of the Battle of the Marne covered more than 150 miles. It stretched due east from Paris to Vitry-le-Francois, then curved to the northeast until it reached Verdun. Not only was the extent of the action unprecedented—the Battle of the Marne was unprecedented also in the number of combatants engaged. Although the number in each army cannot, of course, be stated with scientific accuracy, it can be stated with close approximation. A careful estimate would place the number of men engaged at 2,100,000, of which the German armies contained some 1,150,000 and the Franco-British armies some 950,000. These figures may be compared with a combatant total of some 130,000 at the Battle of Waterloo, some 150,000 at the Battle of Gettysburg, some 450,000 at the Battle of Sadowa in 1866, some 300,000 at the Battle of Sedan in 1870 and some 525,000 at the Battle of Mukden in 1905.

The position of the belligerent armies was as follows:—

Northeast of Paris, the Sixth French Army under Manoury, opposite a corps of the German First Army of von Kluck and northwest of the right flank of the German First Army proper.

East of Paris, along the Grand Morin River, the British Army, under Sir John French, facing the German First Army, on its front and slightly to its west.

East of the British Army, the French Fifth Army, under d'Esperey, facing the German Second (von Bülow's) Army.

East of the French Fifth Army, the French Seventh Army, under Foch, facing the Third German Army under von Hausen.


East of the French Seventh Army, the French Fourth Army, under de Cary, facing the Fourth German Army of the Duke of Württemberg.

Northeast of the French Fourth Army, and stretching up to Verdun, the French Third Army, under Sarraill, facing the German Fifth Army of the Crown Prince.

Southeast of Verdun, the French Second and First Armies, facing, respectively, the German Sixth and Seventh Armies along the Alsace-Lorraine frontier.

The battle opened with an advance of the Sixth French Army under Manoury on September 5. By the following day, Manoury had defeated the small German army corps facing him, had crossed the Ourcq River at Meaux, and had moved directly to attack the German First Army on the latter's right flank.

Von Kluck was now in a quandary. With the Franco-British army stretched out in a straight line from Paris, having thus avoided all encircling movements so far as the individual armies were con-



THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

I—Von Kluck
II—Von Bülow
III—Von Hausen

IV—Württemberg
V—Crown Prince

A—Manoury
B—British
C—d'Esperay

D—Foch
E—de Cury
F—Sarrail

cerned, the German plan had now become one of surrounding the entire Entente force. To this end, the German First Army was to drive back the Allies left wing, while the German Fifth Army was driving back its right wing, and the German Armies on the centre of the line were to keep the Allied centre stationary. But von Kluck was now flanked himself. There was but one course of procedure. He must temporarily abandon his swing to the south-east after the British; call the German Second Army westward to keep in touch with his left, so that the British Army could not flank him there; and drive back into Paris the army of Manoury which had so unexpectedly appeared on his right.

Accordingly, von Kluck swung around in a complete circle. He marched back upon Meaux, through which his troops had advanced but a few hours previously, and prepared to overwhelm Manoury. At the same time, von Bülow hastily shifted his right wing westward, to maintain his point of contact with von Kluck. But von Kluck's reverse in direction had been stupefyingly sudden, and the German Second Army was in no condition at once to occupy in force the ground opposite the British which von Kluck had abandoned in order to get at Manoury. A German cavalry force was therefore hastily interposed opposite the British to try to hold them back from von Kluck's east flank until it could be protected by the advance guard of the Second German Army shifting westward. The British were thus temporarily opposed only by German cavalry detachments, and Joffre's plan had been an immediate advance by the British upon the east flank of the German First Army. As we have seen, the German First Army was now moving northwestward, so that if the British had moved northwestward in pursuit, they would have not only been able to get into touch with von Kluck's east wing before the west wing of the German Second Army, but also could have flanked von Kluck so decisively that, with the aid of Manoury's Army, the entire German First Army would have been seriously threatened by annihilation.

But the retreat from Belgium had so completely shattered the strength of Sir John French's army that it was no condition to advance in force at so short a notice. The British could not fall immediately upon von Kluck's unprotected left flank, and by September 7, the German Second Army was able to complete its movement to the west which brought it into touch with the German First Army, so that this gap in the German line was then closed. Indeed, the British seem not to have got into any important direct action in the first stage of the Battle of the Marne.

Now in turn the situation seemed as desperate for Manoury as but a few hours ago it had seemed for von Kluck. The French Sixth Army had outnumbered the single corps left by the Germans near Meaux, but now it was confronted by the entire German First Army. The German First Army attacked the French Sixth Army with full

force, and at the same time the German Third Army attacked the French Seventh Army. Finding that its plan of turning both French wings had to be abandoned, the German General Staff had at once substituted a new plan of breaking through the Allied centre. At the same time that von Kluck fell upon Manoury, von Hausen fell upon Foch.

THE BATTLE OF THE OURCQ

Throughout September 6, Manoury had consistently driven back the one German reserve corps opposing him, had reached the Ourcq and was threatening to get behind the main German line. The outnumbered Germans resisted stubbornly, but were steadily compelled to withdraw from one position after another. On the next day, however, the advance guard of von Kluck's returning army began to reinforce the Reserve Corps and Manoury made all haste to achieve a crushing defeat before further reinforcements against him could arrive. At the same time, he himself was strengthened by the arrival of fresh troops from the Paris garrison, rushed to the scene of battle in every kind of vehicle Paris was able to provide. But throughout September 7, the German forces were being constantly strengthened by new detachments hastening up from the German First Army, and on the whole Manoury was unable to gain further headway. He could foresee nothing but defeat on the next day when the main body of the German First Army should arrive. Von Kluck was executing a difficult manoeuvre with extreme skill and rapidity. Indeed, on September 8, the German First Army arrived in force opposite Manoury, and not only launched tremendous frontal attacks against him, but also started extremely dangerous flanking movements; and on September 9, Manoury's position was desperate. He was still taking the offensive at times, but his case was hopeless. His men were at the end of their resources, knew they were beaten, and could anticipate nothing better than a wild retreat back into Paris. His northern flank had been driven back until it bent far behind the remainder of his line, and even retreat might not save his outnumbered and overwhelmed troops. He could get no further help from the Paris garri-

son, which could now itself expect an attack by von Kluck, and only by a miraculous Allied victory on another portion of the line could the pressure exerted by von Kluck be lessened.

And it was a miracle, the "Miracle of the Marne," which was occurring on the Allied centre. Events transpiring there were so disastrous to the German plans and so threatening to von Kluck's position that when day broke on September 10 and Manoury's men were wearily awaiting the final onslaught of von Kluck's troops, they found that the victor had become the vanquished overnight, and that, under the cover of darkness, von Kluck had withdrawn and was retreating to the north with all speed.

THE BATTLE OF LA FÈRE-CHAMPENOISE

In the view of this almost overwhelming defeat of Manoury's Sixth French Army along the Ourcq by von Kluck's forces, why should the victory of the Marne be laid to the formation of Manoury's Army? Because that formation caused a general shift in the German line. When the First German Army moved westward to end the thrust on its flank by Manoury, the Second German Army under von Bülow was compelled also to shift to the westward. Opposite the German Second Army, the French Fifth Army under d'Esperey was in good fighting trim, and as von Bülow retired northwestward, d'Esperey followed closely upon his heels, constantly attacking the retreating German forces, which were compelled to retire without making a stand, and which were hence severely punished en route.

We have seen that to the east of the French Fifth Army, the French Seventh Army, under Foch, in the centre of the line between Paris and Vitry-le-Francois, had been viciously attacked by the Third German Army under von Hausen. German success in this onslaught was imperative, as the German Third Army had not moved westward with its neighbor on its right, and hence had allowed a gap to come into existence in this strategic point in the German line. If the German Third Army should be defeated, the left flank of the German Second Army would be exposed. On the other hand, if Foch's forces should be driven back, the French Fifth Army would be exposed on

its right flank. Accordingly, the crux of the entire situation developed by Manoury's unexpected drive at the extreme west of the German line lay in the action in the centre between the German Third and the French Seventh Armies. At the east of the battle-line, Verdun and Nancy had held fast, so that the fate of France once more was being determined in the west. (See Map, page 479.)

Foch was greatly outnumbered, and from the beginning of the attack on September 7 he was steadily driven back. In his rear was a series of marshes, so that his forces soon found themselves in difficulty. The French and the Germans, realizing the gravity of their endeavors, were fighting with sharp fierceness, and many were the deaths in the centre of the line of the Battle of the Marne. The troops advancing on the French lines were the flower of the army of the Imperial German Government, they were supported by magnificent field artillery magnificently equipped, and they would not be denied. The French on their side were equally magnificent, and man for man, the result would have been in doubt. But greater numbers told, and step by step Foch was forced to the south, into the difficult marsh land. Foch's centre, indeed, withdrew only gradually, but his extreme right wing was driven farther back than his centre; so that he was no longer able to present a straight line to the foe. The considerable withdrawal of Foch's right broke the connection with the left flank of the French Fourth Army, and on September 9 it seemed as though the gap in the French line which was the German goal and token of final victory had indeed been opened up.

Foch accordingly sent out despairing calls for reinforcements. Both the Germans and the French had staked their all upon this struggle and had thrown all their reserves into the fray, so that there were no reserves to come to the assistance of the French Seventh Army. Assistance could come only from the armies to the left and right. But on Foch's right the French Fourth Army under de Cary was also being attacked, although it was not in peril as dire as was the French Seventh Army. Indeed, de Cary was also being slowly forced back; and only reinforcements from the French Third Army under Sarrail on his own right saved de Cary also from complete defeat. But the story on Foch's left was a different one. Von Bülow

was retiring in so good order to keep in touch with von Kluck and yet was retiring so rapidly that d'Esperey could neither find use for all his forces nor flank von Bülow. Accordingly d'Esperey hastened to send a considerable force from his army to the relief of Foch. This relief was made possible only by the withdrawal of von Bülow, forced by the withdrawal of von Kluck, which in turn had been forced by the formation of the French Sixth Army under Manoury; and it was this force dispatched by d'Esperey to the relief of Foch which turned the tide and won the Battle of the Marne.

In the midst of retreat, Foch's uncanny military penetration showed him a weakness in the line of his enemy, and with uncanny skill he took advantage of it. The reinforcements lent by d'Esperey Foch placed on his left, thus relieving the pressure there; and at the same time he removed a corps from the left to serve as relief for his right, which was so sorely pressed, which was being driven so far to the south, and which accordingly was endangering the entire French position. The corps withdrawn from his left wing Foch transferred to his right wing, and on the afternoon of September 9 sent it with terrific impetus against the German line driving back his right wing where the German line had become thin. At the same time, he launched a counter-attack along his whole line.

Foch had picked the one point of weakness on the German left, and his transferred corps cut through the thinned German line as a knife cuts through cheese (Simonds); and two of von Hausen's corps found themselves flanked. The entire line of the Third German Army was thus broken and with the victorious division on the east working around to get behind the German centre and right, strong detachments from these sections had to be sent by von Hausen to meet the flank attack. But von Hausen's centre was left so thin by the dispatch of these detachments that Foch's counter-attack won out all along the line. Almost within several hours, under the relentless hammer-blows of the French, the entire Third German Army suddenly crumpled. All order disappeared in its ranks, and it broke into a wild retreat back toward the Belgian frontier. The gap which would decide the victory had indeed been made; but it had been made not in the French, but in the German line.

Foch now threw his entire strength into the hole, or, rather the chasm, left in the German position by the retreat of the German Third Army. For French purposes, the hole could not have been in a better position—it was in the very centre. Foch's army could flank one-half the German force, either the half to the east of Paris or the half to the west of Verdun. There was but one remedy for the Germans to adopt—from both the east and the west of their lines, they dispatched strong forces to hold back Foch's flanking movement into their vitals. Thereby they considerably weakened all their armies between Paris and Verdun, and for the first time the French were not outnumbered. Joffre ordered a general advance. The Germans were driven sharply back all along the line. At this moment, the British, now left largely unopposed through the manoeuvring of von Kluck's and von Bülow's armies, also advanced and threatened to cut a second wedge into the German line. Foch thereupon directed his wedge toward the west. On the west, accordingly, only a small neck of land free from French and British troops was now available for the German retreat. All attempts to rally the flying German Third Army were in vain. Foch was still cutting in. The German Second Army had to come to von Hausen's rescue. It thereby withdrew its support from von Kluck. Menaced now by the British on his left, von Kluck was also compelled to withdraw, and as we have seen, Manoury was thus saved over-night. The entire west half of the German line was making north for the Aisne in as great haste as it had advanced south to the Marne. To the east of the gap made by Foch in the German line, the German Fourth and Fifth Armies had engaged the French Fourth and Third Armies with extreme vigor. Neither side had been able to gain decisively, although the losses suffered were very severe. Even after von Hausen retreated, the armies of Württemberg and the Crown Prince held their ground, but the bend in the German line to the west was too sharp for safety, and by September 12, the German Fourth and Fifth Armies had also withdrawn, although in good order and without severe loss. At the same time, a terrific attempt made by the Crown Prince of Bavaria and von Heeringen to break through the French line on the Alsace-Lorraine border (the Second Battle of Nancy) had also come to grief. This was

the strongest line of the French defence, but the First and Second French Armies had been sadly weakened by reinforcements dispatched to the western front; and the Germans sacrificed thousands of men in a violent attempt to break between Toul and Épinal and thus flank the Franco-British line on the east as von Kluck had tried to flank it on the west. But, aided by their strong natural position, the French finally managed to roll back the German drive; and later when the Germans also were compelled to send reinforcements from their eastern to their western front, Castelnau drove forward and recaptured much of the ground toward the Alsace-Lorraine frontier.

After five weeks, the German advance had been stopped. Not only had the advance been stopped, the Germans had been thrown back. The German plan to overthrow France within six weeks or two months had failed. The greatest danger to face the Allies for many months was now a thing of the past.

THE GERMAN RETREAT TO THE AISNE

The French plan was now obviously to complete the rout of the German forces and to drive them completely out of northern France, or, at least, far north near the Franco-Belgian border. The Germans' plan, just as obviously, was to rally their retreating troops, to halt their retreat so soon as possible, once more to establish a continuous line without gaps, and then again to renew the offensive.

The Germans were aided in their plan by the skill with which von Kluck extricated himself from his dangerous position. The British, getting into readiness for action at the Battle of the Marne more slowly than the French, were now fresher for action than the French legions; and were hence more active in pursuit of the flying Germans. But despite flanking movements of both the British Army and Manoury's Sixth French Army, and despite the press of the German Second Army upon his left, with the consequent narrowing of territory available for manoeuvre, von Kluck managed to escape the trap set for him, and to withdraw in perfect order. Von Bülow also, as we have seen, was undefeated at the Marne and the troops to the east of von Hausen's Third German Army were still holding their positions.

Therefore, it was only the Third German Army in the centre which had been badly routed; and so soon as the German General Staff should be able to rally its centre once more and to reinforce it, the German Army would again be in a position to give battle.

The shrewd German strategists had not been blind to the danger of disaster at the Marne, and even when the German armies were pressing on most eagerly, a defensive line had been prepared in the rear. This line stretched along the Aisne River through Soissons, reaching on the west to the Oise, crossing the Aisne east of Craonne, then bending to the south almost to Rheims, to bend again to the northwest of Verdun. The position was a strong one as prepared. The Aisne is a narrow stream, and one which moves sluggishly; but it is very deep, and on its north it is bounded by a range of high hills, whence the Germans were able to command the approach to the river from the south.

For this position, the retreating German First, Second and Third Armies made all haste. Through September 10, 11, and 12 von Kluck retired, protected against the armies of Manoury, French and d'Esperey by many well-fought rear-guard actions. When the British caught up with him on September 13, he had dug himself in on the hills back of the Aisne, had destroyed the bridges across the river, and was in too strong a position to be routed further—at least, except by a carefully prepared attack. The pursuers were hence compelled to call a halt in their pursuit; and in turn had to consolidate their own positions against the counter-attacks which von Kluck was now able to deliver. By this time, Maubeuge had fallen (see page 488), and von Kluck's ability to make a stand at the Aisne was due largely to reinforcements received from the troops which had captured the great French fortress on the Belgian frontier. (See Map, page 497.)

After his defeat by Foch at La Fère-Champenoise, von Hausen had been replaced in command of the Third German Army by General Einem. Einem was supported in his retreat by divisions lent by the Second and Fourth German Armies, and furthermore the German Third Army had inflicted severe defeat upon Foch in the first days of its drive against the French centre, so that Foch was not able to pursue his victory with sufficient vigor to complete the rout of the

German Third Army. Both Einem and von Bülow, accordingly, made good their positions contiguous with von Kluck; and, remembering that the Germans were still numerically superior to the Allies, a new German offensive might well be expected within a week or ten days.

But Joffre had no intention of calmly taking the defensive again. He first tried direct drives against the German position; but finding it too strong to take by storm, he developed a movement which was to prevent a new offensive by Germany upon Paris and was finally to convert the war on the west front into that long series of monotonous trench battles which amounted to a deadlock in the hostilities from the winter of 1914 to the spring of 1918.

THE FALL OF MAUBEUGE

But before describing this new movement of the Allied forces, it will be necessary to turn our attention for a moment to Maubeuge, back of the German lines near the Belgian border. We have seen that it was probably the German plan to coop up the British and the French Fifth Armies in Maubeuge when they were driven out of Belgium. We have seen also that Sir John French and General Lanrezac chose retreat rather than retirement into Maubeuge; that they thereby left the fortress to its fate, although Lanrezac detached a division to assist its garrison; and that the Germans detached a corps to besiege the fortress before continuing their drive upon Paris.

The strategic importance of Maubeuge lay in its position on the main railroad line from Belgium to Paris. Therefore, so soon as it should have fallen, the Germans would be able to send reinforcements by train directly from Germany to their armies nearing Paris and the Marne. The quicker the capitulation of Maubeuge, accordingly, the stronger the German forces along the Marne. Maubeuge was defended by six forts of modern type, with an adequate garrison; and determined to resist to the last ditch before throwing open to the German advance the railroad which led on to Paris.

It was on August 25 that the first German troops appeared before Maubeuge; but, although they began to shell the fortress at once, they were equipped only with field guns, against which the guns of the

Maubeuge forts stood out stoutly. It was not until four days later that the Germans were able to bring up their heavy siege artillery and to undertake in earnest the reduction of the fortress. The stories of Liège and Namur were then repeated. One by one the forts were battered into nothingness by the outranging German guns, and the garrison was driven from one fort to the other. Nevertheless, Maubeuge held out in sturdy resistance until September 7, when its commander was forced to capitulate. A considerable number of prisoners and a considerable supply of war materials thus fell into German hands; but by this time the Battle of the Marne was in full blast, and Maubeuge had held out long enough to prevent the dispatch of large reinforcements to von Kluck by railroad. Had the fortress fallen a few days earlier, the entire story of the Battle of the Marne might well have been different.

THE RACE TO THE SEA

We now return from the fall of Maubeuge to the struggle along the Aisne. In this connection, it must never be forgotten that the first German drive into Belgium and France did not extend as far west as the sea, but that all decisive actions in the first drive were fought east of a line drawn between Brussels and Paris. Several months after the beginning of the war, the battle-line in France and Belgium was to stretch from the North Sea to Switzerland, so that there is a temptation in most minds to visualize it thus from the first days of August, 1914. But even after the retreat from the Marne to the Aisne, the Germans were far from the sea; and their line along the Aisne extended no farther west than the river Oise.

Joffre found by September 20 that he could not hope to break the new German line. Indeed, on the contrary, another German advance is being threatened. Von Kluck is re-assuming the offensive; von Bülow advances close enough to Rheims to bombard the Cathedral; south of Verdun, St. Mihiel is captured by the Germans; and the Crown Prince advances around Verdun sufficiently to cut many of the lines of communication to the fortress.

Accordingly, Joffre began a vast encircling movement on the west toward the sea. At first, his flanking forces were defeated west of the Oise, but the French High Command persisted in its manoeuvre. Joffre strengthened the flanking forces by troops withdrawn from the eastern frontier, leaving the defence of his right wing largely to the four great French fortresses on the east. Germany countered by also withdrawing troops from the east, and a veritable race to the sea was on. As fast as one French corps was diverted as another addition to the western wing, it found that a corps of equal strength had been detached by the Germans to oppose it. Along the Aisne all the way to Switzerland, the fighting died down, and the war became a test of speed in transportation. The "Battle of the Aisne" was hence merely a series of flanking movements. The extreme value of the Channel

ports was now realized; and even flanking operations were made secondary to the occupancy of the ports along the sea. To the north, Antwerp was still holding out, and the French goal was to drive the western line so far to the north as to be able to reach Antwerp and to join hands with the besieged Belgian army. The German plan, on the other hand, was to occupy ports as nearly opposite to England as possible—especially Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk. Both sides rushed troops from all sections of their lines toward the sea, appreciably thinning out the previous positions. This dilution of strength from the Oise to Switzerland was made possible by the policy of resorting to trenches; and from this time the battle-line east of the Oise becomes a vast trench-contest. Castelnau is brought all the way from Nancy on the Alsace-Lorraine frontier to cross the Oise. Foch is also shifted, and the British are sent far to the west around Ypres. A new army is formed from troops from the centre and placed in command of General Maud'huy. But the French had the advantage of having begun the race to the sea and were hence able to move more quickly than the Germans. The battle-line which was beginning to form west of the Oise thus took a shape pointing toward Antwerp rather than toward Dunkirk. By the end of September a gap of less than fifty miles extended between the extreme western edge of the battle-line and the sea. (See Map, page 497.)

For this gap the Germans and Allies made all speed. But German occupancy of the gap would be rendered difficult by the presence of the Belgian army within the fortifications of Antwerp. So that Germany now undertook in earnest to reduce the strongest of all European fortresses at the same time that she feverishly moved other forces toward the gap between Arras and the North Sea.

Joffre's attempt to flank the Germans on their right between the Oise and the sea may be divided into three separate movements. The first, represented by the forces under Castelnau, made the first flanking attempt. The second was made by the new army under Maud'huy; and the third, by a new army under d'Urbal. In addition, d'Urbal's forces were, if possible, to advance to the support of Lille and to prevent that fortress from being taken. But d'Urbal's advance on Lille was checked by the Germans as decisively as were the other

flanking movements. On October 10, the bombardment of Lille began and three days later the fortress was compelled to surrender.

THE FALL OF ANTWERP

Antwerp was considered the strongest fortress in the world, with the exception of fortresses such as Gibraltar, where the fortification is largely the work of nature. Perhaps in the strength of the man-made fortifications Antwerp was not so strong as Paris; but Antwerp had natural advantages of which Paris could not boast. In the first place, Antwerp was located on the Scheldt, which had been formally neutralized. In the second place, on the northwest it lay so close to the Dutch frontier that it could hardly be completely invested by any force which was willing to respect the neutrality of Holland. And, finally, some ten miles to the south of Antwerp a series of deep marshes formed a natural protection along which had been thrown forts of great strength. Before Liège and Namur, Antwerp had been considered well-nigh impregnable.

We have seen that after its defeat by the German forces, most of the Belgian army had withdrawn into Antwerp. Obviously, its first duty was to keep open the line of communication with the French and the British making for Antwerp from the south, and this it was enabled to do. The Germans left but a comparatively small force to surround the city, and for several weeks, while the Battle of the Marne was being fought, made no attempt to reduce Antwerp. Indeed, on August 25 and 26, on September 4 and on September 9, the Belgian forces made sallies which drove back the besiegers. One of these sallies compelled the diversion to the besieging force of some German divisions which had been destined for France; and the last of the sallies proved to be still more dangerous to the German position. The German troops were scattered, Malines and Aerschot were captured, and the railroad between Louvain and Tirlemont was reached and blown up. For a time the Belgians even threatened to re-capture Brussels, as von Emmich's army had been denuded to support the German forces in France; and Germany drove the Belgians back into Antwerp, with heavy losses, only by recalling a number of divisions

to the south which were headed for the Marne and which had already crossed the Belgian border into France. So that the failure to capture Antwerp and to scatter the Belgian army was not of so insignificant an effect upon the entire military situation as the German General Staff evidently had anticipated.

But with the German troops and the Entente forces both racing to reach the North Sea, the reduction of Antwerp without further delay became necessary for Germany. For if Antwerp should remain in the Allies' hands until the Franco-British forces reached it, so that it became the extreme western outpost of the Allied line, Germany would be cut off from all the sea-coast south of Germany. Whereas if Antwerp and the surrounding Belgian sea-coast could be captured, Germany would be located practically on the Straits of Dover and would have submarine bases at the south extremity of the North Sea. On September 28, accordingly, the reduction of Antwerp began in earnest.

British reinforcements hurried up to assist the Antwerp garrison, but although some British marines and infantry arrived before the fall of the fortress, they were not in sufficient force to affect the final result. On September 28, the Germans advanced upon the Scheldt from the south and the southeast. The defences in this quarter consisted of eight large forts, some distance from the city proper, which were in turn supported by an inner ring of forts, nearer the city. The Belgians worked their guns manfully, but could not withstand the German molten rain. By the next day, one of the largest forts was completely put out of commission, and its neighbor, by October 1. On the latter day, the plight of the defenders was rendered doubly serious by the demolition by German fire of the reservoir which supplied the city and the garrison with water. On October 3, 4 and 5, the Germans were driven back in their attempts to cross the Nethe River, which flows to the south of Antwerp and across which the Belgians had already been forced to withdraw. On October 6, however, the Germans managed to cross this stream; and, seeing that further resistance was hopeless, the retirement of the Belgian army began. Fortunately for the Belgian soldiers, the sea-coast from Antwerp extends away from the city to the west, and it was clear of

German soldiers; nevertheless, the failure of the German forces to cut off the Belgian retreat along the southwest seems inexplicable. On October 7, the Belgian Government left the city; most of the civilian inhabitants and refugees had already left, the greater part making for Holland. On October 8, the city itself was bombarded, and it surrendered on the following day. By forced marches and astute rear-guard actions, the retiring Belgian army, with its French and with most of its British reinforcements, managed to elude the German forces which endeavored to cut it off, gained the Franco-British lines to the south, re-formed along a line between Calais and Nieuport, and then definitely took over its share of the entire battle-line of the Allies in Belgium and France.

On October 15, Ostend also surrendered.

The German army followed the retiring Belgians as speedily as possible, until the Germans came into contact with the Franco-British forces, hurrying to protect the Belgian rear. This point of junction hence became the extreme western wing of the entire battle-line in France and Belgium. Accordingly, by the middle of October the Germans and the Allies were face to face from the North Sea to Switzerland as follows:—

From Nieuport in Belgium, on the North Sea, past Dixmude, past Ypres, crossing the Franco-Belgian frontier west of Lille; between Arras and Cambrai, through Péronne, crossing the Oise at Noyon; then bending from this vertical line to a horizontal line north of Soissons, through Craonne, north of Rheims, through Montfauçon north of Verdun; then turning sharply to the south to form a deep salient into France, with the apex at St. Mihiel and the eastern base ending at Pont-à-Mousson, on the Moselle near the Alsace-Lorraine frontier; then along that frontier, occasionally crossing it, north of Nancy and Lunéville, west of Altkirch, to the Swiss border.

THE BATTLE OF FLANDERS (BATTLE OF THE YSER AND BATTLE OF YPRES)

Opposed in her advance toward Dunkirk and Lille, Germany now resolved to break through the opposition. Only the fifty-mile west wing of the battle-line from the North Sea to La Bassée had not become a series of trenches and Germany resolved to break through this gap at all cost. She refused to accept as final her defeat at the Marne—she was about to make one more great effort before abandoning the offensive.

The country in southwestern Belgium was admirably suited for defence. It is low and flat, but it is intersected by innumerable ditches, marshes, canals and dykes. Some of it is below the level of the sea, and many parts of it can be flooded by letting in the ocean; and from the end of fall to the beginning of spring it is one homogeneous mass of bog.

To oppose the German thrust, the Allies had stationed from Newport to La Bassée all the forces available, comprising troops of many nationalities, mingled according to the press of circumstances. The Allied defence of this fifty-mile stretch of Flanders fields may nevertheless be readily divided into three commands. At the left were the Belgians, from the sea along the Yser River; in the centre, around and in front of Ypres, were the British; and at the right were the French. French and British colonial troops, from India, from Africa, from Australia, and even from Canada—white, black and brown regiments—were also all on the very front of the firing-line.


The Germans opened the Battle of Flanders by a sharp attack on the Belgians at Dixmude, about ten miles from the sea. For eight days, the German troops rushed up in assault, supported by heavy German artillery fire; but the Belgian infantry rolled back the German troops, and the Belgian guns answered the German guns shot for shot. Throughout this long struggle along the banks and canal of the

Yser (the Battle of the Yser) the Belgians held firm; and the Germans could not break through here.

Three days after the inauguration of the attack against the Belgians on the Allied left, the Germans launched a terrific offensive against the British in the centre of the line in front of Ypres (the Battle of Ypres). The British had already advanced, with the hope of penetrating the German centre, of cutting their communications, of flanking the troops attacking the Belgians to the west, or at least of relieving the pressure on the Belgians. But the German offensive soon crumpled up the British offensive, and the British were thrown back on the defensive. The fighting was of the fiercest nature imaginable—in none of the long four and one-quarter years' struggle was the combat to rage with greater violence, or were the losses to be greater, comparatively, than in this test of strength before Ypres. Step by step the British were forced back, until by October 22 they had yielded much ground to the Germans. On that day, the Germans even managed to cross the Yser to the north of Ypres, and to threaten a flanking movement. At the same time, the assault on Dixmude was renewed with increased intensity.

But a French division came to the relief of the Belgians and a British division to the relief of their fellow-countrymen; and on the night of the twenty-third both the Belgians and the British held their ground and beat back the German attacks. So close to the sea-coast was the fighting northwest of Dixmude that a number of British warships managed to get close enough to rain shells upon the Germans and thus to provide material assistance to the Belgian army. Nevertheless, the Belgians, although never routed, were being slowly forced back, and Joffre determined to utilize his strongest remaining defence. On October 25, the dykes were opened and the waters of the ocean began to flood the land. But the waters of the ocean moved slowly, and gave the Germans still several days' breathing space. Until October 28, the army of the Imperial German Government managed to press steadily forward at the expense of the Belgians, although never making considerable gains; but by the latter day the German lines were disarranged by the oncoming water, and their manoeuvres were hampered. Further reinforcements arrived to strengthen the

Belgian ranks; and by October 31, the Germans had been definitely halted along the sea. Their hopes for breaking through to Dunkirk and Calais, and perhaps even for another flanking movement along



THE DEADLOCK IN THE WEST

The battle-line of trenches in France and Belgium in November, 1914

the Allied west, were now concentrated on their attack against the centre of the gap, on their attack upon the British defending Ypres.

After their momentary check on the night of October 23, the Germans came to the attack against Ypres on the following day with

renewed fury. For the next several days, they gained slowly, but surely; but by October 27, the British again held their ground and again drove back every German assault. The struggle was now a man-to-man combat, and the result depended on the manhood of the opposing soldiers. If the Germans had been indeed a super-race, and the British and the French degenerate races, the Germans would have had little difficulty in breaking down resistance at Ypres. But the Battle of Ypres augured ill for the German claim of racial superiority. Indeed, on October 28, the British themselves assumed the offensive and drove back the Germans. The British advanced through Gheluvelt, and threatened to capture Neuve Chapelle. Then the Germans rallied and re-captured Gheluvelt, only to be driven out once more. On the following day, the French forces to the south of the British attacked the German line opposite them, with the effect of lessening for several days the pressure against the British.

On the last day of October, however, the Germans returned to the attack. Orders had been given to break through despite the sacrifices involved, and the orders were being obeyed. For a day, the Germans advanced, but after the first impetus of the assault had passed, the British held firm. On November 1 and 2, the struggle was an absolute deadlock. To and fro the battle-line swerved, with no decision possible. On the following day, the French again attacked to the south, and once more pressure on the British was relieved.

Rallying all their strength, the Germans resolved upon one last desperate effort. Baffled in the centre, on November 10 they drove at both wings—against the Belgians again at Dixmude and against the French to the south, while at the same time they attacked the British with enough force to prevent the Allied centre from rendering assistance to the Allied wings. The attack on the Belgians failed, and after one day's success, the attack against the French also failed. Human flesh and blood could do no more. The Germans abandoned their last attempt to break the Allied line, and entrenched as they had entrenched along the rest of the battle-line.

It was a final quietus upon the attempt to overwhelm France within two months. The French line had held, finally; no French army had

been surrounded or captured; Germany's hope of a short war was forever blasted.

TRENCH WARFARE

The entire struggle in the West from November 15, 1914 to the spring of 1918 hence became a series of trench struggles. The Swiss border and the North Sea prevented further flanking attempts. Airplanes prevented surprise attacks on a large and decisive scale, and the extent of the trenches prevented smashing blows which would break through the opposing lines. Even the implements of warfare changed. With the soldiers entrenched below the surface of the ground, high explosives became far more valuable than shrapnel. For sudden trench raids, hand-grenades, bayonets, even knives, were the armament. Strong obstacles of barbed-wire were erected between the opposing lines of trenches and effectively hindered advances. The Germans in 1915 introduced poison gas, which then became used by both belligerent camps. In the West, the Great War had become a struggle of food, of minerals, of munitions, of man-power, of industry, of propaganda, of political manoeuvres, of financial strength,—in a word, a struggle of attrition.

THE WAR IN THE EAST

THE BATTLE OF LEMBERG

As we have seen, Germany anticipated from Russia no serious threat for the first two months of war. Because of the inevitable tardiness of Russian mobilization, Germany maintained at first but a small force of several hundred thousand men on her Russian frontier. She counted upon an advance by Austria to keep Russia occupied until France had been overwhelmed and until Germany herself could turn her undivided attention to the forces of the Tsar. We have seen also that the most vulnerable portion of Germany bordering on Russia was the southern portion. It was therefore natural that Austria should advance northward in a line parallel to this southern portion of the Russo-German frontier, so as effectively to protect that vulnerable section of the German Empire (Silesia). (See Map, page 503.)

Indeed, with the Austrian advance, the section of Russia bordering on Germany (Russian Poland) became more vulnerable to attack than the section of Germany bordering on Russia. In the words of one writer upon the military strategy of the Great War, Russian Poland projects into Germany and Austria-Hungary like a fist shoved into a pillow. Russian Poland was open to attack on three sides—from the north and west by Germany, and from the south by Austria-Hungary. Moreover, Russian Poland was roughly in the shape of a square—an army occupying it would be able to hold its eastern boundary with hardly less difficulty than its western. It was protected by a number of fortresses—its capital, Warsaw; Novorgievsk, Ivangorod, Brest-Litovsk, and a line of lesser forts along the Narew River to the Bobr. Its frontiers provided little natural protection; and, indeed, the main fortresses of Russian Poland were some distance back from the frontier. Whereas to the south, the Carpathians were too far beyond the frontier to protect Russian Poland,

although near enough the Hungarian frontier to protect Hungary from invasion by Russia.

But as Russian Poland projected into enemy country, so the extreme northeastern portion of the German Empire (East Prussia) projected into Russia—again like a fist into a pillow. East Prussia was open to attack from Russia on the east and south, and could be defended only from the west, as it was bounded on the north by the Baltic Sea. But along the border of East Prussia contiguous to Russia stretched a chain of lakes, the Mazurian Lakes, more than two thousand in number, with huge stretches of marshes, which made any invasion of East Prussia difficult. Moreover, East Prussia was as well supplied with railroads as Russian Poland was poorly supplied; and it was further protected by strong German fortresses—Königsburg and Dantzic on the Baltic Sea; Thorn, Dirschau and Graudenz on the Vistula, which forms the western boundary of East Prussia; and a number of connecting subsidiary fortresses.

We have seen that Russia stole a march upon the other great belligerent Powers in ordering partial mobilization as early as July 25; and in addition she proved that her mobilizing facilities had been underestimated. So that Russia was able to strike vigorously at Germany and Austria before the end of August, and thus came very close to upsetting the plan of campaign of the German General Staff. Russia's facilities for mobilization had been made more adequate to the south than to the west of Russia, because of Russia's predominant interest in the Balkans, her plans to open a road to the Mediterranean and Constantinople, her protection of most of the Slavic states in the Balkans and her consequent sharp rivalry with her southern neighbor, Austria-Hungary, and her knowledge that in the event of a general European war she would be invaded from the south by Austria-Hungary before she would be attacked by Germany. Moreover, the Great War arose through a quarrel concerning Servia; Russia had been moved to advance first to the protection of Servia against Austria-Hungary; and therefore Russian mobilization seems to have been ordered in the south several days before it became a general mobilization.

Austria-Hungary, on her part, carried through according to fore-

cast the part assigned her in the military plans of the Central Powers after the outbreak of war. Leaving but a slight force to proceed with the conquest of Servia, she dispatched the bulk of her army north across the Carpathian passes into Russian Poland. Austria divided her forces into three armies. The main attack against Russia was to be delivered by the army under General Dankl, into which the greater number of the racially heterogeneous Austrian troops had been formed. To the northwest of Dankl, another force had been thrown, but its purpose was chiefly to reconnoitre and to protect communications, as it was realized that the chief Russian forces would come into action against Austria along the eastern instead of the northern Austro-Russian frontier. This realization caused Austria to keep her third army, under General von Auffenburg, within Hungary, along the eastern frontier, to protect Dankl's forces marching toward Warsaw to the northwest from the main Russian armies marching due west from Kiev. Altogether, the Austrian forces numbered in all probability some 650,000 men, a number of the best Austrian infantry and artillery corps having been dispatched to the aid of the Germans in France.

Against Austria, Russia was able, to the consternation and defeat of the Central Powers, to throw more than 1,000,000 men. They, too, were divided into three armies. The first, the smallest of the three, under General Ivanoff, had as its function merely delay to the force under Dankl, while the main Russian armies fell upon von Auffenburg to the southeast. The two main armies, under Russky and Brusiloff, marched straight for the Austro-Russian frontier, disregarding Dankl's army to the north, and making straight into eastern Austria (Galicia) for Lemberg, and incidentally for Dankl's rear. They were therefore opposed by von Auffenburg's army, drawn up north and south before Przemyśl and Lemberg. On August 14, less than two weeks after the declaration of war between Germany and Russia, Russky's army crossed the frontier into Austria.

The battle between von Auffenburg's army and the armies of Russky and Brusiloff definitely began on August 23. For several days the Austrians maintained their lines and even gained minor victories, as the two opposing Russian armies had advanced from different bases

THE BATTLES OF TANNENBURG AND LEMBURG

I—Von Hindenburg	A—Samsonoff	D—Rusky
II—Dankl	B—Rennenkampff	E—Brusiloff
III—Auffenburg	C—Ivanoff	

and had not yet effected a junction. But on August 28 Russky and Brusiloff captured Tarnopol on the Bug, and thus for purposes of conflict became one army. Von Auffenburg was now greatly outnumbered, but instead of withdrawing in an orderly fashion toward Dankl, he courted destruction by standing his ground. Falling back from the Bug, he entrenched himself in a line stretching through Lemberg. The Russian superiority in troops was then so marked that the Russian commanders were enabled to launch flank attacks against the Austrian trenches. Leaving enough troops to hold the Austrian centre, Russky began to sweep around von Auffenburg's north wing and Brusiloff around his south. Brusiloff was the first to break through. After two days' severe fighting, he captured Halicz at the south end of the Austrian line, which now had to bend sharply back. A few hours later Russky succeeded in driving back the Austrian left. More and more the Austrian line was taking the shape of a horseshoe. A few more hours of resistance would have seen von Auffenburg completely surrounded and cooped up in Lemberg. Retreat became imperative, but he had delayed his retreat too long. So far to the Austrian rear had the Russian forces advanced that only a narrow gap was left for retirement and into this gap the Austrian forces rushed with a haste which broke up all order. On September 4 the Austrians had to abandon Lemberg and on September 7 further resistance ceased. It was a complete rout.

Moreover, at the same time that he received word of the victory at Lemberg, Ivanoff to the northwest fell upon the second great Austrian army invading Russian Poland under the leadership of Dankl. A stand by Dankl would have given the victorious armies of Russky and Brusiloff time to march upon his rear. He hastily retired. But the Cossack cavalry shone at breaking up retreats, and before long Dankl's retreat also became a rout. Back across the frontier into Galicia streamed his harassed forces, retiring upon Cracow, while von Auffenburg's forces, prevented from joining Dankl's, retreated into Hungary.

The Russians captured in the neighborhood of two hundred thousand prisoners, vast numbers of guns, and great stores of munitions and other war material. The fleeing remnants of the Austrian army

could not hinder a further Russian advance into Galicia, and almost half of this great province of northern Austria-Hungary was open to the Russian forces. Lemberg, a vital railroad centre, was in Russian hands and Przemyśl itself was soon invested. The Cossacks drove far into Galicia and even into northern Hungary, laying waste the country-side and destroying much material of military value. The military campaign of Germany's chief ally had been for a time irretrievably shattered.

THE BATTLE OF TANNENBURG

In the regions where hostilities have already been described, the opening campaigns had begun according to schedule. In France, as anticipated, the Germans had launched a terrific drive with the hope of ending French opposition within two months. In the southeast, as expected, Austrian forces had opposed the inevitable advance into Galicia. But the hostilities now to be described had had no part in the scheme of campaign predicted for a general European war, and were in the nature of a most disagreeable surprise to Germany. Profiting by her early and comparatively rapid mobilization, Russia attacked Germany in East Prussia at the same time that she attacked Austria to the northeast of the Carpathians.

We have seen that the entrance into Germany most available for a huge Russian army would be Silesia, to the south of the Russo-German border. But such an advance would be dangerous until at least the threat of a German counter-attack upon Russian Poland south from East Prussia had been ended. Accordingly, the Russian plan was first to scatter German forces in East Prussia by a preliminary invasion by the Russian troops first to be mobilized, to be followed, if successful, by a thrust into Silesia by the main strength of the Russian army.

So unexpected was the Russian advance into East Prussia that it found few German troops stationed in that province to oppose it. Probably less than 200,000 German soldiers were available to oppose the first Russian advance into East Prussia, which began as early as August 17. The Russian forces were divided into two armies, under the command of Generals Rennenkampf and Samsonof, the former

marching southwest from Kovno, the latter marching north from Warsaw. On August 20, Rennenkampf's army met German forces under von Prittwitz at Gumbinnen in East Prussia and after a struggle of several days defeated them decisively. Rennenkampf continued to march west and several days later occupied Insterburg. At the same time, Samsonof's advance guard, to the south of Rennenkampf, threw back some German forces with which it had come into contact.

The German General Staff now awoke to the danger of the situation in East Prussia. Active soldiers of the first line were badly needed in France, and Germany was compelled to leave the defence of East Prussia largely to older reservists, hastily mobilized. Many of these were transported by sea from other parts of northern Germany to Königsburg and Dantzig. The defence of East Prussia was then assigned to a German general who had long been out of favor, had accordingly been retired to the inactive list, and had been living a life of quiet solitude. His availability for command in East Prussia consisted chiefly, in the mind of the German General Staff, of an intensive knowledge, acquired by years of study, of the military topography of the Mazurian Lake district. His name was Paul von Hindenburg. At the same time he was given the assistance of a chief of staff by the name of Ludendorff.

Von Hindenburg took command on August 23. He rallied the remnants of von Prittwitz's army, drew upon the garrisons of the East Prussian fortresses, and with reinforcements from other quarters of Germany managed to scrape together an army which must have numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 men, but which, even so, was inferior in numbers to each of the armies confronting him. Meantime, the Russian commanders had made the mistake of not keeping in touch with each other, and had allowed themselves to be separated by the Mazurian Lakes. Von Hindenburg accordingly was able to attack his enemies one at a time. He chose first to attack the Russian army to the south, the force under Samsonof; and to this end, he stationed his army around Tannenburg. To guard against a flanking movement by the northern army of Rennenkampf, he sent to the north several army corps under von Mackensen to watch Rennenkampf's forces. Strategically, von Hindenburg had the better position. He

was nearer each of the Russian armies than they were to each other, he was on firm soil, and he controlled the main lines of communication.

Meanwhile, Samsonof continued to advance, while Rennenkampf evidently stood motionless before Königsburg. Samsonof marched on Allenstein, thus being lured on to place the swamps and lakes of the Mazurian district on his right rear. The Russians then attacked the strongly fortified German centre, while von Hindenburg attempted a flanking movement on the Russian left, at the same time recalling von Mackensen to flank the Russians on their right. Von Hindenburg broke up his army, except in the centre, into various corps, each one of which blocked a line of retreat. For three days, the Germans were occupied in beating off the Russian attack on the centre; they then advanced in turn, after waiting until Samsonof's flanks had been turned and all but one avenue of retreat had been cut off—the avenue of retreat leading into the lakes and swamps. Into that the Russians were forced and became bewildered, while von Hindenburg knew every inch of the ground and struck his defenceless enemy at will. It was a devastating victory. Probably less than half of the entire army of Samsonof was able to escape death or capture. (See Map, page 503.)

In the meantime, Rennenkampf seems to have pursued the inexplicable policy of not coming to his colleague's assistance. At all events, von Hindenburg was enabled to take his time in completing the rout of the southern Russian army before turning his attention to Rennenkampf. On September 4, the victorious Germans moved north against the remaining Russian army in East Prussia.

The Mazurian Lakes were on Rennenkampf's left, as they had been on Samsonof's right. The Russian commander hence naturally expected an attack on his right, and von Hindenburg encouraged him in his belief by making a feint in that direction. Then the wily German leader utilized his extraordinary knowledge of the lake and swamp region to lead a strong force through it, without breaking up his mass formation, and fell unexpectedly upon Rennenkampf's largely unguarded left. Rennenkampf, although still outnumbering his opponent, then wisely decided, without waiting for a decisive engagement, to abandon a position in which he had been completely

outgeneraled. On September 12, he retreated back into Russian Poland and although harassed by the flanking movements which the Germans directed against him, he managed, with the aid of reinforcements, to keep his army formation intact. Nevertheless, the losses of Rennenkampf's army were also very severe.

THE FIRST DRIVE UPON WARSAW

We return now to Galicia, where we have left the victorious Russians unopposed and the military plans of Austria-Hungary completely shattered. Not only was Przemyśl invested, the Cossacks raiding wide and deep on the Hungarian plains and the passes of the Carpathians in Russian hands, but also Cracow was threatened. Cracow was near the junction of the German, Russian and Austrian frontiers, and its capture would have thrown open to the Russians the road to invade all western Germany by way of Silesia.

So complete had been the Austrian rout at Lemberg that even the German war machine despaired of rallying the Austro-Hungarian forces in time to relieve Cracow. A counter-attack upon Russian Poland was accordingly the only alternative, and at the end of September a drive at Warsaw was inaugurated under the leadership of von Hindenburg. It was made possible by the Russian defeat in East Prussia. Warsaw itself was fortified strongly; but between Warsaw and Russia's enemies only the Vistula (a strong line of defense) and a string of fortresses to the north interposed barriers. Von Hindenburg accordingly marched upon the city from the south and west, although a covering force was also dispatched upon Warsaw from the northwest. The army marching upon Warsaw from the west was composed chiefly of Germans and the army approaching from the south was chiefly of Austro-Hungarians.

By October 8, Lodz, to the west of Warsaw, had been taken, and the Austrian army marching north upon the city had also been enabled to swing slightly to Warsaw's east, so that the city was in danger of being surrounded. By October 10, the Germans and Austrians were almost within gun-range of Warsaw, and Russia hastened to dispatch reinforcements to the capital of Russian Poland. That sec-

Upper Left-Hand Corner—Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Erskine Wemyss, Commander-in-chief British fleet in East Indian and Egyptian waters, 1916-1917; First Sea Lord, 1917.

Upper Right-Hand Corner—Earl Kitchener, Commander-in-chief, British Armies in the Sudan, 1896-1898; in South Africa, 1900-1902; in India, 1902-1909. British Secretary of State for War from the outbreak of the Great War until his death at sea by drowning on June 5, 1916.

Centre—Herbert Henry Asquith, British Prime Minister, 1908-December, 1916.

Lower Left-Hand Corner—Andrew Bonar Law, British Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House of Commons, December, 1916—.

Lower Right-Hand Corner—Lord Robert Cecil, British Minister of Blockade, 1916-1918; Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1918—.

tion had been denuded of soldiers to make possible the German drive into East Prussia; so that, as the Germans had foreseen, it became necessary for the Russian commanders to halt their march upon Cracow, and to divert some of their forces in Galicia to oppose von Hindenburg's attack upon Warsaw. The pressure upon Galicia was thus lightened. By October 20, the Russian reinforcements began to arrive. They crossed the Vistula north of Warsaw and began to flank von Hindenburg's forces on the north. Further reinforcements then succeeded in driving back the Austrian army to the south, and, in danger of being surrounded and with but a small number of troops under him, von Hindenburg was compelled to raise the siege of Warsaw and to withdraw back across the German border,—mercilessly laying waste the country-side as he conducted his masterly retreat. He had accomplished his purpose—he had delayed the Russian march upon Cracow, he had given Austria-Hungary a breathing-space in which to re-form her armies, and he had avoided a call for reinforcements from the German forces in France and Belgium.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN OFFENSIVE IN GALICIA

By the middle of October, accordingly, Austria-Hungary was again able to take the field with formidable armies. She advanced upon the Russian armies in Galicia, which retired behind the San River. But within two weeks, after von Hindenburg had retreated back into Germany, the Russians were in a position to resume the offensive. They drove the Austro-Hungarian forces back from the San and again advanced on Cracow. By December, they had approached uncomfortably near to the outskirts of Cracow, so that von Hindenburg once more was compelled to come to the rescue with a drive at Warsaw. Again fearing the fall of the capital of Russian Poland, and also defeated by an Austrian attack, the Russians by December 10 had once more ended their advance upon Cracow and had retired across the Dunajec.

THE SECOND AND THIRD DRIVES UPON WARSAW

In the Russian line extending from East Prussia to the Carpathians, there was a gap between the Warthe and the Vistula Rivers, and von

Hindenburg was not slow to take advantage of it. Into it he threw a force under von Mackensen, and by the middle of November the Germans had broken through the Russian line and had halted the Russian advance north of Galicia. Indeed, they were threatening to surround a considerable portion of the Russian forces in Russian Poland and another Russian disaster loomed on the horizon. But all this time the Russian mobilization had been steadily progressing, and there were reinforcements at hand sufficiently strong to be thrown against von Mackensen and to close the gap in the Russian line. At the same time, a flanking movement to the north again threatened the Russians with encirclement, but again reinforcements were available and the flanking movement was stopped.

Up to this time, von Hindenburg's forces had been small, but now the Germans had been compelled definitely to halt their drive in France and Belgium and had entrenched themselves there. Accordingly, the German General Staff could now shift considerable bodies of troops from the west to the aid of von Hindenburg; and thus strengthened, he delivered early in December a smashing attack along the whole line in Russian Poland, an attack which carried all before it. After severe fighting, Lodz was once more captured, and the Russians were driven to the very fortifications of Warsaw itself. On December 10, von Hindenburg arrived before the outer fortifications of the city, and began to shell it. For three weeks the siege continued; but most of the heavy German siege guns had been sent to the western front; they could not readily be shifted to the lines in front of Warsaw; a mild winter had upset the calculations of the Germans, counting upon frozen roads; the Russians were sufficiently strong to keep the battle-line a distance from the city; and Warsaw was still resisting valiantly by the first day of 1915.

ON OTHER FRONTS

THE ENTRANCE OF JAPAN INTO THE WAR AND THE CAPTURE OF KIAOCHAU

In Volume I we traced the chain of circumstances which had brought Japan into a close defensive and offensive alliance with Great Britain. It was inevitable that soon after the outbreak of hostilities Japan should throw in her lot with the Entente Allies and should proceed to drive the Germans from the east.

The great German stronghold in the east was Kiaochau (Tsingtau). Kiaochau lay at the southern base of the Shantung peninsula, directly across the Yellow Sea from Korea. Germany had obtained it from China in 1898, as part of the price demanded for the murder of two German missionaries in China; and had fortified it and dredged its harbor until it became a stronghold of importance. The German territory surrounding the fortress of Kiaochau comprised some 200 square miles. Not only was Kiaochau the German naval base in eastern waters and the station for the German Far Eastern fleet, but it was also the commercial and industrial centre of German interests in the east.

On August 19, 1914, two weeks after the declaration of war by Great Britain upon Germany, Japan delivered to Germany an ultimatum to which an answer within four days was demanded. Japan insisted that Germany surrender Kiaochau and also remove all German warships from eastern waters. Japan claimed that she was asking Kiaochau merely in order to restore it to China. On failing to receive a favorable answer from Germany within the time-limit of the ultimatum, Japan declared war on Germany on August 23, 1914 and proceeded to attack Kiaochau. Although Kiaochau was strongly protected by heavy guns, there was no reason for unnecessary sacrifice of life because of haste, and Japan proceeded with deliberation in her reduction of the German stronghold. Early in September the first

Japanese troops were landed on the Shantung peninsula, and they were soon joined by a British force from the British possessions in the Far East. At the same time, a number of French and British warships arrived off the harbor of Kiaochau, and bombarded the fortress from the sea. The land forces pushed forward slowly, but surely, and Kiaochau was compelled to surrender on November 7.

With the capture of Kiaochau, however, direct Japanese military assistance in the War came to an end, with the exception of the expeditionary force dispatched to Siberia in 1918. Japan was looking out for her own interests; those interests were concerned chiefly with designs upon China; China had been protected, so far as it had been protected at all, by the western Powers; so that an enervating war, such as the struggle in Europe promised to be, would find Japan stronger and the other great Powers weaker in the game of international bargaining, if Japan conserved her resources while the western Powers were squandering their own.

TURKEY JOINS THE CENTRAL POWERS

In Volume I we traced also the chain of circumstances which had resulted in an alliance, implied if not written, between Turkey and Germany. It was therefore inevitable that Turkey should join the Central Powers as soon as it was seen that Turkish participation in the war would be of assistance to the Entente's opponents.

Soon after the outbreak of the War, Turkey revealed her sympathies by closing the Dardanelles to neutral commerce (thereby punishing Russia severely) and by withdrawing various concessions which foreigners in Turkey had long enjoyed. Turkey had already given shelter to two German cruisers, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, caught in the Mediterranean at the outbreak of war and fleeing to Constantinople from pursuing French warships. The German ships were admitted within the fortifications of the Dardanelles and could train their guns upon Constantinople at a moment's notice. When the Entente Allies' protests against the protection afforded the two German cruisers became uncomfortably strong, Turkey claimed to have purchased them herself. Their names were changed, but they still remained under German personnel.

On October 29, 1914, these two cruisers sailed into the Black Sea and bombarded Russian Black Sea ports. Russia immediately declared that this action constituted aggression on the part of Turkey and declared war on the Ottoman Empire. On November 5, 1914, Great Britain and France followed Russia in formally declaring war upon Turkey.

IN SERVIA

With Serbia as the point of origin of the Great War, it was necessary for Austria to make some attempt to conquer the land of King Peter despite the danger of the attack from Russia. Immediately after the declaration of hostilities on July 28, Austria began the bombardment of Belgrade, the capital of Serbia. Belgrade lies on the Danube across from Austro-Hungarian soil, and thus was naturally exposed to immediate attack. Serbia therefore removed her capital to Kragujevats and then to Nish. (See Map, page 557.)

Servia was a hard nut for Austria to crack. The land was mountainous and otherwise well-adapted to defense, and thus neutralized to a great extent the Austrian superiority in the equipment of modern warfare. The Serbian army amounted to some 250,000 men, with a reserve force of at least 50,000 more; and they were well-trained and had been mobilized more quickly than even the Austrian forces which were to invade Serbia. Moreover, most of the Serbian officers and the privates had seen action several years previously in the Balkan Wars and thus had obtained first-hand experience in the problems of a modern war. Finally, Montenegro in all but name was a part of Serbia, and cast in her lot with Serbia some ten days after Austria declared war, thus adding at least 50,000 men to the Serbian forces.

Austria invaded Serbia early in August, 1914 through the northwest corner of King Peter's kingdom. As the whole northern frontier of Serbia borders on Austria-Hungary, the Austrian path of invasion looked like the longest way around; but in reality it was the shortest way to get at the most vulnerable portions of Serbia. On August 12, the Austrian forces entered Serbia in two columns, the first crossing the Drina River at Zvornika and the other, the Save River near

Shabatz. The Austrian objectives were Valievo and Kraguyevats, the chief Serbian strongholds and points of vantage commanding the great valley of the Morava and hence the road to Belgrade from the south. The Serbian armies took a position at Jarebitze in order to prevent the two main Austrian armies from effecting a junction and on August 16 the southern Austrian army, which had entered Servia across the Drina, came into contact with the Serbian forces. On the north, the Austrians were driven back and Serbian forces accordingly advanced on Shabatz, where the northern Austrian army, which had entered Servia across the Save, had hastily fortified itself. But after several days' struggle, the Serbian advance against the Austrian centre and right at Jarebitze came to an end, so that Servia had to postpone her attack on Shabatz. Until August 19, the struggle shifted from one section to the other, with varying results; but on August 19 the Serbians became generally and decisively successful, and by August 25 all the Austrian forces had been driven out of Servia, although the bombardment of Belgrade from across the Danube still continued. Indeed, on September 1, the Serbians themselves crossed the Save and made a slight advance into Austria-Hungary. In this first month's fighting the forces opposed had been about equal in number, as the Austrians had been compelled to use their main strength against Russia; and the losses had been about equally severe on both sides, although in the Austrian retirement the Serbians captured much war material of value.

Early in September, the Austrians, reinforced, again entered Servia. They succeeded for a time in advancing, then were halted, and for a period both sides entrenched in the mountains to await the outcome of the fighting in Galicia. By November, however, the Serbians had been defeated and the Austrians advanced and occupied Valievo. The Austrians then again advanced and again drove back the forces of King Peter, until by the end of November the Austrians were in possession of most of northwest Servia and were in a position to advance on Belgrade from the south.

But early in December the Serbians rallied, attacked the Austrians in strength, and succeeded in breaking through the Austrian line. On December 2, Belgrade had finally been captured by storm, so that

one half of the Austrian army retired on Belgrade while the other half streamed back across the frontier west and southwest of Belgrade. The main Serbian forces then advanced on Belgrade and the Austrians evacuated it on December 15. By the end of 1914, Serbian soil was again completely free from the invader.

IN THE GERMAN COLONIES

At the outbreak of the Great War, the colonial possessions of Germany consisted of three considerable stretches and one inconsiderable stretch of land in Africa and some islands in the Pacific north of Australia. The African colonies were Togoland, a small strip of country on the west coast, south of the Sahara Desert; Kamerun, a large section of territory extending inland from the Gulf of Guinea, on the west coast; German Southwest Africa, adjacent to and west of the Union of South Africa; and German East Africa, on the east coast. The German possessions in the Pacific were Kaiserwilhelmsland (the northeast section of New Guinea), the adjoining islands of the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomon Islands, the Marshall Islands, the Caroline Islands, the Marianne (Ladrone) Islands, and several of the Samoan Islands.

Of the Pacific possessions, German Samoa was captured by New Zealand troops at the end of August, 1914. In September of the same year, Australian troops occupied the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomon Islands and Kaiserwilhelmsland. And by the end of October, Japanese troops had captured the Caroline, Marshall and Marianne Islands.

In Africa, the German possessions were not captured so easily as in the Pacific. True, almost immediately after the outbreak of the war Togoland fell to England's and France's African forces, as Togoland contained practically no German troops. At the same time, advances were made into the other three German colonies in Africa, but a revolt against British rule in South Africa for some time compelled Great Britain to turn her attention exclusively to her own civil troubles in Africa. Those Boers who still chafed under British rule seized the opportunity presented by the outbreak of the Great War to raise the

standard of revolt, and it was not until the end of the year 1914 that the resistance of the main rebel forces under Maritz, Beyers and De Wet was shattered by Generals Smuts and Botha. Accordingly, the conquest of the main German colonies in Africa had to be postponed until the following year.

ON THE HIGH SEAS

In July, 1914, the British fleet had been concentrated for manoeuvres, and, foreseeing international complications, it had not been disbanded at the end of July when the crisis in Europe over the dispute between Austria and Servia had become acute. The German fleet feared to put the superiority of the British fleet to actual test and retired to the protection of Helgoland and the Kiel Canal. Accordingly, at the very outbreak of war the complete control of the seas passed to the Allies, with the French fleet controlling the Mediterranean waters and bottling up the Austrian naval squadrons in the Adriatic.

However, there were a few German cruisers in other parts of the globe when the war broke out, and they began to give accounts of themselves. Perhaps the most brilliant career of any of these raiders in the first months of the War was that of the *Emden*. On August 1, 1914, the *Emden* sailed from Kiaochau, and sank a number of merchantmen as she made her way into Indian waters. After harassing the Indian coasts, she sailed among the islands of the Malay peninsula, cleverly eluding pursuers, and sinking many craft. Indeed, on October 29, disguised as a merchant vessel she appeared in Penang harbor, and proceeded to attack by surprise and to sink a Russian cruiser and a French gunboat riding at rest in the harbor. A few days later, however, she was picked up by the *Sydney*, of the British Australian fleet, was chased, bombarded, and finally run ashore, a total wreck. She had sunk or captured more than thirty vessels in her meteoric raid on commerce.

The outbreak of war found also a small German cruiser squadron in the waters of South America. A British squadron in that vicinity at once began a search for the vessels, but the two squadrons did not meet until the German vessels had caused a considerable amount of

damage to British shipping. On November 1, 1914, the Germans and the British came into contact off Coronel, Chile; and action began.

The British vessels comprised the cruisers *Good Hope*, *Monmouth*, *Glasgow* and the armed merchant vessel, *Otranto*. A battle-ship of an old type, the *Canopus*, was making all haste to join the British squadron and was close at hand, but the British attacked without awaiting its arrival. The German squadron comprised the cruisers *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Dresden*, *Leipzig*, *Nurnberg*. The Germans proved to have far heavier armament than the British, and the result was never in doubt. The battle began late in the afternoon, but even before the light had fully failed the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* had been rendered *hors de combat*. When night fell, the *Glasgow* and *Otranto* managed to escape under cover of darkness, but the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* were sunk.

Great Britain then dispatched a strong fleet in search of the Germans and the two squadrons met in the following month. The day was December 8, and the locality was off the Falkland Islands. The British fleet was composed of the *Invincible*, *Inflexible*, *Carnarvon*, *Cornwall*, *Kent* and *Bristol*, which had been joined in South American waters by the *Canopus* and the *Glasgow*. The British were now in overwhelming superiority and the Germans attempted flight without resorting to a contest. But the British were speedier as well as more heavily armed, and had no difficulty in sinking three of the four German cruisers. The fourth, the *Dresden*, managed to escape, only to be captured soon afterward in other waters.

In the waters around the British Isles, there were few engagements of importance in the first year of the war. On August 28, a division of the British fleet drove back into the harbors of Germany a division of the German fleet, and there were several similar chance encounters of little interest. On September 28, however, a German submarine managed to sink the British *Aboukir*, *Cressy* and *Hogue*. There were similarly no important naval actions in the Mediterranean or the Baltic Seas. Germany, not risking combat on the water, was making her naval efforts from under the surface; and the naval warfare of the Great War became chiefly a submarine warfare. Mines were laid with great profusion in the North and Baltic Seas, and wire nets were also employed over wide stretches of water.

THE WAR, 1915

ON THE WEST FRONT

Throughout the year 1915 the warfare along the six hundred miles of trenches between the North Sea and the Swiss frontier was a deadlock. Both sides endeavored to gain victories, but the attempts had always the same result—the initial impulse carried the attackers along for a short distance, then the impetus of the attack died out and the attackers halted, only to lose much of the ground gained when counter-attacks were launched. And from a military point of view the loss of life in these attempts seldom compensated for the distances gained. All attempts to break through the opposing line of trenches failed, and the manoeuvres were concerned chiefly with withdrawals to straighten the line or with advances to wipe out a salient.

Early in 1915, however, superiority in numbers on the western front passed definitely from the Central Powers to the Entente Allies. As the Russian armies constantly increased in size, Germany was compelled to shift a great many of her divisions from the western to the eastern front. On the other hand, the British Empire was rapidly increasing the size of its army in Belgium and northern France, and the Entente Allies enjoyed a distinct advantage in man-power also through their ability to call upon their colonies.

Nevertheless, Germany held firm. She revealed a highly efficient technique in trench warfare, and was far better equipped than her opponents for the production of the main factors in trench warfare—heavy guns and heavy shells. Moreover, her material resources were tremendously enhanced by her possession of the greater part of the coal and iron fields of France, while France was thereby correspondingly crippled. And England's ability to furnish munitions and other war supplies was conditional largely upon the amount of shipping available for that purpose.

ON THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT

In the spring of 1915, Joffre attempted an advance against the St. Mihiel salient. At this time, that was a point of great strategic value to the Germans, and its reduction would appreciably lessen the German pressure upon Verdun. The apex itself, St. Mihiel, was too strong to be taken directly, but the French hoped to drive in the sides of the salient, and thus to narrow it to an extent where the Germans would have to abandon it to avoid encirclement. But the French were able to make but slight gains.

THE BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPPELLE

On March 10, the British launched a drive in their northwest section of the line around Neuve Chappelle. The first-line German trenches were levelled by the preliminary gun-fire, and the British were able to advance almost a mile. The British were making for Lille, but were unable to drive the Germans from the ridges which commanded the approach to the city; and by March 10, the attack was brought to an end. The British had captured what was left of Neuve Chappelle, a section of ground possibly a mile deep, and several thousand German prisoners; but the British losses were far heavier than the German and so the attack can be regarded only as a failure.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES

By the end of April, 1915, Italy was wavering on the brink of entrance into the war, and Germany made a bid for Italian neutrality because of German successes. On the eastern front, as will be described, the enemies of the Central Powers had been decisively beaten; the widely-heralded Allied attack on the Dardanelles was not succeeding; and to these successes Germany tried to add a success on the western front. So that, despite her numerical inferiority in France and Belgium, Germany launched an attack before Ypres on April 22.

Ypres was at the base of a salient of considerable size extending into the German lines in Belgium. It was held by British and French regulars and colonials. Several days previously, the British had under-

mined some of the German lines on the southeast side of the salient and had thereby made a slight advance in that direction. Germany then opened the Second Battle of Ypres on the southeast side of the salient by counter-attacks calculated to drive out the British from the newly-won territory. When these attacks failed, the Germans shifted to the north side of the salient against the French.

The attack against the French was delivered with the aid of chlorine gas, the use of which was unexpected, as it was contrary to the regulations of the Hague Conventions; and the French could not stand up against the deadly gas fumes. They broke badly and retreated in disorder, not only opening up to the Germans a considerable slice of the Ypres sector, but also exposing the left flank of the Canadian troops who were stationed before Ypres near the centre of the salient. The Canadians, however, stood their ground and extended their lines to cover the gap made by the withdrawal of the French; and although the Canadians' losses were heavy, they managed to stop the German advance until reinforcements arrived from the Belgians to the west and the British from the east. But in the ground captured by the Germans in the salient were positions of the greatest strength, and through May the Germans step by step solidified their gains until the Allies were forced to surrender a large part of the entire salient in order to straighten their lines. But although the salient was thus flattened, it still remained and Ypres was uncaptured. The Germans also had failed in a hectic attempt to break through.

THE BATTLE OF ARTOIS

In May, the Allied forces tried another advance against the German line. The British advanced once more around Neuve Chappelle and south of the British the French struck north of Arras. The British advanced slightly, but lost heavily in the fighting around Festubert and were unable to pursue their advance because of an inadequate supply of shells. The French advanced a little farther than their colleagues, but were also unable to penetrate the enemy lines, and made no further gains after June. The French captured the Lorette Ridge and the German fortifications (the Labyrinth) near the Vimy Ridge,


which commands the road to Lens and Lille; but the Vimy Ridge itself remained in the hands of the Germans.

THE OFFENSIVE OF THE CROWN PRINCE

In the Argonne, the army of the German Crown Prince attempted an advance at the end of June, but achieved no success.

THE BATTLES OF CHAMPAGNE AND OF LOOS

Taught by the failure of their earlier offensives, the Allies made more extensive preparations for their next offensive in the west during



FRENCH GAINS IN THE BATTLE OF CHAMPAGNE

1915. Throughout July and August the French, British and Belgian armies made no further attempts on a large scale to penetrate the German lines, but prepared huge supplies of shells and brought up reinforcements for a great effort in the fall. By the end of September the stage was set.

The Allied objective was the entire German line between Verdun and the North Sea. This line may be regarded as one long salient

projecting toward Paris, with the apex at Noyon. The Allies were planning to strike toward the ends of the salient, in the hope of narrowing it so decidedly that the Germans would be compelled to withdraw along the entire line, or at least in the hope of wrecking the German system of military transportation. On the north end of the salient, the British and French under Foch were to strike at Loos and at the south end, the French in Champagne under Castelnau, between Souain and Massines. The blow in Champagne was the main blow; the attack around Loos was largely of a secondary and complementary nature. By this time, the German combatant strength on the western front was probably in the neighborhood of 1,250,000 men; and the Allied strength must have been close to 1,750,000.

The preliminary bombardment in Champagne began on September 23, lasted for two days, and in intensity surpassed all previous artillery attacks. The rain of shells completely flattened out the first line of German trenches, and made the German replies feeble and futile. At dawn on September 25, the artillery fire suddenly ceased and the troops advanced on a front of fifteen miles. In only a few sections was the German first line of trenches still tenable, but these sections resisted staunchly; so that the French advance was uneven. Nevertheless, despite severe punishment from the German guns the French advanced steadily throughout the day of September 25, and during the night the French heavy guns were brought forward and delivered a new bombardment on the German lines. On September 26, the French advance continued but was not general, and the French line was compelled to entrench to beat off the counter-attacks which the Germans, hastily reinforced, were now in a position to deliver. For more than a day the attacking French troops rested from their assault and then, on September 27, attempted another advance. But the Germans were now stronger and the French less adequately prepared than on September 25, and the new attack ended almost where it began. Pierced in a number of spots, the German second line of defence on the whole had held. The French had taken many prisoners and some guns; they had advanced about a mile; they had inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy; but their own losses had been severe and they had not broken through.

In the north the advance was roughly in two sections—one of the French against the Vimy Ridge, on a front of about ten miles; the other, of the British, on a front of some five miles. The French, as in Champagne, ushered in their attack by a terrific artillery fire which

BATTLE OF LOOS

caused great damage in the German lines. The advance began on the twenty-fifth, at noon; and throughout the entire afternoon the French managed to work forward. On the twenty-sixth, the advance continued and by evening had advanced up the northwest side of the Vimy hills. The next day was spent by both sides in re-organization and on the twenty-eighth the French advanced again. They managed

to gain the entire northwest side of Vimy Ridge, but could not clear the top; and for a long time Vimy Ridge was shared between the Entente Allies and the Central Powers. It was later to be re-captured by the Germans, only to be lost entirely to an onslaught of the Canadians in April, 1917.

The British attack began with a bombardment, after which the British advanced at daybreak on September 25. On the south a remarkable advance of several miles was made on the first day, and Loos was captured. On the centre and the north, also, the advance, although not so deep, was nevertheless definite. Around Loos, Scotch divisions even penetrated to a depth of almost five miles; passed beyond the last German line of trenches; and for a time threatened to break through the entire German line. The Germans hastened to bring up fresh troops to close the gap in their lines, and the British threw all their reserve forces to the support of the Scotch troops. But the advance on Loos had been planned as a minor and not as a major operation; and the Allies had few reserves available to maintain the gap made in the German lines. The Allied reserves were driven back by the German reserves; by severe counter-attacks the Germans managed to win back most of the ground they had abandoned; and by September 28 the Germans had re-formed their lines, had halted the advance, and had confined the ground won by the British to a depth of only one mile. The British losses were very heavy, and hardly compensated for the ground won.

In November and December of 1915 the Germans were successful in making slight gains in various points of the battle-line, in order to strengthen their positions. In December, Sir John French was re-placed as commander-in-chief of the British Expeditionary Force by Sir Douglas Haig and General Joffre was appointed commander-in-chief of all the French armies on all fronts.

THE TURKISH CAMPAIGN

IN THE CAUCASUS

Soon after the declaration of hostilities between Russia and Turkey, the Russians made an advance in the Caucasus, the range of mountains between the Black and the Caspian Seas at the extreme south-eastern tip of Europe. But the Turkish government had been mobilizing its forces from the very day when Germany declared war on Russia, and was able to send into the Caucasus a force which far outnumbered the Russians. In November, the two armies met; the Russians were flanked; barely escaped being surrounded; retreated precipitately; and by the beginning of 1915 had re-crossed the Turco-Russian frontier. Indeed, early in 1915 the Turks themselves crossed the frontier into Russia, only to be defeated.

In February, 1915, the Russians opened a more extensive campaign in the Caucasus. They had mobilized a large army which swept aside Turkish resistance, and by April had advanced along the southeast shore of the Black Sea. They were thus in position to threaten an advance on Constantinople from the east in case an English and French expedition against the Dardanelles and Constantinople from the west should succeed.

THE TURKISH ATTACK ON THE SUEZ CANAL

England was well aware of the importance of the Suez Canal to the prosecution of the war, especially after the war had reached a deadlock in France by the winter of 1914 and had there degenerated largely into a struggle of supplies rather than of men. So soon as she entered the lists against Germany, England hence made plans to fortify the Canal, and at the same time she took steps to raise an army in Egypt to resist any possible Turkish attack upon the waterway.

The expected attack from Turkey got under way early in 1915,

and the Turkish forces had approached the Canal by the end of January. But the Turkish troops were few in number and were badly managed; so that they were defeated decisively on February 2-4, and several days later abandoned their attempt. A more extensive Turkish effort at the connecting link between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean was halted by the attack on the Dardanelles.

THE ATTACK ON THE DARDANELLES

In many respects, the attempt on the Dardanelles was the most spectacular campaign of the entire war. It is generally understood that the Dardanelles campaign was due to the insistence of Mr. Winston Spencer Churchill, at that time the British First Lord of the Admiralty, even though most of the professional military and naval experts of the Allies were opposed to the project. The failure of the attempt called forth bitter criticism, but there is much evidence to show that its failure was due to mismanagement as well as to difficulties inherent in the project itself.

The Mediterranean and the Black Seas are connected by the water passage known as the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus. Constantinople is situated at the spot where the short and narrow strait of the Bosphorus connects the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmora. The Sea of Marmora is more than 100 miles long and more than 50 miles broad, so that a battle fleet succeeding in passing from the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmora would have Constantinople and the entrance into the Black Sea at its mercy.

The Dardanelles are more than fifty miles long, but their average width is only three miles, and in many of their tortuous windings they are less than one mile from shore to shore. Their southern shore is the northwest coast of Asia Minor, but their northern shore is a long and narrow peninsula extending into the Aegean Sea, the Gallipoli peninsula. The Dardanelles were so strongly fortified that they were considered impregnable, and furthermore they had been sown with mines.

The closing of the Dardanelles and Turkey's entrance into the war

on the side of the Central Powers had sadly crippled the Entente Allies. Their strength was thus unevenly divided. Russia was strong in man-power and wheat but weak in materials, especially munitions; if men and wheat could be sent by Russia to France and England, and materials and munitions to Russia from France and England, the plight of the Central Powers would be indeed serious. But on land the Central Powers were a solid obstacle to any intercourse between the eastern and the western European Allies. The Baltic Sea was closed to commercial intercourse by German mines and the German fleet, Roumania and Greece had not yet thrown in their lot with the Entente Allies and hence transportation from Russia to the Adriatic over the Balkan Peninsula was closed. There were several good Russian ports on the Arctic Sea, but they were closed by ice during a large part of the year, railroad connections between them and the remainder of Russia were very meagre and the wheat fields of Russia were separated from the northern ports by the entire length of Europe. Transportation on a large scale across the over-burdened Trans-Siberian Railroad, the Panama or the Suez Canals, and the Atlantic Ocean was not practicable, with the need of shipping so intense. Only through the Dardanelles was extensive intercourse between Russia and her western allies possible.

Moreover, this was the period when many neutral countries were wavering on the brink of entrance into the War—Italy, Bulgaria, Roumania, Greece. A Dardanelles victory might clinch the adherence of Italy, Roumania and Greece to the Entente Allies, and would tend to restrain Bulgaria from joining the Central Powers. And with a road thus open to the Allies through the Balkans, Austria-Hungary would be exposed to attack all along her eastern and southern borders.


The first attempt upon the Dardanelles was made from the sea, without the cooperation of land forces. Ever since Turkey's entrance into the war, Allied warships had established a blockade off the Dardanelles. On February 19, 1915, this fleet of French and British battleships, reinforced, advanced against the fortifications at the Aegean mouth of the Dardanelles. Here the Turkish positions were weak, the main fortifications being some fifteen miles upstream, where

the Dardanelles twist sharply into an S-shape and become less than a mile wide. There would be little difficulty in battering the forts at the mouth of the Dardanelles from the open sea, but the forts at the narrows presented a more difficult problem. The Dardanelles are so narrow that only a limited number of vessels could bombard the narrows forts at one time, even after the forts at the mouth of the straits had been reduced. Entrance into the Dardanelles had been made dangerous because of the mines sown by the Turks, and mine-sweepers were exposed to fire from numerous shore batteries. Moreover, the current in the Dardanelles is fairly swift, so that the Turks could send floating mines down the stream against attacking warships. And, finally, the Dardanelles were so narrow that torpedo tubes along the shore could direct their deadly missiles with accuracy against vessels in the stream.

The reduction of the forts at the Aegean mouth of the Dardanelles proved no difficult matter. Some of them were seriously damaged by the first day's bombardment. Bad weather then halted the attack until February 25, when the long-range bombardment was resumed. By February 26, the forts had been silenced sufficiently for the entrance to the straits to be opened and hence to be cleared of mines by the Allied mine-sweepers. The attacking warships could now approach nearer the forts at the mouth, and the work of demolition required but a few more hours. Early in March, accordingly, the road to the forts at the narrows was open. For several weeks the mine-sweepers worked assiduously under fire, until the larger battleships could venture to approach near enough the narrows to begin the bombardment of the narrows forts. During this time, the forts were persistently shelled at long-range, with what later proved to be meagre results.

The main attack was delivered at noon on March 18, when the entire fleet of heavy battleships made directly for the narrows and opened fire on their protecting guns. But the Turkish return fire was heavy, and the aim of the German gunners was accurate. The French *Bouvet* was hit almost simultaneously in three places and a moment later she touched a floating mine; within three minutes she was at the bottom of the Dardanelles. Shortly after noon, an-

other mine struck the British *Irresistible*, although she remained afloat long enough for most of her crew to be saved. Toward sundown, shells had crippled both the British *Inflexible* and the French *Gaulois*, and in the dusk of evening the British *Ocean* sank almost immediately after contact with a mine. When night fell, the Allied fleet gave up



THE DARDANELLES AND GALLIPOLI

the attempt and put out to sea. It had proved impossible to force the Dardanelles by a naval attack alone.

GALLIPOLI

The second attempt on the Dardanelles, accordingly, was made by land, an attempt to occupy the Gallipoli peninsula. The Gallipoli peninsula, as we have seen, forms the north shore of the Dardanelles. Although some fifty miles long, it is of an average width of not more than six or seven miles. It is covered by high and rugged hills, very precipitous. The Gallipoli campaign was under the general direction of General Sir Ian Hamilton, with the cooperation of the commanders of the French troops who assisted the British. The Turkish troops were under the command of the German General von Sanders.

On April 25, under cover of the guns of the Allied warships, a landing was made at the very end of the peninsula. The British forces consisted of about 125,000 men, chiefly troops from New Zealand and Australia mobilized in Egypt. One of the many weaknesses of the Allied position in the attack on Gallipoli was the necessity of transporting all supplies long distances across the Mediterranean. Another weakness was the impossibility of concealing moves from the enemy's observation. The landing on the southern end of the peninsula was made only after several days' struggle, in which the British lost heavily. On May 1, the Turks attacked in force, but were stopped, and the Allies in turn then attacked the Turkish position. But the Allies could not advance and had to entrench. The French and British line extended across the entire tip of the peninsula and the French and British objective was the strong Turkish position of Krithia-Achi Baba. Several days later Allied warships shelled the Turkish lines, but von Sanders had several hundred thousand well-trained fighters under him, and the Turks held firm and inflicted severe losses upon the French and British.

At the same time, Australian troops had landed farther up on the north shore of Gallipoli, making for the Turkish position of Sari Behr, with the hope of getting behind the Turks at the tip of the peninsula. But the Australians could not make headway, and after several fruitless attempts to advance on May 6-10, they, too, were compelled to entrench, after having lost many men.

Toward the middle of May, some further attempts at advances were made by both the Turks and the Allies, but without success. Early in June, the forces at the end of the peninsula made another strong bid for Krithia and Achi Baba, but could gain only a few hundred yards in return for thousands of casualties. In the meantime, German and Austrian submarines had arrived at the east end of Mediterranean and began to give an account of themselves. In May, the British *Goliath*, *Triumph* and *Majestic* were torpedoed and sunk; and, realizing the danger of remaining longer off the Dardanelles, the great British and French battle-fleet withdrew and steamed for other locations. Throughout June and July the land fighting resulted in a deadlock. General Hamilton then determined to make no other

attempt at Gallipoli until he had been reinforced. All this time, however, British submarines had made daring passages through the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmora, had inflicted damage upon Turkish vessels there, and had consequently hindered the transportation of supplies to the Turkish forces on Gallipoli.

By August, a considerable body of reinforcements had arrived at Gallipoli, and a final attempt was made to capture the peninsula. This attempt was made half-way along the northern shore, after a landing at Suvla Bay. The Turkish positions fronting Suvla Bay were strong, but if the Allied troops could carry them, the Turkish forces in the entire southern half of the peninsula would be in danger of capture and the way might be opened to attack the forts of the Dardanelles by land. At the same time that British troops advanced from Suvla Bay, the French and British on the other two fronts on Gallipoli endeavored to break through the Turkish positions opposite them. But the Turks were too strong. For three days the Allies fought bravely against overwhelming odds, but by August 10 the impetus of the attack had died down and the French and British were everywhere compelled to entrench and to consolidate their positions to beat off Turkish counter-attacks. On August 21 and 22, another violent attempt was made to capture the hills fronting Suvla Bay, but all in vain. Future efforts were useless, there was no longer reason for keeping back men from the western front, where men were so badly needed, and the attempt on the Dardanelles was abandoned as a costly failure. Although troops remained on Gallipoli for several more months, the fighting was sporadic. In December and January, 1916, evacuation was completed. As a result of their campaign, the French and British could show only a casualty list of more than 100,000, including 25,000 deaths, and a loss of prestige.

ON THE EASTERN FRONT

At the beginning of 1915, the eastern battle-line extended for almost a thousand miles, from the Baltic Sea to and along the Carpathians. To the north, it extended through the Baltic Provinces slightly into East Prussia and the Mazurian Lakes region. In the centre, it cut deeply into Russian Poland about fifty miles west of Warsaw. To the south, it spread into Galicia along the Carpathians. (See Map, page 539.)

There were two outstanding features of the military situation in the east on January 1, 1915. These were the possible entrance of Roumania into the war and the siege of Przemyśl.

IN BUKOWINA AND TRANSYLVANIA

If Roumania should enter the war, she would enter largely in the hope of redeeming a large part of the Roumanian branch of the South Slavs from Austrian rule and of incorporating "Roumania Irredenta" within a Greater Roumania. The Roumanians in Austria-Hungary inhabited chiefly Bukowina and Transylvania, the sections of southeastern Austria-Hungary bordering on the northwestern Roumanian frontier. Into Bukowina and Transylvania Russian forces had accordingly penetrated after the defeat of Austria in Galicia, and the occupation of these two provinces by Russian troops was strongly tempting Roumania to join Russia in the war. Germany and Austria therefore realized that Russian occupancy of Bukowina and Transylvania must not continue unhindered. And a successful blow at any part of the Russian line might compel Russia to support that part by withdrawing troops from before Przemyśl.

In January, therefore, Germany and Austria concentrated great forces in southeastern Austria-Hungary. At the end of the month, the Austro-Germans advanced. The Russian forces in Bukowina and Transylvania were not in great strength, and were able to oppose little resistance to the advance of the Central Powers. Bit by bit

the Russians were driven north to the Carpathians until by the end of February Bukowina and Transylvania had been practically cleared of the invaders. The temptation for Roumania to remain neutral had become stronger.

THE FOURTH DRIVE ON WARSAW

Around the end of January, the Russians attempted advances north of Warsaw, in East Prussia (see below) and south of the Polish capital, in Galicia. These movements evidently were made to prevent the transportation of German troops from the eastern to the western front. The Germans in the east, however, realized that these movements on the north and south of the Russian line must have weakened the Russian centre, and prepared for a direct drive on Warsaw from the centre of the Russian line. On January 31, the German centre, under von Mackensen, loosed a tremendous artillery attack upon the Russian lines and advanced on the next day. It was another attempt to compel the diversion of Russian forces from Galicia. The battle-line was some fifty miles from Warsaw, and the German drive was from the southwest, along the Rawka and Bzura Rivers. The German attack was irresistible and within several days the first, second and third lines of Russian trenches had been taken and a narrow gap had been opened into the Russian line by February 3. On the next day, von Mackensen endeavored to widen the gap, but by this time Russian reinforcements were at hand and the gap was closed. In other words, the Germans once more had been blocked by the greatest element of Russia's strength—an enormous supply of soldiers, just as Germany had made her initial advance because of the greatest element of Russia's weakness—lack of big guns and deficiencies in ammunition. The German losses were unusually severe and Przemyśl was still unrelieved.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE MAZURIAN LAKES

Foiled thus in the centre, von Hindenburg determined to strike in East Prussia. By this time, the younger von Moltke had been replaced

at the head of the German General Staff by von Falkenheyn, and the ensuing campaign was a result of the plans of von Falkenheyn, von Hindenburg, and the latter's chief of staff, Ludendorff. This second great campaign in East Prussia was opened by the Russians themselves. As Germany was striking at various parts of the Russian line in the hope of relieving the pressure on Galicia, so Russia drove at East Prussia in the hope of relieving the pressure in Bukovina and Transylvania. Taught by their first disaster in the Mazurian Lakes region, the Russians avoided that section and at the beginning of February struck both to the north and south of it. To the north, one force marched on Tilsit and Pilkallen on the Niemen, almost due north of Warsaw, and threatened Königsburg itself, the great German fortress on the Baltic Sea. To the south, almost due west of Warsaw, another Russian force along the Vistula advanced to the very Russo-German frontier near Johannisberg and made for the strong German fortress, Thorn. It was part of the German strategy to encourage the Russian advance and until February 7 the Germans retired before the Russians on the Niemen and the Vistula.

The first German retort was then the drive of von Mackensen at the Russian centre, described immediately above. The failure of that drive, if indeed it was not intended as a feint, caused the Germans to strike elsewhere.

On February 7, a German army began to flank the north wing of the Russian army advancing to the north of Warsaw toward Königsburg. The Russian right wing was thus compelled to retire, forcing a retirement of the Russian corps adjacent to it on the south. But the Germans at this moment attacked the latter Russian force and drove it back into a position where marshes and woods prevented it from keeping in touch with the retreating force to its north. Into the gap thus formed, the Germans threw many divisions, and a whole section of the Russian army was thus completely flanked and dispersed in disorder. The north wing of the Russian force advancing to the south along the Vistula was thereby left unprotected and this Russian force was hence also compelled to retire. However, it retired in good order, fiercely resisting all German attacks. By February 12, all the Russians in East Prussia had been driven back across the frontier

into Russian Poland. The Germans' superior strength had enabled them to throw their opponents back a distance of more than sixty miles and to capture thousands of prisoners and many guns. By the end of February the Russians were able to make a stand in Russian Poland, to entrench and even to drive back the Germans by counter-attacks.

At the same time, a separate German drive to the southeast of Johannesburg had been launched, with the possibility of thus driving at Warsaw from the northeast. On February 22, the Germans advanced on Przasnysz and captured it on the twenty-fourth. But Russian reinforcements were on the way, and on February 26, the Germans were driven back along the Narew and compelled to evacuate Przasnysz. Another drive at Warsaw had failed, but East Prussia had been definitely cleared of Russians.

THE FALL OF PRZEMYSL

The Austro-German attempts to relieve Przemyśl had thus come to naught, and the Austrian fortress soon reached the end of its resources. It will be remembered that it had been invested in the first Russian drive in Galicia in September, 1914. The siege had been raised after the ensuing Russian reverses in Galicia, but had been resumed in November, when the Russians again advanced. By this time, Przemyśl was the only considerable Austrian stronghold left in Galicia east of Cracow. It was not only a most important railroad centre—it contained thousands of Austrian troops who had fled there after their defeat, and in addition was a storehouse of great military stores sadly needed by Russia. Indeed, the Russians did not possess the artillery necessary to capture the fortress by storm and so patiently starved it into surrender. The garrison attempted a number of sorties in February and March, as the food situation became desperate, but with scant success. The Central Powers made a last effort to relieve the stronghold, but such efforts were doomed to failure while the Carpathian passes were in the hands of the Russians. Toward the middle of March, the defenders of the fortress were weak from hunger and in the last stages of resistance. On March 13, the Russians

managed to make a breach in the vital defences. Accordingly, on March 22, Przemyśl surrendered.

Aside from the prisoners captured, the fall of Przemyśl was of little material value to Russia, for most of the military stores and guns had been destroyed before surrender. But the moral effect of the capture of Przemyśl was as considerable as its material effect was inconsiderable. It helped to raise the prestige of the Entente Allies and at that moment the prestige of the Entente Allies was sadly in need of succor.

THE BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC

In contrast with the military encounters described immediately above—important, but not to be classed as decisive—there occurred at this stage of the war a battle of overwhelming significance, with results equalled in their far-reaching effect by few of the battles of the Great War. The Dunajec was the outstanding battle of 1915, as The Marne and Verdun were the outstanding battles of 1914 and 1916, respectively.

Throughout the first months of 1915, the Russian army in Galicia had been vainly endeavoring to force all the Carpathian passes necessary to invade Hungary. The attempt to extend the battle-line to the west to capture Cracow had been thwarted by Austro-German resistance, and in Galicia Russia now turned to the south instead of to the west. The northern extremities of the Carpathian passes were in Russian hands, at least to an extent sufficient to cut off any expeditions coming to the relief of Przemyśl; but the southern extremities and in many cases the crests of the important Carpathian passes were in the grip of the Central Powers.

In March, 1915, the Russians, strengthened by troops released by the fall of Przemyśl, concentrated their efforts upon the two passes most available for invading Hungary—the Dukla and the Lupkow Passes. In the Dukla Pass only were the Russians able to advance; and after severe and trying mountain fighting, by April they cut their way through this pass to its southern extremity. But German forces came to the assistance of the Austrian army, and by the end of April the Russian advance through the Dukla Pass had been halted, while

in the other passes the Central Powers had thrown back the troops of the Tsar and were even threatening to flank the Russian forces in and around the Dukla Pass.

All this time, Germany had been making unsurpassed preparations for a decisive drive on the Russian forces in Galicia. Germany had been forced to the conclusion that indirect attacks would not lay the danger in Galicia. In the west, the trench warfare had long been a deadlock, and Germany could weaken her western trenches without laying herself unduly open to peril. Throughout the winter of 1914-1915 Germany had devoted most of her great industrial plants to the manufacture of vast stores of large guns and heavy shells; while the Russian artillery was becoming weaker and weaker because of the inability of France and England to ship munitions to their ally in the east and because of the gradual breakdown of the poorly-organized industrial system of Russia. Corps after corps of the best fighters in the German army were being secretly transported to the Galician front. At several points along the great battle-line in the east, notably in the Baltic Provinces, Germany delivered feint attacks, to serve as pretexts for her great troop movements and to confuse Russia as to the direction in which the main blow might be expected. The complete German censorship on all news worked to perfection and the Entente Allies seem to have had no inkling of the disaster which was about to fall upon them. Germany was preparing nothing less than a blow which should be decisive and which should end for many months the military strength of Russia, so that Germany could devote her undivided attention to the crushing of France and England in the west.

There were also important political considerations favoring a tremendous effort against the Russian forces. A complete Russian defeat might not only keep Roumania neutral; it might even incline Roumania to the cause of the Central Powers. Lemberg and Przemyśl had seriously injured Austro-Hungarian morale; the complete rout of the Russians and the re-capture of Lemberg and Przemyśl would tend to end the unrest in the Dual Monarchy due to the disasters suffered because of the alliance with Germany. The Italian government was considering offers from both camps of belligerents to enter

the war; the complete rout of Russia might strengthen the offers which the Central Powers had made to Italy and which, they were by this time aware, had been more than counterbalanced by the offers of the Entente Allies. The Galician plain occupied by the Russians contained invaluable oil wells and farming land. An Austro-Hungarian victory might fan the flames of revolution in Russia, and with Russia in the hands of the revolutionists, the Russian military power would be, at least for many months, at an end.

At the end of April, the battle-line in the east was as follows:— From Memel on the Baltic Sea sharply southeast along the Niemen River into Russian Poland northeast of Warsaw. Then through Russian Poland parallel to the Russo-German border through Ossowiecz. Then bending to the west to a point some forty miles west of Warsaw. Then due south across the Austro-Russian border east of Cracow to the Carpathians. Then turning almost at a right angle to run along the Carpathians east and west instead of north and south. Then leaving the Carpathians where the mountains bend to the southeast, to stretch due east to Roumania. Then due south once more along the Roumanian frontier to the Carpathians north of Bukowina. The German commander-in-chief in the east was von Hindenburg, with von Mackensen directly in command of the army which was to inflict the defeat on the Dunajec. The Russian commander-in-chief was Grand Duke Nicholas, with General Dmitrieff in direct command of the Russian armies along the Dunajec.

To the north and centre of this battle-line, the Central Powers had already tried to break through in vain. An Austro-German victory along the Roumanian frontier would not necessarily compel the withdrawal of the western end of the Russian line in Galicia. But a victory in western Galicia would spell ruin for the Russians if the Germans could only break the line at that point. For that point was virtually the apex of the huge Russian salient into Austria-Hungary; if it were broken, Dmitrieff's connections with Evarts' army to his north and Brusiloff's army to his southeast might be broken. As the German plan called for the extensive use of heavy guns and as heavy guns could not be quickly moved forward after each attack if the

BEFORE THE BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC
The battle-line in the east in April, 1915

attacks were in mountainous or hilly country, it was inevitable that the point chosen for the German onslaught should be the point where the Russian line in Galicia turned from the Carpathians to the level country to the north.

Dmitrieff's line was behind the Dunajec in front of Tarnow, whence it stretched along the Biala down to the Carpathians themselves. Dmitrieff's army adjoined that of Evarts, on the north, at the Vistula; and the army of Brusiloff, to the southeast, in the foothills of the Carpathians. At the end of April, a sharp thaw had suddenly melted the snows in the Carpathians and the Dunajec as well as other streams were swollen; the Russian position therefore looked strong, especially since Dmitrieff was occupying trenches which had been built several months before and which accordingly were comprehensive and strong. Dmitrieff had behind him the rivers Wisloka, Wistok and San, behind which he could also make stands and which accordingly he considered his second, third and fourth lines of retreat.

On this occasion, the Germans' plan of battle was in sharp contrast to their usual flanking strategy. Von Mackensen was to batter down Russian resistance with his heavy guns, and hence he was going to ram straight into the Russian centre, leaving the flanks to take care of themselves. Indeed, on the wings of the Battle of the Dunajec the Russians constantly drove back the Germans, only themselves to be compelled to retreat by the inexorable advance of the battering ram in the centre of the line.

The great drive was opened on April 28 by a preliminary advance on Dmitrieff's left wing along the Biala, near the junction with Brusiloff's army. A German advance here would flank both these Russian armies and Dmitrieff hastened to support his left with troops withdrawn from his centre. Then, on May 1, the main attack was launched frontally on the southern part of Dmitrieff's line, south of Tarnow. The rain of shells loosed from the German guns had been unprecedented in volume in the east. Before that artillery attack the Russian trenches were leveled, and the Russian forces could not prevent the Germans from bridging the Biala. Completely paralyzed by the heavy fire, the Russian army could not then stop the crack German troops from advancing, and by May 2, the force

Upper Left-Hand Corner—Major-General Leonard Wood, Commander, Department of the East, United States Army, 1914-March 25, 1917, and Southeastern Department, March 25, 1917-August 16, 1917; Commander, Camp Funston, August 16, 1917—.

Upper Right-Hand Corner—Major-General George W. Goethals, Civil Governor, Panama Canal Zone, 1914-1916; General Manager, Emergency Fleet Corporation, April 14, 1917-July 24, 1917; Acting Quartermaster General, United States Army, December 18, 1917-January 7, 1918; Chief, Division of Storage and Traffic and Purchase of General Staff, United States Army, February, 1918—.

Center—General Peyton C. March, Commander, Army Artillery, American Expeditionary Force, 1917; Chief of Staff, United States Army, February 7, 1918—.

Lower Left-Hand Corner—Major General Enoch H. Crowder, Provost Marshal General, United States Army, May 18, 1917—.

Lower Right-Hand Corner—Brigadier General William L. Kenly, Chief, Division of Military Aeronautics, United States Army, April 24, 1918—.

which had made the frontal attack had effected a junction with the force to the south which had begun the engagement on April 28. The combined force then advanced, captured Gorlice, and marched for the rear of the remainder of Dmitrieff's army. The Russian flank had been turned, and to the north also German troops had advanced and had thus driven the Russians back along the whole line. Resistance was hopeless, and the case became one of *sauve qui peut*. Dmitrieff's army ceased to exist as an army—it had been reduced to an unorganized procession streaming in panic toward the Wisloka, twenty miles away.

On the Wisloka the Russians made a determined stand for several days. The ever-present Russian reinforcements were rushed up, and the German infantry was halted. But by May 7, the German heavy guns were once more in place and again the Russians were helpless before the downpour of shells. On May 8, the Russians broke once more, the Germans crossed the river and the entire Russian line in Galicia had been torn wide asunder.

Brusiloff to the southeast was thus in extreme danger. The retreat of Dmitrieff had left Brusiloff's right wing unprotected, and the Germans were hastening across the gap to get in the latter's rear. His escape was well-nigh miraculous. It was due to the manoeuvre of sending against the Germans coming down the Wisloka on Brusiloff's rear some reinforcements which had just arrived. The Russian reinforcements succeeded in holding the Germans for a few hours, and in those hours the bulk of Brusiloff's army managed to rush through the noose before it closed. Both Russian armies were then rushing pell-mell for the San River, more than seventy-five miles from the Dunajec. They had thus avoided complete disaster; but they had retreated almost one hundred miles, they were completely disorganized and their losses in dead and prisoners were very, very high.

By May 12, Brusiloff had reached the San and had taken up positions behind it, positions stretching through Jaroslav and Przemyśl; and what was left of Dmitrieff's army joined itself to Brusiloff's command. To the north, Evarts' army had also retired to a line just west of the Vistula in order to keep in touch with the new Russian

position, so once more there was an unbroken Russian line opposed to the Germans. But the strength of the on-creeping German battering ram was as great as ever, whereas the Russians were far weaker along the San than they had been along the Dunajec.

So that it proved as impossible for Brusiloff to stop von Mackensen at the San as it had proved for Dmitrieff to stop him at the Dunajec. By May 14, the German heavy guns arrived at the San, battered down the Russian resistance and crossed the river north of Przemyśl at Jaroslav, capturing that city. In the meantime, the Austro-German troops who had been facing Brusiloff in the Carpathians, before Brusiloff retreated, began to appear on the scene. They moved for the south wing of the Russian forces, in back of Przemyśl, while von Mackensen made for the north wing. In the meantime, however, General Evarts to the north had not been idle. He struck with vigor against the Austro-German troops facing him, inflicted a severe defeat upon them, and drove them back a considerable distance. But the main Austro-German force was too strong and numerous for any flanking movements upon it by Evarts; so that the latter's success, although inconveniencing the main bulk of the army of von Mackensen, nevertheless did not stop it. Away off to the east, in Bukovina, also, a Russian counter-attack had been successful, but the German centre was too strong and could not be stopped by reverses on the wings. So that the German advance on the centre continued, despite heroic Russian resistance. Przemyśl was attacked, and after sharp resistance fell on May 31. The Russians had spent more than four months in capturing it; they had held it little more than two. Its stand had merely given the Russians time to retire, and by the first of June they had succeeded in withdrawing, with heavy losses, from the San to the hills and marshes in front of Lemberg. Practically all of Galicia was now freed of Russians and the forces of the Central Powers had crossed into Russian Poland from the south so well as from the west.

Upon the Russian line in front of Lemberg, von Mackensen now employed new tactics. His heavy artillery could hardly be used in a hilly and swampy region. He therefore fell upon the Russian south wing, far below Lemberg and the lakes to the west of the town. By

June 7, the Austro-Germans had crossed the Dniester to the south-east of Lemberg. In the meantime, von Mackensen had shifted his heavy guns to the north of the Russian line, and from June 10 began to break through there. Lemberg was too strong to be attacked frontally, but the Russians were being driven in on it; and it was useless to attempt to defend it. Retirement was better than encirclement. By June 20, von Mackensen was in the rear of Lemberg both to the north and the south, and the Russians abandoned the town. The battle-line in the east was now entirely on Russian soil. The Austro-Germans were northeast and southeast, as well as west, of Russian Poland. Russian Poland was being surrounded, and was now a salient from Brest-Litovsk to Warsaw extending into an unbroken enemy line. If the salient should narrow, the battle-line would be straightened and Russian Poland would be completely in the hands of the Central Powers.

In eight weeks, the Central Powers had undone the Russian work of eight months. The Russian armies had been shattered and disrupted, and hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers were now in German prison camps. In the east, after almost a whole year of war, Russia was weaker and Germany stronger than on August 1, 1914.

THE CAPTURE OF RUSSIAN POLAND

With Russian Poland surrounded on three sides and hence forming a sharp salient projecting into the enemy lines, the fall of Warsaw and of the remainder of Russian Poland not already in the hands of the Central Powers became inevitable. There was little demand for unusual strategy or for unusual preparations on the part of the Germans. Their lines in France and Belgium were still holding, so that there was no need for withdrawing back to the west the troops which had been withdrawn to the east. The Russian forces were beaten, weakened, outnumbered, disorganized and discouraged; the Russian morale was at a low ebb; Russian military supplies were becoming scantier and scantier; and enthusiasm for prosecuting the war was dying out in the high administrative circles of the Empire

of the Tsar no less than among the millions over whom the Tsar reigned.

Indeed, the general Austro-German advance upon Russian Poland got under way not long after the fall of Lemberg. Lemberg had fallen in the latter part of June; in the first part of July, the German north wing advanced along the Baltic Sea in the Baltic Provinces and got within striking distance of Riga. It also thus got on the north side of the salient, and into position to march upon the rear of Warsaw. At the same time, a considerable concentration of German troops was effected in East Prussia, around Thorn, on the Vistula, almost due west of Warsaw. Meanwhile, the Austro-German forces under von Mackensen which had completed the rout of the Russians in Galicia were now marching upon Russian Poland from the south.

Warsaw was almost at the apex of the salient, and was hence in a most precarious position. But the chief Russian railways in Poland concentrated on Warsaw, and if Warsaw should be surrendered, the transportation facilities of the Russians would become even more inadequate than they then were. Grand Duke Nicholas accordingly prepared to defend the city, although it was obvious that eventually Warsaw would have to be abandoned.

The Austro-German advance from Galicia upon Russian Poland was in two bodies—one, the Germans under von Mackensen; and the other, the Austrians under Archduke Joseph. On July 3, both these bodies came into contact with the south wing of the main Russian forces defending Warsaw and Poland. After several days, the Russians managed to stop the army of von Mackensen, who entrenched and awaited developments in other points of the line. At the same time, the troops of the Archduke Joseph were sharply checked around Krasnik, and were compelled to retreat before they, too, could entrench to await developments on the northern and western sides of the salient.

From July 6 to July 15, the Germans advanced all along the lines in the north and east. On the latter day, the general attack of the Central Powers was launched in earnest. On July 15, Przasnysz fell. On the eighteenth, the Germans were across the Rawka and Bzura Rivers. By the twentieth, the Russian line was back of the Narew,

and the famous fortresses along that river were under the fire of the German heavy guns. On the twenty-third, the Narew was crossed in a number of places. By July 25, the Germans were on the Bug, only twenty miles from Warsaw.

Simultaneously with this advance from the north, the Austro-German forces on the south had again assumed the offensive. On the eighteenth, although the army of the Archduke had been held, the army of von Mackensen won a signal victory, and by retreating the Russians were compelled to narrow their salient on the south as well as upon the north. By the twenty-second, the Austro-Germans were at Ivangorod, commanding the immediate approach on Warsaw from the southeast. On July 30, Lublin fell, and with it, command over one of the main railroad lines leading from Warsaw.

Ever since July 15, the Russians had decided to evacuate Warsaw, and their military plan since that day had been that of defending the sides of the Warsaw salient long enough to allow the troops in the centre of the Russian line to withdraw in safety. The civilian evacuation of the capital of Russian Poland had begun around July 20 and by July 25, the military evacuation. The Russians conducted their retreat with rare skill, avoiding encirclement, and by the beginning of August Warsaw was free of Russian troops. Exactly one year and four days after Germany had declared war on Russia, German troops were in possession of Warsaw.

The surrender of Warsaw by no means ended the danger confronting the Russian army. The wedges driven by the war machine under the general direction of von Falkenheyn and the immediate direction of von Hindenburg were being constantly deepened, and many of the corps of the Russian army were in danger of being surrounded and compelled to surrender in mass. Their only course was to avoid lengthy engagements and to retreat to a line where a stand might be made with some hope of success. The sole ray of hope in the Russian situation was the presence of a number of strong fortresses in Russian Poland which should have been able to hold off the Germans long enough for the forces of the Tsar to consolidate a new line of defence. On the extreme north, the Germans had advanced in the Baltic Provinces along the Gulf of Riga, but Riga itself had not fallen.

South of Riga, Kovno, a strong fortress, dictated the position of the line in the north, and southeast of Kovno the Niemen River stretched to the fortress of Grodno. From Kovno the line stretched to Brest-Litovsk, a heavily-fortified city; and south of Brest-Litovsk, Rovno, Lutsk and Dubno were fortresses which could conceivably be held.

But on August 17, Kovno unexpectedly surrendered. Its fall allowed the Germans to threaten an approach on Brest-Litovsk from the north as well as from the south, and on August 25, Brest-Litovsk was abandoned. On August 22, Ossowiecz also fell. The Germans were driving ahead along the entire line. Riga held out, but early in September Grodno, Lutsk and Dubno fell before the fire of the heavy German guns, and the Germans were well across the Niemen and the Bug rivers.

Once more the Russian situation was dangerous, and once more extreme skill was necessary to avoid a second Sedan. The Tsar himself took supreme command of the Russian armies and entrusted them directly to General Alexieff; and once more the Russians extricated themselves from their positions without surrendering any considerable portion of their army in mass. Sharp and brilliant counter-attacks held up the Germans for a few hours at the points of greatest danger, and Russia still possessed something which might be called an army to take up a new line of defence. Back of Pinsk was a vast, desolate region of swamps known as the Pripet Marshes, and if the Russian army could be driven into them, it would indeed cease to become an army. But the Russians made good their third position, although Vilna fell on September 18 and although the Germans advanced throughout September. The Germans were now getting farther and farther from their base of supplies; it was not advisable to keep the eastern front so far from the western that reinforcements could not be rushed to France quickly in case of a disaster on the western front; a new Allied offensive in France was at hand; winter was approaching; the Russian line had finally been straightened; the Russians had lost more than a million in killed and wounded, almost a million in prisoners, and some 65,000 square miles of territory; and the Germans had accomplished their chief objectives—the occupation of all of Russian Poland; the disappearance for many months

of any military threat from Russia; the safeguarding of Galicia, Hungary and East Prussia; the straightening of the battle-line in the east from the Gulf of Riga clear down to the Austro-Roumanian frontier; and the crippling of the Russian military forces.

By October 1, accordingly, the fighting died down on the east. The new line stretched from Riga due east along the Dvina River to Dvinsk; then straight south through Pinsk and Dubno through the extreme eastern edge of Galicia to the Carpathians.

THE ENTRANCE OF ITALY AND BULGARIA INTO THE WAR

ITALY DECIDES

There has already been traced, in Volume I, the conflict between Austria and Italy which was made inevitable by the rise of a feeling for unified nationality in the Italian peninsula. There was traced also the problem of "Italia Irredenta," and we saw that the final redemption of all the Italian nationality from Austrian rule had not yet been achieved by the time of the outbreak of the Great War. We saw, finally, that Italy declared that the terms of the Triple Alliance did not enjoin participation by her on the side of Germany and Austria in case the war waged by the latter was an offensive war; and that for this reason Italy had proclaimed her neutrality when the Great War burst forth.

With Trieste, the sea-coast of the Istrian peninsula and a few islands in the Adriatic off Dalmatia, and also the Trentino, inhabited chiefly by Italians, but under the Austro-Hungarian flag, it was natural that there should arise in Italy as the war proceeded an accelerated anti-Austrian feeling coupled with the demand that Italy seize this opportune occasion for bringing all the "unredeemed Italians" under the Italian flag. Along with this feeling ran a longing to see Italy grow in influence and strength. Italian aspirations were concerned largely with a desire for complete control of the Adriatic, and a movement became strong to seize the entire upper east coast of the Adriatic from Austrian rule and from South Slav aspirations and to convert it into "an Italian lake." Finally, in Italy as in other neutral lands, the vicious influence upon international relations which would result from a German victory was appreciated; and Italy would be rendering no small service to civilization if she should assist in the defeat of the Central Powers.

But obviously the decision of Italy would depend largely upon the course which the war would take. Italy's participation in the conflict,

after all, would be chiefly for the purpose of realizing Italian nationalistic aims; and Italy would be injured instead of helped if she joined the losing combination. However, it was becoming more and more difficult for Italy to remain neutral. A neutral Italy could hope for nothing from the victors, whether the victors should be the Central Powers or the Entente Allies. If Italy remained neutral and the Central Powers won the war, "Italia Irredenta" would obviously remain Austrian; and if Italy remained neutral and the Entente Allies won the war, Servia or a new Yugoslavia would gain along the Adriatic at the expense of Italian longings in that quarter. Nay, more, as in the case of America later, if Italy remained neutral, she might have no international friendships, only international enmities, and might have to pay penalties to the victors as part of the spoils of war.

After the German plan of campaign, a plan naturally understood by the Italian government, met with disaster at the Marne and after the Russians showed unexpected strength by their crushing defeat of the Austrians at Lemberg, it seemed as though final victory for the Central Powers was extremely improbable. So that both from private and semi-official sources there was launched in Italy toward the end of 1914 and the beginning of 1915 a campaign of propaganda demanding that Italy throw in her lot with the Entente. This campaign helped to arouse the Italian people to demand war, and by the time that the government was ready to make a final decision, it could rely upon popular support for its course, outside of the ranks of the powerful Socialist and syndicalist groups.

In the early months of 1915, both the Entente Allies and the Central Powers laid before the Italian government tempting promises in order to gain Italy over to their side. The German government dispatched as ambassador to Italy one of its ablest diplomats, Prince von Bülow; but Prince von Bülow's influence upon both the Rome and the Vienna courts, although it delayed Italy's entrance into the war, was insufficient to prevent Italy from formulating in April a series of demands to which the Austro-Hungarian government would not entirely agree. The powerful and popular ex-premier, Giolitti, had no better success in persuading his fellow-countrymen to remain neutral. Austria-Hungary was willing to cede a large part of the Italian demands, but the Entente Allies were willing, even anxious to cede all of them;

and on May 4, Italy formally renounced her treaty with Germany and Austria-Hungary and on May 24 formally declared war on Austria-Hungary. It was significant that war was not declared at the same time on the allies of Austria-Hungary. Italy did not declare war on Turkey until August 21, 1915, nor on Bulgaria until October 19, 1915; and not until more than a year after Italy's declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, not until August 28, 1916, did Italy formally declare war on Germany.

Italy's bargain with the Entente Allies was embodied in a secret treaty, first made public by the Bolshevist leaders when they achieved control in Russia in November, 1917. This treaty, known as the Pact of London, in certain respects went counter to the principles embodied later by President Wilson in his "Fourteen Points." Roughly, the Pact of London promised to Italy not only "Italy Irredenta" proper, but also sections of the Istrian peninsula and the Dalmatian coast, together with Adriatic islands, in which the Slavic and not the Italian nationality was in the ascendancy, and in addition certain non-Italian sections of the Austrian Tyrol. However, the port of Fiume was not awarded Italy by the Pact of London.

With Italy thus entering the war primarily to wrest additions to the Italian kingdom from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy proceeded to send her army to occupy the land desired. We have already seen that Austria had realized that even while the two countries were at peace she would have to maintain a large force on the Austro-Italian frontier, and a large Austrian force had long been maintained there; so that the declaration of war by Italy did not weaken Austria to so great an extent as it otherwise would have done. Nevertheless, Italy's active participation in the war was a sharp blow to the cause of the Central Powers. Italy's assistance to the Entente was a military assistance not only; it also cut off the Central Powers from a source of supplies and furthermore increased both the morale and the prestige of the Entente.

THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

Some twenty miles from the Adriatic along the Austro-Italian frontier the mountains end, and the frontier runs through a plain. A

short distance back from that frontier and parallel to it is the Isonzo River, and back of this stream the Austrians had long been digging trenches and rolling up large guns, so that their position was one of considerable strength. Indeed, throughout 1915, Italian endeavors to carry the Austrian position failed. Even attempts to shell Gorizia, the important Austrian fortress on the Isonzo, came to naught. However, coincidently with dispatching a force along the Adriatic, Italy had sent a force northward into the mountains to gain and to hold the passes there, lest the Austrians descend from them to attack the army along the Isonzo in the rear; and the Italian army achieved marked success in gaining and in holding the mountain passes to the north of the Isonzo line. (See Map, page 605.)

BULGARIA DECIDES

After the first German drive in France and the first Russian drive in Galicia had slackened, the belligerents were given a breathing space in which to look around them. Their looks soon fell upon the Balkans, and by the beginning of 1915 both the Entente and the Alliance were busily pulling wires in the Near East to gain new partnerships or to prevent new oppositions. We have seen that the Treaty of Bucharest, which closed the Second Balkan War in 1913, had laid down political boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula with cool disregard of nationalistic and racial boundaries. We saw that Bulgaria especially had been penalized and almost completely deprived of the fruits of the victory of the Balkan League over Turkey in the First Balkan War. Even more than Italy, Bulgaria seethed in 1915 with nationalistic longings to redeem its Irredenta and to bring under its rule a large portion of its nationality over which an alien flag flew.

In the competition for Bulgaria's allegiance, the Entente Allies were at a disadvantage as compared with the Central Powers. Many of the "unredeemed Bulgarians" were in Serbian territory; and obviously Bulgarian ambitions could be realized only at the expense of Serbia, one of the Entente. Moreover, as traced in Volume I, there was keen rivalry between Bulgaria and Russia, another of the

Entente, in the Balkans, a rivalry which had inclined Bulgaria to the camp of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Bulgaria had even negotiated a large loan from Germany.

At this time, the Entente Allies were feverishly endeavoring to win over Greece, as well, to their side, but a large section of the Bulgarian nationality was also under Greek rule, and hence Greek and Bulgarian interests were diametrically opposed.

The primary element working in favor of the Entente Allies in Bulgaria was the rivalry of Bulgaria and Turkey. Their interests conflicted especially over a railroad. This railroad ran north from Dedeagatch, the one good Bulgarian port on the Aegean Sea. But between Dedeagatch and Sofia the railroad ran through Turkish territory, and Bulgaria was persistently demanding that this small strip of Turkey be ceded her for the furtherance of Bulgarian economic interests.

The Entente's endeavors in the Balkans were centred chiefly around an attempt to resurrect the Balkan League of 1912 and to lead it once more to war against Turkey. Sir Edward Grey evidently hoped that common hatred of the Turk would induce the Balkan states to forget their own selfish ambitions. But the scars left by the Second Balkan War proved still too raw for a new Balkan alliance and the Turk, moreover, was not so dangerous nor so oppressive in the Balkan Peninsula as he had been in 1912. The Balkan states therefore looked with coldness upon the project for a new Balkan alliance and Bulgaria continued to try to pull her own chestnuts out of the fire.

The final success of the German diplomats in Bulgaria was presaged early in 1915, when Bulgaria obtained from Germany a large payment on the loan already negotiated. In the summer, the German statesmen finally prevailed upon Turkey to cede altogether to Bulgaria the strip of Turkish territory along the railroad coveted by Bulgaria, and that serious obstacle to participation by Bulgaria in the War on the side of the Central Powers was removed.

In May, the Entente Allies definitely submitted offers to Bulgaria in return for Bulgarian assistance, but were not able to make these offers sufficiently alluring to win over the Bulgarian government. Indeed, it seems probable that as early as July, 1915, a secret alliance

had been perfected between Bulgaria and the Central Powers. At all events, by this time the failure of the Allies at the Dardanelles and Gallipoli and the utter collapse of the Russian military campaign were giving a gloomy appearance to the Entente cause. However, in August Bulgaria demanded of the Allies that the territory in Serbia and Greece inhabited chiefly by Bulgars should be joined to the Bulgarian kingdom. The Allies were willing to meet most of these demands, but the recompense offered Serbia was from Greece and was inadequate; and as both Greece and Serbia were naturally not in favor of such an arrangement, Bulgaria might well have wondered how reliable and secure were the promises of the Entente. Moreover, at about this time another large payment was made to Bulgaria by Germany on account of credit extended; and so there was little surprise when in the latter part of September Bulgaria announced a policy of armed neutrality and mobilized her army in order to put that policy into effect. The open participation by Bulgaria in the war was evidently delayed to give the country time to mobilize completely and to attack Serbia only when the Germans and Austrians were also in a position to attack Serbia in force. Bulgaria's final purpose was so evident that many Entente statesmen advised that Serbia attack Bulgaria before the latter could effectively prepare to attack Serbia; but Sir Edward Grey refused to invade a country which was still neutral and friendly, if only on paper. However, by October, German and Austrian officers were drilling the Bulgarian troops with such openness that Russia delivered an ultimatum to Bulgaria demanding that Bulgaria cease her intrigues with the enemies of the Entente Allies. Bulgaria's answer was to declare war on Serbia on October 14, 1915 and to invade the kingdom of King Peter from the west without further delay. According to the secret bargain between Bulgaria and the Central Powers, Bulgaria was to obtain territory from Serbia and from Greece and in addition much of Albania. On October 14, Great Britain declared war on Bulgaria, and Italy and Russia followed the example of their ally on October 19.

THE OCCUPATION OF SERVIA

With the Central Powers assured of the support of Bulgaria, the acquisition of Serbia became of primary importance to their interests. Serbia lay between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, and Bulgaria adjoined Turkey; so that if the Central Powers should occupy Serbia; they would obtain a solid belt of territory through Central Europe—the four members of the new Quadruple Alliance could exchange soldiers, guns, food, and goods without interference—there would be uninterrupted railroad connection between Berlin and Asia Minor through Constantinople—the Central Powers would thus obtain for their products markets which had hitherto been closed to them—similarly they would be able to draw for supplies upon new sources—and above all, the fall of Serbia would increase the prestige of the Central Powers throughout the Balkans.

Servia had suffered severe losses in the campaign in the winter of 1914 which had resulted in the defeat of the Austrian invaders. Moreover, since that time, typhus had raged fiercely in the land of King Peter, and had laid low many thousands of soldiers. Against an equal or even a slightly superior force of Austrians, Servia might be able to make a stand; but if the Austrians were in overwhelming strength, especially in artillery, Servia's plight would be desperate; and if at the same time Servia should be attacked in the rear by Bulgaria, her case would be hopeless.

The Central Powers delayed the attack on Servia until the rout of Russia in Poland and Galicia was complete, and until Austro-German troops and guns could be readily transferred to the Serbian front, and also until Bulgaria should have completely finished her military preparations. It was therefore not until October that the attack on Servia began in earnest.


By the first day of October, strong Austro-German forces had assembled on the north shores of the Danube and the Save and also

along the Drina River near its junction with the Save. The enemy was ready to cross the rivers into Serbia so soon as their artillery had paved the way. The Austro-Germans, under the direct supervision of von Mackensen, were divided into two armies, under Generals von Koevess and von Gallwitz. The Serbian commander, General Putnik, sadly outnumbered and fearing flanking movements, placed the bulk of his army of some 200,000 on his wings and left Belgrade and his centre weak.

On October 3, the Austro-Germans opened fire on the Serbian positions on the south banks of the Danube and the Save and on the east bank of the Drina. The Central Powers were employing the same method against Serbia as they had employed some months previously against Russia, and with similar results. The Serbians had no facilities to stop the terrific bombardment, and gradually their positions became untenable. On the seventh, the Austro-Germans crossed the river at various points; on the next day, the Serbians were compelled to evacuate Belgrade, reduced to ruins by the bombardment of many months; and on October 9 Belgrade was once more in the possession of the Central Powers. On the next several days, the Serbian army was driven back all along the northern and western lines. And this was the moment chosen by Bulgaria to attack Serbia on the east.

The Entente Allies had to some extent foreseen the danger which Serbia was facing and had prepared to concentrate men and supplies to be rushed to Serbia's support. But men and supplies could be sent to Serbia only through Greece and Greece was neutral. At least, Greece was officially neutral; in reality, the country was split into two opposing factions, one pro-German and the other pro-Ally. The Greek king and the Greek court were pro-German; the premier, Eleutherios Venizelos, possibly the most discerning statesman in all Europe, with his government was pro-Ally. Since the Balkan Wars there had been an alliance between Serbia and Greece, and Venizelos maintained that that alliance compelled Greece to come to Serbia's assistance against the Central Powers. He had mobilized the Greek army and had invited the Allies to occupy Saloniki (from which a railroad ran to Serbia) and to send assistance to Serbia from Saloniki through

Greece. The Entente Allies had availed themselves of the invitation of Venizelos, and had concentrated their relief expedition to Serbia at Saloniki, under the command of the French general, Sarrail.



SERBIA

But when the Austro-Germans and Bulgarians attacked Serbia, Greece determined still to remain neutral. Venizelos demanded war; the issue was joined; Venizelos was defeated and went into retire-

ment; and Greece withdrew her invitation to the Entente and demanded that the Entente respect her neutrality. But the Entente refused, and, despite the protests of the Greek rulers and of the new Greek government, continued to send troops through Greece in order to get at the enemy beyond. An Allied expeditionary force set out from Saloniki to strengthen the Serbian army and the Bulgars set out to interpose between the Allied force and the Serbians; the fate of Servia hence hinged upon a race for the occupancy of the railroad leading into Servia from Saloniki.

The Bulgars advanced in three armies. The northern one moved up the Danube and joined the east wing of the Austro-German troops. Another army made for Nish, the new Serbian capital. The southern army, the strongest, made all haste for the Varda valley to occupy Uskub, on the Belgrade-Saloniki railroad, before the Entente force marching north from Saloniki could reach it.

In the meantime, the Serbians, attacked on three sides, but stoutly resisting, were being everywhere thrust back. By October 17, the enemy got between Nish and the road to Saloniki. Wedges were being driven at several points into the Serbian lines; and although most of the Serbian army still held together in the hope that assistance would reach it from Saloniki before it was completely overwhelmed, yet already considerable Serbian forces had been detached from the main body.

All this time, the Franco-British were hurrying north to join the Serbians before the Bulgarians could cut them off. But on October 20, the Bulgarians reached Veles, on the Belgrade-Saloniki railroad, and thus blocked the further advance of the Allies along the railroad. Two days afterward, the Bulgarians had reached Uskub also; and their position was too strong to be carried by attack in time to save Servia. There remained only one other method of rescuing her. The Franco-British might leave the railroad and, marching west, might reach Servia through the Babuna Pass, where a Serbian force was awaiting them. But here again the Bulgarians won the test of speed, reached the Pass early in November, and there also cut off the Serbians from their would-be rescuers. Servia was doomed.

The Serbians were still holding back their enemies on the north-east, but as their sole avenue of retreat lay toward Montenegro and Albania on the southwest, their stand was of little significance. On October 30, the strong fortress, Kragujevats, was captured, and the Serbian army was split in two. On November 6, Nish itself fell, and the Serbians were a people without a country. Fighting sharp rear-guard engagements, the salvage of one branch of the Serbian army fled into Montenegro, while the salvage of the other branch fled into Albania, only to be attacked by the Albanian mountaineers and to suffer still further losses before being rescued by Italian forces and ships.

The Allied forces which had tried in vain to come to the relief of Serbia numbered some 175,000. After Serbia had been hopelessly lost, this force entrenched in the Vardar valley around Uskub; and there they were attacked by the Bulgarians early in December. They were outnumbered, and their opponents were excellent fighting men; and after a battle of a week, the Franco-British were defeated and forced back into Greece. They retired on Saloniki, and hastily fortified themselves there, fearing that the Bulgarians would violate Greek neutrality and attack Saloniki. But the Bulgarians respected the neutrality of Greece and did not enter Greek territory. Nevertheless, the Allies continued to maintain a strong force at Saloniki, both to influence Roumania and to exert pressure upon Greece, so that Greece would not join the Central Powers.

THE OCCUPATION OF MONTENEGRO AND ALBANIA

As part of the Serbian campaign, the Central Powers overran also Montenegro and Albania, and the Montenegrin and Albanian campaigns should hence be described at this point, although they continued into the early part of 1916.

With Serbia subjugated by November, an Austrian army crossed the Montenegrin frontier on December 1, 1915. A day or so afterwards, another force attacked Montenegro in another section at the same time that Austrian battleships bombarded the coast. The Montenegrins had been reinforced by some remnants of the Serbian army,

but the Entente, including the Italians, could not see its way clear to lend Montenegro substantial assistance, so that the eventual surrender of the country of King Nicholas was but a matter of time. Upon a country so small as Montenegro and upon a small and poorly-equipped army of some 30,000, the advance of the Central Powers was rapid. The invaders' losses were trifling, for they relied upon their heavy guns to blast away the Montenegrin positions. In December, most of the eastern border of Montenegro fell before the attack of the Austrians; and in January, the Montenegrins were defeated in their last stand in the Tara and Lim valleys. Mount Lovtchen was captured on January 10 by a force operating from the seacoast and Cetinje, the capital, on January 13; and by the end of January the territory held by the Quadruple Alliance included Montenegro as well as Serbia.

The situation in Albania was more complicated. It will be remembered that after the Second Balkan War Albania had been constituted an independent principality under Prince William of Wied. Even in 1913, however, it was obvious that this solution of the problem of Albania could be only temporary, and with the outbreak of the war Albanian neutrality was disregarded on all sides. After William of Wied had fled the country, it had been under the nominal leadership of a pro-Ally leader, Essad Pasha. But the mass of the Albanian mountaineers were Mohammedans and their sympathies were all with Turkey, so that the government and the people were at loggerheads. As early as 1914, Italy had seized the port of Avlona and Greece had occupied the southern part of Albania (Epirus), which she had long coveted. In January, 1915, the mass of the Albanian people revolted against the leadership of Essad Pasha and attacked Durazzo. Essad Pasha appealed to Italy (still neutral) for assistance and Italy sent to his aid a fleet of warships which dispersed the rebels. Italy then retained control over Durazzo.

In February, an Albanian force crossed the frontier into Serbia in the hope of releasing "Albania Irredenta" from Serbia. Serbia retaliated in the summer by invading Albania and after several pitched battles occupied the greater part of the country. She thus obtained the territory promised her as a result of the First Balkan War. At the

same time, the Montenegrins also invaded Albania from the north and obtained the territory allotted Montenegro from the First Balkan War.

So that for practical purposes Albania was in the hands of the Serbians and Montenegrins in the winter of 1915, and the Central Powers therefore proceeded to attack it after Serbia and Montenegro had been conquered.

Cettinje, the capital of Montenegro, is but forty miles from Scutari, the most important city in Albania; and after capturing Cettinje, the forces of the Central Powers proceeded immediately upon Scutari. By this time, Italy had sent a small force to Scutari to assist in transporting those fragments of the Serbian army which had taken refuge in Albania. Northern Albania made little attempt to resist the invaders, although the Italian and Serbian forces made good their escape from Scutari. In February, Durazzo fell. In southern Albania, however, a considerable Italian force had been landed at Avlona, so that northern Albania remained in the hands of the Central Powers while southern Albania was in the hands of the Entente Allies.

ON THE HIGH SEAS

On the water, 1915 was a year of comparative inaction. The Entente maintained its supremacy and the Alliance continued its submarine warfare, so that the chief naval activity was the transportation of troops and supplies. (The Dardanelles attack has been described above and the character of the submarine warfare waged by Germany and Austria-Hungary, in Volume I.) In the Adriatic, the Austrian fleet was still bottled up by the French fleet and, after May, by the Italian fleet as well, and did not attempt to make a sortie, being content to concede Entente command of the Mediterranean as Germany was content to concede Entente command of the Atlantic. In the Baltic Sea, a German naval squadron came into conflict with the Russian fleet, with losses on both sides. In the Black Sea, the Russian fleet was unchallenged, although it could not approach near enough Constantinople for a bombardment of the Turkish capital. In different localities, a number of important and unimportant Allied warships were lost by contact with torpedoes and mines. Several German commerce raiders still made themselves felt. Of these, the *Dresden* and *Königsberg* were sunk and the *Prince Eitel Friedrich* and the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* escaped safely into Newport News and were interned. The only naval engagement of significance was the Battle of Dogger Bank.

THE BATTLE OF DOGGER BANK

In the winter of 1914, German battleships had begun the practise of making short and sudden raids upon the English coast, often bombarding unfortified towns and killing non-combatants of both sexes. A similar policy was pursued in air-raids, until the Entente Allies retaliated in kind and before the end of the war seem to have caused more destruction and more deaths by raids from the air upon German and Belgian towns than the Germans had caused by raids upon English towns.

On the morning of January 24, 1915, a German squadron of battle-cruisers sailed from Helgoland to conduct another raid upon the British coast. The heavy cruisers comprised the *Seydlitz*, the *Derfflinger*, the *Moltke* and the *Blücher*. They were supported by six light cruisers and by a squadron of destroyers. A fleet of submarines also accompanied the squadron, in case of contact with a section of the British fleet.

At seven o'clock in the morning the Germans met a British cruiser squadron of greater numbers and speed and of heavier armament. The British squadron, under the command of Admiral Beatty, comprised the heavy cruisers *Lion*, *Tiger*, *Princess Royal*, *New Zealand*, and *Indomitable*; four intermediate cruisers; three light cruisers; and several squadrons of destroyers.

The British opened fire at once, and, realizing the hopelessness of attempting to offer battle, the German commander, Admiral von Hipper, immediately retraced his course and fled for the protection of Helgoland and the German mine fields. When the battle opened, a distance of some fifteen miles separated the two fleets, but within several hours the British had reduced this to twelve and then to ten. Of the German fleet, the *Blücher* was old and slow, and soon fell behind. Before ten o'clock, heavy shells were dropping upon the *Blücher*, while the other German vessels were also within striking range of the British heavy cruisers. By eleven o'clock the *Blücher* had fallen hopelessly behind, and shortly after noon she sank, with the loss of most of her crew.

By noon, the greater speed of the British began to bring the two squadrons almost level, but the German destroyers then got between the two lines of heavy cruisers and interposed a smoke screen, behind which the Germans turned to the north and lengthened the distance between them and their attackers. By this time, several of the German heavy cruisers had been struck and were on fire; but the leading British vessel, the *Lion*, had also been struck in such fashion as to reduce her speed and to cause her to fall behind. This accident to the *Lion* and the approaching proximity of German mine fields caused the British to call off the pursuit shortly after noon, while still some seventy-five miles from Helgoland.

THE CAPTURE OF THE GERMAN AFRICAN POSSESSIONS

By the beginning of 1915, the revolt against British rule in South Africa had been quite put down and campaigns against German Southwest Africa, German East Africa and Kamerun were in process.

German Southwest Africa—With the outbreak of the war, German forces occupied Walfish Bay, the British harbor on the seacoast of German Southwest Africa; but it was recaptured by the British forces on Christmas, 1914, and in January, 1915, the occupation of German Southwest Africa was seriously begun. The Orange River was crossed by a Boer army, and a steady advance into the German dependency achieved. Throughout the remainder of the winter and throughout the spring the invaders made progress, until in May the entire southern half of the territory, with the capital, Windhoek, was in the hands of the British. In June and July the small German forces resisting the British advance were driven toward the northern border, where they made their last fruitless stand on July 6 at Tsumeb. The entire province officially surrendered on July 9.

Kamerun—The advance of the British and French continued in 1915. The coast was blockaded while an invading corps proceeded on foot farther up the Sanaga River. At the same time, a British force advanced from Nigeria. These two columns converged in the summer to capture most of the German strongholds in the province, the greater part of Kamerun thus falling into the possession of the Entente. Nevertheless, scattered bands succeeded in maintaining a guerilla warfare in certain sections through the latter part of 1915 and complete resistance did not end until March, 1916.

German East Africa—The capture of German East Africa, however, was more difficult. In January, 1915, a British force from British East Africa advancing along the coast was driven back and several other reverses were inflicted upon the British army. In March, the Entente declared a blockade of the coast of German East Africa, and later in the year won several pitched battles. By the end

of the summer, the British had been reinforced by French and by Boers, and succeeded in driving the German forces inland; but with the end of the year the German troops were still resisting stoutly and German East Africa was still far from surrender.

In 1916, the Entente forces made more comprehensive preparations for the subjugation of the last German colony, and an elaborate campaign was prepared. Well-equipped columns began advances from different directions against the various German positions, captured forts, occupied railroads, and surrounded the German forces; until by the end of 1916 the German resistance was no longer threatening. By this time, the invading armies, under the general supervision of General Smuts, were composed of British, French, Belgians, Portuguese, Boers, Australians, Canadians and natives. However, the German forces utilized every possible method of resistance and it was not until the winter of 1917 that all opposition ceased. German East Africa officially surrendered to the Entente Allies late in November, 1917, more than half a year after the entrance of the United States into the War.

Thus ended the year 1915. The Entente had achieved numerical superiority on the western front, but had been absolutely unable to gain there. Russia had been driven out of her acquisitions of 1914, had been overwhelmingly defeated, had lost many hundred thousands of men, had withdrawn from all of Russian Poland, and for a time had been rendered helpless. Bulgaria had joined the Alliance. Servia, Montenegro and most of Albania had been occupied. Italy had joined the Entente, but her campaign against Austria had made little headway. The German colonies had been lost, with the exception of German East Africa; but their loss was no serious matter. The attack on the Dardanelles had signally failed. America had been embittered, but was still far from entrance into the war; and the submarine warfare of Germany was greatly hindering the Entente. The blockade of Germany had resulted in a serious shortage of food and other supplies, but the shortage was still serious rather than alarming, and German morale was still excellent. It had been Germany's year.

THE WAR, 1916

VERDUN

As in 1915 the campaign in the East had been more significant than the campaign in the West, so in 1916 the campaign in the West became more significant than the campaign in the East. In 1915, it had still appeared possible to win a victory and to bring the war to an end by single actions; after the great inconclusive battles of Verdun and The Somme in 1916, it became evident that speedy decision was not to be anticipated and that the struggle would drag wearily along for many more months. In 1915, patriotic fervor still ruled in most of the belligerent countries; in 1916, patriotic fervor had been succeeded by war-weariness and disillusion—accompanied, however, by grim determination to “see it through.” In 1915, the resources of peace-times could still be utilized; in 1916, the hoarded resources of the days of plenty were no more, and strict economy and regularization became the order of the day. In 1915, the military arm of the campaign was still the most important; in 1916, the military strength of the combatants was of less value in the prosecution of the war than industrial strength, economic mobilization, labor-power, efficiency of production, skill in distribution, reduction in consumption, food supply, material equipment, unanimity of purpose, political support, and finally national morale.

Verdun was the northernmost of the four great French fortresses along the Alsace-Lorraine frontier. Its position was such as to compel France to make it also the strongest. Not only did it cover the ground where the duchy of Luxemburg interposed between France, Belgium and Germany—it also was almost directly opposite Metz, the greatest of the German strongholds. In addition, it was an important railroad centre, controlled the approach to Paris along the valley of the Meuse, and commanded the broad valley of the Woevre.

It blocked approach to the Argonne and the Marne valleys. Finally, it covered both the invaluable iron region of France to the northeast and the great mines of Alsace-Lorraine to the east.

The city of Verdun is situated in a low and broad pocket of the Meuse, which runs through the heart of the city in a north-and-south direction. The city is encircled by a range of high hills—hence its military strength as the centre for fortifications. To the east of Verdun Nature had been especially gracious to the defenders—running north and south parallel to and east of the Meuse is a precipitous, rugged ridge known as the Heights of the Meuse. These heights rise some six hundred feet above the level of the river and are cut by deep glens, which make the capture of each hill practically a separate military undertaking. The Heights of the Meuse—averaging some five miles in width—fall down in steep cliffs both to the Meuse Valley on their west and to the Woevre Valley on the east. These cliffs make ascent of the Heights as difficult horizontally as the transverse ridges make ascent difficult longitudinally. To the west of Verdun there is also a range of hills above the average height of the rest of the hills surrounding the city. These hills run east and west, that is, at right angles to the Meuse and to the Heights of the Meuse, and hence they overlook a large section of the ground on which a concentration might be attempted against Verdun. There were two main railroad lines connecting Verdun with Paris and, in addition, a narrow-gauge line between Verdun and Bar-le-duc. (See Map, page 571.)

The French had placed their forts on the strategic points of the hills surrounding Verdun. The circumference of the outer ring of forts was more than thirty miles, and from the easternmost fort across the Meuse valley to the westernmost was almost ten miles. The strongest of these outer forts were as follows—

On the north,—Douaumont, Thiaumont, Marre, Belle-Épine, Bruyères.

On the east,—Hardaumont, Vaux, Laufée, Mardi Gras, Eix, Moulainville, Manazel, Chatillon and Tavannes.

On the south,—Rozellier, Haudainville, Saint Symphorien.

On the west,—Germonville, Bois de Sartelles, Bois du Chapitre, Landrecourt, Dugny, Chana, Choisel, Sartelles.

In addition, these outer fortifications were supported by an inner ring of forts of which the most important were Belleville, Saint Michel, Belrupt, La Chaume, and Regret. Altogether there were thirty-six forts comprising the fortress of Verdun.

We have seen that Verdun, like the three great fortresses to its south, had escaped capture by the German hosts in their first invasion of France in 1914. But in the case of Toul, Épinal and Belfort, the battle-line had been kept at a distance on all sides; in the case of Verdun, the battle-line had swept below the fortress to both right and left. On the west, the battle-line descended gradually through the Argonne Forest into Champagne; but on the east it descended sharply to St. Mihiel. Verdun was thus at the head of a sharp, advanced salient into the German line and at best its position was precarious. But its position had been rendered more precarious by the fact that its railroad communication with Paris had been all but cut off. The German possession of St. Mihiel cut off one of the main lines to Paris. At Montfauçon the Germans had seized and had maintained strategic positions which covered and accordingly rendered almost useless the other main line. The defenders of Verdun could thus rely for supplies and for reinforcements only upon the sadly inadequate narrow-gauge line.

Early in 1916, the Germans had been able to withdraw a large part of their forces from the Russian and Serbian fronts. These they combined with a huge surplus of guns and shells made possible by the comparative inactivity in the winter along the western front, and the German General Staff prepared to utilize all this concentrated strength for a desperate drive upon the Allied lines. Germany realized that even with Russia helpless to assume the offensive, a war of attrition in the west could result finally only in the ultimate defeat of Germany, because of the Allied ultimate superiority in man-power and supplies. Germany therefore was striving again for a decision, with the possibility of another drive directly on Paris in case she should break through.

At first blush, it would seem that the Verdun salient would be

the last point chosen for the big attack in the spring of 1916. Verdun was a salient into the German, not into the French, lines. The tip of the salient was some 150 miles from Paris—other points of the line were less than sixty. But Germany was hoping for a surprise, and realized that the Allies, not expecting an attack on Verdun, had prepared other sectors more adequately for the big German drive than they had prepared Verdun. Verdun was well toward the centre of the Allied line in France after the battle-front turned at the Oise to run east and west instead of north and south. If the Germans broke through there, they could flank, not a mere army, but either half of the Allied forces. The very sharpness of the St. Mihiel salient held by the Germans on the east of Verdun would aid them both in reducing the Verdun salient and in having a broad base for an entering wedge into the French lines in case Verdun should be reduced. Verdun, moreover, despite the reputation of its forts, was probably the weakest point in the Allied line. The war had proved that fortresses were helpless before huge siege guns—indeed, Sarrail, who had been the commander at Verdun for a large part of 1914 and 1915, had placed his chief reliance, not in the guns of his fortresses, but in trenches and field positions. Again, as we have seen, the Verdun communications were inadequate. In late winter and early spring the Meuse could always be counted upon to overflow its banks and to flood the country, so that the defenders of the main positions of Verdun would be isolated from one another so far as the different clusters of forts were concerned. It would be thus almost impossible for the French to retire in good order to new positions in case an initial retirement were forced upon them. Similarly, under flood conditions it would be very difficult for the French in the advanced positions before Verdun to maintain a comprehensive system of communication with the defenders of the fortresses which crowned the hills around Verdun. And Verdun was the most famous of the French fortresses—it had become a by-word throughout the world. Its acquisition in itself might be of small material value to Germany, but the immaterial value would be immense. The capture of Verdun would not only stimulate German morale, it would depress Allied morale; and Germany had already recognized the value of the

morale of the population within the borders of Germany as well as that of the army which was occupying northern France, most of Belgium, all of Russian Poland and Servia. Neutrals leaning toward the Entente, such as Roumania and Greece, would take sober second thoughts before entering the struggle, and Germany's hand would be strengthened in her negotiations with the United States concerning submarine warfare.

Throughout the latter part of February, Germany delivered a series of feint attacks along the entire battle-line from the North Sea to Switzerland, with the purpose, evidently successful, of masking her real intentions. Opposite Verdun many picked corps of the best troops of the German army, long prepared for enormous exertions, had been massed. The guns ran well into many hundreds and there were literally mountains of shells. Germany was going to try the battering-ram tactics which had been so irresistible on the Polish and Serbian fronts. Both the Allies and Germany had shown in the west that a heavy artillery attack would result in gains for the first several days. It was Germany's plan to continue the artillery attack beyond the first several days by moving forward her guns as she occupied territory, so that finally the guns would mow down the first line. Germany was counting upon the effects of surprise, and had no intention of advertising her intentions by a preliminary attack. At seven o'clock on the morning of February 21, 1916, the German drive on Verdun was spontaneously launched.

FEBRUARY

At the beginning of the first furious German drive on Verdun, the battle-line stretched east and west, at right angles to the Meuse, about eight miles from the town of Verdun and about four miles from its important northern forts. The French had prepared only two, instead of the usual three, lines of defence trenches; and there is much evidence that even these had been allowed to deteriorate since the days of 1914 when they had been painstakingly constructed by Sarrail. Moreover, the French troops on the battle-front before Verdun were chiefly territorial and colonial troops, and their num-

and completely dazed the French troops. The very earth seemed to rock with the weight of the leaden rain. Entire forests were uprooted. Bewildered and more than decimated, the thin line of French defenders groped their way blindly back to their second line, almost sub-consciously resolved merely to wreak heavy toll upon the German infantry before the second line of trenches should be abandoned. But the Germans had resolved to spare their troops and to rely chiefly upon their guns. German shells, not troops, advanced upon the second line of French trenches after the first line had disappeared. And by the evening of February 21, the second line of French defence had been blasted out of existence no less thoroughly than had the first line, and the French were in the open. At the same time, the Germans laid down a barrage which, with the flooded condition of the country, cut off communication between the French troops and the garrisons in the forts. Not only were the French in the open, they were also unsupported. Their many counter-attacks were useless.

But on the next day the weather came to the assistance of the hard-pressed French. A heavy snow fell, the weather became bitterly cold, dense mists arose, and the Germans found it impossible to rely upon their artillery to so great an extent as on the first day of the attack. Accordingly, on February 22, the German troops were led forward in great numbers, and for the next several days the fighting around Verdun became chiefly a series of hand-to-hand combats. There was, of course, no possibility that the scattered and outnumbered French could hold what was left of their lines, but if only the German advance could be delayed for several days, Verdun might be saved by the reinforcements which were being rushed up (chiefly in automobile trucks) by the French General Staff, now aware that Verdun was the main German objective. And the stubborn resistance of the French territorials from February 21 to February 25 saved Verdun. It required four days for the Germans to advance the four miles to the first of the main outer forts defending Verdun and in those four days the forts defending Verdun had been greatly strengthened. By the evening of February 25, the Germans had suffered tremendous losses from the deadly gun-fire of the French batteries, but they had gained most of the strategic positions from

Photos by International Film Service

AMERICAN AIRCRAFT

The upper panel shows an American airplane squadron flying in battle formation above Kelly Field, San Antonio, Texas.

In the central panel is given an excellent idea of the huge size of the Handley-Page type of bombing airplane. The plane in the picture was used at the training field at Mineola, Long Island, for training purposes. It was a sister-plane of the first big bombing plane built in the United States for participation in the Great War.

In the lower panel are shown twenty-two airplanes in line at Mineola. The picture has especial significance in the fact that flying in the plane in the air is Major-General William J. Kenly, director of the aircraft production program of the United States, who was on a trip of inspection of the Mineola field at the time the picture was taken.

which the chief forts of Verdun could be attacked. They were at the very gates of Fort Douaumont, the key to the defence of Verdun. They were also at the gates of Forts Vaux and Trouville, to the east. At the same time, the Germans had advanced along the Woevre Valley on the other side of the Heights of the Meuse, so that the Heights of the Meuse were being assailed from three sides. The French in the Woevre Valley were driven all the way back to the cliffs which rise from the valley to form the Heights, but with their backs to the Heights they succeeded in making a stand and the Heights of the Meuse were not in serious danger of capture from the east.

On the evening of the twenty-fifth the Germans then attained the apex of their first effort against Verdun in a terrific rush on the lines directly in front of Fort Douaumont. The French, now under the command of Pétain, literally mowed down the oncoming Teutons, but the Teutons came on in wave after wave, heedless of losses. On the wings the French drove back every attack, but in the centre the Germans finally gained the French trenches. Thence to the works of the fort itself was an easy journey, and before midnight a large part of Fort Douaumont was in German hands. It seemed as though Verdun was doomed.

But on the morning of the following day Pétain launched a terrific counter-attack. His men proved to be as good fighters on the offense as on the defense, and like the Germans on the previous night they, too, would not be denied. The attacking troops were the pick of the French army, as the defenders had been the pick of the German army, and step by step the Germans were driven back from the lines surrounding Douaumont. The fort itself remained in German hands, but the French had captured all the lines leading to the fort and had thus rendered the German division in possession of the fort, now a mass of ruins, incapable of taking the offensive. The lines of Vaux and Trouville had held, so that Verdun's case, although still serious, was no longer desperate. The surprise and impetus of the attack were over; on February 27, the French were stronger and the Germans weaker than on February 21.

However, the German General Staff would not yet admit a check.

Their whole advance had been stopped for the time being on their flanks—they now drove at the centre of the Heights, at Haudramont. Throughout the day and night of February 27 the bloody struggle continued, but in vain—the French held firm. At the same time, another violent artillery and infantry attack was launched upon Douaumont, but also without avail. On the twenty-eighth, the German commanders made three final despairing efforts—one in the Woevre Valley, one against Eix, and one against the village of Manheulles and against Fresnes, in the rear of the main French fortifications. But the trench-lines which protected the forts held firm, except in the last case, when part of the Manheulles-Fresnes line fell to the attackers. Then at last the Germans were obliged to admit a check. Their initial energy was spent. They were compelled to take a breathing-space of several days, and by the same token to allow the French to take one. The first drive on Verdun had failed.

MARCH-APRIL

On the West Bank of the Meuse

The scant four miles which the Germans had been able to gain were all on the east bank of the Meuse. The French positions on the west bank had remained intact. Accordingly, in their positions on the east bank of the river the Germans were exposed to the fire of the French positions on the west bank. Realizing, then, that if Verdun were to be carried at all, it would be carried only by slower and sounder methods, the Germans prepared to inaugurate their next attempt on the great French fortress by a drive on the west bank of the Meuse. (See Map, page 571.)

It was manifestly impossible for the Germans to withdraw from the attack altogether. Such a withdrawal would be an open confession of failure which would injure morale at home and prestige abroad. Even the German people realized that the losses at the Marne had been heavy, and by this time the minority Socialists were opposing the Government while even the majority Socialists were becoming restless. Germany would be rent by political dissensions if the German General Staff should tacitly confess that the lives lost at Verdun

had been thrown away without military gain to the Fatherland. Incidentally, the prestige and popularity of the heir to the thrones of Prussia and the German Empire would suffer. From a military point of view, Germany was compelled to keep the offensive. She realized that the Entente Allies had been preparing for a blow in the west while Germany had been preparing, and one of the reasons for launching the Verdun attack as early as February had been the hope of thereby forestalling the Entente attack. If Germany should make further advances of importance around Verdun, the Allies would be forced to bolster up the Verdun lines still further. The first French reinforcements had been Joffre's reserve, but future reinforcements could come only from other parts of the battle-line, which would thereby be weakened, and weakened probably in the sectors where the Entente was preparing its own drive. Or the Entente might try to relieve the pressure on Verdun by starting its own drive at once. The German Intelligence Bureau knew that the Entente forces would not be fully prepared to utilize their maximum strength until the summer; and a premature attack instead of a well-prepared drive against the German lines would serve Germany's purpose as well as a withdrawal of Allied troops from other sectors to Verdun.

The character of the fighting in this second phase of the drive on Verdun was diametrically different from that of the first phase. In the first phase, after a heavy artillery onslaught of some twenty-four hours, the attack had been an infantry advance and the fighting had been largely hand-to-hand. In the second phase, the Germans, depressed by their severe losses, relied almost entirely on their artillery. Certain points were shelled without intermission for weeks. The town of Verdun itself became a mass of stark ruins. The forts were reduced almost to ruins, and the chief positions of strength were the trenches, with their protection of barbed-wire, and the field positions of both the field-guns and the siege-guns.

The Germans were still intent upon reaching Verdun through the centre of the French line along the east bank of the Meuse. The present advance on the west bank was chiefly for the purpose of making an advance in the centre again possible with chance of success. Throughout March and April the French centre was therefore

persistently attacked by shell-fire, but the main attacks were on the French wings—on the west at Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304, and on the right at Vaux.

It will be remembered that the range of hills on the west bank of the Meuse runs east and west, instead of north and south. At the western end of this ridge, the dominating positions are Dead Man's Hill (Le Mort Homme) and its secondary ridge, Hill 265. (That is, the hill which is 265 metres above the level of the Meuse.) The commanding position on the eastern end of this ridge was Hill 304, Goose Hill (La Côte de l'Oie). (See Map, page 571.)

On March 2, the Germans began their bombardment of the French position all along the west bank of the Meuse. The heavy rain of shells continued for four days. At the end of that time, a vigorous attack was made on Fort Douaumont, across the Meuse, in order to prevent the transfer of men from the French centre to meet the forthcoming attack on the French left. Then on the morning of March 6 German troops advanced upon Forges, to the right centre of the positions of the French west of the Meuse and in front of Hill 265. By noon, Forges had been taken, and the French fell back to their prepared positions on Hill 265. By March 7, the Germans had gained a foothold of considerable importance upon the eastern slope of Goose Hill. On that day, the Germans achieved other gains, but the French counter-attacks recaptured many of them. The struggle for Goose Hill continued until March 14, and followed the usual rule of order in trench warfare—that is, the Germans made initial advances after heavy artillery attacks, only to be driven out of most of their new gains by the ensuing French counter-attacks. On March 14, the attack shifted to Dead Man's Hill. On that day, the Germans succeeded in capturing the subsidiary crest (Hill 265) of Dead Man's Hill, but Dead Man's Hill itself was beyond their powers. On the next day, the French repulsed with heavy losses numerous desperate German attempts to gain the commanding position of the west end of the French west wing. There was a lull at Dead Man's Hill on March 15, but on the following day the attack was renewed, only to be repulsed again. The Germans then paused a few days to prepare still heavier attacks, which were launched on March 20 and which

by the end of the month had eaten somewhat into the French lines. The German attacks continued into April, but although there were some gains, the French still held Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304.

By the middle of April, the Germans again confessed defeat. Their gains on the west bank of the Meuse were little more than one mile on a front of six miles and did not include the dominating positions of Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304. The struggle had lasted six weeks, and represented the severest and costliest German setback since the Battle of the Marne.

On the East Bank of the Meuse

The commanding fortification on the east wing of the Verdun lines was Fort Vaux. Vaux was about one and one-half miles southeast of Douaumont, on a plateau considerably lower than the hill on which Douaumont is situated. On March 8, the Germans delivered a night attack on the trenches before Fort Vaux and succeeded in occupying the village of Vaux, about half a mile from the fort. But on the following day a French counter-attack regained the village. On March 9-11 the Germans delivered renewed attacks, and gained some ground, including a position on the foot of the plateau which is crowned by Fort Vaux, but their gains were of little value. At the same time, another advance in the Woevre valley was attempted, but that, too, was unsuccessful. The Germans then made no more efforts on Vaux until March 16, when another unsuccessful attack was delivered. There was no other attack on Vaux until April, when the Germans, after a heavy bombardment, achieved a slight foothold on the village of Vaux. On April 2, the Germans gained a long ravine separating Vaux from Douaumont (the Ravine of Death), a valuable position; but after an extremely costly struggle the French managed to drive out the Germans once more by a severe counter-attack. The final German attack on Vaux was delivered along Pepper Ridge (la Côte du Poivre) on April 18. It was a terrific onslaught, but the French rolled it back and inflicted losses so heavy that the Germans were temporarily stunned, and abandoned for the time being their advance on the right wing of the Verdun lines as they had abandoned the advance on the left.

MAY-JUNE

During the latter part of April, the Germans before Verdun were inactive. They were recovering from their terrible reverses in the battle which had lasted almost without interruption from February 21 to April 18, and at the same time they were making unprecedented preparations for further attacks. The Germans were still much closer to Verdun on the east side of the Meuse than on the west. That is to say, their occupancy of Fort Douaumont and of other points on the Heights of the Meuse represented greater and more valuable gains than their occupancy of ridges to the west of the river.

On the West Bank of the Meuse

As we have seen, although the Germans had not captured the crests of Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304, they had occupied positions on the slopes of these famous hills. The French had therefore prepared their strongest line of defence along the Charny Ridge, some distance behind their more advanced position on the west bank of the Meuse. The Charny Ridge was parallel to Douaumont, so that if the Germans should finally capture Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304, the battle-line would be straightened out once more along the entire Verdun front.

On May 3, the Germans let loose upon Hill 304 the supply of shells which they had been accumulating for the purpose of obliterating the French lines there. So heavy was the fire that the crest of the hill was reduced a considerable number of feet. As the fire continued through the night, the French trenches were blasted into nothingness, and as best they might the defenders took refuge in shell-holes. Early on the morning of the next day, the Germans then delivered their anticipated mass-attack and had little difficulty in occupying most of the French front lines on Hill 304. The expected French counter-attack was delivered on the evening of May 4, and succeeded in driving the Germans out of the most valuable and the most advanced of the positions which they had occupied. Then the Germans again rested for several days while making preparations.

for a further advance, which began on May 7 with the customary artillery attack. Five times the Germans advanced to the attack, only to be repulsed; but the fury of their onslaughts drove the French back of the crest of the hill, which thus became No Man's Land.

Again the Germans rested. On May 17, they returned to their attempt. Having failed to carry the top of Hill 304 by frontal attack, they resorted, as usual, to flank attacks. Gaining strategic positions for flank movements upon Hill 304, they then turned their attention to Dead Man's Hill. The French position there was very precarious, for although the French held the main crest (Hill 295), the Germans held the subsidiary crest (Hill 265). Moreover, the Germans had crept around both sides of the hill, until it had become more nearly surrounded than even Hill 304. On May 20, the Germans advanced directly against Dead Man's Hill, and succeeded in gaining some ground. This minor success stimulated the German commanders to even greater efforts, and on the next day the crest of the hill was in German hands, and the French had been driven to the southern slopes, where their positions were still very strong.

The German advance was temporarily held up by the counter-attack which at this moment the French launched across the river at Douaumont in order to relieve the pressure on Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304; but on May 23, the Germans redoubled their efforts. Again and again they were driven back with heavy losses, but again and again they returned to the attack, until in the evening they carried the French trenches in the deep and narrow Esnes glen. During the night of the twenty-third and the day and night of the twenty-fourth, there was terrific fighting for the village of Cumières, on the east flank of Dead Man's Hill, but the Germans finally occupied the entire village. Thus the French positions had been both divided and flanked, and the French were compelled to retire. Both Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304 were now in the hands of the forces of the Crown Prince. Until the end of the month the French then delivered counter-attacks and the Germans, fresh attacks, but equally without success. Then on May 29 the Germans made a final effort to turn their expensive occupancy of Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304 to advantage. Another violent artillery attack was followed by a general German advance

all along the French positions on the west bank of the Meuse. The French first-line trenches had been leveled by gun-fire and the Germans had no difficulty in occupying them. But beyond them the German infantry could not go, and the Germans finally confessed that the game was not worth the candle. By tremendous exertions they had forced the French back less than a mile, and the new French positions were almost as strong as the old. A few more German successes of this nature and there would be no more German army.

On the East Bank of the Meuse

To ease their situation on the hills on the west bank of the river, the French had driven a counter-attack against the German lines at Douaumont. On May 20 a heavy bombardment was let loose from the French heavy guns, and advances of infantry on May 21 captured some ground around Vaux and Douaumont. A general and long-prepared attack on Fort Douaumont itself was then launched under General Mangin on the following day. The heavy French fire had demolished most of the trenches and barbed-wire with which the Germans had protected the fort they had won in February, and the French managed to gain the centre and left of the works of the fort. On the right, the Germans were enabled to make a stand within the works through the inability of the French troops advancing against this section of the fort to make headway against the trenches below it. Throughout the day the fighting continued within the fort, but by the evening two-thirds of it was in French hands. The inevitable German counter-attack was delivered near midnight. It failed, but it was renewed on the next day, and finally succeeded. Bit by bit the works of Fort Douaumont were re-occupied by the German troops, and by May 24 it was entirely in German hands once more. But the French were able to hold on to many of the trench positions below the fort which they had gained in their attack.

Even before the end of their onslaught upon Dead Man's Hill, Hill 304 and the French position behind these hills on the west bank of the Meuse, the Germans had realized that their only hope for a definite decision at Verdun lay along the Heights of the Meuse. Along

the Heights the villages of Douaumont and Vaux and Fort Douaumont had previously been captured—the German General Staff determined on another effort to gain Fort Vaux. With Forts Douaumont and Vaux both reduced, there would be in the outer defences of Verdun a gap of strategic value sufficient to warrant a hope that the entire fortress might be taken, for then most of the other fortifications could be flanked. On May 25 and again on May 27 preliminary German advances were successful, and on the twenty-ninth a heavy artillery bombardment indicated another general advance. By this time, Pétain had been promoted to the command of the entire sector and the direct command at Verdun had been entrusted to General Nivelle.

Nivelle's front lines had again utterly caved in under the German shell fire, and when the German general advance began on June 1, it gained important points around Fort Vaux. The fort itself had been reduced to ruins in February by the heavy German fire, and what is here called "the fort" was but a series of heavily-guarded trenches and gun positions on the hill where the fort had been. Throughout June 2 and June 3 countless ranks of Germans surged forward against stern resistance until the fort was completely surrounded and its defenders isolated. Nevertheless, the French left within the ruins of the fort continued their hopeless fight under the command of Major Raynal, and for several days more the Germans were kept outside the ruins and off the crest of the hill. It was not until June 6 that Raynal finally surrendered the fort, the Germans permitting him to retain his sword in token of admiration at his heroism and at the heroism of his men.

With Fort Vaux as well as Fort Douaumont in their possession, the Germans were kindled with renewed hope that, after all, their sacrifices to obtain Verdun might not be in vain, for the position of Verdun was now critical in the extreme. They immediately aimed at Fort Souville, the last of the major outer fortifications to the northeast of Verdun and less than three and a half miles from the town. With Souville in German hands, the inner fortifications, Belleville and Saint Michel, might be attacked; and if Belleville and Saint Michel should fall, the town of Verdun would inevitably go. (See Map, page 571.)

The German leaders spent four days in preparing for their decisive

rush upon Souville. On the night of June 11, a preliminary advance was attempted and proved successful in capturing important positions. On the following day, severe flank attacks were hurled around Thiaumont, to the northwest of the fort. For an entire week, the Germans managed to post themselves in advantageous positions and on June 23 the final effort was made. Along the entire front of more than three miles the German cohorts pressed forward. General Nivelle recognized that the situation was critical and officially urged his troops to superhuman efforts. The French responded. On the right, Nivelle's lines held firm. In the centre, Fleury was captured but a brilliant French counter-attack regained it. Only on the left did the Germans sweep forward, capturing Fort Thiaumont. On the next day, the Germans risked everything in a frenzied effort to increase their gains. Again they got into Fleury, but the French battle-cry at Verdun was "Passeront pas" (they will not pass), and beyond Fleury the Germans did not pass. For days the French held firm until the Germans had exhausted every ounce of attacking energy they could command. Then, on the very last day of June, the French themselves advanced and re-captured Fort Thiamount. After 130 days Verdun remained still in danger but still safe.

In losses of men, in intensity of purpose and in continuity of ceaseless battle, Verdun was probably the greatest battle in the world's history up to 1916. But the results of the battle were as inconclusive as the scale on which it was waged was great. The Germans had gained less than half of the eight miles separating Verdun from the battle-line at the beginning of the onslaught. For their attempt, the Germans had paid probably 375,000 casualties, while to foil them the French had paid probably some 350,000. Verdun was the major German effort of the year 1916; the major German effort had dismally fizzled out. The loss of Verdun definitely saw the offensive in the West pass from the Central Powers to the Entente Allies. For all further German attempts at Verdun were now halted by the pressure of the Allies at the Somme, where Joffre was ready by July to launch his own great drive, and where the Germans now were compelled to rally all the forces at their command.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME

By the summer of 1916, Great Britain had adopted the policy of conscription, and the British army in France had increased to about one and one-half million men, with at least a million in reserve for any great drive in which Haig might utilize them. The British had taken over by this time some 90 miles of the battle-line, forming the link between the small force of Belgians along the sea-coast and the French left flank around the Somme. The staunch defence of Verdun had enabled Haig and Joffre to keep intact and unweakened the forces they were carefully training to break through the German line. For months that training had proceeded. It had been not only preparation and instruction of men, but also hoarding of shells and airplanes. The British had invented the "tank," and were to use it before the battle was over, while their equipment for hurling liquid fire and poison gas had extended beyond even the German equipment. The British production of munitions was now at its height, with Lloyd-George as Minister of Munitions, and both the French and the British large guns were now of calibre, range and power as great as the German guns. In the east, the Russians had partially recovered from their prostration of the previous summer, had again defeated the Austrians and had compelled the diversion of German forces to the east, as will be described later. On the southern front, the Austrians had inflicted a sharp defeat upon the Italians, but the Allies were not thereby weakened to any extent in the west, and the Italian lines finally held firm. So by the end of June the Allies were at last ready.

The western section of the battle-line in France and Belgium crossed the Somme River between Péronne and Amiens, 80 miles almost due north of Paris. That portion of France (Picardy) is flat and low, well-watered, well-wooded and fertile. The valley of the Somme is broad, often becoming marshy. Along the river, with its sluggish current, a canal winds, and much of the soil back of the river-

banks is chalky. Up to the summer of 1916, the Picardy front along the Somme had been comparatively inactive and the Germans had had many months in which to make their lines impregnable. They held most of the little high ground which existed; their trenches were deep and complicated; their guns were many and well-placed; their supply of shells was large; and their connecting railroads and highways were extensive. The attacking British army, under the general direction of Haig, was under the direct command of General Sir Henry Rawlinson and the cooperating attacking French army was the old French Sixth Army of de Castelnau, now under General Fayolle. Below the army of Fayolle lay the French Tenth Army, under the command of General Micheler. The entire sector was under the supervision of Foch. The opposing German armies were under the command of General Otto von Below and Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria.

From the middle of June, the British and French guns became active in Picardy. Numerous raids were undertaken for reconnoitering purposes, surveys from airplanes became more frequent and minute, and violent bombardments were loosed all along the line to hide the direction of the main attack. On June 24 the bombardment became severer. For a number of days the German lines were heavily pounded. On the last day of the month the fire from the big guns rose to the fury of the devastating and methodical molten rain which levels all enemy trenches preparatory to an attack. Then, on the first day of July, the British troops "went over the top" on a twenty-five mile front from Gommecourt to Estrées.

The Somme River runs east and west through the front along which the advance was made, cutting that front into two almost equal sections. The lower half was occupied entirely by the French, who held also a small section of the upper half, joining the British on the northern bank of the Somme. The ultimate objective of the British was obviously the important highway and railroad centre, Bapaume, some ten miles back from the front; and the ultimate objective of the French was the even more important town of Péronne, on the Somme and only some six miles from the front. The imme-

mediate objective of both British and French, however, was the range of low hills occupied by the Germans just back of the front, for that range commanded all the surrounding country. The front along which the attack was made represented the middle of the northern side of the great bend of the German line into French soil from Arras to Soissons, the so-called Noyon salient. (See Map, page 587.)

But the Germans had ably prepared themselves to meet the British attack. The German artillery returned the British fire shell for shell, and, indeed, caved in the front line trenches of the British themselves, so that the attacking parties had to form in the open, where the German fire inflicted heavy losses upon them. The Germans reconstructed trenches as quickly as the British fire blotted them out, and when the British troops advanced, they found before them German lines which had not been weakened to any appreciable extent. Moreover, the Germans had skilfully hidden both their lines and their gun positions from the prying eyes and lenses of the Allied airmen, and the advancing British were literally swept off their feet by the gusts of shells and shrapnel which were poured into them. The German guns were numerous enough to lay down a dense barrage behind the advancing British, so that they were cut off from support. In some cases, the British were purposely allowed to advance only at the proper moment to be taken in the rear, and subjected to fire from four sides. From Gommecourt to Thiepval, the German supply of ammunition seemed inexhaustible. By the time that the British reached the German front line, their numbers had been so diminished that they could offer little resistance to the German infantry lying in wait for them. Along the greater part of their advance, then, the British at evening were back at the positions whence they had started. Never in the war had the slaughter been so terrible. In many places the dead lay in even rows like unbroken mounds. In other places, the dead were piled up in heaps which completely covered the soil, and not a trace of earth could be seen through the solid masses of the bodies of what had been the flower of English manhood. Mr. Frank H. Simonds declares that on that one day the British losses in dead, wounded and prisoners were materially greater than 50,000.

In the extreme southern edge of the British advance, however, better

fortune attended Allied arms. The Germans seem not to have anticipated so clearly an attack near the Somme itself, and the British were able to make headway near the point of their junction with the French in front of Albert. At that point, the German lines formed a salient, and when several positions, notably Mametz, Maricourt and Hardecourt, had been captured by both French and British on the southern side of that salient, the Germans were compelled to fall back.

The French, on the other hand, were successful in their share of the advance to the south of the Somme on July 1. The French advance took the opposing German lines by surprise, for the German General Staff seems to have expected an attack by only the British. North and south of the Somme the French captured the German first-line positions, and drove the Germans back to their secondary defences. In one day, the French had cut into the German positions for more than a mile along an eight-mile front, had inflicted severe punishment, had captured many prisoners and guns and had themselves suffered but little.

The first day of the Battle of the Somme made impossible a further prosecution of the British attempt to break through the German lines by a sharp and vigorous campaign of several weeks. The reasons which had prompted the undertaking in the beginning still held good, and there was hence no idea of abandoning it, but its character changed. The British had been stunned by their losses. Instead of a general onslaught, Haig resorted now to step-by-step advances and to the acquisition of separate strategic positions.

The French break into the German lines, however, was more serious and the French commanders prosecuted their further attack with vigor. Throughout July 2, the French general advance continued and made headway, while the Germans were not yet sufficiently recovered to launch counter-attacks of pretension. Throughout the many, many weeks through which the Battle of the Somme was to drag on, the gains were all to be on the lower half of the line where the only gains had been made on July 1. Along the upper half of the original battle-line the advance of the British after July 1 was but slightly greater than their advance on July 1.

On July 3, the French continued their inroads into the German

positions south of, and along the north bank of, the Somme. On this day, they reached the main German secondary lines. Ger-

THE FRONT BEFORE AND AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME

many rushed up reinforcements from other parts of her lines, thus admitting the strength of the French thrust, but the French drove back every German advance. By July 5, the French had captured the village of Estrées and were only three miles from Péronne. For

the next four days, the French advance was steady, if slower, and on July 9 they occupied Biaches, only one mile from Péronne. And the wedge driven by the French was not only deep but wide. In ten days Fayolle had driven through a front of ten miles to a depth of almost six miles, had captured a considerable number of guns and men, and had taken some fifty square miles of ground.

In the meantime, the British to the north of the Somme were proceeding more cautiously, but were nevertheless getting forward. Haig's plan was now to concentrate on one point at a time, compelling the Germans to withdraw in order to straighten their lines after a number of advanced positions had been captured. On July 4, La Boisselle was taken, after a struggle of fifty hours. On July 7, Contalmaison fell. From July 4 to July 16, a struggle raged for Ovillers, which the British occupied on the latter day, having succeeded in surrounding the position. South of these positions, the British had captured portions of the Forests of Mametz and Bernafay on July 4; but it was not until a week later that they were completely occupied. So that by July 13, the British, like the French, had come to what had been before the battle the German second lines. The combined French and British gains were now some ten miles in length, representing about one-third of the front as conceived at the beginning of the Battle of the Somme.

In two weeks, accordingly, the long-prepared Allied drive had opened along a twenty to thirty mile front, and had gained from five to six miles on a ten mile front. On this latter front, the Allies had finally penetrated to what had been at the beginning of the battle the German secondary line of trenches and from July 14 the Battle of the Somme accordingly entered upon a second phase. On the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille the British again concentrated their strength for a general advance, this time on a four mile front before Pozières. The attack was begun in the darkness of night, several hours before dawn, and it was completely successful. The attacking British outfought the defending Germans, and by the evening of July 14 the German lines had been carried on a front of three miles. On the next day, the Germans regained some of the most advanced positions, and for two weeks contested some of the positions, notably Longueval

and Delville Wood. On July 16, the British made further slight advances, and the way was open for a direct drive on Pozières. By July 26, Pozières was within the British lines, but by the end of the month the fighting died down on this sector.

On the south of the Somme, the French had been unable to make further headway during the last two weeks in July. Indeed, the Germans were successful in several sharp counter-attacks and managed to regain some of the ground before Péronne. Throughout August both the British and French were unable to win any considerable success. By this time they had utilized all of the resources which they had been laboriously hoarding for the Battle of the Somme, so that it was evident that their intentions had been frustrated. They had gained less than one hundred square miles and had lost many men, although they had relieved the pressure on Verdun. In the course of the month, the Allies were able to penetrate merely one mile further into the German lines, although this advance gave them the crest of many of the ridges and the approach to what had been the German third line of defence at the beginning of the battle, two months before. The Allies were using the month chiefly to widen their salient, which had become too narrow, and thus to prepare for another general advance.

On September 3, another drive was developed by the British and French north of the Somme, and in several days a gain of from one-half to one mile was obtained along a seven mile front. All these gains were made in piece-meal fashion, only after stubborn resistance and chiefly because of Allied superiority in man-power. It was the story of Verdun repeated. At Verdun the Germans had been thwarted in their hope of a smashing victory, but had continued their advance step by step only with heavy losses which did not repay for the ground gained. At the Somme, the Allies had also been thwarted in their hope of a smashing victory, but were continuing their advance step by step until they, too, should decide that the price being paid in human beings for square miles of devastated land was too high.

Meantime, from the fifth to the eighth of September, the French to the south of the Somme had also advanced along their whole line and had maintained against the German counter-attacks the ground

which had been won. By this time, the slow but sure advances of the Allies had created a salient into the German lines both north and south of the river, and with a base of some fifteen miles the fronts in action now covered some twenty-five miles. By the tenth of September the Allies had acquired all the ground they had hoped to gain in their first furious onslaught on July 1, and were in command of all the hills overlooking the valley of the Somme, although the French had not captured Péronne and the British were still far from Bapaume.

The final great and extensive effort of the Allies to get ahead in the Battle of the Somme began around the middle of September. The British immediate objective was now Combles, and it was attacked by the "pincers" rather than by the direct method. That is to say, two drives were made on either side of the objective with the intention of converging behind it and thus isolating it. It was the method to be used later by Pershing on the St. Mihiel salient. In the advance on Combles, which dates from September 14, "tanks" were used for the first time and proved efficacious in reducing the German positions after a terrific bombardment, in which the German guns replied lustily to the British. To the centre and left the British gained on September 15 and 16, but were held on their right in front of Combles. From the thirteenth to the eighteenth of September the French to the south of the river, although making no general advance, gained many positions of strategic value, but got no nearer Péronne. The German strength and stubbornness then compelled the Allies to halt their attack for several days, and it was not resumed until September 25. By this time Combles had been flanked by both the British on the left and the French on the right; and after brilliant charges it fell on September 26. The Allies had broken through what had been the German third line of defence on July 1, and were approaching the old German fourth line.

But the end of the summer was now in sight. The British had had three months in which to open a gap, and, although they had gone steadily forward, they had not even threatened to break through the German lines. Even the wildest plans of the Allied strategists had not contemplated much success after the rains of the fall should set in, and in October the good weather came to an end. From that time to

the end of the entire battle in November the Allied strength at the Somme was bound to dissipate. Extensive movements were impossible over fields which were little better than seas of mud. Moreover, the Germans had finally abandoned their aspirations before Verdun and had shifted to the Somme much of the artillery and many of the men used at Dead Man's Hill, Hill 304, Douaumont and Souville. Further French and British attempts at the Somme either were beaten down, on the whole, or were nullified by strong German counter-attacks. For many weeks the offensive passed to the Germans. The British managed to capture Thiepval and to get to the south of Bapaume, but bit by bit the intensity of the battle waned. In the second week of November, the weather temporarily cleared and the ground became somewhat firmer, a situation of which Haig and Foch took advantage to make one last despairing effort. Until the middle of the month gains were made all along the line, especially along the River Ancre to the north of the Somme River; but they availed little, and with December the offensive gradually and imperceptibly faded away.

As at Verdun, the attackers had failed to break through. As at Verdun, some ground had been gained, but the cost in man-power had been prohibitive. As at Verdun, the victorious defenders had suffered almost as heavily as the baffled attackers. In five months of ceaseless fighting, the Entente had penetrated the German lines on a twenty-mile front for an average distance of some seven miles. They had captured points of value, but not of decisive value. The German lines had held, and the struggle in the west was still a deadlock. The Allied gains had been slightly greater than the German gains at Verdun, but their losses had been both absolutely and proportionately greater. For two hundred square miles of French soil, which had been transformed into a desert by the process of acquiring it, the Allies had paid a toll of almost 750,000 casualties; on their side, the Central Powers had a casualty list of certainly more than 500,000. As at Verdun, there was no victor at the Somme; the sole loser was humanity.

THE FRENCH COUNTER-STROKE AT VERDUN

By September, the German lines in front of Verdun had been depleted in order to strengthen the lines at the Somme. The defenders of the fortress accordingly prepared to take the offensive themselves. For the German positions before Verdun were too strong for French comfort. Although the Germans had been unable to utilize their occupation of Forts Douaumont and Vaux to reduce the entire fortress, yet their attempt had come perilously near succeeding, and no Frenchman would have dared the prediction that Verdun could have continued to be held without the Allied pressure on the Somme. Pétain realized the difficulty of the task to which he had set himself, the task of regaining enough of the position lost at Verdun to render the situation of the fortress less dangerous. For many weeks he prepared the forces for his counter-stroke with extreme deliberation.

At the end of October, Pétain, Nivelle and Mangin were ready. Their troops were to advance in three bodies. One was to storm Douaumont, one was to storm Vaux and the third was to get behind and flank these two German strongholds. As usual, the French advance was ushered in by a heavy bombardment. On October 21, France's heaviest guns spoke out, and continued to speak for several days, until the first line of the German trenches defending Douaumont and Vaux had been levelled. The infantry did not advance until noon on October 24, when they found that the guns had done their work well. The Germans were helpless to stop the French forces as they rushed up the slopes of the hill crowned by the ruins of the fort. Within four hours the French flag was flying from Douaumont. The encircling movement also met with general success on the first day, although it was held in many places. For the next several days Vaux was bombarded mercilessly until it, also, was helpless. The progress of the French infantry up Vaux ridge was steady, if slow, until by November 1 the French were at the gates of the fort; and within the gates of the fort one explosion after the other had compelled the

Germans practically to withdraw from the ruins. By November 3, Vaux as well as Douaumont was flying the French flag. On the next several days the advance continued, until the French had regained all the ground lost at Verdun after the first week of the German attack in February. (See Map, page 571.)

But the French were not yet satisfied. They were determined to extend their lines well beyond Douaumont and Vaux, so as to protect them for all time. Again the preparations were extensive and again the gain was immediate. In three days after the attack was launched on December 15, the French captured some fifteen square miles of heavily-fortified and fiercely-contested German territory in front of the outer lines of the Verdun fortifications on the east bank of the Meuse. Before Douaumont, they penetrated the German lines to a depth of almost three miles. The Germans launched counter-attack after counter-attack, but all in vain. The French consolidated their gains; Verdun would never again be in danger. And the victory had been won with few French but with heavy German losses. In many respects, it was one of the most exhilarating events for the Allied cause during the entire history of the war.

As one of the results of his brilliant defence of Verdun, General Nivelle was made commander-in-chief of the French armies in France, replacing Marshal Joffre, worn out by the unprecedented responsibilities of the two and one-quarter years of war. At about the same time, Great Britain placed her government in new hands. The capabilities of the Asquith ministry were generally recognized, but England had come to the conclusion that her strongest man was David Lloyd-George. Asquith refusing to turn over the premiership to his chief lieutenant, the latter organized a combination in the Cabinet and in Parliament, went over to the Unionist Party, and overturned his old chief, taking office on December 10 with a coalition-Unionist majority in the House of Commons and with a Unionist ministry. Sir Edward Grey was succeeded by Arthur Balfour as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The inner control of the government was administered by a War Cabinet of five—the premier, Lords Milner and Curzon, Andrew Bonar Law and Arthur Henderson.

ON THE EASTERN FRONT

THE ATTACK ON CZERNOVITZ

With the beginning of 1916, Russia determined on an attempt on Czernovitz in Bukowina while recuperating from the disaster of the summer of 1915. Czernovitz is situated near the point where the Russian, Austrian and Roumanian frontiers meet, and is an important railroad and highway centre. The main purpose of the Russian advance was political, as Russia was aiming chiefly at winning Roumania over to the Allied cause and at competing with the Central Powers in the political and military pressure which they were exerting upon Roumania. The battle-line ran less than fifteen miles from Czernovitz and the Russian commanders hoped that a surprise attack in the dead of winter might gain the town with little opposition. On December 27, 1915, the entire Russian line along the Pruth and the Dniester advanced. (See Map, page 599.)

For ten days, a number of successes were recorded, but after the first week in January the Austro-Hungarians held firm. The Russians made no more headway and were punished severely as they stormed the Austro-Hungarian lines. By the middle of January, 1916, the Russian generals abandoned their attempt, with inconsiderable and valueless gains and with a heavy casualty list.

THE CAPTURE OF ERZERUM AND TREBIZOND

After the Russian collapse in 1915, the former commander-in-chief, Grand Duke Nicholas, had been transferred to the Caucasus. There he matured plans for an advance on Erzerum and they were put into successful operation in January and February of 1916. Erzerum was high in the mountains of Armenia, due south of the eastern end of the Black Sea, and it was the key to Asiatic Turkey.

On January 11, 1916, the Russians made an unexpected advance

from their lines in the Caucasus, more than seventy-five miles from Erzerum. The snow lay thick on the ground and the temperature was below zero, so that the Turks were resting in false security in the mountains, expecting to be reinforced in the spring by forces made available by the Allied withdrawal from Gallipoli. The Russian forces completely routed the Turks in the mountain passes, and had little difficulty in gaining some fifty miles in the first week. The Turks were outnumbered and outgeneraled, and fled wildly after defeat in the few stands they attempted; and by January 20 the Russians were on the ridge which commands Erzerum. Russia held control of the Black Sea and reinforcements from European Turkey could not reach the fortress in time to save it. On January 25 the city was invested, and the Russians patiently camped around it until their heavy guns should have been brought up through the mountains. On February 12, the bombardment of the fortifications began and two days later one of the important works fell into Russian hands. Within the next three days the other fortifications fell, and Erzerum was completely occupied on February 16. A few weeks later, Trebizond, the great Turkish port on the Black Sea north of Erzerum, also fell.

THE RUSSIAN DRIVE IN MID-SUMMER

When the Germans opened their great drive upon Verdun in February, Russia was frantically appealed to by the Entente for a diversion on the east. The armies of the Tsar responded, although the effects of the defeat in 1915 were still felt. The location chosen was the northern section of the battle-line, some fifty miles south of Dvinsk. On March 18, after a heavy bombardment, the Russian infantry rushed forward; but the Russian bombardment had no more levelled the German lines than the later British bombardment on the Somme was to level the German lines there. The German guns poured a devastating fire into the Russian ranks as they came forward, until the losses were so great by the time the Russians reached the enemy trenches that the German infantry was able to complete the work which the German guns had begun. Throughout the latter part of the month, the Russians made other attempts along this sector to drive

back the forces of von Hindenburg, but again in vain and again with heavy losses. Throughout the first two weeks in April the Russians continued their attempt, but never with sufficient success to affect the fighting on the western front. They then rested on their arms, but at the end of April the Germans counter-attacked and drove back the Russians along the whole northern front and more than atoned for the slight losses which the German forces had suffered. Both in their own and in the German attack the Russian losses were extremely heavy.

The Russians then determined not to anticipate again the reorganization of their armies and waited until the summer for another attempt of significance at the position of the Central Powers in the east. In the north and in the centre of the battle-line in the east, the German positions were too strong to warrant hopes for success, and the Russians, moreover, had learned that they had more chance of success against Austrian troops and Austrian commanders than against German. Furthermore, the situation in the Balkans was still unsettled and success in the southeast would serve the purpose of strengthening the Allied program in the Near East as well as in France and Belgium. Finally, as will be described below, Austria had inflicted a sharp defeat upon the Italians and an attack on Austria by Russia would relieve the pressure on the Italian front as an attack on the German lines would not.

The stage on which was played the last great Russian advance in the Great War was therefore once more Bukowina, the farthest east of the provinces of Austria, the home of many thousands of "unredeemed" Roumanians, and the extreme southern tip of the battle-line in the east, just across the Roumanian frontier. At the same time, however, the Russians were to become active along the entire lower third of the battle-front, the three hundred miles from Bukowina to the Pripet Marshes, in order to prevent the dispatch of reinforcements to Bukowina from the sectors which adjoined the province to the north of the Carpathians. Again the direct conduct of the manoeuvre was entrusted to General Brusiloff, with Alexieff as commander-in-chief of all the Russian armies. Once more the Rus-

sian preparations had been extensive; once more Russia was determined to cripple Austria-Hungary as Russia herself had been crippled in the previous summer; once more the Russians outnumbered the Austrians by almost three to one.

The Russian advance was heralded on June 3 by sharp artillery fire along the entire three hundred miles of the front south of the Pripet Marshes. On June 4, the Russian infantry advanced along the whole line. At the extreme northern end of the advance, little headway was made, largely on account of the marshy nature of the ground. But in the sector half-way between the Pripet Marshes and Bukowina, the Russians broke through at once. These were the lines in Volhynia, just north of the Austro-Russian frontier. Within several hours the Austrian lines had been all taken, and the Austrians were in full retreat, leaving many dead, wounded and prisoners behind. By June 6, the Russians had advanced on this sector fifteen miles to the important town of Lutsk, which fell on the evening of the same day. The next several days were spent in enlarging the salient north and south of Lutsk in preparation for an attack on Kovel. Kovel was one of the vital centres of the Austro-German lines of communication, and if it should fall, the forces of Germany and Austria along the battle-line in the east would be all but severed. Within two weeks, the Russians advanced almost to a line parallel to the Austro-Russian frontier, captured close to 75,000 men, and on a front of nearly one hundred miles had cut through to a depth of forty-five miles. But by this time, both Austria and Germany were dispatching reinforcements to bolster up the lines before Kovel. The German General Staff took over the command of the Austrian army which had been routed, von Hindenburg rushed down German forces from the north, Austria rushed up forces from the Balkans and from the Italian front, and Ludendorff arrived on the scene to take general command. During the latter two weeks of June the Austrian lines held and the Russians in this Volhynian sector were occupied entirely in maintaining their gains against counter-attacks. (See Map, p. 599.)

This was the first gain in the Russian advance of June. The second was on the lower third of the battle-front, in Bukowina, and was the


main object of attack. There the Russians had concentrated many guns, and the Austrian lines were wiped out by the unexpectedly heavy bombardment. Driven thus into the open, the Austrians were no match for the more numerous Russian forces, and the Austrian army in Bukowina fled wildly. The Russians seized one important pass after another, and the entire Austrian formation was broken up. On June 17, the Russians entered Czernowitz. By June 23 most of Bukowina had been captured, the Russians had broken through to a depth of seventy-five miles, and the way was opened to Stanislau and Lemberg, the centers of the Austrian lines of communication in Galicia. The gains on the two sectors were extensive. It looked as though Russia might be about to repeat her great victory of 1914.

But in one vital respect the Russian position at the beginning of July, after one month of fighting, was weak. The two sectors on which gains had been made were separated by a considerable portion of the line. With German generals, German guns and German troops being rushed up, a successful German drive north of Bukowina would drive a wedge between the two sections of territory gained and spell disaster. The Russians had failed to advance in the south centre of their attack in June, so that, after all, their success was not so decisive as it seemed at the first impression. Brusiloff therefore had to halt his further onslaught in order to gain enough ground between his two salients to consolidate them and also to strengthen his Bukowina salient against the anticipated Austro-German counter-attack.

On the northern salient, the ground gained by the Russians was to the south of their objective, Kovel. Early in July, therefore, the Russian commander, Lesch, launched severe attacks to push out his salient on the northwest; and he won a signal success. The Austrians again were routed, their losses were heavy, and by July 10 the Russians were only some twenty miles from Kovel on both the east and the southeast.

In the second week of July, the necessary Russian advance in the region connecting their two great salients was begun and it made progress all through the month. By the end of the month, a considerable amount of ground had been gained and the salient to the

north had also been slightly widened and deepened. But it was obvious that at this rate the Russians would not attain their final objectives and hence would not have struck a decisive blow by the end



RUSSIAN GAINS IN 1916

The eastern front before and after the last great Russian offensive

of the summer; and in the meantime their meagre resources were being exhausted.

In the Bukowina salient the Russian advance was temporarily halted by a sharp Austrian counter-attack some twenty miles east of the Dniester. The Austrians were helped by the heavy rains which swelled the rivers and flooded the country; and for the entire month of

July the Russians were able to accomplish little. In August, however, the Russians again struck hard in Bukowina and again carried all before them. On August 10 they captured Stanislau and with further advances were once more in a position to menace Lemberg.

By the middle of August, the German General Staff was well aware of the seriousness of the situation in Bukowina. It took complete charge of the operations, replaced the Austrian commanders by German, and infiltrated many corps of German soldiers between the ranks of the two great Austrian armies, of more than a million men, which had been demoralized. Brusiloff was striking in two directions—one, toward Lemberg; the other, across the Carpathians toward Roumania, in order to keep in touch with the Roumanian political situation.

On August 20, the Austro-Germans ceased retreating and stood firm in well-prepared positions. In the next several days, both sides concentrated resources for another test of strength on a large scale. On August 29 the Russians, still greatly in the majority, struck hard and drove back the Austro-German right. After a resistance of four days, the Austro-German left also broke, and again the Russians advanced, capturing many prisoners. Halicz, the most valuable point between Lemberg and the Russian forces, was now endangered; and on September 5 the Russians drove straight for Halicz. But now the Austro-Germans held firm, along the Narajokva River. For weeks the Russian waves beat in vain on the enemy's position, until from sheer weakness the attack subsided; and there subsided with it the chief threat of the Russian summer offensive.

In the Carpathians the Russian advance was hampered both by the difficulties of mountain fighting and by the check to the forces of Brusiloff to the north. When Roumania entered the war (see below), Roumanian forces cooperated for a time with the Russian, but when Roumania fell, the Russians in the Carpathians could get no further ahead.

The Russian offensive in the summer of 1916 had thus achieved gains which were notable but not notable enough seriously to affect the outcome of the entire war. Indirectly, however, the Russian drive

certainly affected the situation in France, and relieved some of the pressure at Verdun and on the Italian front. As from the very first days of the war, the Russian contribution to the Allied cause was largely concealed from public gaze, but he would be a rash prophet who would dare to assert that without the Russian diversion in the summer Italy could have continued to hold out.

Upon Russia herself, on the other hand, the attempt was decisive. It was the last despairing effort of a dying organism. Generations of corruption, of oppression, of enforced illiteracy and ignorance, of mismanagement, of exploitation, had done their work. Russian resources were dissipated. The Russian people were exhausted. The court was discredited. Suffering became more intense. Murmurings became louder. The Russian people no longer were deluded by the specious cry of patriotic support for a country when the existence of that country was not devoted directly to the welfare of its people. Further prosecution of the war might spell increased happiness for the Russian business and landed interests, but the Russian people would gain no direct happiness to atone for the deaths and mutilations which war was imposing. For a hundred years the rulers of Russia had danced; the piper was now about to present his bill.

KUT-EL-AMARA

Soon after the outbreak of the war, British troops occupied the mouths of the Tigris and the Euphrates at the head of the Persian gulf. They thus closed the most readily available German road to India and controlled the right of way of the Berlin-to-Bagdad Railroad. Later, the British occupied also the rich oil fields north of Basra. The Turkish force in this region was defeated in November, 1914, and by the end of the year the British hold upon the delta of the Tigris and the Euphrates and upon Basra was undisputed.

Early in 1915, the British advanced up the rivers and occupied Kurna, almost one hundred miles from the Persian gulf. In the spring, an attacking force of Turks was sharply repulsed and in April and May the British pursued the enemy up the Tigris to Kut-el-Amara, at least seventy-five miles from Kurna. By this time, the small British forces were far from their base of supplies, but the resistance of the Turks had been so weak and the temptation of further advance was so strong that the British continued to press forward. On September 28, 1915, they defeated the Turks in front of Kut-el-Amara, and took possession of that city. The British were now only one hundred miles from Bagdad itself, and they determined to press forward to the occupation of Bagdad as well.

The entire British expedition was hardly above 20,000. The commander was General Townsend, acting under the direction of General Nixon. By the middle of November Townsend had drawn very close to the outskirts of Bagdad. On November 22, 1915, he defeated a Turkish force at Ctesiphon, less than twenty miles from the greatest city of Mesopotamia. But then the tide turned. An overwhelming force of Turks, well-equipped and ably officered, appeared on the scene, and Townsend was defeated and compelled to retreat, after having suffered severe losses. Fighting rear-guard actions, the British hacked their way back to Kut-el-Amara, where they were surrounded on December 3. The surrounding Turks were many thou-

sands strong and a relief expedition dispatched by General Nixon was unable to break through the Turkish lines to the beleaguered city. Food was sent to the starving British by airplanes, but it was insufficient and the suffering became intense within the lines of Kut-el-Amara. Sorties were as unsuccessful as relief expeditions, and, starved out, Townsend was compelled to surrender with some 10,000 men on April 28, 1916.

During the same year Russia also suffered reverses in Persia and Kurdistan. A Russian expedition aiming at Bagdad from the northwest and at the Berlin-to-Bagdad Railroad was defeated by the Turks in the summer of 1916. Another Russian attempt at the railroad, farther to the north, also met with disaster in July. Other Russian advances against Asiatic Turkey were likewise repulsed during 1916.

ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT

THE INVASION OF ITALY

We saw that the Italian advance against Austria was in two sections. The first was along the Isonzo River, near the sea-coast; and the second was in the mountains of the Trentino, serving as a covering movement for the first, lest the main Italian army be assailed in its rear while proceeding against Gorizia. Up to the spring of 1916, there had been little change in the situation on the Italian front. Cadorna's army was still drawn up along the Isonzo, having still failed to capture Gorizia, and in the mountains of the Trentino the main passes were still held by light forces of Italians.

But it was well known that the Italians were preparing for a great coup in the summer, as the British and French were preparing on the Somme and as Russia was preparing in the east. The Allied plan was to wait until Germany had beaten herself out at Verdun, and then to strike both Germany and Austria at the same time.

The Central Powers, however, had no intention of awaiting inactively the blow of which they had been already well informed through the many ramifications of their Intelligence Staffs. They determined to strike at Italy before Italy herself was ready to strike, in the hope of frustrating the Italian offensive. And in planning to strike through the Trentino, where a blow was unexpected, they hoped not only to invade Italian territory itself, but also to get in the rear of the main Italian army on the Isonzo and thus to surround Cadorna.

It was significant evidence of the efficiency of the military organization of the Central Powers that they should be able to make great military preparations, extending over many weeks, for a drive in the Trentino without permitting any suspicion of their intention to reach the ears of the Entente. The Central Powers were still predominant in artillery, and they concentrated many of their heaviest guns, both German and Austrian, in the mountains of the Trentino

Upper Left-Hand Corner—Field Marshal Sir John Denton Pinkstone French, Commander-in-Chief, British Expeditionary Forces in France, 1914-December 15, 1915; Commander-in-Chief, British Forces in the United Kingdom, 1915-May 5, 1918; Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, May 5, 1918.

Upper Right-Hand Corner—Sir Eric Geddes, British Director-General of Military Railways, 1916-1917; First Lord of the Admiralty, July 17, 1917-January, 1919; Director of British Demobilization, January, 1919—.

Center—Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander, First British Army, 1914-December 15, 1915; Commander-in-Chief, British Expeditionary Forces, December 15, 1915—.

Lower Left-Hand Corner—Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commander, First British Battle Squadron, 1912-November 29, 1916; Commander, Grand Fleet, November 29, 1916—.

Lower Right-Hand Corner—General Sir Edmund Allenby, Commander-in-Chief, British Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 1917—.

opposite the strongholds of the Italians. Four hundred thousand of the best soldiers of the Austrian army were massed in front of the guns. The Italians, on their side, seem to have had some inkling of a forthcoming attack, although they grossly underestimated its strength; at all events, they had sent some reinforcements to their

THE ITALIAN FRONT IN THE SPRING OF 1916

Trentino positions just before the storm broke. The chief deficiency of the Italians, however, lay in artillery.

As customary, the Austrians prefaced their drive by a terrific bombardment on May 14. Before many hours, the Italian positions had been blasted into ruin and the Austrian shells were falling upon an army stationed in the open. When the Austrian infantry then advanced, the Italian centre fell back, but the flanks resisted vigorously.

Indeed, on the flanks the Austrians were able to make little direct headway, but they continually drove back the Italian centre until the flanks were also compelled to withdraw in order to maintain a straight line. For a week the retirement of the Italian centre was rapid, until along almost the whole Trentino line the attackers were on Italian soil. By May 25, the Austrians were nearing the southern edge of the mountains which overlook the plain of Venetia; and unless they should be stopped within the next several days, they would be able to swoop across the plains and get at the Italian army along the Isonzo from the rear. Cadorna rushed up reinforcements, but the mountainous character of the country and the scarcity of communications made it doubtful if the retreating Italian forces could be materially strengthened before the first days of June. During the latter part of May, the Italian centre was still being forced back, but on the left the Italians were holding firm. At Coni Zugna and at Pasubio and at Buole Pass positions were held in such a fashion as to form salients into the Austrian line. Again and again the Austrians advanced again these positions, but again and again they were unable to make headway. On May 30, the Austrians reached the climax of their attempts on the Italian left, but again they were thwarted by the magnificent defence of the outnumbered Italians; and with the stand on the left the remainder of the Italian line was being given a moment's breathing-space in which to re-form. Nevertheless, the Austrians continued to advance in the centre and on the right. On May 25, Battale fell. On May 28, the Austrians crossed the Posina and were separated from the Venetian plains by only a single ridge of high hills. On June 3 they won one of the points on this ridge, were also on the heights overlooking Arsiero, and had captured Asiago.

But by June 3 reinforcements reached the Italian line and it stood firm, thanks to the stand made by the left wing. The Austrian frontal attacks were beaten back. In the next several days the Austrians resorted to flank attacks but equally without success. And, while they, too, were rushing up reinforcements and preparing for a final stroke, their attention was diverted. Responding to a despairing cry for help, on June 4 Brusiloff had launched his great drive in

Bukowina. Without this Russian diversion, Cadorna's army might have been surrounded, with only portions of it managing to retreat along the coast with sufficient speed to avoid surrender; the road to much of northern Italy would have been opened; the ever-smouldering Italian revolution might have broken out, with results upon the military campaign similar to the results of the Russian Revolution; Roumania might have joined the Central Powers; and Austria would have been able to throw many of her forces and much of her equipment and supplies into the scales of battle in France and northern Belgium.

But the threat in Bukowina was too serious to be overlooked. Austria hastened to divert many of her crack troops from the Italian to the Russian front. With the opposing forces thus nearly equal in number, Italy repelled all further attacks; and by the middle of June was safe and still in a position to launch her great drive along the Isonzo, although she had been in dire peril and perilously close to the edge of complete disaster.

The Italian counter-attack in the Trentino was launched on June 16. On the right, after sharp fighting, the Austrians were driven out of their more advanced positions and by the end of the month both Asiago and Arsiero were recovered. The Austrians were still removing troops to the Russian front and on June 27 the entire Italian centre was once more across the Posina. By July 10 the Austrian front was behind both the Posina and the Asa, and there it maintained itself. The Austrian retreat was skilfully conducted and the Austrian losses were not great in comparison with the Italian, but the enemy had been forced to relinquish more than three-fourths of the ground he had gained. For the remainder of 1916 the battle-line in the Trentino was on the average only some five miles beyond the point where it had been before the Austrian offensive, and only in a few places did it encroach, and then only slightly, on Italian soil.

THE CAPTURE OF GORIZIA

In July the battle-line on the fifty-mile front along the Isonzo was practically where it had been at the beginning of the preceding winter. North and south of Gorizia the Italians had established a

foothold on the eastern bank of the river, but Gorizia itself was still uncaptured.

On August 1 Cadorna launched a heavy bombardment along the entire front. Three days later he delivered a strong attack against Montfalcone, on his right, near the sea-coast. But the Montfalcone attack was only a ruse, in order to draw to the south some of the Austrian reserves. On August 6, the bombardment was resumed and finally razed the Austrian first-line positions. In the afternoon, the Italian infantry then advanced directly upon Gorizia. The immediate Italian objectives were the heights of Sabotino and San Michele, to the north and south, respectively, of Gorizia, and the key to the fortress. Storming the heights of Sabotino, the Italians carried all before them, and before nightfall the crest of the hill was in Italian hands. The Austrians fought bravely and fiercely, and while it lasted the battle for Gorizia was one of the most stirring of the entire war. San Michele was a more difficult nut to crack, as its steep sides and strong fortifications made it all but impregnable; but the Italians stormed it directly, and after severe losses had it completely in their hands by August 8. On the next day bridges were thrown across the stream, thanks to the capture of Sabotino and San Michele, and the main Italian army crossed the Isonzo. The main defences of Gorizia were gone and the city was occupied on August 10. It was a notable victory.

On the next several days, the Italians extended their lines beyond the Gorizia position, although the effort expended in the offensive had been so great that by August 15 the Italian advance upon Trieste halted and there was no further activity of importance on the Italian front during the remainder of the year.

THE ENTRANCE OF ROUMANIA INTO THE WAR

Since gaining her independence in 1878, Roumania had been a nominal ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The latter rulers of Roumania were Hohenzollerns and the court was definitely under German influences. Roumania was indebted to Germany for valuable loans. The logical markets for Roumanian production and trade were in Germany and Austria-Hungary, so that the commercial interests in Roumania were also wrapped up in the welfare of the members of what had been the Triple Alliance.

On the other hand, several millions of the Roumanian race dwelt in Bukowina and Transylvania, under the rule of Austria-Hungary, and they were heartlessly oppressed under that rule. Many Roumans were "unredeemed" also in the Russian province of Bessarabia adjoining Roumania along the Black Sea; but to the mass of the people of Roumania the problem of the Roumans in Bukowina and Transylvania was far more pressing than the problems of the Roumans in Bessarabia.

So that Roumania in the early years of the twentieth century was a land in which the upper classes were pro-German in their sympathies and the lower classes were anti-German, or, more exactly, anti-Austrian. But Roumania was a sad autocracy, both politically and economically, and the lower classes had little or no influence upon their government; so that up to the Balkan Wars Roumania could be counted upon to support the cause of the Central Powers.

But the complications of Balkan politics changed the diplomatic status of Roumania after the Balkan Wars, disassociated her from Austria-Hungary and Germany, and threw her into the arms of the Entente. Bulgaria was promising to become the leading nation of the Balkans, and there was hence bitter rivalry between the two countries. Bulgaria was being opposed also by Russia (see page 99), so that a "rapprochement" between Russia and Roumania became in-

evitable. And by 1914 the plight of the Roumans in Bukowina and Transylvania was beginning to stir even the Roumanian court and the Roumanian government.

So with the outbreak of the Great War Roumania proclaimed her neutrality, and anxiously awaited developments before determining on which side to throw the weight of her influence in the Balkans. The German advance almost to the gates of Paris inclined Roumania to the Alliance; the German defeat at the Marne inclined her to the Entente. The Russian defeat in East Prussia counterbalanced the Russian victories in Galicia. In 1915 the Russian advance into Bukowina itself stirred the government of Roumania to action, negotiations were entered into with the Entente and a loan was obtained from England; but the great Russian disaster at the Dunajec and in Russian Poland threw Roumania back into a policy of neutrality. The conquest of Servia and Montenegro was not unnoticed, and the failure of the Allies at the Dardanelles and Gallipoli and at the Vardar also lowered the value of allegiance to the Allies in 1915.

But in 1916 the situation presented a different aspect to Roumania. Germany's great attempt at Verdun had signally failed. In the summer, the Allied advance on the Somme at first promised great results. The Austrian advance into Italy had been checked and in return the Italians had won a signal victory at Gorizia. In October, 1914, King Ferdinand had succeeded to the throne of Roumania; and although he was a Hohenzollern, he was far cooler to Germany than had been his predecessor, and his wife was an English princess. And to cap the climax, in the summer of 1916 Russia began her great offensive against Austria-Hungary which for a time threatened the complete overthrow of the Dual Monarchy. By August, Russia herself was getting into Bukowina and Transylvania; and Russia informed Roumania that if Roumania did not throw in her lot with Russia at this time, Russia herself would keep Bukowina and Transylvania as she was keeping Bessarabia. It looked as though the fortunes of the war were favoring the Allies, it was probable that unless this opportunity were seized, Roumanian aspirations in the direction of Bukowina and Transylvania would never be realized; the Allied army at Saloniki

was strong and the Allies' promises were tempting; and on August 27, 1916, Roumania declared war upon Austria-Hungary.

THE ENTRANCE OF PORTUGAL INTO THE WAR

In 1916 Portugal also officially joined the Allies. She had long been under the protection of Great Britain and had signed a treaty to furnish to the British Crown at demand 10,000 Portuguese soldiers. At the very outbreak of the war, Portugal had been ready to become an active participant, but England made no direct demands upon her small ally until 1916. In 1916, Portugal obeyed England's order to seize German ships interned in Portuguese waters, and on March 9, 1916, Germany declared that that action, and also Portugal's action in permitting British troops in Africa to pass through Portuguese territory, constituted an act of war between the two countries. Portuguese troops were dispatched to the trenches in France and Belgium, but the chief value of the adherence of Portugal to the Entente consisted in the German shipping seized when she entered the war.

THE CONQUEST OF ROUMANIA

Roumania was shaped like a scissors cutting into Austria-Hungary. The upper blade was Moldavia; the lower blade was Wallachia; and the handle was the Dobruja, the stretch of land along the Black Sea taken from Bulgaria at the end of the Second Balkan War in 1913. The capital, Bucharest, one of the most strongly fortified cities in the world, was in the south centre of the country, forming the junction between the blades of the scissors. Roumania was strongly situated strategically. On her east lay the Black Sea, under the control of Russia. To the south lay the enemy country, Bulgaria; but the border was the wide Danube, forming an excellent line of defence. On the north and west were the Transylvanian Alps and the Carpathians, another natural defence of strength. And the Austrian province of Transylvania, the territory desired for incorporation within a Greater Roumania, lay between the two blades of the scissors. (See Map, page 615.)

The Roumanian army had been mobilized months before Roumania declared war on the Central Powers, and Roumania had waited until the end of the harvest before taking the final plunge; so that she was ready to open hostilities on a large scale so soon as war was declared. The Roumanian army numbered in the neighborhood of half a million and the country was rich in agricultural and oil lands, so that it seemed as though the Entente had gained in Roumania a valuable addition to its ranks.

Counting on little danger from Bulgaria, Roumania left but one army to defend the Bulgarian frontier, and with the bulk of her forces invaded Transylvania along the entire length of the Austro-Hungarian frontier on August 28, the day after the declaration of war. There were a number of passes into Transylvania, and Roumania rushed her forces through all of them. Roumania's plan was one of cooperation with the Russian forces invading Transylvania at the same time from the north. The invading Roumanian troops were in three great bodies, one headed west into Transylvania from Moldavia, one headed north from Wallachia and the third headed northwest between the first two. For the first two weeks, the Roumanians carried all before them. The Austrian forces in Transylvania which had not gone north to stop the Russians were few and poorly equipped, and whatever engagements were fought in the mountains resulted in favor of the Roumanian army. By September 12, more than one-fourth of all Transylvania was in Roumanian hands. The advance had been especially successful in the centre, at some points penetrating as deeply as fifty miles into Austrian territory, so that the Roumanian line was becoming almost straight. A number of important towns and positions were included with the captured territory and there was jubilation in Bucharest.

But the Roumanians were reckoning without their host. Germany had no intention of permitting Austria to be endangered. Germany also saw in the Roumanian situation an excellent opportunity to regain whatever prestige the Central Powers had lost in the Balkans. An object lesson would not be lost on Greece, and there was both material and immaterial profit in rewarding Bulgaria for joining its fortunes with those of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. The defeat of

the German drive at Verdun had seen the downfall of von Falkenheyn, who was replaced as chief of the German General Staff by the brilliantly aggressive von Hindenburg, his chief assistant being Ludendorff, with the official title of First Quartermaster General. To take charge of the Roumanian front, von Hindenburg dispatched the man whom he had supplanted, and the direct prosecution of von Falkenheyn's strategy was entrusted to the past master of mountain warfare, von Mackensen. Simultaneously, Germany rushed up to Transylvania some of her crack regiments and supported them by many of the best troops of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. By this time, the German forces had halted both the French and British drives on the Somme and the Russian drive in Galicia, while on the Italian front Gorizia had already fallen and beyond that point the Italians were not in a position to advance much further. Indeed, it is probable that among the troops being massed against Roumania were many Austrian divisions which had been removed from the Trentino and the Isonzo lines in order to repel the Russian advance in Galicia. Moreover, von Hindenburg was rolling up also a large share of the seemingly endless supply of German heavy guns, and despite the difficulty of moving them through the mountains, he was able to conceal from the Roumanian leaders the full strength of the blow which was soon to fall upon them.

Further, Roumania was stronger in theory than in fact. She was counting upon promises of Russian support which could not be fulfilled. Indeed, there is evidence to show that by this time the reactionary interests in control of the Russian Court were realizing the danger of a successful revolution in Russia if she continued to fight much longer. Like many of the reactionaries in all the belligerent countries, they hated Socialism even more than they hated militarism, and had a greater fear of Socialist ascendancy than of the triumph of the Imperial German Government. More and more the agents of Germany were gaining power at the court of the Tsar of all the Russias, and the charges are both many and serious that at this juncture Roumania was deliberately betrayed by the Russian government.

At all events, the Roumanian army was ill-equipped, inadequately

officered and poorly trained. There was almost a total lack of heavy guns and other equipment necessary in modern warfare. The Roumanians had practically no airplanes. Neither the troops nor the officers had enjoyed the experience of actual fighting, as had the Bulgarians in the Balkan Wars; and the Roumanian army was far inferior in strength to the Bulgarian and certainly to the Austrian forces. The Roumanians had evidently counted upon the Allied forces under Sarrail at Saloniki to occupy the attention of the Bulgarians, but Sarrail's position was too dangerous for him to do much more than maintain his Saloniki lines. To have moved out into the open against the Bulgarians would have courted disaster. Moreover, the Roumanian railroads and other means of transportation were hopelessly inadequate for military purposes, whereas even in the most mountainous regions of Transylvania the Central Powers could rely upon adequate transportation. Finally, Roumania was a land of a far lower type of civilization than Bulgaria, and her entire military and non-military strength reflected the weakness of a land and a people who have failed to utilize their opportunities to progress to an advanced state of culture.

The first warning of danger to the Roumanian forces in Transylvania came from the Dobruja, on the opposite border of Roumania. Von Mackensen had been collecting forces in Bulgaria for an advance into eastern Roumania. Besides several regiments of Bulgarians, he had a number of Turkish troops and some German forces. On September 1, he crossed the Danube, defeated the few Roumanian troops in his way and made all haste for the railroad connecting Bucharest with Kustenje, the important Roumanian port on the Black Sea. On September 6, von Mackensen then drove for Wallachia itself, capturing Turtukai on the following day, and Silistria on September 9. By September 15, von Mackensen was well into the Dobruja.

The Roumanian forces in the mountains of Transylvania were now compelled to give heed to this menace in their rear. A number of troops, including some Serbians and Russians, were hastily dispatched from the Carpathians to the Dobruja, and the further Roumanian

advance into Transylvania was halted. However, by the third week in September a severe defeat had been inflicted on the Bulgarian-Turkish-German forces in the Dobruja.

But by this time von Falkenheyn was ready with his main thrust,

THE CONQUEST OF ROUMANIA

The successive battle fronts are shown as follows:

A-A—September 20, 1916

B-B—November 22, 1916

C-C—November 30, 1916

D-D—December 8, 1916

E-E—January 24, 1917

the Russian drive into Transylvania having been stopped. On September 20, he struck hard on the Roumanian left in Transylvania, prefacing his attack by a bombardment from his heavy guns which completely demoralized the Roumanian troops. The Roumanians

broke badly and by September 26 von Falkenheyn was at one of the main passes between Transylvania and Roumania and had thus driven a sharp wedge between the Roumanian armies. On other sectors, however, the Roumanians retired in good order, and on the north the army from Moldavia continued its advance and got even farther into Transylvania by the first day of October.

But on October 3, von Falkenheyn began to drive from the Rotherthurm Pass at the rear of the Roumanian armies to his left, and the danger of being flanked drove them back from the positions they had occupied. By October 10 the Roumanians had evacuated all the territory they had gained in Transylvania and were occupied entirely on the border. Von Falkenheyn then drove into the Roumanian centre, south of Kronstadt, breaking it badly, and opening the way for an invasion into all of Roumania. At the same time, von Mackensen in the Dobruja had recovered from his temporary reverse and again advanced. Roumania was helpless. The remainder of the story is monotonous in its recital of the steady procession of Roumanian defeats and German advances. On October 23 the Bulgarians occupied Kustenje, on the Black Sea. Throughout the second half of October and the month of November von Falkenheyn drove back the Roumanians, although in a number of places in the mountains they checked the Austro-German advance for some days before retiring. The German commander was aiming south and was occupying the western end of Wallachia before moving on Bucharest itself. By the end of November the southern half of the Dobruja and the western half of Wallachia were in enemy hands, and Bucharest was thus being approached from three sides. The great fortifications of the Roumanian capital, as expected, were helpless before the monster German field guns, and they resisted for but a few days. On December 5 von Mackensen entered the city and the two armies invading Roumania joined hands. Practically all of Wallachia was gone. However, the retreating Roumanians set fire to both their oil wells and their wheat fields, so that the occupancy of Roumania was not so advantageous as the German General Staff had anticipated.

The combined forces of the Central Powers continued their advance throughout the winter. By Christmas, 1916, all the Dobruja, all

Wallachia and the southern tip of Moldavia were in their hands. By the end of January, 1917, the Roumanians had withdrawn to the Sereth River. By the middle of February von Falkenheyn's and von Mackensen's forces were well into Moldavia.

But there they halted. It was becoming difficult to bring supplies all the way from Austria and Bulgaria, and the German General Staff could ill spare forces from their western front at the beginning of spring. During the invasion of Roumania, Russia had twice tried counter-attacks in the hopes of bringing relief to the hard-pressed Roumanians; but early in March the Tsar of Russia became a private citizen.


Meanwhile, the Roumanian government refused to surrender. The capital had been removed to Jassy, and thence the king continued to issue orders to his subjects and to consider himself as one of the Entente Allies. The population was for the greater part deported, more than half of the army of 500,000 was gone, and the country was ruined. In December, 1917, Roumania was compelled to join Bolshevist Russia in signing an armistice with the Central Powers and in March, 1918, Roumania, helpless, made peace with Austria-Hungary and Germany. The Dobruja was given back to Bulgaria, but in return Roumania obtained Bessarabia; on the other hand, humiliating political, geographical, military and economic terms were imposed which rendered the country helpless and made it for practical purposes subsidiary to the Central Powers.

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

In 1916 occurred the one important naval engagement of the Great War. On May 31, the British Grand Fleet was sweeping in two sections through the North Sea. It was cruising south, having left the waters off the southwestern coast of Norway, and had reached the waters of the Skagger Rack, the channel between Norway and Denmark which is the western connecting link between the North and the Baltic Seas. The first section consisted of the so-called Fast Battle Fleet, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, and the Fifth Battle Squadron, with some squadrons of destroyers and several light battleships, under Rear-Admiral Thomas. Beatty's command comprised the battle cruisers *Queen Mary*, *Princess Royal*, *Tiger*, *Lion*, *New Zealand* and *Indefatigable*. The heaviest ships of Thomas's command were the fast battleships *Warspite*, *Valiant*, *Barnham* and *Malaya*. This advance guard of the Grand Fleet was some fifty miles south of the main section, under Admiral Jellicoe, which contained the great dreadnaughts, with other battleships and cruisers.

Germany's fleet was also in the custom of cruising through the North Sea, although never as far from the land as the British, for the Germans were too conscious of the numerical superiority of the British to attempt anything but flight if the two main fleets should come into contact. Germany's hope was to encounter a mere section of the British fleet, so that the odds would be in favor of the Germans, or, at best, would be even. The German High Seas Fleet had also put to sea on May 31, sailing north to the Skagger Rack from Helgoland. The advance guard of the German fleet, under Admiral von Hipper, consisted of five battle cruisers, the *Derfflinger*, *Lützow*, *Moltke*, *Seydlitz* and *Von der Tann*, with a number of light cruisers and destroyers. It was closely followed by the main German Battle Fleet, under Admiral von Scheer. The purpose of the Germans is unknown. It may have been to meet only a section of the British

fleet of equal or of less strength. It may have been to induce the British fleet to pursue the Germans into mine fields. It may have been another raid upon the British coast. It may have been an attempt to



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND (after Buchan)

get at the Russian fleet in the Baltic. It may have been a cover under which one or two cruisers could slip away from the British screen and get into the open Atlantic, where they could play havoc with merchant shipping.

At noon on May 31, Beatty had turned to the north, in order to keep more closely in touch with Jellicoe as the two sections of the

British Grand Fleet approached the waters in which enemy vessels might be expected. The weather was clear and the water was smooth, but clouds were rolling up from the horizon and a haze overhung the surface of the ocean, making for a condition of "low visibility." At 2:20 P. M., the *Galatea*, the first of the light cruisers, reported the presence of enemy vessels to the east. Beatty at once turned to the east and then to the south, in order to cut off the enemy from his base. Further reports, including one from a sea-plane, showed that the enemy was in force and as Beatty made for von Hipper's five battle cruisers he prepared for action. The British formation was one in which the light cruisers were spread out before the battle cruisers. The British had six battle cruisers and four heavy battle-ships as against the German five battle cruisers, but the odds would be in favor of Germany if von Scheer should join von Hipper before Jellicoe could come up. Nevertheless, Beatty closed in at once upon the German vessels and prepared to give battle.

Confronted by overwhelming superiority in numbers, in guns and in speed, von Hipper turned to the south and made all haste to regain von Scheer before the British could get his range. Both squadrons were thus sailing at full speed south-south-east. As Beatty's vessels were faster than Jellicoe's, the two portions of the British Grand Fleet were drawing farther and farther apart. At 3:48 P. M. the ten large British ships opened fire at the same time as the five large German, the range being about ten miles and the visibility for the moment good, and the battle was on.

The first loss was Beatty's and hence the first palm for accurate gunnery went to the Germans. Around four o'clock a shell penetrated to a vital spot in the *Indefatigable* and the battle cruiser sank at once after a heavy explosion. Less than half an hour afterwards, Beatty suffered an even more depressing loss when a German shell blew up the *Queen Mary*. By this time, however, at least one of the heavy German ships was on fire and the heavy haze which now descended made it impossible for the British to see the effects of their own fire. The destroyers had also engaged, and the Germans lost two of these subsidiary craft, although several of the British destroyers were also punished severely. German submarines were attacking the heavy

British ships without effect, but several of the British destroyers scored against the German battle cruisers. At 4:40 P. M., the situation suddenly changed with the appearance on the scene of the main German Battle Fleet. Beatty was now outnumbered as he had outnumbered von Hipper, and it was now his turn to retrace his course and to flee for the support of his own main battle fleet.

From 4:45 to 6, the ships under the command of Beatty fled to the north, pursued by the combined German fleets of von Hipper and von Scheer. The Germans evidently suspected that they had achieved their purpose of catching an isolated section of the British Grand Fleet; at all events, they followed Beatty in steaming northward toward the main British fleet. In the pursuit one of the German battle cruisers fell out of action, and others showed signs of injury; the British were getting revenge for the loss of the *Queen Mary* and the *Indefatigable*. Shortly before six o'clock Jellicoe was sighted and Beatty at once closed in on the Germans again. It was once more the Germans' turn to make for the south.

The struggle now became sharp. One of the heaviest of Jellicoe's fleet, the *Invincible*, was sunk. Soon afterward, a German light cruiser disappeared under the waves. The destroyers were engaged in fierce struggle, with losses on both sides, although the British losses were the heavier. At 6:05, the British destroyer *Onslow* was disabled and had to be towed off the scene by the *Defender*, itself crippled in the process of rescue. By seven o'clock the British as well as the German ships were now in one fleet. Beatty had been to the west of von Hipper, but had crossed over to the east in order to join Jellicoe, and the German fleet was now to the west of the British. The light was failing and the mist was heavy, and the Germans were making good their retreat to the southwest, by the process of covering their manoeuvres by torpedo attacks from their destroyers. In vain the British commander tried to bring about a general action. From seven to eight, as the fog lifted in spots, the British planted shell after shell upon the retiring German ships while the two fleets made all speed to the southwest. A number of German ships were seen to be on fire and at least one heavy explosion through the mist revealed that one of the German battle cruisers or heavy battleships had blown up. But

the Germans were using smoke also to escape detection and by nine o'clock contact between the two fleets was lost. The main fighting had been done by Beatty's advance squadron and the heavier vessels of Jellicoe had not been able to make themselves effective for more than a few minutes.

During the night, only the British destroyers and light cruisers managed to find traces of the German High Seas fleet. From time to time a German warship would be located in the fog and would be attacked, sometimes with effective results, sometimes with disastrous results. Because of the danger from submarines, Jellicoe was compelled to keep his heaviest vessels in back of his destroyers and light cruisers, but he continued to drive ahead until near dawn in the hope of cutting off the Germans from their bases. However, when dawn broke, no traces of von Scheer's ships were visible; a further British pursuit would have brought Jellicoe's vessels dangerously near the German mine fields; the British fleet therefore returned to the scene of the battle; and in the afternoon of June 1 the British Grand Fleet left the scene of the battle and proceeded with its task of patrolling the North Sea.

The British losses were officially stated as follows:—

<i>Ship</i>	<i>Class</i>	<i>Tons</i>	<i>Crew Losses</i>
<i>Queen Mary</i> —Battle Cruiser.....		27,000	1,000
<i>Indefatigable</i> —Battle Cruiser.....		18,750	800
<i>Invincible</i> —Battle Cruiser.....		17,250	800
<i>Defence</i> —Armored Cruiser.....		14,600	850
<i>Black Prince</i> —Armored Cruiser.....		13,550	750
<i>Warrior</i> —Armored Cruiser.....		13,550	750
<i>Tipperary</i> —Destroyer		1,430	150
<i>Turbulent</i> —Destroyer		1,430	...
<i>Nestor</i> —Destroyer		1,000	100
<i>Nomad</i> —Destroyer		1,000	100
<i>Ardent</i> —Destroyer		935	100
<i>Fortune</i> —Destroyer		935	100
<i>Shark</i> —Destroyer		935	100
<i>Sparrowhawk</i> —Destroyer		935	100
		<hr/>	<hr/>
		113,300	5,700

The German losses were officially stated as follows:—

<i>Lützow</i> —Battle Cruiser.....	28,000	1,150
<i>Pommern</i> —Battleship (Old).....	13,040	736
<i>Rostock</i> —Light Cruiser	4,820	373
<i>Wiesbaden</i> —Light Cruiser.....	3,450	...
<i>Elbing</i> —Light Cruiser.....	3,450	...
<i>Frauenlob</i> —Light Cruiser.....	2,660	281
<i>Destroyer</i>	1,100	...
<i>Destroyer</i>	1,100	...
<i>Destroyer</i>	1,100	...
<i>Destroyer</i>	1,000	...
<i>Destroyer</i>	1,000	...
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	60,720	2,540

Immediately after the battle, the Germans claimed that Jutland had been a great German naval victory. This claim was at once disputed by the British, who insisted that the Germans were concealing their true losses and had published a list of only half of the tonnage which had been destroyed. Jellicoe estimated that the total German tonnage destroyed in the battle was in the neighborhood of 120,000, and many and bitterly scornful were the British jibes at the untruthfulness of the German Admiralty. With the close of the war, however, it was seen that the German statement had been correct. However, many of the German ships which returned to port were in an almost helpless condition and doubtless the British estimate of the German losses included many vessels which the British believed could not make port but which managed to keep afloat until safe within German harbors.

Accordingly, considered absolutely, Jutland was a German victory. But it must be remembered that the ratio of the British fleet to the German was as two to one, and as the losses were in that ratio, Jutland, considered relatively, was a drawn battle. At all events, the outcome of the battle was indecisive. The British continued to control the seas and to maintain their blockade; the Germans continued their submarine attacks and furtive bombardments. There had been no

test of the strength of the respective main fleets—the British had fled when outnumbered and the Germans had fled when outnumbered. The naval situation was the same after June 1, 1916 as it had been before May 31, 1916.

An indirect result of the Battle of Jutland was the replacement of Sir John Jellicoe in command of the British Grand Fleet by Sir David Beatty, on November 29, 1916.

Shortly after the greatest naval contest of the war came another severe blow to Great Britain. On June 6, there sank off the Orkney Islands the British armored cruiser, *Hampshire*. The vessel and the crew were a total loss, and to the end of the war there was no information as to how the ship had met its end. The vessel had been transporting to Russia the man in complete charge of the British war program, Lord Kitchener, and he went down with the ship. But by the summer of 1916, Kitchener's work had largely been done. His extensive plans for England's participation in the war had been matured and other shoulders were better prepared to take the burden of the direction of the war than they would have been in 1914 or 1915. Kitchener was succeeded as Minister of War by David Lloyd-George.

Other naval incidents in the year 1916 were unimportant. Throughout the year a number of British warships, large and small, were sunk by mines or torpedoes. In August a skirmish was fought in the North Sea between fragments of the main fleets, and the British cruisers *Falmouth* and *Nottingham* were sunk and the German battleship *Westfallen*, although not sunk, was seriously damaged. On the whole, the Russians maintained control of the Black Sea and the French of the Mediterranean, but Turkish warships appeared on occasions in the Black Sea as did Austrian warships in the Adriatic. In March, the German auxiliary cruiser *Moewe* slipped safely through the British blockade into a German port, after having destroyed much merchant shipping.

The situation at the end of 1916 was still distinctly favorable for the Central Powers. True, 1916 had not been so decidedly a German year as had 1915, but nevertheless the developments of the year had been more helpful to the Central Powers than to the Allies. Germany had failed to break through at Verdun, but similarly the Allies had in turn signally failed in their great effort along the Somme. Russia had revealed some signs of recuperation from her complete military collapse in 1915, but the recuperation was not vigorous and the signs were many that Russia would be of less and less assistance to the Allies. The Russian people were becoming war-weary to the point of revolt; the Russian government was yielding bit by bit to German influences; and rumors of a separate peace with Russia were increasing, in spite of the fact that in September, 1914 the Allies had formally agreed that no one of them would make peace without the consent of all. The blockade of the Allies was causing great inconvenience and distress in Germany and Austria-Hungary, but the great victories of the Central Powers in Serbia, Roumania, Poland and the Dardanelles had opened new sources of supplies. On the sea, the Allies still maintained control, but the submarine warfare was greatly hindering the prosecution of the war by the Entente. In man-power the Central Powers were at a disadvantage, as they had by this time put forth their maximum strength, and France was the only one of the Allies which had called upon her man-power to its utmost resources; but the geographical position of the Central Powers was such that they could utilize their man-power to far greater advantages than the Allies could utilize theirs. Italy was employed entirely in occupying the territory she desired to annex, and her support had not yet been of signal help. Moreover, Germany was revealing far greater industrial skill in manipulating her resources than the Allies, for the latter, although taking many steps towards the greater material war-time efficiency of state socialism (state capitalism), were nevertheless hampered by a tenderness of feeling for private property and private interests to which Germany in war-time was less subservient. In March, the Allies for the first time had pooled their resources in a Joint War Council, followed by a great Joint Economic Conference in Paris in June. In the latter, they officially declared that even after the war

they intended to cripple Germany's commerce and industry. Whatever the ethical and economic justification of this declaration, its practical effect was that the German people was more readily persuaded than ever by its government that the war it was fighting was in reality a war for the defence of the Fatherland; and that if the German people should refuse to support the war whole-heartedly, the terms of peace imposed by the victorious Allies would be the brutal terms of the victor over the vanquished. There is much evidence to show that before June, with the German failure at Verdun, the feeling for revolt or at least for a greater democratization of the German political system had been growing in Germany; but the official statement of the Paris Economic Conference served the effect of discouraging and weakening the forces making for revolution inside of Germany and Austria-Hungary. In 1914, the Allies had promised to set up an independent Poland at the expense of Germany and Austria-Hungary, although it would be under the general suzerainty of Russia; but in 1916 Germany countered against the advantageous political effect of that declaration by promising in turn an independent Poland at the expense of Russia, although naturally refusing to admit within its boundaries the Poles in Prussia and Galicia. On the whole, the Allies were wasting their greater resources so much more rapidly than the Central Powers were wasting their lesser resources that ultimate victory for the Allies was becoming recognized as doubtful unless the United States should finally be drawn into the war.

THE WAR, 1917

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

Not until many decades after the official termination of the Great War will it be possible to determine which of the settlements arising from the struggle will prove to be superficial and which will prove of far-reaching effect. Although no other war has so thoroughly shaken civilization to its foundations as has the Great War, yet there have been wars, and great wars, before this, and their results have usually been seen with different eyes by the generation which passed through them and by the generations which knew them only through the written pages of history. Political necessity makes strange bedfellows overnight and the evil civilization of one decade becomes the beneficent civilization of the next. In 1900, Great Britain resounded with praise of Germany and bitter detestation of Russia; in 1910, Germany had become the enemy and Russia the ally. In 1887, the British Government semi-officially announced that England would not feel called upon to declare war against a country which used Belgium for a military passage-way, with no idea of permanent occupancy; and in 1914 England's official reason for entering the lists against Germany was the German violation of the treaty of 1839, guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality. Our own Mexican War seemed unrighteous, in the whole United States, to only a few recalcitrant spirits like Daniel Webster; today most American historians confess that it was hardly justified. Even the complete helplessness of the military autocracy which was Germany may not be lasting; in 1870 France was also on her knees. The League of Nations may be permanent or may dissolve into another illusion like the Hague Conferences. Woodrow Wilson himself has maintained that the Great War had its roots in the disregard of the right of minor nationalities to choose their own political destinies, and in a number of instances the Treaties of Versailles place nationalities

under foreign dominations to which they are opposed; who will assert with complete confidence that the Great War will prove to have been indeed the war which ended war?

No, at the signing of peace only one of all the achievements of the Great War could be said to be immutably secure, and that achievement was the overthrow of the Tsardom in Russia. Despite the condition of flux which obtained in Russia during the years following the Revolution, despite the civil war or rather the civil wars into which the Revolution plunged the territory which once had been the Tsar's, despite the bitterness of the controversy long raging among all sections of opinion as to the truth about the Russian situation, despite the natural and the unnatural ignorance of the western world as to the real conditions in Russia, despite official propaganda and subsidized censorship, despite the anti-Revolutionary character of most of the challengers to the Bolshevik regime, despite the undemocratic and class-selfish nature of that regime itself, despite the economic prostration of most of Russia and despite the continued misery and impotence of the Russian people, never again will a hereditary Tsar rule with uncontrolled power the land which knew the Romanoffs.

The Communist Manifesto of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, which may be said to mark the beginning of modern scientific Socialism as a program, appeared in 1848. The organization of the Social Democratic Party of Germany was accomplished by Ferdinand Lassalle in 1863 and the International Workingmen's Association, the international Socialist and Labor organization, was organized in 1864. Considering that by the middle of the nineteenth century and in the following years there was less freedom and greater exploitation in Russia than in any other of the great Powers, it was inevitable that by that time the revolutionary feeling in Russia should begin to show traces of an effective organization. By 1870, revolt against the oppression of the Russian government had crystallized into a definite movement, a movement which, according to modern nomenclature, would be considered anarchistic rather than socialistic.

The revolutionary movement in Russia was influenced greatly by the teachings of the anarchist leader Bakunin, the opponent of Karl

Marx, and in the years around 1875 became a movement of terrorism. (It was not until 1879 that Marxian Socialism got a strong foothold in Russia, under the leadership of Plechanof.) With hundreds of the highest type of men and women imprisoned, exiled and executed for participation in the movement to bring freedom to Russia, their comrades had determined upon a policy of reprisal. Bombs were thrown, officials were shot and in every possible way the Government was defied. The Government retaliated by increasing the severity of its punishments, by broadening the scope and the powers of its secret police, by introducing spies into the ranks of the revolutionists; and in the decades immediately preceding the Revolution of 1917 Russia was practically in the throes of a civil war for freedom. However, despite the boundless courage of the terrorists and their unswerving devotion to their ideals, it became increasingly evident that the policy of terrorism was failing and that more thorough, if less spectacular, methods of overthrowing the Russian monarchy would have to be adopted. Accordingly, by the end of the nineteenth century, although the terrorists continued their activities, there arose from the earlier inchoate movements for freedom several definite movements aiming at freedom by the non-terrorist methods of political and industrial solidarity.

The bogs of Socialist theorizing are both vast and treacherous, and it would hardly profit here to analyze the creeds of the various Socialist factions in Russia with great minuteness. They were divided into two great bodies, the Socialist Revolutionary Party and the Social Democratic Party. The points of difference between them were due chiefly to the character of Socialism as expounded by Karl Marx. Marx had surveyed society as a scientist surveys a problem in mechanics and the Socialism deduced by Marx was a system of society which was inevitably destined to come rather than a system which ought to come. The Socialist state as analyzed by Marx was merely the next stage of human development which would succeed the stage of private ownership of big business as irrevocably as the factory system of the nineteenth century had succeeded the household economy of the eighteenth century.

But Marx, who had been exiled from Germany, had spent most of his mature years in England, the greatest industrial nation of the time;

and Marx's premises were based chiefly upon the presence of a highly-organized industrial state like England. So that when the revolutionists of Russia confronted the Socialism of Marx, they came up squarely against the fact that Russia was predominantly an agricultural country. Russia had not yet reached the stage of capitalism which, Marx had taught, would be the predecessor of the Socialist system. The factory workers of St. Petersburg and Moscow could become enthusiastic about the Marxian Socialism as the peasants and their well-wishers could not. Marx had devoted some attention in his great work, "Capital," to the problem of agriculture, but his theses did not appeal strongly to those who saw that the prime need of the peasants was to wrest the ownership of the land from the nobility and to exploit the soil of Russia themselves. Accordingly, the town revolutionists rallied around Marxian or determinist Socialism while the agricultural revolutionists rallied around non-Marxian or evolutionary (revisionist) Socialism. The revisionist Socialist party was the Socialist Revolutionary Party; the orthodox Marxian party was the Social Democratic Party.

From this distinction arose inevitably other points of difference between the two parties. The Socialist Revolutionary Party was anxious to cooperate with the liberal elements in the non-Socialist (bourgeois) parties; the Social Democrats were opposed to what they called compromising with the bourgeoisie and political trading. The Socialist Revolutionaries were anxious to effect a Socialist state step by step, by evolution; the Social Democrats' program called for the immediate fruition of the Socialist ideal, for a cataclysmic revolution. The immediate hopes of the Socialist Revolutionaries were centered upon Russia; even the immediate program of the Social Democrats called for the advent of the social revolution over the entire world. The Socialist Revolutionaries were hence counting upon accomplishing their program by the ballot, by political action; the Social Democrats' hope lay largely in industrial (direct) action. The ideal of the Socialist Revolutionaries was hence what we should call democratic; the ideal of the Social Democrats was a dictatorship of the working-classes (proletariate). On the other hand, the Socialist Revolutionaries were more closely allied to the terrorists and showed greater willingness to resort to terrorist methods than the Social Democrats.

Each of these parties was split within itself into three groups on the question of nationalism. One group in each party believed that nationalism was beneficial in itself. One group in each party believed that nationalism could bring forth certain fruits beneficial to internationalism. One group in each party believed that nationalism was wholly harmful and hence believed in unadulterated internationalism. But it would be far too confusing to continue this triplicate division in an account of the rôles played by each party in the Russian Revolution. For practical purposes each of the two great Socialist parties in Russia may be considered as divided into a conservative (Right) wing and a radical (Left) wing. The Socialist Revolutionary Party was organized in 1901; the leaders of its right wing were Kerenski, Madame Breshkovsky and Chernoff, and the leader of its left wing was Marie Spiridonova. The Social Democratic Party was organized in 1898. At its convention in 1903, it split into two camps on the question of the amount of centralization to be permitted both in its organization and in the Socialist state which it hoped to establish. The majority in this convention favored centralization and became known as Bolsheviki, from the Russian word meaning "more." The conservative wing of the Social Democratic Party then became known as Mensheviki, from the Russian word meaning "less." The outstanding leader of the Bolsheviki was Nikolai Lenin, who was later joined by Leon Trotsky and Cheidze.

The non-Socialist reform element in Russia became organized in 1905 as the Constitutional Democratic Party, which was known, from the initial letters of its name, as the party of the "Cadets." Its leader was Miliukoff. The Cadets were often aided in their political endeavors by the Octobrists, or qualified supporters of a monarchist regime, under the leadership of Gutchkoff; and could count for support also upon the union of the Zemstovs or district assemblies, under the leadership of Prince Lvoff. The Cadets were tolerated within Russia and hence could build up a more effective organization than either of the great Socialist parties, many of whose leaders were in exile or in prison. It was therefore inevitable that after the Revolution of 1917 the Cadets should be able to take over the government of Russia at once. The Socialist Revolutionaries were tolerated by the govern-

ment to a greater extent than were the Social Democrats, and hence had a more effective organization in Russia itself than the latter; it was therefore inevitable that when the government of the Cadets fell, the party of Kerenski should be in a better position to assume the reins of government than the party of Lenin.

Only in the light of this division of parties in Russia can the course of the Russian Revolution be understood.

As we have seen, in 1905 Russia had been swept by a revolution which for a time gave promise of being successful. Indeed, it is not too much to say that in 1905 Russia might have achieved freedom had it not been for assistance rendered the Russian government by the financial interests of France and Germany, with the connivance of the French and German governments. France and Russia had long been allies, and France and the French capitalists had long poured money into Russia to support the Tsar's government. Naturally, therefore, France was anxious that that government should not be succeeded by a group which possibly would cancel the debts contracted by the Tsarist regime and contracted largely in order to repress the movement for freedom,—a group which also in all probability would not maintain the military obligations of the alliance against Germany. Similarly, the governmental system of Russia was more like that of Germany than was the governmental system of any of the other great Powers, except Japan. If the autocracy in control of Russia should go, the autocracy in control of Germany might likewise be endangered—even the docile German people might be taught by the example of their Russian brothers, and it was to the interest of the Imperial German Government that the Revolution of 1905 should fail.

The Revolution of 1905, like the Revolution of 1917, and like the German Revolution of 1918, throve on the military defeat of the Government against which it was directed. Japan declared war on Russia in February, 1904, and immediately began to win conclusive victories. By the middle of the year, Russia's military force was largely disorganized and demonstrations against the Government became general. By the end of the year, strikes had become serious, and with the continued victories of the Japanese in the next year, the Russian Gov-

ernment was threatened at home no less than abroad. In January, 1905, a general strike was proclaimed and executed in St. Petersburg, and there was every evidence that, if left unhampered, the general strike would be successful in bringing the Government to terms. A procession of many thousands, led by a priest named Gapon, moved upon the Tsar's palace in order to ask for bread, only to be shot down by the hundreds. This was the finishing touch,—the Revolution then broke out in earnest. In St. Petersburg, in Moscow and in other large cities, the revolutionary forces armed themselves, erected barricades in the streets and defied the authorities. In the country districts, the peasants revolted against their landlords, pillaged and burned. In Finland, in Poland, in Georgia, in Armenia, in the Baltic Provinces, there arose revolts looking toward political freedom from Russian rule. The army and the police were merciless in their retaliation, but it was seen that force alone could not break the Revolution and the Tsar was induced by his ministers to grant concessions. With the aid of these concessions, the revolutionists were finally quieted and comparative peace reigned in Russia for the next few years.

Of this Revolution of 1905, the Revolution of 1917 must be regarded as the continuation. The intervening years were notable chiefly for their indication that the Tsar's promises had not been made in good faith and for the consequent realization that Russia could achieve freedom only by force. The Tsar's pledge of a Parliament was vitiated by the restrictions placed upon it, and the four Dumas which were convened, in 1906, 1907, and 1912, were helpless to effect real amelioration for the misery of the bulk of the Russian people. In the several years preceding the Revolution of 1917, the Government increased the severity of its oppression and restrictions. But despite the material misery of the mass of the Russian people, the complaint of the liberal elements in Russia was not centered chiefly upon material misery. It was concerned fundamentally with the restrictions placed by the Government upon freedom of speech, of thought, of press, of assembly and of petition. On the grounds that the radicals were attempting to overthrow the Russian government, they were forbidden to agitate for changes of a vital nature in the Russian governmental system. On the same grounds, discussion of new forms of political

and social organization being perfected in other countries was banned. The Government declared that it was unpatriotic and hence illegal to question the correctness of the forms and principles by which Russia was being ruled. Similarly, persons from other countries who were trying to give the Russians the benefit of their advice were deported, on the charge of being undesirable foreigners. Newspapers and periodicals which attacked the head of the Government, or its form, or its laws, or its flag, or its army and navy, were suppressed. A censorship was imposed by the Government which forbade the dissemination of information unfavorable to the Government, although it could often be proved that it was the truth which would have thus have been disseminated. Men and women of the deepest sincerity were sent to jail for five, ten, twenty years or for life for speaking the truth as they saw it, or for contending against certain discriminatory government laws. Teachers had to pass the requirements imposed by local and district authorities as to their political faith; restrictions were enforced even upon the teaching in the universities—in a word, the Government was committed to a policy of exploiting the minds as well as the bodies of its subjects.

In 1912 and 1913, accordingly, plans for the continuation of the 1905 Revolution were again being matured on a large scale. By 1914, the strikes throughout Russia were no less threatening than those which had precipitated the general strike of January, 1905. On May Day, 1914, no less than 130,000 workers are reported to have struck in St. Petersburg alone. Throughout May, June and July, 1914, the strikes became progressively serious. On July 23, the strikers constructed barricades in the streets of St. Petersburg and there were armed conflicts between the workers and the police. And then the movement for revolution came to an abrupt halt as Austria-Hungary dispatched her ultimatum to Serbia on the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

With the amount of information available at the signing of the peace treaty which closed the Great War, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Russian Government in 1914 was not unwilling that war should occur. In the account of the diplomatic correspondence preceding the outbreak of the War, attention has already been

called to the fact that Russia tried to mobilize secretly before any of the other great Powers (page 125). It was noted that in the last days of peace Austria-Hungary suddenly showed a less chauvinistic and more conciliatory temper and that Russia failed to take advantage of the sudden reversal in Austria's stand (page 140). The direct responsibility for inaugurating the War can be placed only at the door of the Central Powers, but it is impossible to escape the conclusion that Russia was precipitate in ordering a mobilization against Germany as well as against Austria; for Germany had not yet mobilized and had warned Russia that a Russian mobilization against Germany would result in German mobilization and hence in war (pages 128, 132, 136, 141, 145, 146, 151). It is true that several of Germany's communications to Russia had threatened to declare war even if Russia mobilized against Austria (pages 129, 133, 136), but Russia disregarded that threat and war was not declared. With these facts in mind, it seems evident that Russia's course played directly into the hands of Germany and gave the German militarists the excuse they needed in order to hoodwink the German people into believing that the war was being forced upon Germany by Russia.

And similarly it seems difficult to escape the conclusion that the Russian Government was not altogether unwilling to see war break out at that time because of its realization that if peace continued, the days of the monarchy in Russia were numbered. The coming of war would rally most of the people behind the government and would silence the revolutionists; indeed, many of the revolutionary leaders themselves supported the Russian Government in the first two years of the war. If the Entente should be successful, the Russian Government would emerge from the peace conference with an increased prestige and with gains of a material nature which would augur ill for the movement for revolution; and if the war should begin to go against the Entente, the unprincipled heads of the Russian Government might change sides and desert the losers for the winners, with results equally harmful to the revolutionary movement. Indeed, as has been seen, there is much evidence that Roumania was deliberately betrayed by Russia in the fall of 1916; and the evidence is undeniable that by 1917 the Russian Government, realizing that it stood

to lose by a long war as well as to gain by a short one, was flirting with Germany and was contemplating signing a separate peace.

At all events, the Russian people went into the war with an emotional outburst of patriotism. Owing to the low degree of the organization of Russian life, it was not feasible to raise within Russia itself loans of sufficient size to pay the war-debts, nor could Russia's allies spare enough money from their own hard-pressed treasuries to meet Russia's monetary demands. The Government was compelled to issue more paper currency, money became plentiful and inevitably prices rose. The peasant therefore soon began to get more money for his products and a sudden and short period of prosperity, false prosperity, set in soon after the Russian armies took the field. The Battle of Lemberg was more than sufficient to wipe out the effect of the reverses in East Prussia, but Russia awoke as from a dream with the overwhelming defeat at the Dunajec and in Russian Poland in 1915. Of all the great Powers, Russia was the least adequately prepared for war, so that the sacrifices and the distresses due to war fell earlier and more heavily upon the Russian people than upon the people of any of the other belligerent great Powers. The peasants were buoyed up, however, by assurances that the war would end soon and for a time they bore their distress without complaint. But industries had been run beyond the safety point, and a sudden industrial paralysis set in. It was found that the most necessary military supplies were lacking, and Russia feverishly sacrificed all other production for military production. The peasant's money was of little use to him when there were few goods for him to purchase with it, and distress became prevalent.

So that Russia managed to weather the winter of 1915-6, but in 1916 she was almost at the end of her rope. So vast was Russia's man-power that the first calls of the army upon it had affected Russian production very little, but Russia's losses and her consequent new calls upon man-power began seriously to diminish even agricultural production by 1916. Added to this natural cause for distress was the inefficiency and corruption of the Government. By 1917, the great bulk of the Russian people had been driven by desperation to the conviction that the only solution of their problem lay in the overthrow

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Upper Left-Hand Corner—Ignace Jan Paderewski, Premier of Poland, January 17, 1919—.

Upper Right-Hand Corner—Thomas G. Masaryk, Chairman, Czecho Slovak National Council, 1918, and President, Czecho-Slovak Republic, November 10, 1918—.

Center—Stephen Pichon, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, November 17, 1917—.

Lower Left-Hand Corner—Alexander F. Kerenski, Russian Minister of Justice, March 15-May 17, 1917; Minister of War, May 17, 1917-July 20, 1917; Prime Minister, July 20-November 7, 1917.

Lower Right-Hand Corner—Baron Sidney Sonnino, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1914-July, 1919.

of the Tsar and of his Government. Coupled with this ingrained feeling among the masses was deep resentment among the educated classes at the all-too-evident fact that the Government was about to sell out to Germany. The old ministers had been replaced by men who were known to be either pro-German or the most reactionary type of politician, or both. In the fall of 1916, Miliukoff courageously proved in the Duma, which had been meeting since 1912 but without real power, that all Germany hailed with delight the accession of Stürmer as the Russian Prime Minister. Stürmer was forced to resign, but his successor fell under the control of Protopopoff, without doubt the most heartily detested of all Russian statesmen; and the patriotic Cadets became willing to cooperate with the Socialists to effect a successful revolution. An indication of the temper of the Russian people was given on the first day of 1917, when the body of Gregory Rasputin was found in the Neva River. Rasputin was a monk who had risen to uncanny control over the Court, and his assassination was proof that no personage was too powerful to escape vengeance. The Duma had been adjourned toward the end of December, 1916, so that the delegates were given an opportunity to return to their home districts and to obtain information and instructions from their constituencies. The Duma was to re-convene on January 25, but the Tsar's Government prorogued it until February 27, thus increasing discontent and opportunity for organization of a revolution. Rumors were current that the Duma would even be dissolved. On January 9, 1917, Prince Gollitzin was appointed premier, in place of Trepov, and the Government fell more completely than ever under the domination of Protopopoff and his reactionary lieutenants. Food supplies had been entirely exhausted. Outrageous profiteering was prevalent. The people had ahead of them several months of bitter winter, and spring was not yet near enough to raise their hopes. Thousands were perishing for lack of food and of the prime necessities of life. There was no confidence in the ability or in the willingness of the Government to remedy distress; the people were desperate; nothing could make their lot more miserable.

So sudden and so immediately successful was the revolution of 1917 that it was believed at first that it had been carefully prepared;

but there is little evidence to support this belief. Indeed, so unpremeditated were the beginnings of the Revolution toward the end of February, 1917 that at first the merely liberal elements in the Duma seem to have refused to support it, through fear that it was doomed to failure. For the Government had fully anticipated disturbances on a large scale and in preparation for trouble had posted machine-guns and regiments of Cossacks throughout Petrograd. A century of repression had left the bulk of the Russian people illiterate and untrained, and many of their most optimistic leaders were dubious. But even an untrained mass is irresistible when it is one in purpose, and the glory of the Revolution belongs to the sluggish and child-like Russian masses. The true leader of the Revolution was Hunger. The true hero was the Russian people.

The Duma re-convened on February 27 (February 14, Russian calendar) and immediately challenged the authority of the Government. On that day, more than one hundred thousand workmen struck in Petrograd and proportionate numbers in Moscow and other cities, in order to encourage the Duma in its stand, although strikes had been forbidden under military law. The Duma demanded that the Government take steps to meet the food shortage, and on the Government's refusal to meet the Duma's demands, Miliukoff, Kerenski and Cheidse openly hinted at revolution. Bread riots took place in the streets of the capital; the Government posted machine-guns and mobilized its soldiers and police for the test of strength; the Revolution was on its way.

By March 8, the crux of the struggle had arrived. Most of the Petrograd factory-workers went on strike. The street-cars stopped running. The red flag appeared on the Nevski Prospekt and, despite the police, processions and harangues were omnipresent. On March 10, the Social Democratic Party and the leading trades unions officially joined the ranks of the protesting people. On that day, the more radical elements, distrustful of the merely liberal leadership to be expected from the Duma, elected their own body of representatives, a Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates—the first *Soviet* of the Revolution, the successor to a similar body in the 1905 Revolution, headed by Trotski, and the forerunner of the system which was to gov-

ern most of Russia before the end of the year. On Sunday, March 11, there were armed conflicts between the police and the people and blood was shed in numerous quarters of the city. On that evening, the Government officially ordered the Duma to dissolve; the Duma retorted by a refusal to dissolve and continued with its meetings. The final test had come.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that all these events were transpiring as one large, sluggish, stolid and above all peaceful mass-movement. Considering the scope of the Revolution and the power against which it was arrayed, it may be said to have been practically without violence. There was comparatively little bloodshed. There was practically no looting, except for bread. The people obeyed unquestioningly the injunctions of their self-appointed leaders and a rude order predominated over the type of chaos usual in mass-revolutions. There was now no thought of compromising or being appeased by promises—the lesson of 1905 had sunk in. Nevertheless the police were not fired upon until they fired upon the crowd—the masses were functioning for freedom, not for revenge.

But even the police of the Tsar were helpless before the grim determination of hundreds of thousands of civilians, and the Government turned to the army. The success of the Revolution depended then upon the attitude of the soldiers. If the soldiers came to the support of the police, the Revolution might still be beaten; if the soldiers sided with the people, the Revolution was accomplished.

The soldiers, however, were as anxious for peace as were the masses of the civilians in the streets of Petrograd. They had seen their comrades marched almost unarmed against German guns which had mowed them down in solid rows. They had been sent to fight with little more than their bare hands against the heavily armed and carefully protected enemy. They had seen soldiers dying of disease in droves, because of the lack of doctors and medicines; they had been half-starved at the front; they had been kept half-naked through the rigors of a Russian winter; and all through the incapacity and corruption of the regime which had so long ruled their country. They had seen the favoritism of special privilege in its most revolting aspects. They had finally come to understand that they were fighting, not for things

which spelled happiness to them in their daily round of existence, but for the power of the upper classes of Russia to profit by the war. The Russian army had been defeated again and again, and its soldiers had witnessed with their own eyes that the defeats had been due as much to the weakness of the Russian Government as to the strength of its enemies. They knew from their own experiences that Russia could never again cherish hopes of great military success, and that any further sacrifices they might make would be in vain. They were tired of strife—they wanted to get back to their homes. The soldiers were disgusted with the old regime; they were with the people, not with the rulers; they longed for peace.

And the soldiers had begun to question the issues at stake in the war. The Russian Government had done little to explain the causes and implications of the conflict to the men who were being called upon to die for Russia in that conflict. Fraternizing with the enemy had become common in the latter months of the war and the Russian soldier was hence at the mercy of propagandists of two sorts, German and Russian revolutionary, with no knowledge to counteract the information they poured into his ears. The German propagandists made the Russian soldier believe that Russia was fighting chiefly for Constantinople and for domination in the Balkans. The most deeply-hated enemies of the Russians were the Japanese and the Japanese were with the Entente. The condition of the working-class in Germany was contrasted with the condition of the working-class in the Entente countries, to the detriment of the latter.

Moreover, in the simplicity of soul of the Russian peasant, all war was murder and was hence contrary to the teaching of the Christianity which had been taught him and which had a dominating influence over him. Finally, the army was honeycombed with radicals and revolutionists of all creeds. They preached the doctrine of the recognition of the international class struggle. In a country with a population so greatly dispersed as Russia, it had been difficult for these revolutionary propagandists to reach large audiences, except in the cities; but with the concentration into vast armies of hundreds of thousands of men who could not read and who had never before been reached by revolutionary propaganda, the propagandists were in their

element. They taught that national divisions were artificial, and that the true division between autocracy and democracy was one of economic status. They informed the Russian peasant in the army that the vital issue at stake in a fight for a better world would be an issue between workers and owners; that hence the true friends and comrades of the Russian soldier were the workingmen of all nations, German as well as Russian; and that similarly the true enemy of the Russian soldier was the capitalist class of all nations, Russian as well as German.

So that the Russian soldiers in Petrograd were no less ripe for revolt than were the civilians. At first covertly, then openly, they refused to put down the demonstrations and the processions of the people, when soldiers were finally ordered into action by the side of the police on March 11 and March 12. The army had come to hate the police as had the people. Individual soldiers joined the ranks of the revolutionists; whole regiments were merely waiting for enough time to screw up their courage before going over in a body. From refusing to put down the revolutionists, the whole Volynski regiment at noon on March 12 went over to the people as a unit. It sent committees to urge other regiments to follow its example, and most of the other regiments responded. It is true that a number of troops remained loyal to the Tsar, but they were outnumbered by the disloyal element and the number of the anti-revolutionary soldiers rapidly decreased. Soldiers marched upon the prisons, including the Fortress of Saint Peter and Saint Paul, and freed their inmates. The police remained loyal to the Government, but they were no match for the revolutionists after the revolutionists had been joined by the soldiers; and the police were soon outnumbered and one by one their strongholds were captured. All representatives of the old Government who could be found were arrested, including Protopopoff; and by March 14 the issue had been decided. The Government was overthrown and the Revolution was successful.

The Tsar had been at the front. To him Rodzianko, the President of the Duma, had telegraphed on March 11, announcing the desperate nature of the situation and urging that the country be placed under a ministry responsible to and trusted by the people. The Tsar

had replied, as we have seen, by disbanding the Duma; and two days later he started for the capital. By this time, he had begun to realize the gravity of the situation, and was prepared to promise concessions. But near Petrograd the railway was in the hands of the revolutionists, and the Tsar's train was diverted on March 14 toward Pskov, where Nicholas hoped to find refuge with loyal troops. At Pskov, on the following day, a committee of the Duma met the Tsar of all the Russias, convinced him of the unalterable success of the Revolution, and went back to Petrograd with an official abdication to the throne on behalf of the Tsar and his son. In that document Nicholas had abdicated in favor of his brother, Grand Duke Michael; but Grand Duke Michael was too discerning to cherish any illusions as to the character of the Revolution. He refused to accept the throne unless his brother's choice was accepted by the people; the people were tired of all hereditary rulers and made no move to elevate Michael to the throne; and on March 16, 1917 Russia joined the free nations of the world.

When it had appeared that the Revolution would be successful, the leaders of the Duma had put themselves at the head of it, and it was therefore inevitable that when the old Government fell, the new Government should be formed by the Duma leaders. (The Duma itself, however, was disbanded; it had done its work.) As has been seen, other forces were not so thoroughly organized as was the Cadet party. Many of the revolutionary leaders were abroad—for instance, Lenin was in Switzerland, Trotski was in New York—and others had been released from prison only by the Revolution. The Soviets, composed of delegates elected directly by the workmen and soldiers and representing them only, were an active force in the new order of things, but were by no means ready to assume the burdens of administration. So all elements cooperated for the moment with the Duma leaders and rallied around the new Government. In the last several days of the Revolution, it had been guided by a committee under the chairmanship of Rodzianko; but that yielded to the Government formed on March 15 with Prince Lvoff as premier. He represented the liberal group of land- and property-owners active in the remarkably helpful Zemstvos. Miliukoff was made the minister for

foreign affairs and Kerenski, representing also the Petrograd Soviet, was made minister of justice.

But almost from the first the new Government failed to obtain the unqualified support of the bulk of the Russian people, at least of the section of the bulk which was articulate. In the first place, the leaders of the new Government represented primarily the upper social and economic classes. They were interested chiefly in reform rather than in revolt, were liberals rather than radicals. The Revolution had been a movement of the masses, but the Government which first tried to steer the revolution did not represent the point of view of the masses.

In the second place, the primary interest of the leaders of the new Government was political, rather than social and economic; and their first legislation was political, rather than social and economic. The censorship was removed, political prisoners were released, the death penalty was abolished, all class and creed restrictions were ended, self-government was promised Finland and Poland, the disabilities upon the Jews were removed, suffrage was made universal, the police and militia were radically reformed, and other similar reforms were perfected. But the masses had been stirred to a hope for a profound reconstruction of the economic and industrial life of Russia as well, and the Government was by no means in favor of overthrowing the capitalist system.

In the third place, the urgent demand of the peasant was for land. The new Government was ready to remedy much of the agricultural distress; but the peasant wanted the land and wanted it at once, and the liberal element under Lvoff delayed complete confiscation of the land in favor of the peasants.

Finally, and fundamentally, the majority of the people of Russia wanted peace and the new Government was in favor of prosecuting the war against the Central Powers. Not only had the mass of the people lost enthusiasm for the war, but also they wanted their sons and husbands and brothers back into the bosom of the family, and the soldiers themselves were anxious to get away from the army. It was increasingly evident that the cabinet of Lvoff was weak and

would be overthrown so soon as the more radical forces could perfect their organization.

In the meantime, Soviets sprang up all over Russia. Local Soviets sent representatives to district Soviets, which sent representatives to the central Soviet in Petrograd; and more and more the Soviets were obtaining power. Indeed, much of the wholesome legislation passed by the Lvoff government was due to pressure from the Soviets. The Soviet represented the agricultural, industrial and military strength of the land, and without its support the Government would have been well-nigh helpless. Indeed, the Government within several months was in much the same relation to the central Soviet as the British Cabinet to the British Parliament.

An excellent example of the weakness of the Government of Lvoff was revealed in the army. Soon after the Revolution, and despite the obvious intentions of the Government, the rank and file of the army took control into its own hands. Officers were discharged by vote of the soldiers and were replaced by elected delegates. Other principles of equality were enforced by order of the privates, such as refusal to salute officers. The death penalty in the army was abolished, fraternizing with the enemy became the order of the day, thousands upon thousands of soldiers left for their homes without authorization, and for practical purposes a truce with the enemy was in force. The Russian people, as represented in the Central Soviet, was delaying negotiations leading to a separate peace with Germany only in the hope of achieving a general peace by an appeal to the working-class of all the belligerent countries. It was realized that the German people had supported their Government in the war largely because of fear and hatred of Tsarist Russia; but with Russia free, the Russian people cherished a hope that the movement for peace in Germany would become irresistible.

Throughout April and May, the Central Soviet at Petrograd became more and more lukewarm toward the Government. In May, a vote of confidence in the Government was passed in the Soviet by a majority of less than fifty in a vote of over two thousand. The first definite split occurred on the war policy of the Lvoff Government, which desired to retain its obligations toward the Entente, and which

refused to take the steps toward peace desired by the more radical and pacifist elements in Russia.

The split widened on the question of a Socialist conference to be held at Stockholm with delegates present from the Labor and Socialist movements of all the belligerent countries, with the purpose of ending the war by a "clean peace." The Soviet leaders got into touch with the German Socialists on this question, but the attitude of the Lvoff government toward the Stockholm Conference did not satisfy the Soviet forces. The Soviet was insisting that the Allies revise their war aims; but then, as later, the leaders of the Entente were callous to this demand from Russia, and the Lvoff Government was rendered all the weaker by its inability to get this needed diplomatic assistance from the Entente. Finally, in the middle of May, Miliukoff openly proclaimed that one of the aims for which Russia would continue the struggle was the acquisition of Constantinople. This statement was too much for the Russian people. The acquisition of Constantinople would be of value only to the commercial classes; it would confer no benefit upon the proletariat. In other words, the people of Russia were no longer conceiving of their country as an entirety—they were thinking in terms of class instead of in terms of country. The indignation aroused by Miliukoff's attitude was so great that the entire Government was imperilled, and, on May 16, Miliukoff was compelled to resign as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Cabinet was reorganized, Kerenski becoming Minister of War and Terestchenko succeeding Miliukoff at the Foreign Office.

But the ministry, even as reorganized with greater control in the hands of the Socialist elements, was unstable. Its program for continuing the war was further weakened by the failure of the Entente Governments to show cordiality toward the Russian peace program, soon to be crystallized under the formula of "No forcible annexations, no *punitive* indemnities and right of self-determination for all nationalities." President Wilson, it is true, responded to this program, although qualifying it; and much of whatever feeling still persisted in Russia in favor of continuing the war was due to the idealism in the spoken and written words of President Wilson. For, less than a month after the consummation of the Revolution, the United States entered

the war as the ally of Russia, and there was at this time more popular enthusiasm in Russia for the United States than for any other of the great Powers. It was not until later that Russian radicals returning from America and pacifist, Socialist and German propagandists spread before the Russian people lengthy accounts of exploitation, poverty, slums, lynchings, and child labor in America with the result of turning radical Russia against America as against other non-Socialist states. Indeed, any survey of the Russian situation must lead to the conclusion that if Russia had continued to repose faith in the high purposes of President Wilson and his ability to impose those purposes likewise upon the Governments associated with the United States in the prosecution of the war against the Central Powers, Russia might have remained longer in the war, the rise of Bolshevism might have been postponed, and the German victories of 1918 might have been impossible. It leads also to a conviction that the Entente pursued a policy of leaving Russia largely to its own fate, or of failing correctly to evaluate the forces behind the Revolution. For instance, commissions dispatched to Russia were under the leadership of men like Lord Milner and Elihu Root, who, despite their abilities and devotion to the cause of their own countries, were of entirely too conservative a cast of mind to inspire confidence in radical elements who looked upon conservatives as the tools of commercial and banking interests.

On the other hand, Germany was highly efficient in turning the Revolution to her own account. She filled Russia with German agents, who were far better equipped and trained to influence the Russian mind than the Entente agents dispatched to Russia. There has been much falsification of the amount of the power wielded by these German agents in Russia. Anti-Bolshevist opinion during the war was too prone to charge that German agents were entirely responsible for the Bolshevik Revolution and that the Bolshevik leaders were in essence German agents themselves. On the other hand, the pro-Bolshevist opinion was demonstrably inaccurate in maintaining that these German agents had little or no influence in guiding Russia toward a separate peace. Germany was relying not only upon her own agents—she was relying also upon the super-radical agitators. Most of these latter were sincere idealists who would have scorned

to play Germany's game openly, but Germany could well be content to allow them to play their own game, as Germany would nonetheless profit. Germany offered every facility for the return to Russia of the radical leaders like Lenin and her support of the anti-Government forces was not counterbalanced by support of any great value rendered to the Government forces by the Entente.

At all events, the control of Russia was passing more and more from the liberals to the Socialists. More and more the latter were relying upon direct rather than upon political methods of gaining their ends. Strikes increased in both number and power. Discipline became even more lax in the army and disobedience more frequent. A serious mutiny occurred in the Baltic fleet. Ukraine, Finland, the Caucasus, the Baltic Provinces, were re-asserting their nationalistic claims to independence. Early in the summer Kerenski, as minister of war, led his forces once more against the Germans, but inevitably without success. Indeed, this and the later military offensive of Kerenski was a tremendous tactical blunder of the most unfortunate effect. For it stirred up anger in Germany against revolutionary Russia and quieted the feeling for revolution in Germany. Before that time, the feeling for emulating the Russian people was growing in Germany; when the Russian workers took the field against their German fellow-workers, the latter once more were compelled to regard Russia as an enemy.

But the question of the land was more deeply responsible for dissatisfaction with the Lvoff ministry than even the question of peace. Despite the presence of several Socialists in the Cabinet, the Government was still not prepared to adopt a policy of confiscation toward the ownership of the land. The Government promised merely widespread reforms and relief, and for a time the peasants were patient; but after several months patience ended. The Central Soviet was directly responsive to the people and reflected the people's desire for a new administration by withholding support more and more regularly from the Government. The final overthrow of the Lvoff Government was accordingly inevitable. On July 20, Lvoff resigned.

The delegates of the soldiers and peasants who composed the Central Soviet were still hopeful of avoiding the final extreme of radicalism,

and a moderate instead of a radical Socialist was their choice for prime minister. The Bolsheviki were still a minority, if a persistent and able minority, in the Soviet, and Lenin was passed over for Kerenski. The latter promised that if Russia would but continue a little longer to resist the military aggrandisement of the Central Powers, a peace could be arranged which would be a universal instead of a separate peace. The mass of the people had fallen under the power of the Socialist ideal of internationalism and were altruistically willing to continue to torture Russia a little longer if by such means the entire world might be relieved from its misery and hatreds. Kerenski also promised to share the land and on July 22 he became prime minister of what was soon to be proclaimed the Republic of Russia.

Alexander Feodorovitch Kerenski, born in the Caucasus, was still in his thirties at the time that he was called upon to guide the destinies of the world's newest republic. He had prepared himself for a legal career, and soon after graduation from his law courses had attracted attention by defending with great zeal political offenders and other personae non gratae to the Government of the Tsar. His fearlessness and his devotion to the interests of the people soon made him popular, with the result that in 1913 he was elected a delegate to the Fourth Duma from Saratov. Kerenski had affiliated himself with the Right Wing of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, that is to say, had become a Socialist of the moderate and evolutionary type. He was gifted with a burning eloquence which was apt to carry all before it, with a personality which inspired admiration, and with a singleness of purpose which soon brought him to the front as a leader of the Russian masses. With the overthrow of the Tsardom, Kerenski became no less powerful in the Soviet than he had proved in the Duma, succeeding in parrying the attacks of the Bolshevik Soviet leaders. As minister of justice and later as minister of war in the Lvoff Cabinet, he had become more powerful than ever; and ardent hopes were aroused when he assumed the burden of leading Russia toward the achievement of a moderate and practicable Socialism.

But the course of events—or at least the knowledge of them which had been allowed to filter through the censorship to the outside world by the signing of peace—seem to indicate that Kerenski's administra-

tive ability and qualities of successful leadership were less marked than his eloquence and his personality. He lost much support by continuing the military offensive against Germany. Blind even at this time to the fact that the Russian soldiers so well as the Russian peasants wanted peace, in person he led the army against the German lines. The Germans had been expecting no attack, trusting in the sincerity of the Russian preachment of the brotherhood of the international working-class; and for a few days the Russian forces, the mere shadow of the armies which had battled under the flag of the Tsar, advanced under the red flag. But the advance was soon halted. Not only did the Germans rally their strength, but the Russian soldiers themselves deserted and mutinied by the thousands. Most of them had remained at the front solely in the belief that an armistice would soon be declared or at least that all fighting on the eastern front was over; and this rude shattering of their hopes for peace drove them back to their homes. In Austria and Germany, the Governments were once more able to still the feeling for revolution, which had been manifesting itself by strikes on a large scale; and were able to come before the people of Austria-Hungary and Germany once more with the plea that the Allies were fighting primarily for a peace at the expense of their enemies, for imperialist ambitions, for the domination of world-trade, and for the crippling of Germany.

In the second place, Kerenski made the mistake of trusting to mere words to gain the concessions he desired from the leaders of the other countries in the Entente. The other Entente lands were taxing their resources to the uttermost in order to continue the struggle against the Central Powers and were in little mood to divert men and supplies from their own needs to the needs of the new Socialist state, unless that Socialist state should force their diversion under threat of withdrawing from the war without it. Still less were the Governments of the other members of the Entente in a mood to alter without compulsion agreements as to the terms of peace which they had entered into, agreements which would accrue to the nationalistic interests of the countries which had demanded them. When Kerenski's promises as to a revision of the war aims and peace terms of the Entente, as to encouragement of the revolutionary feeling inside of Germany, as

to the inauguration of steps leading to a general "clean peace" were unfulfilled, partly through his inability to influence the other Entente Governments. the people of Russia naturally laid the blame, not at the door of the other Entente Governments, but at Kerenski's door.

The character of the British missions to Russia affords an illuminating example of the inability of the Russian Government to achieve fruitful cooperation from the other Entente countries. When the first British mission to Russia, under Lord Milner, had failed to awake in the mass of the Russian people unadulterated trust in the high and unselfish aims of the Entente in continuing the prosecution of the war, a Labor commission was dispatched. But it was dominated by the type of trade unionist who, like the leaders of the American Federation of Labor, was conservative, nationalistic and antagonistic to separate political action by labor as such. Accordingly, the second British mission also failed of results, and Premier Lloyd-George was finally compelled to dispatch to Russia the leader of the British Labor Party, Mr. Arthur Henderson. Mr. Henderson was in favor of prosecuting the war, but only with the reservation that peace be arranged solely on the principle of effecting a stable international organization, not of duplicating the old imperialistic peaces based on revenge and national aggrandizement. In Russia, Mr. Henderson became an ardent supporter of the Stockholm Conference, and both he and the powerful political party which he led were in favor of opening a discussion of peace terms with the Central Powers so soon as the latter would postulate their withdrawal from Belgium and northern France. So powerful was the section of British opinion represented by Mr. Henderson that he had been chosen as one of the five members of the British War Cabinet and held that position at the time that he visited Russia, in June, 1917.

Perhaps it was just because of Mr. Henderson's connection with the British Government that even he was not sufficiently trusted by the mass of the Russian people to give them an unbiased account of the principles at stake in the War. The leaders of the Russian masses demanded that Great Britain send to Russia instead Mr. J. Ramsay Macdonald, the leader of the Independent Labor Party. Mr. Macdonald and his followers were Socialists, and were hence more radical

than Mr. Henderson. Mr. Macdonald had taken a pacifist stand toward the War and had maintained that stand in spite of pressure and abuse; and Russia felt that he could be better trusted than Mr. Henderson to interpret for the Russian people the true issues of the war. Mr. Henderson was wide-visioned and magnanimous enough to perceive that not he but Mr. Macdonald was needed in Russia, and accordingly Mr. Henderson requested that Mr. Macdonald be dispatched to Russia. After much delay and ill-grace, the Lloyd-George Government finally consented to grant passports to Mr. Macdonald, but its consent was nullified by an extra-Governmental agency. The Seamen's Union of Great Britain, under the leadership of Mr. Havelock Wilson, refused to allow any ship to transport the pacifist from the British Isles, as a result of his attitude toward the War. The British Government was then requested to place a ship of the British Navy at the disposal of Mr. Macdonald, the course of procedure customary when the Government dispatched an agent to a foreign shore on a Governmental mission. But the Government refused to send Mr. Macdonald to Russia on a British man-of-war, with the consequence that he was prevented from delivering his message to the Russian people, who were expecting him and who would have placed implicit trust in his words. As a result, the Bolshevist leaders in the Soviet and the German agents outside the Soviet were given greater credence when they insisted that the war aims of the Entente would not bear scrutiny by an impartial observer and that there was no sympathy with the new Russian Socialist Republic among any of the other nations of the world, whether of the Central Powers or of the Entente Allies. Kerenski's hand was weakened; the desire for a separate peace increased in Russia; and distrust of the Allies grew to a point where most Russians were beginning to believe that, whoever began the war, it was being waged for selfish purposes by both groups of combatants.

In the third place, Kerenski made the mistake of delay in partitioning the land among the peasants. The delay was due to the best of motives, as Kerenski was determined that the partition should be arranged systematically, impartially and thoroughly; but the Russian people were impatient and became suspicious of further delay. Kerenski was disappointing them—they were ready for a new administration.

Moreover, the Entente had refused permission to its Labor and Socialist elements to send delegates to the international Labor and Socialist conference at Stockholm, called to examine the possibilities of peace. The Central Powers had granted such permission to some of their Labor and Socialist elements, with the result that Russia was still further tempted to believe that the Central Powers wanted peace and the Entente wanted a continuation of the War.

And by the fall of 1917, the Russian people were beginning to fear that any new Government replacing Kerenski's combination of moderate Socialists and non-Socialist liberals might be a counter-revolutionary echo of the old Government of the Tsar. This feeling was intensified by the so-called Korniloff Revolt. General Korniloff was commander-in-chief of what was left of the Russian army. Early in September, he had a sharp disagreement with Kerenski, who demanded his resignation. Korniloff then set out for Petrograd with some accompanying forces; but it is not clear if he was actually meditating the capture of the capital or if he was merely paying a visit to discuss the situation. At all events, his coming was construed into a revolt, Petrograd was placed under martial law, and all the forces in Russia opposed to a Socialist regime hailed with joy this attack upon the authority of Kerenski's Government. When Korniloff's soldiers approached Petrograd and discovered that they were being regarded as challengers to the Revolution, they at once disbanded and Korniloff was left without support; but the menace of counter-revolution had nevertheless been taken closely to heart by the Russian masses.

Moreover, there are many charges—of which the truth will not be determined for many years—that the elements in Russia planning to overthrow the Revolutionary leaders, and to replace them by types of the old ministers of the Tsar, were receiving both official and unofficial assistance from the other Entente countries, which were naturally anxious to see the war in the East once more prosecuted against Germany with vigor. At all events, throughout the fall of 1917 the signs that Kerenski had failed were irrefutable. Lenin's attacks upon the Government were slowly but surely increasing the Bolshevik strength in the Soviet; and it was evident that when

the Bolshevik leaders should control a majority of votes in the Soviet the Government would be overthrown, for the Soviet had become the true master of Russia. The Left wing of Kerenski's own party was also becoming impatient of his rule, and was ready to cooperate with the Bolsheviks in overthrowing it. Lenin was simply biding the most opportune occasion to seize control.

On November 7, the Bolsheviks challenged the Government of Kerenski, and immediately overthrew it. Kerenski fled, and Russia was given over in theory as it had been given over in practice to the Government of the Central Soviet at Petrograd. The premier of the new government was Nikolai Lenin and the minister of foreign affairs, Leon Trotsky. The Bolsheviks at once proclaimed an armistice with Germany, took immediate steps to give the lands to the peasants, and promised to call a Constituent Assembly, in the meantime proclaiming that all power rested in the Soviet. Russia was out of the War.

ON THE WESTERN FRONT

THE GREAT GERMAN WITHDRAWAL

In the latter weeks of 1916, the British had been busily preparing for further efforts against the German line, and in January, 1917, those preparations began to bear fruit. On January 11, Haig captured the crest of the hills east of Beaumont Hamel, and later successes of the month gave the British the high ground commanding Grandcourt. British advances in the first days of February compelled the Germans to evacuate Grandcourt. Throughout February and into March, the British nibbled away at the German lines, capturing Serre and creating an awkward German salient around Arras. It was evident that the superior strength of the Allies in man-power was at last beginning to tell and that the Germans would be compelled either to shorten their lines by a general retreat or to call up reinforcements from other fronts.

For many weeks von Hindenburg had been preparing for a withdrawal from the great dip of the German line into France from Arras to the Aisne River. This salient, the so-called Noyon salient, represented the deepest penetration of the Germans into France. It was the most threatening German position, a curve of more than ninety miles with a base of almost seventy-five miles. The curve was both broad and deep, and its evacuation would be a portent of the waning power of Germany. By abandoning the curve between Arras and the Aisne for a straight line between those two points, Germany could shorten her positions by some twenty miles.

By March 10, the German purpose was clear. The entire German line was seen to be making preparations for withdrawal, at the very moment when the British, with the French adjoining them on the southeast, were ready to deliver their great thrust of the spring of 1917. Indeed, the British rushed the German lines before Bapaume on March 11-13, and thus thwarted to some extent the German plans

THE WITHDRAWAL TO THE HINDENBURG LINE

for an uninterrupted retirement. On the whole, however, the German retreat was conducted in a masterly fashion and the new positions were taken up without disorder and without loss to any great extent to the forces of von Hindenburg. The German first lines were abandoned on March 14-16, and on March 17, the Allies ordered a general advance. But the Germans had determined to make good their retirement by systematically and ruthlessly laying waste the evacuated country with a thoroughness characteristic of "German efficiency." If von Hindenburg had confined his destruction merely to roads, bridges, railways, trenches, buildings, trees, he might well have claimed that he was but pursuing the methods recognized by the rules of military warfare as justifiable in covering the retirement of an army so as to prevent it from being attacked as the enemy occupied the evacuated ground. But the Germans had gone farther than the destruction of the property which might have been of value to the British and French, even in the expanded scale of military values of the Great War as contrasted with previous wars. The Germans had rather pursued a policy of destruction simply for the sake of weakening France after the war, a policy of impoverishing French territory far beyond the impoverishment due to the exigencies of war itself. Everything movable had been taken. Young fruit trees had been uprooted. Wells had been destroyed. The soil had been churned into impassability simply for the purpose of preventing future crops. Streams and wells were poisoned. Churches were looted. Even private property so useless for military purposes as furniture was either taken away or destroyed. Germany gloried in this destruction as a retort to the Allied "starvation blockade," but the day was to come when the German people would repent of the mischief their armies had thus wantonly wrought.

So thorough had been the German destruction of roads and positions, and so skilfully managed was the great German retreat, that the British and French were not able to occupy the former Noyon salient with the same speed as the Germans were evacuating it. New roads had to be built. New bridges had to be constructed. Mines had to be guarded against. There was never a moment when a German counter-stroke might not be launched. Von Hindenburg had left at

strategic positions a number of machine guns with gunners, and these nests had to be reduced before the Allied forces could advance. Nevertheless, the Allied engineers performed miracles in construction and the Allied forces arrived at the new German line (the Siegfried line, usually called the Hindenburg Line) early in April. The retreat had been at places to a depth of twenty miles, and the total ground re-occupied by the British and French was more than one thousand square miles. Nevertheless, the Allied reclamation of the evacuated land was so rapid that even the retreat to the Hindenburg Line did but postpone for some weeks the stroke which the Allies were preparing. And cover the move as they might, the German leaders could not fully persuade the German people that so extensive a retirement was the prelude to the final and speedy German victory.

THE BATTLE OF ARRAS

When the British arrived in front of the Hindenburg Line, they discovered that it was too strong to warrant a frontal attack against it as the great British effort of the spring of 1917. Accordingly, Haig determined to strike at the pivot of the line just north of Arras, where the new line branched off from the old. Arras itself had remained in Allied hands since the German retreat from the Marne in 1914, but the lines extended only slightly beyond the city. Some ten miles almost due north of Arras lay the city of Lens, an important German centre; but between Arras and Lens lay the Vimy Ridge of hills, which dominated that entire section of the country. Against the Vimy Ridge, accordingly, the British effort was concentrated.

Toward the end of March, the barbed-wire entanglements and the communications of the Germans were systematically shelled, and on April 4 the British loosed their bombardment preliminary to a general advance. All along the Vimy Ridge fell a molten rain which disabled the German batteries one by one. The struggle for control of the air was particularly keen, and the air combats were both numerous and costly. For several days the bombardment was continued, until on the morning of Easter Monday, April 9, the British, Canadians and Scotch leaped from their own lines for the German, on a front about thirteen miles long, north and south of Arras.

The bombardment had razed the German first lines and within an hour they were occupied by the attackers. Aided by an impenetrable barrage, Haig's forces then made for the German second lines. On the left, the Canadians gained the crest of Vimy Ridge, but the struggle for its northern slopes was bitter and brilliant. The Canadians would not be denied, however, and by nine o'clock practically all of Vimy Ridge had been cleared of Germans.

In the meantime, the artillery fire directed against the German second lines was razing them as the first had been razed. The British were employing the munitions produced and stored up for many months in anticipation for this very attack, and the artillery fire was heavier than in any preceding battle. By noon, most of the German second line was also in British hands and the attackers were making for the third German line. The same tactics were pursued against the German third line of defence as against the first and second lines, and by the evening of April 9 the German third line had been penetrated to a distance of some three miles.

But by the next day the attack slowed down owing to the necessity of bringing up the hundreds of British big guns. The British, especially the Canadians, continued to gain strategic positions, but the Germans, as usual, were recovering from their first confusion and were consolidating their forces in new positions of strength. On April 11, the village of Monchy-le-Preux, some five miles east of Arras, was taken. It was situated on a ridge overlooking that section of the country, and was hence an important gain. But it was carried only after the stiffest kind of resistance, which showed that the Germans were once more able to halt the British. On April 12, the Germans launched counter-attacks, and the British were thrown on the defensive in order to hold their gains. The first stage of the Battle of Arras thus came to an end. On a front of thirteen miles the German lines had been pierced to a depth of from two to four miles.

On April 13, 14 and 15, the British achieved some further gains of a minor character and approached nearer the defences of Lens, without, however, placing that city in great danger. On April 16, the French delivered their own drive at the southern pivot of the Hindenburg Line, to complement the British drive at the northern

pivot around Arras, and further British efforts were concerned chiefly with preventing the diversion of German reinforcements from the British to the French front. On April 23 and 24, the British ordered another general advance, but without making considerable headway. The main impetus of the drive was gradually dying down. On April 28 and 29, a further advance into the German lines was consummated. On May 3, another determined effort on a large scale was made by the British on the Hindenburg Line, and some notable gains were made; but the Germans also were fighting with resolution and resource and their counter-attacks drove the British from their newly-won territory. On May 8, the Germans themselves took the offensive and drove the British out of Fresnoy. From May 8 to May 12, the Australians, by brilliant fighting, managed to gain most of the village of Bullecourt, at the southern end of the line of the Battle of Arras; and by May 17 all of Bullecourt was in the possession of Haig's forces. By the beginning of June the fighting died down in intensity and the Battle of Arras was over.

The chief result of the second stage of the Battle of Arras had been to lengthen rather than to deepen the gains made into the German line in the first stage. By the end of the battle, the British gains extended to five miles in depth along practically all of an eighteen mile front. The great British effort of the spring of 1917 had thus been inconclusive. The gains were extensive, but of little permanent value in achieving final and complete victory. The losses had been great on both sides—more and more the war was degenerating into a struggle of military, economic and political attrition.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE AISNE

The French thrust at the southern pivot of the Hindenburg Line occurred several days after the British thrust at the northern pivot. At the Aisne, the German line turned sharply at a right angle to parallel the northern bank of the river. The German line rested upon a high ridge known as the Heights of the Aisne, and the position had been strongly fortified. The salient formed by the sharp turn of the line was wide and was sufficiently protected so as not to form a point

of unusual danger to von Hindenburg. Against this entire stretch of twenty-five miles, Nivelle planned a blow which would crumple up the opposing German armies. This was to be France's great effort of the spring of 1917, as Arras had been the great British effort. It is significant that, for the first time during the war, the offensive had fallen to the Entente instead of to the Central Powers in the spring of the year.

The French preliminary bombardment opened on April 6, became violent by April 10, and continued until April 15. On the following day the French *poilu* followed the British Tommy "over the top." The French crossed the Aisne, broke through the German first lines opposite Chavonne, and made for the foothills of the Heights of the Aisne. But the German position was too strong. After vigorously assaulting all day, the French were driven back in their centre to the edge of the river. But on the right and left some ridges had been gained and many prisoners and some guns had been captured, although the total result of the first day's drive was a severe disappointment to the French. On the very next day, the French were compelled to take the defensive against the sharp German counter-attacks, which were finally beaten off.

On April 17, the French made further gains of importance and value, cutting deeply into the lines at a number of points along the Aisne and capturing many high spots of ground. On the two following days the assault continued, until the tip of the salient had been captured. But the French could get no further ahead through the remainder of April and it was evident that they had failed no less signally than had the British in the attempt to break through the German positions. Nivelle was soon replaced by Pétain as commander-in-chief of the French armies.

Early in May, the French renewed their efforts. The struggle was now for the famous Chemin des Dames, a road some fifteen miles long paralleling the north bank of the Aisne and almost identical with the German positions. Throughout the month the French attacks continued and some strategic positions were won, but the strength of the German lines was not appreciably lessened. The French had

still not got beyond the tip of the Aisne salient, penetrating only to a depth of some three and a half miles along a fifteen mile front.

But if no better results could be obtained after months of preparation, it was evident that the war would end with no decisive victory for either group of combatants. The Russian Revolution was enabling Germany to strengthen her western front by troops withdrawn from the eastern; and the demand for the beginning of peace negotiations grew stronger among the great Entente Powers. To some extent, this demand was minimized by an intense official propaganda; but there can be little doubt that it would have compelled the French, British and Italian governments to consider peace had they not been able to look forward to the presence of a great American army on French soil and to limitless American assistance in money, food, supplies, guns, airplanes and especially in political leadership.

THE BATTLE OF FLANDERS

Having failed around Arras, the British shifted their efforts northward to Belgium. Haig's purpose was to advance in Flanders sufficiently to threaten the German hold on the Belgian seacoast and thus to end the German use of the Belgian shore for submarine bases. The configuration of the Belgian coast was such that a deep wedge driven into the German lines in Flanders would compel a general German withdrawal from Belgium, unless Germany, despite the remembrance of the universal detestation caused by the violation of Belgian neutrality, should venture to violate Dutch neutrality also.

In front of Ypres, the British held a sharp salient into the German lines. On the other hand, the Germans held the two ridges just beyond the salient, Messines Ridge and Passchendaele Ridge; and all the territory through which the battle-line stretched was so low and marshy that the British would be at a great disadvantage in attempting an advance, especially with their strength vitiated by their failure at Arras.

But the British attack on the Messines Ridge was to be of a novel kind. Haig had decided to fight the Germans with their own weapons and to blow up the German positions by mines. Incredible as the

achievement may seem, for more than a year the British had been drilling mines under the Messines Ridge. No less than twenty-five separate mines under the German positions had been prepared and had been charged with over one million pounds of high explosive. During the last days of May and the first days of June, the enemy lines had been violently shelled, and the entire country-side laid waste, with whole villages and forests wiped out of existence by the British fire. Then, after many days of preparation, the mines were set off early on the morning of June 7. The force of the explosion rocked the earth like an earthquake. The entire top of the Messines Ridge was blown up, the noise of the explosion being heard more than one hundred miles away and travelling across the sea to England itself. Thousands of German soldiers, resting in the trenches without suspicion of doom, were caught like rats in a trap and were blown to eternity without a moment's warning and without the slightest chance of escape or of resistance.

The British soldiers followed immediately upon the explosion. With most of the German front line trenches and most of their defenders destroyed, it was no difficult matter to advance, and within a few hours the Messines Ridge was in British hands, with a strip of territory some ten miles long and two miles deep, including what was left of the towns of Wytschaete and Messines. Despite the explosion of the mines, in many places the Germans were able to resist fiercely, and the British advance was purchased dearly.

With this preliminary success to their credit, the British prepared for a general advance in Flanders in the following month. But they were anticipated by the Germans. Near the seacoast, at the very northern tip of the battle-front, the Germans launched on July 11 a severe artillery action along the Yser Canal. Having destroyed all communications whereby the British force could be relieved or could retreat, the Germans advanced and captured or killed practically all of the three thousand British who held that position. The result was to gain control of the bridgehead over the stream and to make more difficult any British advance along the coast.

Nevertheless, the British were moving nearer the point of their main advance in Flanders. Throughout July, they raked the German

lines with gas and with shells; and by the end of the month Haig's plans had matured. On the very last day of July, the British struck on an eighteen mile front from the Lys River to Steenstraat, although the main attack was delivered on an eight mile front in the centre of this line. The rain of shells had levelled the German first line of trenches and it was captured with little difficulty. Indeed, the German plan was to sacrifice the first line and then to trust to a counter-attack to regain it. But the British kept on beyond the first line, winning many engagements, until by the end of July 31 they had in some instances advanced beyond even the former German third line, and had broken through to an average depth of two miles on an eight mile front, and for one-half to one mile on an additional ten mile front.

Then a heavy and steady downpour of rain interrupted the attack, which could not be renewed for some days. It was impossible for the British to continue their preparations for assault until the ground should become less porous, and it was almost as difficult for the Germans to rally their forces for defense. On August 15, the British attack was renewed on a ten mile front east and north of Ypres; and general gains were recorded, and German counter-attacks were beaten off, on the left and centre. But on the right the Germans held firm, and there the British were unable to make headway, with the result that the entire movement was retarded. Then once more rain fell and once more Haig was compelled to await good weather. By this time, it was evident that the plan of the Flanders campaign was making little headway, due not only to the weather conditions, but also to the German plan of resisting advances by machine-gun nests advantageously placed, a plan which, as modified, was to be largely responsible for the great German successes in the spring of the following year. The British losses were more severe than the German and by no means compensated for the ground won.

Nevertheless, Haig struck again in the middle of September. On September 19 and 20, the British once more drenched the German lines with shells and gas, and once more charged the German lines. The gain was not great in distance, but it was important in the strategic nature of the positions captured—so strategic that the Germans

counter-attacked for five entire days, but with scant success. Having beaten off the German counter-attacks, the British then advanced again on September 26. Once more the Germans were compelled to abandon positions and once more they counter-attacked in force, this time with gains at a number of points. On October 4, the British made another great effort, despite heavy rains, and succeeded in gaining a portion of the Passchendaele Ridge. On October 9 and again on October 12, the British advanced closer and closer upon the Ridge. On the twenty-second and the twenty-sixth, the advance continued, with the aid of the Belgian army and of French detachments. On October 30, the town of Passchendaele itself was occupied, only to be re-taken by the Germans; and a week elapsed before the British gained unquestioned occupation of the town and of all of Passchendaele Ridge. And with this last advance, the battles in Flanders came to an end. Valuable positions had been gained, but at no point had the Allies advanced more than four miles from the original positions in Flanders at the beginning of the summer; and the main purpose of the attack had undeniably not been achieved. It was another sharp and discouraging reverse for the enemies of Germany.

FRENCH ADVANCES IN THE FALL

Throughout July, there had been much activity on the Verdun sector, and there in August Pétain struck hard again to regain more of the ground lost to the Germans in 1916. On August 20, after a three days' bombardment, the French advanced and immediately began to capture many of the strategic positions gained by the Germans at so terrific a cost more than a year previously. Through August and most of September the French continued to make headway, despite strong German counter-attacks, and by October Dead Man's Hill and Goose Hill were once more under the French flag. Pétain had advanced to an average depth of more than a mile on the fifteen mile front before Verdun and to a depth of almost three miles in the very centre of that front.

In October the French renewed their efforts along the Aisne. The Germans still held most of the Heights of the Aisne and the Chemin

des Dames, and Pétain was determined to drive them from these strong positions back across the Ailette River, some five miles in their rear. The preliminary bombardment began on October 17 and reached its climax six days later. It completely devastated the German lines and there was little difficulty in occupying them when the French rushed forward on October 23. From the first lines the blue-clad soldiers made their way through the German second and third lines, until by evening they had penetrated to a depth of two miles on a five mile front. On the next three days the advance continued, until all of the Chemin des Dames was in French hands. The French beat off German counter-attacks throughout the remainder of the month, and the enemy was driven altogether from the Heights of the Aisne. With the commanding positions thus occupied by the French, a further German withdrawal was imperative and by November the German commanders had withdrawn all of their forces across the Ailette.

In extent of ground won and in value of positions taken, the French drive along the Aisne in the autumn showed greater results than the drive in that sector in the spring. But the approach of winter made inevitable a surrender of the offensive in the fall, whereas the drive in the spring had been planned as a prelude to a great defeat to be inflicted upon von Hindenburg's forces. Indeed, only local gains had been planned as a result of the autumn offensive, and therefore it was of less importance as showing the strength of the combatants than the spring offensive had been. By this time, it had become evident that the Allies were not strong enough to break through the German lines by themselves and that their plan of campaign must be a series of nibbling efforts until the rapidly-growing American army should reinforce them sufficiently to break down the German resistance. On the other hand, it was no less evident that unless Germany, aided by the military collapse of Russia, should strike successfully before the American army should become ready, a final German defeat could be predicted without fear of error.

THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

Sir Douglas Haig determined to make one more effort before the close of the year. He could hardly hope to make it a decisive effort,

since the British endeavors of the spring and summer had well-nigh exhausted British resources for the time being. But an overwhelming disaster had befallen the Italian army and it was necessary to exert pressure on another battle-front to relieve as far as possible the grave strain upon the Italian army along the Piave. Moreover, with Germany pouring troops from the eastern to the western front, it was well to strike before Germany could completely consolidate her new strength. Finally, the British production of tanks had placed hundreds of these fighting machines at Haig's disposal. They had been used in previous battles, but with little effect, because they had advanced over ground not conducive to their best services and also because they had not been used in sufficient numbers. Haig believed that by throwing hundreds of tanks against the German lines in a surprise attack, he could achieve a notable gain.

In most of the great battles preceding the Battle of Cambrai, the attackers had prefaced their advance by a heavy artillery bombardment. It had been discovered that if the bombardment were sufficiently heavy, gains would inevitably follow; but the weakness of that method consisted in the warning it gave to the enemy of the location of the effort. Haig had determined to use his tanks with no preliminary bombardment, trusting to surprise. He chose for his attempt the sector opposite Cambrai, some eight miles within the German lines, largely because the nature of the ground in that region would make the tank attack highly effective.

On November 20, hundreds of tanks, which had been skilfully assembled in secret behind the British lines, suddenly rolled toward the German lines, at the same moment that a heavy artillery barrage fell behind the first enemy positions. The tanks had little difficulty in breaking through the barbed wire entanglements, in clearing out the machine-gun nests and in mowing down the defenders of the trenches. The tanks did most of the work for the infantry which followed closely upon their heels, and within a few hours all three German lines had been captured on an eight mile front. For the first time in many months, the Germans were driven completely out of prepared positions and for some hours the fighting was in the open, with the British cavalry taking a large share in the conflict. Havrincourt, Graincourt,

Anneux, Flesquières Ridge, Ribecourt, Lateau Wood, Marcoing, Masnières, were taken, and many prisoners fell into the hands of Sir Julian Byng, the commander of the British forces at Cambrai.

But the advance had been uneven and the Germans were rushing up reinforcements. On November 21, accordingly, the British made heroic attempts to straighten out their new lines, and were successful. Advance after advance was achieved, and strategic point after strategic point was captured, until by the evening of November 21, after two days of fighting, the British had acquired a block of territory, almost exactly in the form of a rectangle, eight miles long and five miles wide. Byng was within three miles of Cambrai and proceeded to bombard the town until it was but a mass of ruins.

On the next day, the Germans recovered sufficiently to launch counter-attacks and the British were strictly on the defensive, at several points being compelled to yield ground to the persistent enemy. On November 23, the British drove for Bournon Wood and the village of Bournon, positions which they needed to consolidate their gains and which they had not yet been able to occupy. Until November 27, the battle raged for these positions, which were taken and re-taken by both British and Germans, until finally the British were able to obtain a precarious foothold upon them.

But the British had not managed to lengthen their flanks and the rectangular shape of their own line before Cambrai was an element of great weakness. For Ludendorff, who had become the virtual dictator of Germany's military program, had no intention of permitting the British to hold gains so extensive as those gained by Byng. He rushed up many new divisions and by the end of the month Germany herself was prepared to assault in force. On November 30, the German infantry sprang in great numbers for the British lines. As the Hindenburg Line had been broken by the British through a surprise attack, Ludendorff in turn was using a surprise attack to restore it. Only a cloud of gas gave warning of the German attack on November 30, and the German soldiers reached the British lines with little difficulty under cover of mist and gas. The struggle thus became a hand-to-hand test of strength and in that test the Germans were victorious. The Germans had made for the sides of the rectangle,

and when they gained along these flanks, the entire British line was in danger of being turned. The Germans were pressing on, wiping out or driving back all detachments opposing them, and gaining most of the important positions. On December 1, 2 and 3, the British, aided by some companies of American engineers, succeeded in stopping the German advance in a number of places for a sufficient length of time to permit the withdrawal of forces in dangerously advanced positions; but the Germans were still coming on, especially on the British right and a further retirement was necessary in order to strengthen the British line. Bourslon and Bourslon Wood were evacuated, and Byng withdrew all along the line until his position had been straightened out into an arc instead of a rectangle projecting into the German trenches. The Germans had recaptured about three-fourths of the ground which they had lost and the net British gains from the Battle of Cambrai amounted to two miles in depth along the four mile front in the centre of what had been the line of advance.

SEA FIGHTERS

In the upper panel is shown part of the fleet of American warships in European waters as it escorted President Wilson, on the "George Washington," into the harbor of Brest, on his first official visit to Europe to share in the conferences in which the terms of peace of the Great War were formulated.

In the upper central panel is shown one of the American "submarine chasers."

In the two lower central panels are shown engines of naval warfare which are not restricted to the surface of the high seas.

The dreadnaught in the lower panel is the U. S. S. "Nevada," steaming at full speed ready for action.

ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT

THE ITALIAN SPRING ADVANCE

After their capture of Gorizia in the fall of 1916, the Italians made no further advance of a pretentious nature until the spring of 1917. The winter of 1916-17 was an unusually severe one, hindering operations; and Italy was preparing for a great blow at Trieste and Laibach. The Austrians still held heights east of the Isonzo and along both banks of the Isonzo north of Tolmino, and the reduction of the Austrian positions was a task requiring many months' preparation. In October and November, 1916, Cadorna had punched out a gain some two miles square on the Carso plateau south of Gorizia, and this position made an excellent base for his general advance of 1917.

At the same time, the Central Powers were also planning for an offensive on the southern front, and the two opposing forces indulged in a race to see which could complete its preparations first. Both Austria and Italy constructed many miles of new roads. Italy raised many new divisions and Austria filled the gaps in her old ones. Both countries stored up quantities of shells manufactured over the winter. But it was evident that the Italians were preparing to renew their attack along the seacoast while the Austrians were preparing another attempt in the Trentino to get at Cadorna's rear. (See page 675.)

The Italians struck first. On May 12, Cadorna began his artillery attack and within two days his troops were able to advance with success against the Austrian positions. The main assault was north of Gorizia and succeeded in gaining many positions of strength. From May 16 to May 20, the Austrians attempted to regain the lost ground, but unsuccessfully, and by May 22 the Italians had won several other strategic positions. They had gained ground to the depth of almost a mile on a four mile front along the Isonzo north of Gorizia.

On May 23, the attack was shifted to the Corso plateau, south of Gorizia. Throughout the month, the drive continued, the Italians

gaining step by step. On the six mile front between Kostanjevica and the Adriatic, the Austrian positions were penetrated to an average depth of some two miles. But the Austrians were in great strength and launched a heavy counter-attack on June 1. The Italians resisted ferociously, but the attack was too strong and for several days the Austrian forces won back many positions which they had lost. By June 10, the Austrian counter-attack died down, but it had succeeded in regaining ground to a depth of one mile along a four mile front.

In the meantime, the anticipated Austrian attack in the Trentino had failed. From May 19 to May 22, the Austrians had endeavored to break through the Italian positions in the mountains, but their gains were not commensurate with their casualties and after May 22, they diverted their forces from the Trentino to the Isonzo line in preparation for their counter-attack in that quarter.

The Italian spring offensive had been like the French and the British spring offensives—it had made some gains, but the gains were so greatly below hopes and expectations as to constitute virtual defeats.

THE ITALIAN SUMMER ADVANCE

On August 18, Italy made another drive to straighten out the Isonzo battle-lines and to gain further positions among the heights on the eastern bank of the river. The location of the great summer effort was the extensive Bainsizza plateau enclosed in a ten mile bend of the Isonzo north of Gorizia. North of Gorizia the Italian line was on the east bank of the river only for a distance of some seven miles to Plava, beyond which the line was still on the west bank; and Cadorna's effort was to break through far to the east of the river so that the road to Trieste and Laibach might be at least cleared for 1918.

At last the Italians were able to get ahead with comparative ease. Their preparations had been skilful and comprehensive and the Austrians were driven back sharply and consistently. It was August 30 by the time that Italy's opponents were able to rally and to put a temporary check to the advance. But on September 3, Cadorna drove again and once more with success. The important height of San Gabriele fell at last; but the Austrians utilized every ounce of their

power to regain it, for it dominated the approach to Trieste. For ten days the slopes of Mont San Gabriele were contested for, and although the Italians finally retained control of them, yet the delay greatly hindered the general Italian advance. Indeed, so severe had been the Austrian resistance that by the end of September the Italian military strength was completely exhausted. Cadorna's exertions had been tremendous, but so had been his losses. Nevertheless, he had to show for them a gain which, he might well claim, was the greatest Allied success of 1917. Through the difficult and rugged mountainous country north of Gorizia he had broken to an average depth of almost five miles along a ten mile front, had captured many prisoners and guns, had gained positions of the highest military importance, had crossed far beyond the Isonzo to the comparatively open country leading to Trieste. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that these gains were valuable chiefly in respect to Italy's hopes of acquiring land along the Adriatic and the Trentino—they could be of little weight in deciding the main issue of the war. And such as they were, this victory of the summer was soon to be forgotten in the shadow of a great disaster.

THE GREAT ITALIAN DEFEAT

With the development of the Russian Revolution, most of the German and Austrian divisions in the east were made available for service elsewhere. The Allied attacks in the west had evidently been relied upon to absorb most of these reinforcements to the armies of the Central Powers, but Ludendorff and von Hindenburg had been able to stop the British and the French advances in Belgium and France without calling upon their troops from the east to any extent. Instead, the divisions withdrawn from Poland and Galicia were carefully trained and drilled for a great offensive in another quarter—as Belgium had been crushed in 1914 and Servia in 1915 and Roumania in 1916, the German General Staff was determined to crush Italy in 1917.

The Italian lines stretched in a great semi-circle along the Austro-Italian frontier. From the northern tip of Lake Garda they cut off

a slice of the Trentino on both sides of the Adige, then crossed back to Italian soil on the Asiago Plateau, then paralleled the frontier with surprising exactness through Cadore and the Carnic Alps until on the eastern edge of the frontier above the Adriatic the Isonzo River was reached, when as we have seen, the Italian lines dipped for an average depth of some ten miles into Austrian territory.

The weak spot of the line, from strategical and geographical considerations, was obviously the extreme western wing. A break there would threaten to surround the armies along the Isonzo, as in 1916; and Cadorna had strengthened his lines in that region to prevent a repetition of the 1916 advance by Austria. At the crest of the line in the Carnic Alps precautions had not been taken on so extensive a scale. For, in the first place, these lines represented a deep salient into the enemy lines, and an attempt to break through at the tip of the salient would obviously give the Italian armies on the wings the maximum amount of time for recovery and counter-attacks, at the same time that it would require the attackers to march the maximum distance in order to drive a wedge of great proportions. In the second place, the Carnic Alps were almost impassable for movements of large bodies of troops and of heavy guns, and by the same token could be readily defended.

And this reasoning was sound. The enemy made no attempt to break through again in the Trentino or on the northern sections of the Austro-Italian frontier.

But on the northeast end of that frontier the unerring eye of Ludendorff found a point of weakness. Between Tolmino, on the Isonzo some fifteen miles north of Gorizia, and Plezzo—a distance of about twelve miles—the Italian forces had not been able to advance across the Isonzo more than several miles. The Italian position was along heights of great ruggedness and seemed so strong that Cadorna had little fear of a drive in that quarter. And it was the very strength of that position which tempted Ludendorff to select it as the site of his great effort; for an effort between Tolmino and Plezzo would have all the power of a surprise attack and the essence of his strategy was victory by surprise. And if he could break through on that front, he could with little difficulty make for the rear of the Italian armies

along the lower Isonzo. For back from the heights occupied by the Italians between Tolmino and Plezzo ran two great valleys almost to the Adriatic, presenting roads readily available for a rapid advance if once the heights should be captured. (See Map, page 675.)

The German General Staff had taken over the complete direction of the Austrian front. The German troops from the east and the Austrians from Galicia, after their long period of rest and training for mountain fighting, were secretly inserted into the battle-lines just before the blow was to fall. As always, the Germans were counting chiefly upon their big guns and not only had they brought up hundreds of them, but had also prepared them especially for difficult mountain work.

Moreover, the Austro-Germans were immeasurably aided by the anti-war feeling within Italy itself. There can be no denying the fact that large and influential sections of the Italian people were opposed to Italy's entrance into the prosecution of the war against the Central Powers. The mass of the powerful Socialist Party in Italy took the same attitude toward the war as was taken by the Socialist Party in America—namely, that the war had not broken out for, and was not being waged primarily for, democracy, peace and future security; and that the prosecution of it should therefore be opposed. The Socialists, with a few patriotic exceptions, as in the United States, pursued their anti-war agitations both in the political and in the industrial field. Most of the Socialist delegates in the Chamber of Deputies consistently opposed the war measures of the Italian Government, and many and serious were the strikes, even in munition plants, called as a protest against the war. The Socialists were supported also by the anarchists and syndicalists, by no means as few in the southern as in the northern countries of Europe; by certain non-radical pacifists; and by that element of the population whose sympathies were with Germany.

That some of this opposition was due, as in the United States, to direct German propaganda can hardly be denied; but that most of it, again as in the United States, represented a state of mind reached without or even despite German influences, can also hardly be denied. At all events, thousands of Italians drafted into the army were there

against their will and were determined not to fight. According to the Italian statements, the Austrians and Germans had cleverly exploited this pacifist sentiment among the Italian troops by encouraging fraternizing, which the Italian commanders were unable to stop. Many of the opposing Austro-Hungarian troops were members of nationalities oppressed under Austrian and Hungarian rule and were thus no more enthusiastic about continuing the war than were many of their Italian comrades. The fraternizing groups spoke long and fervently of the brotherhood of the international working-class; of its stupidity in fighting its own comrades instead of its true enemies, the capitalist and governing class; and of an impending international Socialist state where control would be in the hands of the workers and purely national political divisions would be obliterated. And the Russian Revolution, with the evident withdrawal of Russia from the war, had greatly stirred the masses in all lands to hope for peace. It is possible that the Austro-Hungarians were sincere in their determination to disobey future orders to fight, but the German General Staff was far too wily to entrust its plan to them. When Ludendorff was ready to strike, he replaced most of the fraternizing troops with fresh German divisions, who were kept in ignorance of the situation in the Italian ranks.

Ludendorff was ready toward the end of October. The Italians had an inkling that a heavy attack was about to be made against them, but they were ignorant as to its location and strength and equally ignorant as to the extent of the pacifism among the Italian soldiers. On the evening of October 23, the Austro-Germans let loose a bombardment along the entire Isonzo front, followed on the next day by a concentrated avalanche of shells. With most of the Italian positions destroyed, the Austro-Germans advanced. South of Gorizia and directly north of it, to the Bainsizza plateau, the Italian lines held; but in the sector marked off by the Austro-Germans for their entering wedge, from Tolmino to Plezzo, the Italian positions were carried after several hours with little trouble. By the afternoon of October 24, the Italians had been driven across the river, closely followed by their pursuers. The Austro-German attack consisted of three main

thrusts. After being driven across the Isonzo, the Italians held the northernmost enemy group; but the two lower thrusts succeeded in continuing to eat into the Italian lines, and by the morning of October 25 they combined at Caporetto. They met little resistance worthy of the name—the Italian forces broke badly and fled wildly, although many isolated groups put up a heroic resistance against overpowering odds. The wedge at Caporetto was threatening to envelop Cadorna's

THE ITALIAN FRONT BEFORE AND AFTER CAPORETTO

main forces, and on October 26 he ordered a general withdrawal from most of the positions which his men had gained at so great effort and cost. Ludendorff turned south after reaching Caporetto, pouring the bulk of his forces through the opening he had made, capturing thousands of prisoners, and making all haste for Cadorna's rear.

Resistance was impossible—the only hope for saving the Italian army lay in a precipitate retreat back along the seacoast across the frontier until some pretense of a front could be re-established. The Austro-Germans were sweeping in wider and wider circles toward

the Venetian plains and only haste, headlong haste, could prevent complete surrender. Abandoning guns, ammunition, prisoners, wounded, civilians and all supplies, the Italians rushed pell-mell back toward Italy. It was a rout. On October 27, Cividale was in the enemy's hands and the fall of Udine was a matter of but a few hours. On the same day, the Austrian flag once more flew over Gorizia. The news of the disaster ended the Boselli government—on November 1, Orlando took up the burdens of the premiership, with Sonnino as minister of foreign affairs.

Throughout those hectic days of October, pursuer and pursued rushed madly for the Tagliamento River, twenty-five miles into Italian territory from the frontier and the first location of a possible temporary stand. The Italians fought a number of skilful rear-guard actions, but were often compelled to sacrifice divisions in order to make good the escape of others. Every hour thousands of prisoners were falling to the Austro-Germans. Until November 1, the mad race for the Tagliamento continued, but on that day it was evident that the Italians had shown the greater speed and that the greater part of Cadorna's forces had succeeded, by an uncomfortably close margin, in eluding the jaws of the Austro-German nippers. Fortunately, the Tagliamento was in flood, so that when the advance guards of Ludendorff's army reached the river on November 1, with the bridges destroyed and the Italians entrenched on the other side, they had no course open to them but to postpone the pursuit and to await the arrival of their heavy guns.

But the Tagliamento line was manifestly weak, too weak to be held when the German heavy guns should arrive. So during the next several days the Italians prepared to retire still further to the Piave, and while the weary and disorganized troops were resting on the Tagliamento, the Piave line was energetically fortified for a lengthy resistance.

In the meantime, the Austro-Germans might well have been satisfied with their accomplishment. They had not only robbed the Italians of the gains of more than two years of war, not only ended for all time the threat to Trieste and Laibach, not only carried the war into Italian territory, not only encouraged their despondent home popula-

tions and to the same extent lowered Allied morale, and not only broken up Cadorna's entire army—they had also to their credit almost 200,000 prisoners and 2,000 guns. It was the greatest victory of 1916 and 1917. And if the Austro-Germans could continue to advance so as to cripple Italy on both land and sea and so as to compel her to sue for peace, a peace with provisions of material assistance to the German General Staff in prosecuting the war, it was by no means impossible that the Italian disaster might end the war in Germany's favor before the American army should be able to turn the tide.

On November 3, the Austro-German heavy guns were in place and the Tagliamento was crossed. In the next several days, flanking movements began to enclose Cadorna's left and on November 7 he abandoned the Tagliamento line. The Italians were hotly followed, but again they managed to preserve order and by November 10 were firmly established along the Piave. They had thus been driven to surrender more than 3,500 square miles of Italian territory. French and British divisions were rushed to the aid of Diaz, who succeeded Cadorna as the Italian commander-in-chief and for the moment the crisis had passed. Throughout the remainder of November, the Austro-Germans made desperate efforts to drive Diaz back from the Piave line. Their plan was to drive in his wings, paying little attention to his centre; and both along the lower Piave, with its marshes, and the upper Piave, with its high hills, attempt after attempt was made to break the Italian line. But the Italians now were holding firm on their own soil, fighting as they now were for their own homes, and the losses in November were heavier among the Austro-Germans than among the forces of Diaz. On a number of occasions the enemy managed to cross the river, but each time he was driven back by Italian counter-attacks.

In December, Ludendorff made a last effort to turn the Italian left wing among the mountains. The Italians guarding the line along the Trentino had been affected but slightly by the disaster at Caporetto and, although they had been compelled to withdraw in order to maintain points of contact with the Piave line, their positions were strong. Nevertheless, the Austro-German forces managed to make headway by a formidable attack in December on the Asiago Plateau. On De-

cember 6, on December 11-15, and again on December 22, the enemy gained ground of great value and for a time the position of the whole Italian army was grave, for it looked as though it was about to be flanked again and compelled to withdraw farther south, possibly to the Adige, a move which would practically throw Venice into the enemy's hand and thereby both weaken Italy's command of the Adriatic and give the Austrian navy an opportunity to become active. But in 1917 the weather on the southern front came to the assistance of the Allies as it had come to the assistance of the Germans in France and in Belgium. Heavy snows and severe cold broke up the German plans and the British and French reinforcements had reached Italy in sufficient number to counter-attack and to regain some of the positions which had been lost on the heights on the Italian left. At the end of December and through January, 1918, both the Anglo-French and the Italians drove back the Austro-Germans and at the end of January, Ludendorff withdrew many of the best troops from the Italian front. He had other use for them.

Despite the stupendous disaster which thus befell Italy, there was a silver lining to the dark cloud. For Caporetto brought to the Allied governments, as nothing before, the criminal folly of a super-nationalism which refused to sacrifice national advantages for the common good. With Caporetto, all the Allies pooled their resources, established the Allied War Council at Versailles, and placed the separate nations warring against Germany under the control of an international Entente command. Henceforth there was to be in the Entente a much greater unity of function.

IN ASIA

THE CAPTURE OF BAGDAD

After the surrender of General Townsend's force at Kut-el-Amara in April, 1916, the British had spent the remainder of that year chiefly in holding their own positions south of the city. But they were preparing a vigorous campaign to avenge Kut-el-Amara and to restore Allied prestige in Asia Minor, and their plans were put into operation early in 1917.

In the middle of February, the British, under General Maude, advanced along both banks of the Tigris until they had driven most of the opposing Turkish forces into Kut-el-Amara and had surrounded them there. By February 23, the positions dominating the city were captured, and it was abandoned by the Turks on the next day. Harassing the Turks in their retreat, Maude's forces advanced rapidly up the Tigris and early in March approached Bagdad. Severe fighting occurred around Bagdad on March 7-10, but the British were too strong, and on March 11 the famous old city was in their hands.

At this time, the Russians were also advancing through Turkey in Asia, but the Russian Revolution put an end to this advance and, after driving the Russians back into Persia, the Turks were thus able to throw new forces against the British front. The British advanced in March and April far up the Tigris and the Euphrates after the fall of Bagdad, but the Russian collapse and the approach of summer put an end to their progress for the time. In September, Maude won an important victory at Ramadie and the Russians again advanced; but the growing strength of the pacifist and Bolshevik sentiment in Russia once more ended the Russian attempt and the Germans also managed to send some aid to the hard-pressed Turks, so that Maude made no further gains of note during the remainder of 1917.

One result of the Allied victories in Mesopotamia was the recognition by the Allies of the independence of the Hedjaz, a strip of land

along the northeast coast of the Red Sea. The Hedjaz had been induced, largely by Allied planning and support, to revolt from Turkey in June, 1916, and the fall of Bagdad enabled its independence to be secured. The Hedjaz contained about 100,000 square miles and 1,500,000 inhabitants, with an army which was to render assistance to the Allies in the further prosecution of the war against the Turks.

THE CAPTURE OF JERUSALEM

An advance in Palestine was determined to some extent by the same motives of a non-material nature which had dominated the advance in Mesopotamia. But in addition, there were certain material advantages to be gained by the acquisition of Palestine and Jerusalem. In the first place, the Suez Canal would thus be safeguarded. In the second place, the nationalists in Egypt agitating for freedom from British rule (for Great Britain had formally announced a protectorate over Egypt soon after the outbreak of the war) would be less able to count upon Turkish support and more completely isolated if a revolt for Egyptian independence should gain headway. Finally, the Zionist movement, aiming at the restoration of an independent Jewish state in Palestine, had become strong. Many of the world's leading financiers were Zionists, and would render greater financial assistance to Great Britain if she first conquered Palestine and then promised to safeguard a Palestinian Jewish state. Moreover, great numbers of the Zionist enthusiasts were citizens of Austria-Hungary and Russia; and the establishment of a Zionist state (probably impossible in event of the victory of the Central Powers) as a result of Allied victory both would increase the disaffection within Austria-Hungary and might serve to re-stimulate enthusiasm in Russia for prosecuting the war.

On January 9, 1917, the British advanced from their positions protecting the Suez Canal and captured Rafa, on the Sinai peninsula. With this town as headquarters, plans were matured for an advance upon Beersheba and Gaza. In February and March, the British advanced, but a stiff resistance by the Turkish army, under a German commander, prevented the capture of the two main objectives. In

April, another attempt was made upon Gaza, but the Turkish positions were too strong, the summer was approaching, and the British postponed their main drive into Palestine until the fall.

On October 30, 1917, Gaza was shelled, with the cooperation of the Allied fleet, and another force made for Beersheba a day later. Wedges were driven into the Turkish positions between the two cities and in the following days many of the dominating positions were carried. Beersheba fell to the frontal attack of the British on October 31 and Gaza fell to encircling movements on November 7. General Allenby, the British leader, then made all haste for the Damascus-Jerusalem railway, in order to keep the retreating Turkish troops from supporting the Jerusalem garrison. On November 14, the British gained the junction point on the railroad after a sharp struggle, and the way to Jerusalem was open. Allenby next diverted his thrust to the seacoast in order to capture Jaffa, the sea-port of the ancient Jewish capital. For some days, Allenby then rested, in order to give his troops a respite from the fatiguing fighting in a hot climate and to allow sadly-needed supplies to be brought up through the desert country. On November 17, the British advanced directly upon the Holy City. Their plan was to gain the strategic positions one by one, with a minimum of fighting and of bombardment of the city itself. For five days, the British advanced without difficulty, but during the remainder of the month were occupied in repulsing heavy Turkish counter-attacks. In December, however, Allenby concentrated his main strength, continued to encircle the city, and on December 11 received its capitulation.

GREECE JOINS THE ENTENTE

Throughout 1916, the Allies had been attempting in vain to persuade Greece to enter the coalition against the Central Powers. The powerful Greek leader, Venizelos, was in favor of such action, but King Constantine and his court were bent on maintaining Greek neutrality. The Greek people were split on the issue—some siding with Venizelos, some frankly pro-German, and some favoring neutrality. The failure at the Dardanelles; the conquest of Serbia, Montenegro and Roumania; the inability of the Entente to make headway in the west; the obvious impending collapse of Russia in the east, all lent support to the King's position. Furthermore, an Entente victory would mean Russian predominance in the Balkans and the strengthening of Serbia and Roumania, whose interests in many respects conflicted sharply with those of Greece. Again, Italy had seen fit to occupy southern Albania, despite the treaty of 1913 which guaranteed Albania's independence; and Grecian ambitions were centered largely upon expanding through southern Albania. Similarly, Italy was claiming, and in the Pact of London had obtained promise of, certain islands inhabited chiefly by Greeks. And, finally, the maintenance of the Allied army at Saloniki, in defiance of the wishes of the Greek Government which had succeeded the government of Venizelos, was technically a violation of Greek neutrality which was resented by many Greeks.

The Allies, on the other hand, pointed to the existence of a defensive treaty between Greece and Serbia, signed in 1913, as exacting Grecian participation in the war, and the Allied army at Saloniki used its position to make demands upon Greece which Constantine was unable to refuse. Thus the Greek king was compelled to demobilize his army, to dismiss his ministry and to appoint one more favorable to the Entente, to surrender to Allied officials the control of communications in Greece, to submit Greek newspapers to Allied censorship, and finally to turn over a large proportion of the military and naval supplies of the Greek army and navy for the use of the entente forces at Saloniki.

Through an Allied blockade of Greece and an Allied threat of naval bombardment of Athens, Constantine was compelled also to dismiss the German, Turkish, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian representatives in Greece.

But nevertheless the Greek government claimed that the majority of the Greek people was opposed to declaring war upon the Central Powers. Thus in the general elections held in the beginning of 1916 the Greek people had returned representatives opposed to joining the Entente. The Allies insisted that these elections had been dominated by pro-German influences and that the King himself was pro-German, and they forced Constantine to dismiss the Chamber of Deputies thus elected. The Allies then openly supported Venizelos in organizing a revolt against the Government in Macedonia and in Crete, but Venizelos received little support in Greece itself.

In 1917, the situation in Greece became more violently anti-Entente. There were many demonstrations against the Entente throughout the country; and many speakers, without interference from the Government, echoed the King's charge that the Allies' violation of Grecian neutrality nullified their indignation at the violation of Belgian neutrality and that the Allies' plea of military necessity for their policy in Greece was the plea used by Germany in overrunning Belgium. The inability or the reluctance of Constantine's Government to repress these demonstrations was inclining the Entente to take control of the country themselves. In January, 1917, the Allies delivered an ultimatum to the Greek Government, with which the latter agreed to comply; but the Entente maintained that the terms of its ultimatum had not been fully met and continued its blockade against all Greek ports and its support of the Venizelist revolt. Throughout the spring of 1917, the differences between the Entente and the Greek Government became stronger instead of weaker. The Allies renewed their charges that German agents were active in the country, that the Grecian army had not been altogether disbanded, that the Government was not able to repress attacks on the Allies breaking out among both civilians and the army throughout Greece, that the King was under the control of Berlin, and, in short, that he was disregarding the wishes of the Greek people. Finally, on June 11, the Allies officially

demanded that Constantine turn over the control of Greece to them. With his own army disbanded and with the Entente forces at Saloniki, there was nothing for Constantine to do but to abdicate. The Entente placed his second son, Alexander, on the throne, Venizelos became the head of the Government, and Greece declared war on Germany and Bulgaria on July 2, 1917.

AMERICA ENTERS THE LISTS

The United States formally declared war on the Imperial German Government on April 6, 1917. The entire American navy at once joined the navies of the associates of the United States in the war. But the control of the seas already belonged to the Entente, and it was the American army which was relied upon to act as the weight in the scales which would bring Germany to her knees. At that time, the American army consisted of less than 200,000 men; but, as we have seen, the policy of conscription was resorted to almost at once, and it was apparent that the entire man-power of the United States would take the field so soon as it could be trained, transported to Europe and sustained there. The progress of the Great War had shown that the demands of modern warfare are so varied and exacting that it requires some nine months of intensive training completely to prepare an untrained man to take his place in the trenches. Moreover, before the men of America could be trained, extensive preparations for that training had to be completed, both in Europe and America; and the small American professional army would have to be utilized at first largely as instructors for the raw recruits. It was therefore evident that it would be well after the United States had been in the war for a year before an American army of millions of men would be ready to take over a large section of the battle-front. Nevertheless, by January 1, 1918, Pershing had more than 250,000 men under his command in France.

There were two rôles which the American Expeditionary Forces conceivably might play in the campaign against the Central Powers. The first would be one of striking as soon as possible, rushing up minor detachments of men at the moment they were ready—the rôle of opposing Germany with the greatest possible speed. The other rôle was that of waiting to strike until the American strength was

great and approaching its maximum—the rôle of opposing Germany with the greatest possible force. It was the second which the American armies elected to play in the struggle against Germany. On the whole, they became the reinforcements and reserve—we were to provide whatever help we could to France and England in 1918, but our greatest blows were to be delivered in 1919. Our plan was to trust our associates, with some assistance from us, to hold off the enemy for yet one more year; in 1919, we should strike for a decisive victory, rather than attempt to gain an indecisive victory in 1918.

This plan was foiled to a great extent, of course, by the terrific German drives of 1918, which came within a hair's breadth of ending the war with a German victory; but nevertheless the most valuable function of the American army in Europe was to act as a reserve force so that France and England could oppose their maximum strength to Germany. St. Mihiel, Château Thierry, Argonne Forest, Belleau Wood and a score of other engagements were undeniable and important American victories; but the greatest military assistance rendered by America was indirect, in that, by taking over a large section of the battle-front, the American army permitted the French and the British to strengthen their own lines. And, above all, it was the knowledge that, even if the worst came to the worst, America could be counted upon to win a victory in 1919 that kept alive the spirit of hope and determination in even the darkest days of 1918 and enabled Clemenceau to win his stand against negotiating for an inconclusive peace despite the German successes from March to July of 1918.

And similarly without American assistance in realms outside of the battlefields of northern France and Belgium, Germany and her associates could hardly have been defeated. For industrially, financially and politically the Entente had well-nigh reached the point of exhaustion by the end of 1917. It is no secret, and with the end of the war it is permitted to confess, that Italy was in great fear of a revolution; that France's finances were dangerously shaky; that British and American shipping was being depleted by the submarine warfare until the ability of Great Britain and America to furnish the irreducible minimum of needed supplies was gravely doubted; that there had been

serious mutinies in the French armies in the thick of the fighting as early as March, 1917; that Japan would not send troops to Europe; that British Labor, angered by the refusal of the Entente to grant passports for the Stockholm Conference, was becoming more and more restive, more and more ready to cripple all British industry with strikes in order to achieve its political demands from the Lloyd-George government; that the majority of the French Socialists had joined the Italian and American Socialists in demanding that steps looking toward peace be considered; that certain conservative elements in even the Entente countries were looking with dismay upon the threat of Bolshevism and upon the increase in the power of Labor with the continuation of the war, and that many felt that if the war were continued until Germany was completely defeated, only Bolshevism would be left to reap the fruits of victory; that the Pope's appeal for peace had stirred many Catholics and even many non-Catholics; that when the German Reichstag in July, 1917 went on record as supporting the Russian peace formula, there were many who thought that that challenge should have been accepted; that the German government had finally succeeded in gaining the upper hand of the movement for a revolution in Germany, a movement on which many hopes had been based; that men of all classes in Europe dared not express, even may not have been aware of, the hopes aroused in their breasts by the opening and the progress of the peace parleys at Brest-Litovsk between the Germany of the Kaiser and the Russia of the Bolsheviks; and that a profound discouragement had settled upon all the members of the Entente with the failures of the French and British drives in the spring and the summer, with the great Italian disaster and with the withdrawal of Russia from the war.

If any proof were needed that this picture is not painted in too gloomy hues, it would be furnished by the fact that before the end of 1917 General Smuts, high in the councils of the British government, secretly met in Switzerland Count Mensdorff, representing the Austro-Hungarian government, in order to discuss, if only unofficially and gingerly, the possibilities of peace.

Indeed, it is possible that by the beginning of 1918 France would have been willing to enter into peace negotiations with the Central

Powers if she were assured that she would receive Alsace-Lorraine. For on April 2, 1918, Count Czernin, the Austrian Premier, announced that "shortly before the beginning of the offensive in the West" Premier Clemenceau of France had asked him upon what basis he was ready to negotiate for peace, and that the conversations were broken off by France after Count Czernin had answered that only France's demand for Alsace-Lorraine stood in the way of peace negotiations. Premier Clemenceau immediately denied that the negotiations had been started by France, asserting that Austria had taken the initiative in asking France's peace terms; and that France had replied that no negotiations were possible until Austria recognized the justice of France's claims for Alsace-Lorraine. On April 11, 1918, Paris further issued an official note, asserting that on March 31, 1917, Prince Sixtus de Bourbon, the brother-in-law of Emperor Charles of Austria, had communicated to the French President and Premier a letter to him signed by Emperor Charles, saying in part:

" . . . It is a special pleasure to me to note that, although for the moment adversaries, no real divergence of views or aspirations separates my Empire from France, and that I am justified in hoping that my keen sympathy for France, joined to that which prevails in the whole (Austro-Hungarian) monarchy, will forever avoid a return to the state of war, for which no responsibility can fall on me.

"With this in mind, and to show in a definite manner the reality of these feelings, I beg you to convey privately and unofficially to President Poincaré that I will support by every means, and by exerting all my personal influence with my allies, France's just claim regarding Alsace-Lorraine.

"Belgium should be entirely re-established in her sovereignty, retaining entirely her African possessions without prejudice to the compensation she should receive for the losses she had undergone. Serbia should be re-established in her sovereignty and, as a pledge of our good-will, we are ready to assure her equitable natural access to the Adriatic, and also wide economic concessions in Austria-Hungary. On her side, we will demand, as primordial and essential conditions, that Serbia cease in the future all relation with, and suppress, every association or group whose political object aims at the disintegration of the monarchy, particularly the

Serbian political society, Narodni Odbrana, that Serbia loyally and by every means in her power prevent any kind of political agitation, either in Serbia or beyond her frontiers, in the foregoing direction, and give assurances thereof under guarantee of the Entente Powers. The events in Russia compel me to reserve my ideas with regard to that country until a legal definite government has been set up there.

"Having thus laid my ideas clearly before you, I would ask you in turn, after consulting with these two powers, to lay before me the opinion first of France and England, with a view thus to preparing the ground for an understanding on the basis of which official preliminary negotiations could be taken up and reach a result satisfactory to all. . . . CHARLES."

The great immaterial but nonetheless invaluable relief furnished by America for the amelioration of this distress of the Entente consisted in the formulation by President Wilson of a program of international political organization. America could be trusted by the masses of the belligerent countries as could no other country, for America alone was fighting for no material advantages from the war. America could therefore be relied upon for sincerity when she insisted that from this holocaust there must arise a union of the great Powers which should make another Great War impossible. Every competent and frank observer of European public opinion at this time bore witness to the abiding faith of the war-weary and bereaved European masses in the hope of a world better organized for peace in the future. Most of such observers have borne testimony also to the fact that all European civilization had approached so close to the brink of absolute dissolution that it was only faith that the war-aims and peace terms of the Allies had been purged and raised in virtue by President Wilson's messages and papers which enabled the people of Europe blindly to stumble through the last stupefying months of the war. They were trusting that the peace which would come of the overthrow of Germany would be no mere peace of the usual type between vanquished and victor, but peace which would end the Balance of Power system in which the roots of the Great War had been sunk. That it would be a peace founded on desire for future world-order, not on nationalistic self-seeking nor on ven-

geance. That it would be a peace looking only to the welfare of the common people, not of powerful financial and industrial interests. That it would be a peace providing for disarmament and the end of the burdens and wastes of peace-time conscription, no longer to be made necessary by the ever-present threat of defeat without preparedness. That it would be peace providing for the true freedom of the seas. That it would be a peace giving self-determination to all nationalities, placing no nationality nor any large section of a nationality under an alien rule against its will; and that the new boundaries of Europe would be drawn entirely according to nationalistic and not strategical considerations. That it would be a peace ending for all time the practices of secret diplomacy. So fervent was the hope of Europe for this kind of a peace that President Wilson's program was officially accepted by most of the associates of the United States in the struggle, although in private many of the leaders of the governments of those associates had been known to have questioned the advisability and practicability of that program.

Furthermore, with the entrance of America into the war, a far greater degree of unity was achieved among the opponents of Germany. Naturally, it would be beside the mark to lay the chief credit for the increase in Allied unity at the door of America, for much of it was inevitable under any circumstances, and much of it was forced by the exigencies created by the great German victories in the spring of 1918. Much of it was due also to the dominating insistence of Georges Clemenceau, who became premier of France after the Ribot ministry fell in September, 1917 and after two months' trial of the succeeding Painlevé ministry had not inspired confidence. But much of the achievement in accomplishing unity of purpose and of function was nevertheless due to American leadership in the military and industrial as well as in the political field, and for the same reason—America was known to be disinterested and was hence trusted to a greater extent than was any other of the great Powers. Up to 1918, each of the Allies had fought chiefly as a separate unit; in March, 1918, Ferdinand Foch was made commander-in-chief of all the Entente armies. On November 29, 1917 there met in Paris an Inter-Allied Conference, from which sprang the Supreme War Council

which coordinated all military efforts, and an Inter-Allied Naval Board which coordinated all naval efforts. Herbert C. Hoover was given greater powers, which made him practically the administrator of the wheat and then of the general food programs of all the Entente countries, as well as of the United States. As another result of the Paris Conference, the Allied Maritime Transport Council was formed, to coordinate the work of shipping all needed commodities, especially cotton, wool, petroleum, coal, meats and fats, sugar, nitrates, steel, chemicals and explosives. An Inter-Allied Blockade Committee took over the maintenance of the blockade against the Central Powers.

• These two latter bodies were not international bodies directing the efforts of each country represented on them, as their scope was chiefly advisory and as each Entente country theoretically maintained its independence of action in the spheres in which those bodies functioned; nevertheless their recommendations and findings usually had, in practice, the effect of laying down an international program binding upon the several countries. In 1918, many other similar bodies were created to coordinate the efforts of the enemies of the Central Powers—the Allied Food Council, the Munitions Council, the Finance Council, etc. All these bodies not only materially increased the efficiency of the campaign against the Central Powers, but also paved the way for international action which made people in the various belligerent and even in the neutral countries familiar with international actions of a sort which would transpire under a League of Nations.

THE WAR, 1918

THE TREATIES OF BREST-LITOVSK

The two main promises on which the Bolsheviki had ridden to power were immediate peace and immediate transfer of the land to the peasants through the medium of the state. After taking over control of Russia on November 8, 1917, the Bolshevist leaders at once took measures to redeem these promises. Without waiting for tedious delay and scientific methods, the ownership of the land was transferred to those who were its tillers, and at the same time steps were taken in the direction of an official armistice. The Bolsheviki dispatched messengers to both the Central Powers and the Entente Allies, proposing an immediate cessation of hostilities with a view to negotiating peace or at least to surveying the possibilities of peace. A favorable reply was received only from the camp dominated by Germany. On November 28, 1917, Germany agreed to the Russian proposal for an armistice; on December 2, it was tentatively proclaimed; and on December 3, Russian and German representatives met at Brest-Litovsk, in Russian Poland, to enter upon an official agreement to govern the armistice and the peace negotiations. The plight of Roumania compelled her also to enter the Brest-Litovsk conference, and with the German delegates were associated Austro-Hungarian, Turkish and Bulgarian delegates.

The course of the preliminary discussions proved that Russia was still aiming at a general peace and not, unless forced to that extremity, at a separate peace. For the Russians demanded that the armistice be proclaimed not only on the eastern front, but on all fronts—thus showing their hopes that, despite the refusal of the Entente to enter the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, the Entente would finally consent to consider peace. This demand the Germans categorically refused, and there was a deadlock at Brest-Litovsk for some days, until the Russians finally agreed to withdraw this demand if Germany granted

their other chief demand, which again showed that the Bolsheviki wanted an immediate general peace rather than a German victory. This second demand was that during the armistice no troops be transferred by the Central Powers from the eastern to the western and southern fronts. This demand also the Central Powers attempted to evade, but the Russians were obdurate and revealed so plainly that unless this demand were met, they would abandon the conference, that Germany finally promised to cede; and the official armistice went into effect on December 17. But there is much evidence to prove that with characteristic brutal and cynical lack of good faith the Imperial Government broke its word and during the armistice transferred a number of divisions from Russia to the western front.

The formal opening of the Brest-Litovsk parleys took place on December 22, 1917. The meeting-hall spread before the eye a strange and significant contrast. On one side of the room sat the representatives of the German Government and its associates in the War, led by the astute and suave German Foreign Secretary, von Kühlmann, the faithful servant of the Kaiser but withal a liberal, and Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Secretary. Around them were grouped army officers in resplendent uniforms glittering with decorations; diplomats of soft voice, sleek appearance and wide experience; and an extensive entourage of experts, assistants and technical advisers. On the other side of the hall sat a group of simply, even poorly, dressed members of the lower classes, the representatives of Russia. Their language was that of the soil and the hustings; their bearing was rough; their attitude was aggressive.

The Russians were headed by Leon Trotsky, the Bolshevist Foreign Minister. His name at birth had been Leber Braunstein, but the rigors of a revolutionary's life in Tsarist Russia compelled many of the revolutionary leaders to adopt pseudonyms, until a change of name in Russia occasioned none of the suspicion and ill-repute with which that action is often surrounded in the western countries. Trotsky was born in Russia in or about 1880. He was of Jewish parentage, but the radical and revolutionary creed which became his before he had attained his majority was one which taught the superficial nature of political nationalistic and religious affiliations and the fundamental

nature of international economic class affiliations ; so that inevitably he did not retain his religious connections after early youth. Before he was twenty years of age, he had taken part in revolutionary uprisings and plots against the Tsarist autocracy and he soon became known as a trenchant writer and organizer. A Socialist, his Socialism was of the most orthodox and uncompromising kind, and he became affiliated with the Bolsheviki under the leadership of Lenin. Trotsky played his part in the Revolution of 1905, becoming head of the Soviet in St. Petersburg, only to be arrested after the failure of the Revolution and sent to prison, where for several years he endured the cruelties and tortures imposed on Russian political prisoners. After his release, he settled in Berlin, whence he was expelled by the German Government at the outbreak of the war. From Switzerland, from Paris and from Spain, where he attempted to carry on his propaganda, he was in turn driven, until in 1915 he came to New York. There he joined the editorial staff of a revolutionary Russian newspaper, but he was too radical and orthodox to fit in with the organization work of the dominant faction in the Socialist Party in New York. With the outbreak of the Revolution of 1917, he set sail for Russia, where his fiery eloquence soon lifted him high in influence among the Bolsheviki.

Under the guidance of Trotsky, the Russian delegates assumed in the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk a highly defiant attitude. For weeks, the entire Bolshevik and non-Bolshevik world wondered at the refusal of Russia to recognize her helplessness and Germany's position of domination. The German army was powerful, the Russian had evaporated; Germany was still industrially efficient, Russia was on the verge of ruin and collapse; Germany was rich, Russia was bankrupt; Germany could take what she wanted from Russia, Russia was in dire need of goods from other countries, but could obtain them only by Germany's permission; Germany was united, Russia was being divided by nationalistic uprisings in Finland, Ukraine, the Baltic Provinces, Georgia, the Caucasus, Bessarabia, Poland, Lithuania; Germany was the victor in war, Russia was the vanquished; the German Government was still firmly in the saddle, the Bolsheviki had but recently obtained control and were threatened at

any moment with overthrow by their numerous and powerful enemies; Germany was supported by her allies, Russia had chosen to pursue a course in which her allies would not support her—and yet the Russian delegates at Brest-Litovsk refused to admit that Germany could dictate and refused to take a position other than that of equals.

The main Russian demands, for in essence they were put forward as demands, were as follows: The old Russian peace formula of "No *punitive* indemnities, no forcible annexations, and the right of self-determination for all nationalities" was to be the principle on which the peace must be based. Complete independence was to be restored to Belgium, northern France, Servia, Montenegro and Roumania. Races like the Poles, the Czechs and Slovaks, the South Slavs, were to determine their own nationalistic future. The losses of the war were to be met by all the belligerents according to their abilities and there was to be no economic boycott after the war. Germany was to relinquish all her conquests and in turn the Allies were to surrender the German colonies captured by them. There was little attention paid in the Russian peace platform to the future organization of the great Powers and the lesser nations of the world, for the Bolsheviki were bent upon carrying the social revolution into all lands so as to wipe out nationalistic political lines and to replace them by the rule of the international working-class.

For weeks the Russians stuck by these proposals. They called upon the Entente to accept them also and to send delegates to Brest-Litovsk to support the Russians in their stand. But the Entente took its stand on the answer of President Wilson to the Pope's peace proposals, and insisted that there could be no reliance upon the word or the pledge of the German Government and that the war must continue until the Germany led by that Government had been decisively defeated, so that the final terms of peace would be those not reached by negotiations but imposed by the Entente.

And these Russian peace terms were less palatable to the German Government than even to the Allies. Germany had visions of patching up a general peace by granting concessions in the west and possibly in the Balkans at the expense of Russia. Germany might well

be willing to return Belgium, northern France, Servia, Montenegro and Roumania if she should gain, covertly or openly, large slices of western Russia—for instance, much of Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania and the Baltic Provinces. But if Germany were compelled to relinquish her Russian conquests as well, there could be no pretense that she had won the war. The Germans refused the Russian demands—the Russians nevertheless insisted on them and defied Germany to do her worst. It was an interesting study in the strength of a contest between an adversary in a weak material and a strong moral position and an adversary in a strong material and a weak moral position. Germany threatened compulsion, Russia shrugged her shoulders—and Germany hesitated. For during all this time, the Bolsheviki had been conducting an intensive propaganda in Germany and Austria-Hungary, not only by fraternization along the battle-fronts, but also by written and spoken words in the great industrial centres. There was no telling what resistance among the people of the Central Powers themselves would be called forth by the imposition upon the Bolsheviki of a brutal peace only by force of arms. Von Kühlmann and Czernin made desperate efforts to effect a compromise which would satisfy the Russians and yet give Germany what she wanted; but the Russians held firm. Germany therefore struck in another quarter—she induced Ukraine to revolt from the authority of Bolshevik rule. But the Bolsheviki had been building up an army which, although it might not be able to resist the German army, was nevertheless able to defeat the Ukrainians; and they began to put down the Ukrainian revolt.

By February, therefore, peaceful German attempts to write a German peace at Brest-Litovsk had come to naught and Germany determined to waste no more words in discussion—she delivered an ultimatum to Trotsky and made ready to enforce it by the armed might of her armies. The Russians retorted by denouncing the ultimatum as impossible of acceptance and announced to the world that they would not sign the terms of peace demanded by Germany although they could not and would not resist German attempts to enforce it.

The German answer was to the point. German troops were rushed to the defense of Ukraine and on February 9 a separate peace was

consummated between Germany and Ukraine. On February 10, Germany invaded helpless Russia and thus prepared to gain by conquest the territories demanded. One German army marched through Ukraine, another through the Baltic provinces and another toward Petrograd and Finland. After two weeks, the Bolsheviki capitulated and agreed to sign a peace at Germany's dictation and on March 5, 1918, the Russian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed, with the Roumanian Treaty signed two days later. The terms were more severe than even those originally submitted by Von Kühlmann. Russia had to renounce sovereignty over Ukraine, Livonia, Esthonia, Poland, Lithuania, Finland, Bessarabia and also over certain other lands around the Black Sea and the Caucasus, which latter were awarded to Turkey. In addition, the Bolsheviki had to pledge themselves to abstain from propaganda in the territory of the Central Powers—a silent tribute to the accomplishments of that propaganda; and to grant to the Central Powers favored economic and trade concessions which practically made Russia an economic vassal of Germany. The terms to Roumania were similar—they have already been discussed.

Germany announced that the territories wrested from Russian rule were to be given the right of self-determination after the conclusion of a general peace; but it was painfully evident that the process would be supervised so thoroughly by the Imperial German Government that the control over those countries would rest at Berlin. Indeed, even after the treaty had been signed, Germany wantonly violated its provisions whenever it was to her interests to do so, and for practical purposes the ceded territories became German vassal and buffer states.

It seemed as if the advantages to Germany from the treaties signed at Brest-Litovsk would be enormous. Germany was still strong in man-power and in munitions—her chief weakness was in food, fats, etc. And the way was now opened to the fertile wheatfields of the Ukraine, with an outlet on the Black Sea and with a new route for trading with neutrals both in the east and in northwest Europe. The way was opened also to the oil-fields of Roumania and to many other promising sources of supply. But the havoc of war had fallen upon

neutrals no less than upon belligerents. Ukraine had felt the disintegrating influences of the remainder of Russia and Germany was sadly disappointed at the booty she obtained there. Similarly, the Roumanians had set their wheat and their oil-wells on fire as they retreated, and again Germany was disappointed. But nevertheless the economic gains to Germany from the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk were well-nigh invaluable in the light of Germany's economic plight; and if the war had continued for another year, Germany would have reaped even more abundant fruits from her exploitation of powerless Russia and Roumania.

But there was another side to the story. Germany's conduct had opened the eyes of many persons, not only in neutral and even in belligerent countries, but also among the Central Powers. Especially did the peoples of Austria-Hungary come in greater numbers to realize the ruthlessness of the German Government—to use the words of President Wilson, the attitude of all countries toward defenceless Russia would be the “acid test” of the sincerity of the high ideals which those countries professed. The majority of the German Socialists still supported the German Government, still waiting until the Government was ready to fall before breaking with it; but the numbers of the anti-war and anti-Government minority Socialists were increased by Brest-Litovsk. By the time of the signing of the final peace terms there was no definite information as to the strength and the extent of the resentment in Germany at the Brest-Litovsk atrocity. For the strikes in Germany, due to some extent, at least, to Bolshevist propaganda, had been threatening, and to quell them Ludendorff had been appointed the virtual dictator of the country; martial law had been for practical purposes proclaimed throughout Germany; strikers were answered by being sent to the front, and inciting to strikes which would cripple the Government was made a capital offense. For Germany was now girding her loins for a last desperate effort and any resentment which might have broken out later as a result of Brest-Litovsk was stilled, even forgotten, in the news of the smashing drives opened in France by Ludendorff and von Hindenburg not many days after the ink on the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk was dry.

THE FIRST GREAT GERMAN DRIVE: THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

At the beginning of 1918, Germany's strength in comparison with the strength of the Allies was greater than at any other period of the war after 1914. The armistice with Russia made possible the concentration of practically all the German man-power on the western front. The submarine warfare, although it had failed to compel the Allies to sue for mercy, was nevertheless seriously crippling the Allies, and in particular was hindering their production and transportation of munitions and other materials. An American army was being assembled in France, but it was not yet ready to strike. France had thrown her maximum strength into the war early in 1915 and the force she was exerting on the western front was now declining to a sufficient degree to counterbalance to a great extent the increase in the British force. Italy was on the defensive and German troops and guns could be withdrawn from the Italian front. Roumania had capitulated and hence German troops could also be withdrawn from the Balkans. And, finally, so efficient was the long-planned and comprehensive German system of conducting war that Germany had not yet reached, as had France, the point when her strength was beginning to decline.

But in 1919 the story would be different. By that time, there would be several million well-trained men under Pershing, ready to take over their share of battle-line. The ship-building record of America was beginning to soar and the production of new shipping would probably more than atone for submarine losses. The climax of Germany's effort would have passed—it was inconceivable that even the German people could continue their sacrifices for another year. Italy would have recovered from Caporetto and would again demand attention. There was no telling how long the Bolsheviki might remain in control of Russia. Austria-Hungary was restless and openly clamoring for peace—the nationalistic movements of the Slavs

and Czechs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire could not be suppressed much longer.

And the Allies were still unwilling to concede a German victory. They were still insisting that Germany must be defeated; and certainly Clemenceau would make no peace without Alsace-Lorraine, Lloyd-George would make no peace without the complete restoration of Belgium, Wilson would make no peace at the expense of Russia. Germany could doubtless have obtained a peace in accordance with the "Fourteen Points" promulgated by President Wilson, but the strict application of those principles would end the war to Germany's great disadvantage. Germany could obtain a German peace only through a devastating victory over the Allies, and if Germany was to obtain a devastating victory over the Allies, she must obtain it in 1918 or never. Germany weighed the situation; considered the risks; reckoned on the penalties of failure no less than upon the rewards of success; counted the cost—and determined to risk all upon one last final effort. It was to be everything or nothing.

In 1916 and 1917, the Germans, by the confession of Lloyd-George himself, had been outnumbered on the western front at a ratio of about two to three. Even with the concentration of all Germany's available troops upon the western front and with reinforcements in both men and guns from Austria-Hungary, the same authority has stated that in 1918 the Germans were still slightly inferior in infantry and artillery and certainly in aircraft. But Ludendorff and von Hindenburg had the advantage of the offensive—they could secretly mass their troops and guns on a certain sector while the Allies were compelled to divide their strength along their entire line. Moreover, with their ignorance as to where the blow would fall, the Allies were compelled to maintain a certain proportion of their forces behind the battle-line as reserves. Accordingly, the Germans would be and were able to strike with great superiority in men and guns on the sector decided upon for the thrusts upon which the entire result of the war hinged.

Ludendorff obtained a great advantage also by re-arranging his forces so that they were into a greater number of divisions, with fewer men to each division and to the battalions comprising a division. His

BRITISH DIRIGIBLES

plan was to tax the resources of one group of troops to the utmost, when they would be relieved by another group and sent to the rear for rest until they could be shoved up again. That is to say, the plan was much like an endless chain of men, always fresh; whereas it was expected that on the attacked sector the Allied troops would be kept constantly in the fight because of their inferiority in numbers in that sector and because of the exigencies of retreating. This plan was to be especially effective because of the new system of attack which the German General Staff had developed.

Each year of the war had seen a development of new military tactics. After their retreat from the Marne in 1914, the Germans had taken the initiative in depending for defense upon trench systems of an elaborate and intricate nature. In 1915 the scheme of shoving an infantry wedge behind a great artillery attack had come into vogue, and the favorite method in 1916 was that of attempting to gain a broad section of line by a terrific bombardment all along the front. In 1917, the method of step-by-step but ceaseless nibbling had been used by the Allies in the summer; but at Cambrai in the fall of that year the British had developed the new method of a sudden attack without a long warning bombardment. At Cambrai also the Germans had revealed a new method, that of strong and isolated machine-gun nests, used for defense instead of the general trench line system. And the new plan developed by the German General Staff for 1918 was a combination of the two new methods revealed at Cambrai. The Germans intended to strike without warning and they intended to use the plan of separate clusters of machine guns, this time for offense instead of for defense. Their method might thus be described as one of infiltration. That is to say, a number of separate groups were to break through at different points of the attacked sector, maintain their positions, keep closely in communication with one another, hastily get their machine guns into position, and then rake the Allied lines until the adjoining regions had to be abandoned. Into the gaps thus created, new German units would penetrate until the accumulation of one position after the other would throw the Allied lines into complete disorder and confusion and open up wedges big enough for whole divisions to be thrust

into them, with the consequent chance of surrounding and capturing large sections of the opposing armies.

As the German General Staff scrutinized the Allied battle-line, there was no difficulty in ascertaining the chief weakness in the Allied army. This was the fact that the British and French armies were fighting as separate units rather than as one body. On the extreme east of the battle-line, on the Lorraine front, in the Vosges, there was little to gain by breaking through. The French held the stronger positions; mountain fighting was difficult; there would be no better chance of breaking through the defences of Épinal, Toul and Belfort than there had been of breaking through the defences of Verdun; and Paris was too far away. Farther to the northwest, the St. Mihiel salient was too narrow to provide a good base for an attack, adjoined as it was by the French salient behind Verdun; and the Germans had had enough of Verdun. There then remained the French line in Champagne and the British section of the line to the North Sea.

Early in 1918, Great Britain had taken over a much greater share of the Allied line. It was felt that her increased strength in manpower and France's decreased strength involved such a move. But it was soon seen that to take over a longer section of the line, the British ranks had been dangerously thinned. Naturally, the German General Staff knew of this manoeuvre and of the decreased number of the British troops to the square mile; an attempt against the British would therefore have greater chance of success than an attempt against the French.

And back of the British was the sea. True, it was scores of miles away, but the German General Staff knew the strength of the thrust it had prepared and was hoping to break through for scores of miles. It hoped to drive a wedge that would reach the Channel between the Somme and the Seine and completely isolate the French and the British armies. If the British and the French armies could be separated by the great German drive, there would be little possibility that the French could rush up reinforcements in great number in time to save the British army, which for practical purposes would

be isolated and might even be compelled to surrender or at least to re-embark, in great numbers; and if Haig should be driven back of the Somme and rolled to the west along the North Sea, north of the Somme, a relatively small German force might well hold his shattered ranks in check while the remainder of the great German army should concentrate its efforts upon the French.

Germany therefore prepared to strike at the point where the French and the British armies joined—the fifty mile front between Arras and the Oise. Most of this front was held by the British Fifth Army under General Gough, and represented the section of the line taken over from the French early in 1918. The opposing German force was under the nominal command of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, with the separate armies under Generals Otto von Below, von der Marwitz and von Hutier; but for the direct planning and management of the attack the latter was chiefly responsible. The British forces numbered less than 200,000, with the opposing Germans, when the battle started, certainly as strong as 500,000. The British lines, however, were very strong, consisting of three separate trench lines with an outpost line—the three main lines being arranged as a first resistance line, a main resistance line and a final resistance line. The Allies were expecting to receive a tremendous drive and had made all preparations for it; but the Germans had concentrated against both the French and the British near their point of junction and also at other points along the entire line, and until the attack broke, there could be no assurance as to its exact location. On the other hand, the magnificent net-work of German railways behind von Hindenburg's lines allowed him readily to shift his forces at night from the British to the French front or vice versa, so that the Allies could not well prevent being outnumbered in the early days of the greatest battle yet seen in the history of the world.

The night of March 21, 1918 was foggy. For more than a week, the weather had been unusually clear and warm for that time of the year, so that the ground was hard and favorable to the transportation of men and guns, an entirely unexpected aid to the German attack. A light rain on March 19 had not softened the ground, but had mois-

tened it just sufficiently to cause a mist to rise when March 20 broke fair. Throughout the night of March 20-21 the Germans had been massing their men and at 4:45 a. m. on March 21 they launched the beginning of the drives on which they were counting for a final and complete German victory.

The sudden artillery attack was not confined to the front upon which the great drive was to be made. It was delivered as far to the west as Dunkirk and as far to the east as Rheims. But the great concentration of Germany's fighting force was along the fifty mile front held by the British Fifth Army, with especial concentration along the southern part of that front between St. Quentin and La Fère. Far back of the lines the shells fell and a barrage of gas was laid down which joined with the mist in concealing the German advance. Under that molten and gaseous rain the British gunners were powerless—the British communications were hindered and machine-guns were without eyes. Meanwhile, the German advance parties were cutting the barbed-wire and preparing for the grand rush, which the outnumbered British were awaiting in breathless expectation.


From eight to ten o'clock the first German lines advanced. The British in the front lines had had their positions blasted out of existence, there was no visibility for their guns and the Germans were upon them almost before they could see them. The British resisted while resistance was possible and then fell back to their second and third lines, where they hoped to make a stand. But the Germans, as we have seen, were not planning to advance en masse. At certain points, they had hurled through the British line little groups which immediately set up machine guns, and in many spots the British troops found themselves taken in the rear as they prepared to retreat. The Germans had picked their openings with uncanny accuracy and the British position was becoming more like a sieve than a solid line.

Before noon, the Germans had broken through the first British line of defence at no less than four places—near La Fère, on the extreme British right, and at three contiguous points on the British left within the lines of the Third British Army under Byng—Bullecourt, Lagnicourt and opposite Louveval. Shortly after noon the Germans had

penetrated the British centre also, not only through the first but also through the second line of defence. Through these openings the German masses were streaming to erect positions, without waiting for the remainder of the line to be pierced, conscious that their numerical superiority was permitting so many of these positions to be constructed that they could not be surrounded but would rather be consolidated. The British fought with desperation, but the odds against them were too great. Their communications could not function properly after the heavy German fire had been let loose upon them; and at point after point British divisions would attempt to fall back after a staunch defence only to find that in the meantime adjoining bodies had already fallen back and that German divisions and machine-guns were in their rear. In the afternoon, the Germans broke through the second line of defence on the British right and at a number of places in the line were engaged by nightfall in attacking the third and last British line of defences. With the close of the first day's fighting, the Germans had broken through to an average depth of more than three miles on the entire front, except on the British left centre, where they had been held opposite Havrincourt.

On March 22, the German attack increased in power and intensity. The same tactics were pursued as on the preceding day and with the same result. Along the entire line the Germans had got through the second British line of defences and were assaulting the third line. But on the south of the battle-front the Germans had broken through even the third and last line of British defences by the evening of March 22, and had driven the bewildered and weary British at last into the open. This was the point of greatest strategical value, since it represented the direct junction of the French and the British armies, and the wedge driven by the Germans was so deep that reinforcements from the French would have to be diverted to a great depth in order to reach the British. The Germans were realizing the object of their attack.

With all the British reserves already in action, with no French reserves or reinforcements immediately available, with the dent on the British right both deep and wide, with the Germans pressing against it in increasing numbers, there was only one method by which Gough



could prevent his line from being broken and his centre from being flanked from the south. He ordered his right to abandon their positions and to retreat seven miles to the Somme, where it bends to flow north and south instead of east and west. The situation was critical and there was no time to regret the loss of territory—the British sole aim was now to prevent the loss of the entire Fifth

Army. But so deep a retirement on the British right necessitated a similar retirement on the centre and left, in order to maintain a continuous battle-front. Moreover, the centre and left were also hard-pressed themselves and there was no telling when they, too, would be pierced. Again there was only one thing to do—the entire Fifth Army, with the adjoining right of the Third Army, would also have to retire to the Somme and to a line parallel with it; and accordingly throughout the night of March 22 and the day and night of March 23 the British beat a confused retreat for the Somme, fifteen miles away from the original front of battle.

The retreat was made under desperate conditions. The entire army was now in the open and was too hard-pressed to maintain system and order throughout its lines. In many places, German detachments were already forming lines in the British rear, breaking alignment; and for a time the British army became a series of separate bodies struggling almost blindly in the dark, but fighting with grim determination somehow to reconstruct a front and to stop the German cohorts eventually. The British were ill with fatigue, whereas the greater numbers of the Germans permitted their commanders to afford them rest and sleep. And in the centre the northernmost corps of the Fifth Army was being driven to the south while the southernmost corps of the Third Army was being driven to the north, so that by March 24 Byng and Gough were losing touch with each other, and another wedge, of an even more serious nature than the wedge to the south between Gough and the French, was being driven into the British lines. For in the south the British troops were retreating before the wedge driven by the Germans and were still blocking their further advance; but in the centre on March 25 there were practically no troops for several miles in front of the Germans, with only open country at that point between them and the Channel or even Paris.

Throughout March 24 and 25 the Germans poured troops into this gap between the Third and the Fifth British armies and also against the British right in the hope of gaining the crossings of the Somme. On March 25, Gough desperately collected any and all the reinforcements available and sent them to bridge the gap between him and

Byng. So close upon the British heels were the oncoming Germans that there was no opportunity to send a unified body. Gough found some scattered troops from units which had disappeared as such or had been disorganized. There were also some men who had been on sick-leave or rest-leave, who had been hastily rushed to the lines when the extent of the disaster was seen. There were some groups which had been in training behind the line for machine-gun and tunneling companies; there were some Canadian ordnance corps; and last, but not least, there were some companies of American engineers who had been engaged in construction behind the British lines and who in a few cases had to resort to picks and shovels as the only weapons at hand when they were called upon to help stop the Germans. This motley crew was placed under the command of General Cary, and it staunchly bridged the gap between the two British armies and held off the enemy. Up to this time, the German Intelligence work had been superb, but now it failed. It failed to realize the weakness of the force under Cary and the Germans prepared to attack it cautiously as they would have attacked a well-defended section of the line. They proceeded with utmost deliberation against Cary's men, who could not prevent a German advance but who could at least retreat in order and still offer opposition until reinforcements of strength could be rushed up. For six days the gap was thus bridged, the Americans, British, Canadians fighting side by side, using whatever methods were available, and finally the gap remained closed and almost miraculously the British front remained a front.

But the British were still being driven back into the open through country in which there was little opportunity for more than temporary resistance; so the order was given the disorganized left wing of the Fifth Army and the right wing of the Third Army to retreat further to the Ancre, a little stream branching off from the Somme in a north-and-south direction. Through all this period, naturally, the British losses in dead, prisoners and guns were sickeningly large.

In the meantime, this precipitate withdrawal of the British left compelled the further withdrawal of the British centre and right. It is doubtful if these latter could have maintained positions along

the Somme under any circumstances, for the Germans had reached the river almost as soon as the British; and so disorganized were the British forces there that in a number of positions the bridgeheads along the river were not held and in others the Germans had already experienced little difficulty in forcing a crossing. Nevertheless, the British managed to launch a few counter-attacks and to hold the line of the Somme through most of March 24. The gap between the two armies above and below the Somme was widening, however, and on March 25 Gough's right and centre retreated another five miles. But the position of the centre and right was in touch with the position which the left had occupied a day previously; and in the ensuing twenty-four hours the left had retreated still further and the gap still remained, while there were serious gaps in the centre and right also. Accordingly, on March 26 the retreat was continued on the south of the line as well as on the north.

But by March 27, the situation, although still dark, was becoming slightly more promising and was furnishing hopes that the worst was over and that the British army might still escape. For one thing, some French reinforcements had begun to arrive. For another, Foch had been placed in supreme command of all the Allied armies and they were now at last unified. In the third place, the Germans were at length showing signs of weariness and even the efficient German system of transportation was failing to keep the German heavy guns in the forefront of the German pursuit. And, above all, on March 27 the British left was finally able to make a stand along the Ancre, and north of Albert the British lines gave promise of becoming stable. The German attacks along the Ancre were losing power and the British managed to beat them off in that region.

On the centre and south of the line, however, the Germans were still coming on. The French reinforcements were being dispatched to Montdidier, and the Germans drove for that centre. The British reached it on March 27 but it had to be abandoned on the following day. Montdidier was at the extreme British right, and when it was carried, the centre, which had made something of a stand on the twenty-sixth, was also compelled to retire. Throughout the twenty-seventh, therefore, the right and centre retreated and the extent of

retreat still showed no sign of decrease. The lines were now farther to the west than before the great German withdrawal in the spring of 1917 and were approaching uncomfortably close to Amiens, the great British concentration camp. If Amiens should be taken, the British and the French would indeed be separated. Up to this time, the French in Champagne, under Fayolle, had maintained their positions, swinging back only their north wing to keep in touch with the retiring British and driving back the Germans in that region by a sharp counter-attack. But if Amiens should fall, a rapid French retreat all along the Champagne line would be inevitable, and even so, the points of contact between the French and the British might disappear.

Meanwhile, the Germans had begun the bombardment of Paris by a gun with a range of more than seventy-five miles. Obviously, over such a distance accuracy was impossible and the destruction wrought could thus be only for the purpose of striking terror to the Parisians and of weakening French morale. But again the Germans revealed their characteristic inability to understand the psychology of other peoples and the sole effect of the bombardment of Paris, besides the material destruction wrought, was to increase still further, especially in America, resentment against the Germans.

While the fate of western civilization was thus being determined, America had been appealed to, with results that may best be appreciated by quoting from Premier Lloyd-George's address to the British House of Commons on April 9, 1918:

"For many reasons—reasons, perhaps of transport, reasons connected with the time it takes, not merely to train troops and their officers, but to complete the necessary organization—it was quite impossible to put into France the number of (American) divisions every one had confidently expected would be there. Under the circumstances we, therefore, submitted to the President of the United States a definite proposal. We had the advantage of having the (American) Secretary of State for War in this country within two or three days after the battle had commenced. Mr. Balfour and I had a long conversation with him upon

the whole situation, and we submitted to him certain recommendations which we had been advised to make to Mr. Baker and the American Government.

"On the strength of the conversation we submitted proposals to President Wilson, with the strong support of Premier Clemenceau, to enable the combatant strength of the American Army to come into action during this battle, inasmuch as there was no hope of it coming in as a strong separate army. . By this decision American battalions will be brigaded with those of the Allies.

"This proposal was submitted by the Earl of Reading on behalf of the British Government to President Wilson, and President Wilson assented to the proposal without any hesitation, with the result that arrangements are now being made for the fighting strength of the American Army to be immediately brought to bear in this struggle, a struggle which is only now beginning, to this extent, and it is no mere small extent, that the German attack has been held up. It has stirred up the resolution and energy of America beyond anything which has yet occurred."

On March 28, therefore, General Pershing placed all the American forces in France unreservedly at the disposal of Marshal Foch. The American First Division was shifted from the Toul sector to a position in reserve at Chaumont en Vexin. It could not, of course, get into action at once; but the knowledge that it was on the way to act as a reserve force allowed Foch to shove into the battle a number of French reserves whose places would be taken by the Americans; and these reinforcements were invaluable at this desperate crisis.

But meantime the stand of the British left wing along the Ancre had permitted the centre to retreat nearer to it, and by March 27 the gap between the two forces was narrowing. And early on the following day, the line to which the British centre and right had been driven was parallel and adjacent to the line of the left, and the greatest danger was over. The British line, stretching from south-

west of Arras through Beaucourt and Albert, crossing the Somme at Hamel and stretching thence southwest of Montdidier, was once more straight.

On March 28, the Germans opened the last stage of the battle by a terrific advance all along the line, an advance headed for Amiens, now but ten miles away only, about one-fourth of the distance the British had already retreated. Back of the British lines in this river-infested region of Picardy stretched the great railway between Paris and Calais, the main route of Allied transportation and communication in northwestern France. It would not be necessary for the German army to obtain Amiens to cripple that railway—the acquisition of the heights half-way between Montdidier and Amiens would effectively control the Paris-Calais line. And if the railway went, Amiens would go.

The twenty-eighth proved to be the turning-point of the battle. The Germans, despite their utmost zeal, had advanced farther in the centre than on the wings, and the territory they had gained was thus beginning to assume the shape of a great triangular salient. To widen it, they attacked fiercely on both wings—north around Arras and south against the French under Fayolle. On the north, they made some headway but pierced only the British first lines, and the enemy's attempt to widen the salient in that quarter ended on the same day on which it had begun. In the south, he succeeded in driving back the French but was far from breaking through.

But south of the Somme, in the direct drive for Amiens from the southeast, the Allied position was critical. The British Fifth Army was incapable of further resistance in its former shape—it was re-organized, many of its corps were replaced, and it was put under the command of General Rawlinson. It was still seriously outnumbered and throughout March 28 the Germans bit into the British right centre. On March 29, the French who had swung up to the extreme British right wing were also driven back and Mézières was lost. On March 30, the Germans were still gaining positions and were getting closer and closer to the Paris-Calais railway. But the encouraging features in the situation, which was still of the utmost gravity, were many. Reinforcements, though still scanty, were com-

ing in greater numbers, the British were retreating only short distances, the Germans were getting farther and farther from their bases and transportation facilities, they also were now weary almost to the point of complete exhaustion, and, above all, the British were able to deliver strong counter-attacks on a number of occasions—the best sign of recuperation. On March 31 and April 1, the Germans still made gains, but at last their drive was losing momentum, the Allies were regaining much of the ground lost and reinforcements were beginning to give an account of themselves.

The Germans were then compelled to rest, girding their loins for a final drive on Amiens. Throughout April 2 and April 3, there was a lull in Picardy, both Germany and the Allies making desperate preparations for the final test of strength. It came on the morning of April 4, again at the point where the two British armies joined. Cary's miscellany which had held this gap for so many days had been relieved on March 31 by heavy detachments, but the strength of the German drive on April 4 was by no means despicable, and on this and on the following day they won through the line and came within several miles of the railroad. On the latter day, however, the enemy was not only repulsed in many places, but repulsed with great losses. The tide of battle had turned. On April 6 and again on April 8, the Germans made several slight gains which compelled slight French strategic withdrawals, but the battle was over.

There was no blinking the success Germany had achieved. It was the greatest victory in the west since the retreat from the Marne in 1914. Ludendorff had achieved what had been considered impossible in trench warfare—he had broken all the way through the enemy's line to a depth of many miles. On a sixty mile front the Germans had advanced in two weeks to a maximum depth of about forty miles, gaining some 1,500 square miles of French territory. The enemy had completely disorganized one British army. He had disorganized much of another. He had compelled the Allies to use all their reserves to stop him—if he could deliver another similar blow at once, there would be few Allied reserves to call upon as reinforcements. He had temporarily disarranged the plans for the organization of the

American army. He had compelled England to send to France most of the army she was maintaining in the British Isles against invasion. The German losses had been terrific, but the German General Staff could still achieve a superiority in man-power on any salient where it might make another attempt. The Allied line had finally held, but it was pitifully weak in many spots.

Nevertheless, the situation was not without its crumbs of comfort for the Allies. The ground gained, after all, was not much greater in extent than the ground evacuated by the Germans in the same region in the spring of 1917. The French and the British had not been separated and Amiens had not been captured. A few more losses of men on a similar scale and the great German preparations for a final victory would melt away. The Germans had increased by some thirty-five miles the length of the lines they had to hold. The longer the war continued and the Allies still resisted, the greater the number of Americans in France. The British had fought magnificently against overwhelming odds and there was no evidence of deterioration in the fighting power of the Allied armies. And, above all, the defeat had not succeeded in lowering Allied morale. In France, in England, in Italy, and finally in the United States determination to win a final victory was but increased.

THE SECOND GREAT GERMAN DRIVE: THE BATTLE OF THE LYS

Had the Germans exhausted the possibilities of their offensive and was the worst now over? By no means. The Germans were still superior in strength and the Allies were still trembling from the blow struck in Picardy. The offensive was still in the hands of the German General Staff; the Allies could still assume only a precarious defensive; and the danger of final Allied defeat was still imminent.

Ludendorff was in no mood to permit the Allies a breathing-space. If the great victory at the Somme in March was to bear fruit, it must be followed by another and possibly by yet another, until the Allied army was annihilated and German victory conceded. The Germans had used much of their strength in the first blow, but that strength was but slightly diminished, whereas the Allies had been compelled to use their resources to the uttermost in order to make a final stand. From all parts of the line, French and British reinforcements had been brought up to the Somme lines and hence most other sections of the Allied lines had been seriously thinned; and all the available Allied reserves had been thrown in. The iron was still hot—the Germans must not delay long in striking again.

Ludendorff determined to deliver his second blow in Belgium, to the north of the scene of his March triumph. Haig was expecting little activity in that section, counting on a renewal of the drive upon Amiens or on another drive headed toward Paris; and the British lines in Belgium had been thinned to the point of inadequacy in order to send fresh troops to stop the German advance in the Second Battle of the Somme. The lines in Belgium were held largely by the divisions shattered in Picardy, sent to the north in order to recuperate; and an attack against them would again be an attack by fresh troops against weary troops. If the Germans should threaten to break through, Haig would be compelled to divert troops from the defence of Amiens

and a second German drive in Picardy would hence find the British lines there still further weakened.

Moreover, the March drive had not reached the Channel for the reason that the Channel was too far away; but from Ypres in Belgium the Channel was but some forty miles, and the March drive of Ludendorff had achieved some forty miles. If the Germans could break through in Belgium, they would not occupy the Channel coast down to the Seine nor would they bottle up the entire British army; but they would occupy a large stretch of the Channel coast, including Dunkirk, Calais and possibly Boulogne, and would bottle up at least a large section of the British army.

The sector chosen by the Germans for their second great drive in 1918 was the twenty mile stretch from Ypres south to the Bassée Canal. The ground was marshy and interlaced by canals, but the dryness of the spring had made it of an unusual firmness. The Germans could concentrate their forces at Lille, while not far into the British lines were Hazebrouck and Béthune, valuable transportation and communication centres, the acquisition of which would more than repay much effort. Cutting the sector into two almost equal sections was the river Lys, flowing from southwest to the northeast. North of the Lys rose a series of ridges, including Kemmel and Wytschaete, dominating strategic points. South of the river the land was low and marshy. The river separated the British Second Army, under General Plumer, stationed from the Channel to the river and the British First Army, under General Horne, stationed between the Lys and Arras. It similarly separated two German armies, that of General von Arnim opposite Plumer and that of General von Quast, opposite Horne. The British were assisted by some Portuguese divisions.

On the evening of April 7, the Germans let loose a heavy gas bombardment on the southern half of the British position from Ypres to the Bassée Canal, the half south of the Lys. Throughout the following day the lines were drenched with gas and in the early morning of April 9 shells were added to the gas. Several hours after dawn, the German cohorts fell upon the British lines, the attack being aided by the presence of fog. The Portuguese broke almost im-

mediately, the Germans poured into the gap thus created, the British divisions on either side were flanked and within several hours the



entire British centre of the lines south of the Lys was in full retreat. By the end of the day, the Germans had broken through to the extent of some four miles on a ten mile front. However, the British right at Givency, around the Bassée Canal and protecting Béthune, had held firm and the success achieved by von Horst came far from realizing his anticipations. It was evident that the

salient must be extensively widened if the Germans were to gain another overwhelming victory, and on April 10 they struck north from the top of the salient they had carved out on the preceding day. The enemy crossed the Lys, capturing Estaires, Lestrem and Steenwerck and breaking through on the north bank of the river for several miles. At the same time, von Arnim's army attacked in full force on the north bank of the Lys, broke through to a depth of several miles and joined the forces of von Quast striking north from the southern half of the lines. Von Arnim captured Messines and reached the Wytschaete Ridge.

But the British were in no mood to accept defeat. On the north bank of the Lys, Scottish and South African troops rallied sufficiently in the afternoon of April 10 to recapture Messines and to drive back the enemy from his positions on the Wytschaete Ridge. On the north wing at Messines Ridge, the British had held firm as on the south wing, and the salient was hence still a narrow one. Amentières, however, on the Lys near the original British lines, had been practically surrounded and had to be abandoned.

On April 11, the Germans drove with unabated strength along the entire line and still advanced, although in several places British corps held their positions until they were flanked. The enemy succeeded in re-capturing Messines, on the north wing, but Wytschaete still held. The Germans had broken through to a depth of some ten miles on a front of less than twenty miles, and so narrow was the salient becoming that it was evident that heroic measures were necessary if further gains of consequence were to be recorded.

Up to this time, Ludendorff had not used his full strength on the Lys front, thus giving rise in the minds of many students of the battle to the suspicion that it had been originally intended, not as a major operation, but merely as a diversion; and that the German General Staff made a major operation of the Battle of the Lys only after Ludendorff saw the possibilities created by the successes of the second and third days of the battle. At all events, on April 12, the Germans for the first time threw all their reserves into the fray. At the same time, British reinforcements began to arrive and the battle took on an enlarged scope and a new intensity. The Germans made

a sudden thrust at the southern pivot of the line, carried Givenchy at last, reached the Bassée Canal and carried all before them for several miles before the disordered British could rally. In the centre, also, the Germans made extensive gains, as on the north, and the salient was taking on the form of a square instead of a triangle.

On the following day, the Germans continued to break through. Their gains were by no means as deep as the gains achieved in the Second Battle of the Somme, as the forces employed were fewer, but nevertheless gains to a depth of several miles daily would have seemed stupendous in 1915, 1916 or 1917. On the centre they attacked in great force and for a time threatened to clear the road to Bailleul. At the same time, they drove for Neuve Eglise and Wulverghem, which commanded Mont Kemmel. But in the centre the thin British line managed to hold until it was reinforced in the evening and the Germans were held. In the north, the Germans could not capture Neuve Eglise until the following day and their advance at other points on the line was also being halted. The drive was losing its impetus and at sunset on April 13 the Germans were compelled to halt for a breathing-space. There could be no denying the critical nature of the Allied position, especially since Foch had been forced to weaken the remainder of his line by hurrying up reinforcements.

On April 15, the Germans drove ahead once more in the centre and would not be denied until they had finally captured the town of Bailleul, one of their main objectives. With this gain, Ludendorff had broken through to a depth of some fifteen miles. Now, north of this battleground around the Lys was the famous Ypres salient, where the British lines curved gradually into the German to a depth of almost ten miles. The fall of Bailleul was the first step in flanking Ypres and the British began to withdraw from the Ypres salient in order to straighten their lines and also thus to increase the number of men to the square mile of the line. The retreat from the Ypres salient obviously necessitated the withdrawal from what had been the northern pivot of the Battle of the Lys and at last, on April 17, Wytschaete was abandoned. If the British should be driven back much further, the salient would have advanced so close to the Channel that the troops to the north of it would be in danger of being cut off from the main body of the

British army. They would have to retreat altogether from the coast of the Channel east of Arras, abandoning Dunkirk and probably evacuating Calais, and the Germans would have gained their long-cherished Channel ports. The battle had reached its decisive stage.

On April 17, von Arnim therefore drove with all his power against the Belgians north of Ypres, in the hope of deepening the salient in that quarter and thus of getting in the rear of Mont Kemmel, the chief obstacle in the German march to the sea. The outnumbered Belgians were driven back by sheer weight of numbers on their centre and left, but held firm on their right. And the right adjoined what had been the Ypres salient, so that it was the section of greatest value. At the same time, the Germans advanced directly upon Mont Kemmel, only to be driven back with great loss. Attacks on other sections of the line were also thrown back.

On April 18, Ludendorff diverted his thrust to the other end of the salient, attacking in great force around the Bassée Canal, and driving straight for Béthune. Once more he was repulsed with great loss. At one or two points he succeeded in crossing the Canal, but each time the British counter-attacked and won back all the ground they had yielded. The German attempt to widen the salient on the south had not fared so well even as the attempt to widen it on the north. These two reverses called a halt in the plans of the German General Staff. Their losses had been of the severest and for almost a week they abandoned further attempts, resting from their exertions and preparing for another attempt to carry Mont Kemmel.

Mont Kemmel was only 156 metres high, but in the low country around the Lys that height was sufficient to dominate the land for miles around. The possession of Mont Kemmel would give the Germans command over a wide stretch of country to both the north and the east and would doubtless involve a British withdrawal still further from the lines around Ypres. At Kemmel also was the junction between British and some French troops and German tactics were still to open a gap between the two nationalities on the firing-line.

On the morning of April 25 the Germans drove directly for Kemmel with fresh and rested troops. It was a vigorous attempt and was successful, for before noon Mont Kemmel was in German hands. The

enemy's further attempts to advance in the afternoon were checked, however, and on the morning of the following day the British and French delivered some counter-attacks which gained ground. Then followed another German attempt to advance along the entire line around Mont Kemmel, but it made no headway. On the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth the Germans made no further gains, but on the twenty-ninth renewed their general attack in great strength. At its inception, it made some slight gains, but after several hours the French counter-attacked to such good purpose that the German lines were driven a considerable distance beyond their original front of the morning. A second German attempt also resulted disastrously. There could be no doubt that superiority was now with the Allies in the Lys region. The losses inflicted upon the Germans in the last several days of the battle had been far in excess of the losses inflicted upon the Allies, the struggle was becoming an asset rather than a liability to Ludendorff, and with the costly repulse on April 29 the Battle of the Lys came to an end.

Altogether, this second great drive of the Germans in 1918 had netted them some 400 square miles. But the gain was uneven. The British still held Ypres, which broke the ground gained by Ludendorff into two sections. South of Ypres, the penetration was to a depth of some twenty-two miles on a thirty mile front; and north of Ypres, to a depth of some ten miles on a fifteen mile front.

THE THIRD GREAT GERMAN DRIVE: THE THIRD BATTLE OF THE AISNE

The final test of the war had come. Germany had reached her maximum strength and her next drive would be decisive. For with a rapidly increasing number of Americans being shoved into the Allied lines and with hundreds of thousands reaching France every month, Germany must win the war by the end of the summer of 1918 or not win at all. Even the vast man-power and military supplies hoarded by Ludendorff for a final victory were beginning to disappear at the rate they were being dissipated, and the cost of many more victories such as those in Picardy and Flanders would be beyond even German endurance.

Through almost the entire month of May the German General Staff therefore hurried its preparations. Every available German soldier was rushed to the western front, even to the boys of seventeen and the men of fifty. Every gun and every case of ammunition were turned over to the German generals on the battle-front—Germany was risking all on a final attempt and was leaving none of her strength in reserve. And now Ludendorff was to abandon indirect modes of gaining final success, such as the separation of the French and the British armies or the acquisition of the Channel ports—it was win all or lose all and he drove straight for Paris.

The nearest point of the battle line to the French capital was the salient northeast of Soissons, stretching some five miles north of and parallel to the Aisne. The Allies were still concentrating their greatest strength in front of Amiens, anticipating that the next German attempt would be for that town and for the Channel beyond; and by striking at the Soissons salient directly for Paris, Ludendorff assured himself the advantage of several days' attack before the Allied reinforcements could be transferred from before and behind and around Amiens.

The German army in this Aisne sector belonged under the nominal

leadership of the Crown Prince of Germany, but for practical purposes it was divided into two armies, one under von Boehn and one under General Fritz von Below adjoining von Boehn on the east. The Allied lines were held, from west to east, by part of the French army of General d'Esperey, by the French army of General Maistre (on the Heights of the Aisne), by some British divisions, by the French Fifth Army, with the French on the extreme right around Rheims under General Gouraud. Ludendorff's preparations for the attack were made with all secrecy and when the attack opened on May 27, the Allies were caught entirely unprepared.

Early in the morning of May 27, the Germans struck, with all the desperation of a final bid for victory, on the thirty mile front from the Ailette River, due north of Soissons, to Rheims. At the beginning of the attack, the German positions were extremely weak in natural advantages and the French were correspondingly strong, with their hold on the Heights of the Aisne, gained with so much effort in 1917. It was therefore necessary that the first impact of the German effort should completely drive the French off the high positions, lest the attack lose impetus at its very beginning and the French be able to counter-attack. And the Germans succeeded. Never had the German war machine worked more smoothly. Never had the artillery preparation been more severe. Never had the Germans so completely outnumbered their opponents in any sector in the west. Never had the German corps been rehearsed more carefully in the rôles they were to play. Never had the new tactics of infiltration been so irresistible. When the swarming infantry advanced, the Allies could hardly make even a pretense of opposing them. The Chemin des Dames position went at once. Within an hour the enemy was on the slopes of the Heights of the Aisne. Within another hour, he was on the crest. Several hours before noon, the French and British were driven back beyond the Aisne. The Allies' line was literally riddled with holes. Any corps that had attempted a lengthy stand would have found itself surrounded almost immediately, and the French and British commanders realized the futility of attempting a stand. Foch had recognized that the German superiority in man-power was such that,

for the first days, gains must be conceded to Ludendorff on whatever sector he struck, and the Allied commander-in-chief wisely ordered a retreat until the Germans should become embarrassed by the difficulty of transportation over ground systematically laid waste by the French and British as they retreated and until reinforcements, including the Americans, could arrive in force. On the right wing, the British held fairly well, retreating only several miles, and their example was emulated by the French on the left wing; but in the centre the retreat continued until the Vesle River was reached, more than twelve miles from the scene of the battle's opening, giving the Germans a total gain in one day of more than 150 square miles. In the entire history of the war from the days of 1914 when the Germans entrenched themselves after the Battle of the Marne, not even in the Second Battle of the Somme, there had been nothing like this.

But so long as the wings of the Allied line held north of Soissons and west of Rheims, a further German advance in the centre would dangerously narrow the salient thus punched out on the first day. So that on the following day, although the completely disorganized French centre was in no position to hinder further German progress across the Vesle, the Germans were compelled to divert their main attention to the wings in the effort to widen the salient. They were successful. On the Allied left the French were driven back a number of miles north of Soissons, the Germans gaining the heights commanding the city itself, and on the right the British were driven far back, even across the Vesle. At the same time, Ludendorff's centre was by no means inactive and reeled off gains of several more miles in depth. The Allies were still completely helpless and it seemed indeed as though the end of the war were in sight. Whereas on the first day of the battle the Germans had gained a triangle extending twelve miles only from the base to the apex, on the second day they were masters of a deep salient almost in the form of a square from twelve to fifteen miles deep along its entire length. They had captured thousands of prisoners and hundreds of guns, and at that rate of progress it would not be many days before the spires of Paris would be before their eyes.

But on May 28, a new factor entered into the situation. American

troops entered the thick of the battle. Before this time, there had been some engagements between Germans and Americans in the Lor-



raine sector held by Pershing, far on the east of the battle-line, but these engagements had been on a quiet and relatively unimportant sector and had been of a minor nature. But on this day an American division took by storm the town of Cantigny, and held it against furious German counter-attacks. It was an augury of future American successes.

On the twenty-ninth, the Germans swept far ahead in their pressure on the Allied left wing and

captured Soissons. The French were still able to launch a counter-attack, which re-took the town; but the Germans seemed to be insatiable for punishment, and in the afternoon they returned with an assault which re-captured the town and drove the French far beyond its environs. On the Allied right, also, the Germans were still coming on and the entire salient was getting wider and wider. A few more gains on the wings and the salient would be wide enough for the apex to reach all the way to Paris itself without danger. Indeed, the German lines ran in a straight line for at least twenty-five miles west of Rheims before curving up toward Soissons and the German gains were taking on the appearance less and less of a salient and more and more of a solid chunk out of the Allied lines, a chunk so square that for practical purposes it came close to cutting the Allied lines in two and to preventing communications between the two halves.

Never before had the Allied cause seemed so dark. The extent of the disaster could not be glossed over. It was a rout. The first days of the Second Battle of the Somme had also been a rout, but chiefly in the centre and in other isolated sections; but at the end of May all the Allied lines on a front of scores of miles seemed to be reduced to a shapeless mob. Some routs cannot be stopped.

Everything was therefore ready once more for a further concentration of the German effort against the centre of the line. Ludendorff brought up hundreds of his big guns and threw in his freshest divisions, and the results were immediate. Foch realized that the beaten French and British divisions would only be altogether lost by attempting to stem the German tide while it was thus still flowing at flood and he ordered a further retreat, with no attempt to make a general stand until such an attempt might be visited with success. It was a repetition of the tactics during the French and British retreat to the Marne in 1914—the Allies were retreating at full speed in frantic endeavor to save their armies from being altogether annihilated and were determined not to end their retreat until their lines could be straightened. And there was another point of similarity between the Battle of the Marne and the Third Battle of the Aisne. For as new troops under Manoury unexpectedly rushed up to create a

diversion on the German right in 1914, so in 1918 American reinforcements were to enable Foch to stiffen his resistance at last before Paris fell. But in the meantime the Germans penetrated to a further depth of no less than twelve miles on May 30 and before nightfall had reached the Marne itself along a front of at least ten miles. In no more than four days, the Germans had broken through to a depth of more than thirty miles, and, if anything, their attack seemed to be stronger on May 30 than on May 27.

But this advance in the centre once more narrowed the salient and once more Ludendorff was compelled to try to widen it on the wings. And now at last he met with reverses. On the western wing around Soissons, the Germans failed signally to deepen their front; and although some minor successes were recorded around Rheims, Gouraud's forces there on the whole held firm. Wave after wave of German infantry followed bombardment after bombardment against the French lines on both the wings, but the numbers of the belligerents were now nearly equal and the Germans were checked.

Accordingly, on May 31, the German gains were once more roughly in the shape of a triangle, with an apex ten miles wide at the Marne, whence the sides sloped northeastward toward Rheims and northwestward through a point west of Soissons to Noyon on the Oise, the point from which the gains to the west achieved in the Second Battle of the Somme in March and April began.

Foch had determined to make his stand on the Marne, and on the south bank of the river large bodies of British, French and American reinforcements had been stationed. Their position at last was stable and their numbers were strong, and Ludendorff dared not penetrate deeply south of the Marne while his salient was still so narrow. He therefore had to drive once more on the wings at Rheims and west of Soissons.

On May 31, accordingly, the chief German effort was confined to the west pivot of the salient, where it almost adjoined the east pivot of the Montdidier salient. Ludendorff struck hard north of the Marne on the entire west side of his new salient and drove the French back for a number of miles before they could rally and make a stand. On the following day he struck equally hard at the French lines around

Rheims, but with different results. For his gains against Gouraud were slight and were re-captured by bitter French counter-attacks. The fate of France was being decided on the pivots of the salient. On June 2, accordingly, the Germans continued to drive along the sides rather than along the centre of their salient at the Marne. On the east, they were again thrown back with disheartening losses and their failure to advance there was imperilling the entire German drive. On the west, the Germans advanced along the side of the salient near the Marne, increased their front along the river to some fifteen miles and occupied Château Thierry. But near the wings of the salient they were still unable to advance to any great extent and the salient was still dangerously narrow for further progress. Along the Ourcq, at Troesnes, in the forest of Villers Cotterêts, at Passy and at Torcy, fighting of the sharpest nature resulted either in German reverses or in French acquisition of lost ground by counter-attacks.

The impetus of the German drive was at length slackening. Of course, the situation was still highly threatening to the Allies—their lines had been stretched again and were still thinly held—their armies were still disorganized and weary—their communications were disrupted—the new German gains had become almost adjacent to the gains in March and April—and Paris was now but some forty miles from the front. But in the next several days, the Allied lines held. The efforts of Ludendorff had exhausted the German armies also and the big German guns had not yet had time to catch up to the front ranks of the German infantry. American detachments were now everywhere in the Allied lines, in some places in the very front, at others in the reserve; and Foch was therefore enabled to hold his lines almost as deeply as the German lines were held. On June 3, all enemy attempts to break through in the centre of the west side of the salient were unavailing. In the centre, the Germans had succeeded in crossing the Marne at a number of places, notably around Château Thierry; but in each case they were driven back across the stream by determined French and American counter-attacks. On June 4, the Germans were compelled to pause in order to make further prepara-

tions, but their preparations were fruitless, as their attacks on June 5 were all repulsed.

The Americans were now fighting in their own formations on the southwest tip of the salient where it left the Marne west of Château Thierry. With the Marine Corps, the American National Army drove forward in Neuilly-la-Poterie Wood and also blocked a German attempt to cross the Marne east of Château Thierry. On June 6, the British and French stopped all German advances and on the following day the Americans and French captured Neuilly-la-Poterie and Bouresches. In the entire Marne salient, the Germans had been brought to a standstill and it was necessary for Ludendorff to divert his attention to another section. He still cherished ardent hopes of success, for Foch had repulsed attacks in the last several days only by weakening his lines at other points, where the Germans might well hope to break through again. In ten days they had broken through on a forty mile front, had penetrated to a depth of thirty miles and had occupied some 900 squares miles.

In this first stage of the battle, therefore, the Germans had gained more rapidly, but their advance had been halted more rapidly, than in the Second Battle of the Somme. It was evident that Foch's tactics, to yield ground almost without struggle and then to hold when there was hope of success, instead of fighting stubbornly to prevent deep retreats, were well calculated to save the day for the Allies.

With the pivots of the new salient holding at Rheims and along the western side and with the south bank of the Marne held by the Allies in great strength, the time was now ripe for the Germans to consolidate the salient just won with the salient carved out in Picardy in March and April. And there was no time for delay—it was now or never.

Between the Montdidier salient and the Soissons salient the Allied position rested in the centre on a range of low hills south of Lassigny. At the extreme right, the Allied position was along the south bank of the Oise before the river turns to flow to the southwest. Behind the hills in the centre flowed a narrow stream, the Matz, and west of the Matz to Montdidier the line possessed no natural advantages of

importance. With a salient sixty miles wide and forty miles deep on the west and with a salient forty miles wide and thirty miles deep on the east, if Ludendorff should be able to carve out a new connecting salient from the Montdidier-Soissons base, it could extend to Paris and even beyond without danger of becoming too narrow. Whereas if his gains were but local, he could no longer rely upon further victories upon a large scale, for his resources were being spent with extreme rapidity and the spent resources of the French and British were being made good by American aid. The climax of all the German drives of 1918 was at hand. (See small map, p. 725.)

On June 9, after a night of heavy artillery fire, the Germans advanced to the attack before dawn. The drive was on the twenty-mile front in the centre, between Montdidier and Noyon; and it was made by all the man-power which Ludendorff could effectively pack into that front.

But the Allies now held the upper hand. Of course, with such extensive preparations, it was inevitable that the Germans should make gains, but their gains were by no means commensurate either with the great effort expended or with the severe losses inflicted. For the Germans, on the first day of the attack, attained a depth of less than three miles and at several points on the line the Germans were thrown back to their original position. The Allies retired in good order, full of power—indeed, even before the close of the first day's fighting, the French were able to counter-attack with success near-Hautebraye. Included within the German gains were several of the hills which had been held by the Allies along the Matz.

Alarmed by their inability to continue to win devastating gains, and consequently with final failure staring them in the face, the Germans came to the attack with renewed desperation on June 10. They succeeded in breaking through to the extent of several more miles, capturing Méry, Belloy, and Saint Maur; and this advance endangered both the French pivot at the west of the Soissons salient and that at the east of the Montdidier salient, so that Foch withdrew to straighten his line on both sides of the new German gains. Ludendorff thus had possessed himself of a rectangular-shaped piece of territory about thirty miles long and seven miles deep, but beyond that he was not

able to make appreciable gains, despite the fact that he had extended his efforts to the salients on either side of the Soissons-Montdidier line and that thus the Germans were driving ahead along every mile of a front which extended for certainly one hundred miles. The Allies stood firm everywhere. And as the Germans still endeavored to press forward, bit by bit they were actually driven back. On June 11, after the Germans had advanced to the Aronde stream, on the west, had advanced more than a mile along the Matz in the centre, and had surrounded the Ourscamps Forest on the east, the French recovered most of the ground which had been lost, driving the Germans out of Méry and Belloy. Along with this counter-attack the American Marine Corps again distinguished itself by a brilliant success at Belleau Wood, northwest of Château Thierry in the Soissons salient. On June 12, the French continued to regain ground in the central of the three salients, driving the enemy north along the Matz. On the following day, the Germans renewed the attack with all their strength, but again succeeded in obtaining only local successes. At the same time, a drive along the Marne in the Soissons salient failed. The Germans were stopped and were being driven to feel out various points along the entire front in order to find a weak spot in the Allied line where they might break through once more. But it was of no avail, and Ludendorff was compelled to rest for several days, his armies completely exhausted by their exertions. On June 16, he again failed to advance along the Matz. On the next day, he again failed along the Marne. On June 18, he suddenly launched another attempt at Rheims, but again failed; and for almost a month the fighting died out. It was evident that Germany was preparing for a final blow, but it was similarly evident that the worst was over. For the Allies were better prepared to parry a great thrust than they had been at any time since March, while the Germans were less adequately prepared. The difference was represented by the presence of some 300,000 trained American troops in the battle-lines.

If Germany yielded the offensive to the Allies, Germany was defeated. She still could cherish a dying belief that she might break through, and hence the attempt was worth making; but Ludendorff must have known as well as Foch that the chances of a final German

victory had vanished. If the Germans should wait several months until the Allies were ready to take over the offensive, Ludendorff would be compelled almost at once to order a general retreat from his advanced positions, a retreat similar to that in the spring of 1917; for the extent of the salients carved out and the extent of the German casualties had thinned his lines beyond the point of safety, and the Allies would have a decided superiority in man-power in any section where Foch might concentrate his forces. It was better for Ludendorff to mass troops once more on one sector and to stake everything on a final blow. There was little chance that it would succeed, but failure would not affect the military plight of the Central Powers much more than refusal to make the attempt. A final German effort, although at the best it represented but a forlorn hope, had everything to gain and nothing to lose.

THE TURN OF THE TIDE: THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE

While awaiting the last German drive, Foch was by no means inactive. From the middle of June to the middle of July, the Allies constantly nibbled away at the German lines along the entire front. A number of strategic positions were thus gained, and, above all, the German army was kept occupied and weakened still further by casualties. In anticipation of the great blow, all available American troops had been inserted into the Allied lines, so that now there were twelve of Pershing's divisions brigaded among the French and British. At the same time, Diaz was called upon for help and some additional Italian troops were ready to meet Ludendorff's crack divisions. It was evident that the chief threat was in the centre of the lines and that the northern section of the battle-line was relatively unimportant, so that Foch not only withdrew practically all the French troops which had been supporting the British in Belgium and south of the Franco-Belgium border, but also diverted some of Haig's divisions from that section to the centre of the front.

To meet the German onslaught, Foch had developed new defensive tactics. The chief feature of his plan was a deepening of the first-line positions before the main defensive battle line, so that even after breaking through the lines for a great distance, the German attack would still find the Allied main position strong and would be largely spent when its chief test came. To this method was added that of not permitting the enemy to concentrate for the attack unmolested, but of subjecting his forces to a severe artillery fire as they were in process of concentration. And Foch was relying also upon hundreds of small tanks for counter-attacks with which to combat the new German strategy of piercing and disrupting the Allied line by infiltration. So soon as a German group should pierce the lines and endeavor to establish itself with machine guns, it would be attacked by light tanks supported by infantry.

Ludendorff also managed to scrape up reinforcements, from the East. He utilized as much time as he dared in order to prepare for his final blow. He extended his communication lines to the front on which he was going to attack, preparing to strip other sectors in order to mass guns and men on a vast scale. As he surveyed the military situation, he could see that his chief weakness lay in the narrowness of the Soissons salient carved out in the last days of May and the first days of June. By advancing across the Marne without widening his salient, an Allied application of the "pincers method" might cut off his most advanced divisions. He had tried to widen the Soissons salient on the west, where it adjoined the Montdidier salient, but had been met with such staunch resistance that he was loth to make the attempt again. There was no time for secondary objectives—it must be Paris or nothing and the Montdidier salient was too far from Paris to warrant an attempt from that base. Ludendorff therefore determined to play his last cards in a drive to widen the Soissons salient on its east wing around Rheims, at the same time plunging ahead in the centre of that salient across the Marne, an advance depending for its success upon gains around Rheims. If he succeeded, he could break through also from the Montdidier salient and his forces from these two directions could meet at Paris.

On this battle front, the Germans in the centre of the Soissons salient were under von Boehn, faced by Mangin's Tenth Army on the west side of the salient, Dégoutte's Sixth Army in the centre and Berthelot's Ninth Army on the east side extending to Rheims. In front of Rheims was the German command under von Einem and east of the city was the army of von Mudra, faced by the French Fourth Army under Gouraud. With Berthelot was an Italian force. With Dégoutte were the American First, Second, Third, Fourth, Twenty-Sixth and Twenty-Eighth Divisions, under General Liggett. Under Gouraud was the American Forty-Second ("Rainbow") Division.

The attack was opened by a severe artillery bombardment on July 14. The French positions suffered greatly, but the French guns had been skilfully placed and in return the Germans were punished severely, especially at the points where their largest forces were

GERMAN GAINS, SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE

concentrating. The attack was in two sections—one along the Marne from Château Thierry east to Dormans and the other east of Rheims, for Ludendorff had wisely attempted to capture that city by flanking it on the east instead of by a frontal attack. The first was the less important of the thrusts—indeed, Foch was not unwilling to see the Germans advance beyond the Marne if the Rheims lines held—it was east of Rheims that the key to victory was to be found.

At dawn the Germans leaped from their trenches across No Man's Land. In the Marne section they were immediately successful east of Château Thierry, although at that point and west of it, at Vaux, and east of it at Fossoy, the Americans held firm, driving back the Germans with heavy losses. For some five miles east of Château Thierry, the Germans were accordingly unable to cross the Marne; but from Mézy past Dormans and along two-thirds of the east side of the salient they penetrated to a depth of from two to four miles.

But east of Rheims the forces of Ludendorff were checked almost as soon as their first rush was over. Along the twenty-mile front, the Germans at no point penetrated beyond a depth of two miles. Prunay, southeast of Rheims, and Auberive and Tahire, almost due east of it, were occupied, but before evening French counter-attacks were recovering lost ground and the German drive had been checked for the day.

On the following day, Ludendorff threw all his reserves into the fray. Behind Rheims the French occupied a commanding position on the Mountain of Rheims and, failing to flank that position from the east, the German leader tried to reach it by striking upward from his newly-acquired ground along the Marne. Throughout the entire day the French and Americans under Berthelot were fiercely attacked, but at the end of the day they had been driven back less than three miles, toward Epernay, south of the Mountain of Rheims, and the German gains were on a front of little more than five miles.

On July 17, the attack east of Rheims dwindled into merely local advances. The Germans still held Prunay, but Prunay was almost ten miles from Rheims and between the two towns the Germans were held to their original lines. They advanced to Prosnes, Souain, Perthes and Massiges, but soon had to halt in order to take the defensive against the French and American counter-attacks. They had

gained a rectangular-shaped stretch of ground some twenty miles long but never more than four miles deep, one that could not by any stretch of the imagination be termed a salient and one that in no sense menaced Rheims. Accordingly, the Germans' only hope of capturing Rheims and of carving out a new salient lay in extending the gains west of the city along the Marne. Throughout the seventeenth, therefore, Ludendorff drove for Epernay. He advanced for three miles, capturing Clairizet, the Courton Wood and Montvoisin. But he was driven out of his advanced gains by French and Italian counter-attacks. On the preceding day, the French and Americans had counter-attacked south of this region, between Comblizy and St. Agnan, and had thus pinched the German gains there into narrow limits. By the end of July 17, the German advance for the day had been confined to an arc less than five miles long and two miles wide.

The German drive thus came to a halt. The Germans were checked. After four months, the Allies held firm. Ludendorff's armies were at the end of their tether—they abandoned the offensive and wearily assumed the defensive. It was now Foch's turn to strike.

Foch struck on the west side of the Soissons salient. The German efforts of the last several days had been on the east side and in order to make those efforts, the west side had been largely stripped of men. Also, the German communications within the salient were so arranged as to make it more difficult for Ludendorff to reinforce the west side of the salient, from Soissons to Château Thierry, than the east. The salient was still dangerously narrow and if Foch could drive in one of its sides or, better yet, narrow its base by the capture of Soissons, the entire German force within the salient would be in danger.

The Allied attack was made on July 18. It was in two sections—that of Dégoutte's army on the lower third of the west side of the salient, between Bouresches and Faverolles; and that of the French Tenth Army under Mangin on the middle third of the salient's west side, southwest of Soissons. The Allied troops had been assembled in the Villers-Cotterêts Forest, which admirably protected them from observation. Mangin attacked, like the British at Cambrai in 1917, without warning, although Dégoutte prefaced his advance with a bom-

bardment of several hours; and, again like the British at Cambrai, the French advanced behind squadrons of tanks. The Allies were everywhere successful. The Germans at last were inferior in numbers and furthermore the attack caught them by surprise; they yielded ground almost at once. Along the entire front of from twenty-five to thirty miles the Franco-Americans broke into the German lines and drove the enemy back for several miles. The Americans were chiefly on the extreme south wing of the attack, where they broke through the German positions and captured Torcy. On the following day, they won Belleau and Courchamps, thus placing them several miles beyond their original positions. But, as planned, the greatest Allied advance was toward Soissons. Southwest of the city, Mangin broke through on July 18 to a depth of some five miles and seriously threatened to gain the Mountain of Paris, the height south of, and dominating, the city. On July 19, the French leader continued to sweep ahead, brushing aside with little difficulty the ineffectual German resistance. Before noon the French had captured the Mountain of Paris, overlooking not only the city but also the invaluable railway junction to its southwest. Further south, they almost touched the highway from Soissons to Fère-en-Tardenois, the chief German line of highway communication within the salient, and hence also invaluable. The Germans were still retreating rapidly; thousands of them were being captured; their casualties were far heavier than those of the Allies, who were advancing with comparatively slight losses; many German guns were falling into Mangin's hands; the lines of communication between the various German armies within the salient were severed; Soissons was on the point of falling; the entire western side of the salient was evaporating; and thus the salient was being constricted to a point which augured ill for the German troops across the Marne in the centre and on the east.

On July 20, accordingly, the German leader recalled his forces from beyond the Marne. At the same time, he withdrew men from his centre to hold the Allies on the wings at Soissons and around Rheims, where they had begun to recover ground. By this clever strategy, the sides of the salient were supported against further Allied attacks, so that the rate of its constriction became less rapid and hence less

threatening; but the sides of the salient were thus being protected at the expense of the centre, and the centre was compelled to beat a hasty retreat. Rather than court the loss of von Boehn's army, Ludendorff was giving up most of the ground which the Germans had gained in their great push of May and June. In other words, he was recognizing the superiority of the Allies by shortening his lines and by assuming the defensive along the entire battle-front. Whether the Germans should be sufficiently successful on the defensive to reduce the struggles in the west once more to a deadlock depended upon Foch's resources and leadership.

For the next two weeks, the story of the war is the story of an orderly German retreat from the Marne back to the Vesle. The retirement was conducted with extreme skill and the German losses on the way were comparatively small.

Throughout July 21, the Germans held the rim of the entire salient in strength while their heavy guns were being rushed through the centre back across the Vesle to safety. Despite the stiff German resistance, however, the Americans advanced several miles east and north-east of Château Thierry. On the following day, the Franco-American forces continued to make progress both north and south of the Ourcq. The French to the north of the river occupied Oulchy-la-Ville and Montgru and, to the south, the Bois de Châtelet, while the Americans were capturing Jaulgonne; but toward the end of the day a sharp German counter-attack drove the Americans out of Epieds, which had been captured on the preceding day. However, the Americans returned to the attack on July 23 and once more succeeded in occupying the town. Throughout this day and the next two, the Allies continued to press in the sides of the salient, especially on the west, while the Germans continued to evacuate it from the centre, although still in good order. By the twenty-fifth, the French were less than five miles south and west of Soissons. On the same day, Gouraud drove forward east of Rheims and won back all the ground which the Germans had captured on that front from July 15 to July 18. The rate of the German retreat was becoming at least several miles a day along the entire salient. Foch was making little effort to break through the German lines, being well content to force the retreat by slow pres-

sure without suffering heavy losses, for he had to keep his ranks intact if the steady accretions of Americans were to weigh down the scales for final Allied victory before the end of the summer.

By July 27, the Germans seemed to have got all their valuable war material out of the lower tip of the salient above the Marne, for on this day they abandoned their sturdy defence along the apex of the salient and retreated with extreme rapidity to a line through Fère-en-Tardenois and Ville-en-Tardenois. Ludendorff thus had retreated from the entire lower half of the salient which he had won in May and June. (See Map, page 725.)

But even this rapid retreat did not stabilize the German lines against the pressure the Allies were exerting and the German retreat was continued. On July 28 Dégoutte's French forces occupied Fère-en-Tardenois, thus controlling both banks of the Ourcq, while his American forces were occupying a number of towns to the east of this region. At the same time, Berthelot was advancing along the lower eastern side of the salient. Through July 29, the steady German retirement and Allied advance continued. The British captured Buzancy and after sharp fighting the Americans held on to Sergy, after the town had changed hands several times.

On July 30 and 31, the German rate of retreat slackened and the resistance stiffened. On both sides of Sainte Euphrasie, Ludendorff checked the French advance and northeast of Fère-en-Tardenois the Americans were able to capture and maintain Seringes only after struggles of the fiercest nature. But on August 1 further Allied forces arrived on the scene and the Germans abandoned any hope they might have had of attempting a general stand at this moment. Hard pressed along their entire line, they hastened back toward the Vesle. They thus surrendered Soissons, which was at once occupied by the French with great rejoicing. In the centre the Americans reached Dôle Wood and on the east Berthelot entered Ville-en-Tardenois. On the following days, Mangin on the left advanced along the Aisne. About two-thirds of the Marne salient had thus been abandoned by the Germans. On August 4, the Germans were all back on the north bank of the Vesle, twenty miles from the Marne, where they had erected strong positions and where they managed to hold firm. It was their

first great defeat since 1914. They had saved their forces by the cleverness and quickness of Ludendorff's manoeuvres, but their threat at Paris was now a thing of the past and all Allied anxiety as to a final German victory was over.

THE THIRD BATTLE OF THE SOMME

Having thus regained two-thirds of the Marne salient, and possessing the superiority in man-power, thanks to Pershing's forces and to the collapse of the German offensive, Foch turned his attention to the Somme salient. So did Ludendorff. The German leader frankly recognized his danger by withdrawing his forces before Amiens a slight distance to the west banks of the Avre and the Ancre, in the hope of strengthening his position there to such an extent as to prevent a more extensive retirement. The Germans thus abandoned the tip end of their Somme salient and to that extent gave evidence of their inability to continue their pressure upon Amiens. •

On August 8, between the Ancre and the Avre at the apex of the Somme salient, the opposing forces were stationed roughly as follows: The lower third of the north side of the salient was held by the British Fourth Army under Rawlinson, from Albert to the junction of the Luce and the Avre. Below him, along the western end (the farthest into France) of the salient to a point below Montdidier was the French First Army, under Débeney. The southern side of the salient was held by the French Third Army, under General Humbert. All these three armies were under the direct control of Sir Douglas Haig. Opposed were the German Army of von der Marwitz, north of the Somme, and that of von Hutier, south of that river.

Haig prepared to attack on the southern half of the salient, chiefly in order to keep in touch with the new Allied advance in the salient below him. That side of the salient was the side near Paris and an advance there would not only drive the Germans still farther from Paris but also would threaten the point of contact between the two salients east and northeast of Compiègne. (See Map, page 706.)

The attack was in three separate sections and was delivered at dawn on August 8. Following the tactics used at Cambrai in the fall of 1917, Haig attacked without artillery preparation, placing his reliance for preparatory assistance upon several hundred small tanks. He had

assembled his forces under cover of darkness and he seems to have succeeded in his endeavor to catch the Germans by surprise.

The northernmost of the three attacks, north of the Somme, was not successful and the British were held there. But the two advances south of the Somme broke through the German lines at once. The enemy was driven back a considerable depth on the first day and thousands of prisoners and hundreds of guns were captured. Allied cavalry plunged through the holes opened into the German lines and were highly effective in breaking up the German retreat. It was one of the most extensive gains of the war and stood comparison with the first day's gains in the four preceding German drives, for Haig had broken through on a front of almost twenty miles to an average depth of six miles. The Germans were plainly outfought—their morale was low—their resistance was weak—their strategy was deficient; it was another bit of evidence piling up as proof that the Allies unquestionably held the upper hand.

On August 9, the Germans rallied and Ludendorff hastily rushed up all reinforcements on which he could lay his hand, but the Allies nevertheless proceeded. The tanks were proving as efficacious in breaking up the German lines as the German method of infiltration had proved in breaking up the Allied lines. On this day, the British managed to smash through north of the Somme and, with the aid of American detachments, captured Morlancourt, several miles beyond the Ancre. Just south of the Somme, Canadians and Australians captured Proyart, seven miles from the original battle line and some fifteen miles east of Amiens. Still farther south, the French drove the Germans out of Fresnoy-en-Chaussée and held the town against heavy counter-attacks. General Humbert was now getting into action south of Montdidier and also broke into the German positions. Montdidier was thus being flanked from both the north and the south and the Allies occupied it with little difficulty on August 10. As we have seen, Montdidier was a most important communication centre and its capture was a cause for great rejoicing in the Allied ranks, especially since the Allied attack had been so rapid and unexpected that a great quantity of war materials had to be abandoned by the Germans as they evacuated the town. Montdidier fell before noon and

before dark Humbert had pushed his lines still further east and had begun to approach Lassigny. In three days the Allies had cut out of the Somme salient a triangle with a base of almost thirty miles and with a maximum depth at its centre of about eleven miles.

On the eleventh, however, the Allied attack temporarily lost its impetus. Great numbers of German reinforcements had been brought up and were used in sharp counter-attacks which even captured a few of the more advanced Allied lines and re-occupied Proyart and Fresnoy-les-Roye. But to the south of this check Débeney continued to progress, capturing Marquivillers and Grevillers. At the extreme Allied right Humbert made small gains, capturing Cambronne and Machemont. All this was no mere orderly and unhindered retreat such as had been seen in the Marne salient some days previously, for there the Germans had resisted to the utmost of their strength and had retreated only when actually and directly driven back. The Allies were becoming invincible. Foch had shaved off one-third of the great Somme salient, gaining almost as much ground as had fallen to the Germans in the entire Battle of the Lys.

On August 12, the French returned to the attack, and recaptured Proyart, but it was difficult for the big guns to catch up to the front lines, the Germans had become more numerous, and it was necessary to prepare more extensive lines of transportation and communication to foil further German counter-attacks. The assault therefore again died down. Several days later the Germans were compelled to retire several miles along the north side of the salient above the ground gained by the Allies, for these German positions had been rendered precariously advanced by Haig's success. On the same day, Humbert continued his advance at the extreme Allied right and penetrated into Thiescourt Wood, only several miles to the south of Lassigny. Foch was bringing his lines in the two salients closer to each other. And on August 18, Foch sent Mangin against the German lines above Compiègne, forming the junction between the two salients.

Mangin struck between the Aisne and the Oise and again the French proved to be the masters of the Germans. The latter fought bravely but in vain, and on the first day of the attack Mangin broke through on a ten mile front to a depth of almost two miles. On the

next day, the Germans were still driven back and at the same time Humbert on the other side of the Oise irresistibly if slowly swept on again toward Lassigny. On the twentieth, Mangin mercilessly continued his drive, with even better results. East of Fontenoy he broke through the German lines on a fifteen mile front to a depth of between two and three miles. A wedge of no mean proportions was being driven into the junction of the German positions in what was left of their two great salients. Mangin had reached Carlepoint, only four miles south of Noyon. The German lines were becoming fluid.

On August 21, Byng's British Third Army added its quota to the pressure that inexorably was driving the Germans back to the Hindenburg Line. Byng struck at the extreme north pivot of the salient, where little pressure had as yet been exerted. Combined with the pressure on the south pivot of the salient between Compiègne and Noyon, the salient was being pinched at both its wings.

Byng advanced on the twenty-first on a ten mile line from Beaucourt to Moyenville, about five miles south of Arras. Once more the Germans were powerless to stay the Allied advance. The artillery levelled their trenches; the shrapnel mowed down their ranks; the tanks broke up their formations; the airplanes crippled their Intelligence work; and in hand-to-hand fighting the Allied bayonets put them to flight.

On the same day, Humbert's advance on the south pivot of the Somme salient was marked by the capture of Lassigny. At the same time, Mangin continued his progress along the sector connecting the two salients and approached nearer and nearer to Noyon. On August 22, Rawlinson increased his pressure at the centre of the salient and advanced beyond Albert toward Péronne, although Byng's advance was temporarily halted on the north wing by sharp German counter-attacks. In a number of places, especially in the sector connecting the two salients, the increasing demoralization of the German army was evidenced by the fact that the German retirement was becoming far less orderly than the retirement from the Marne salient had been, many prisoners and guns falling into the hands of the Allied commanders.

On the twenty-third, Rawlinson and Byng both struck along the en-

tire upper side of the Somme salient. South of the Somme Rawlinson broke through for several miles, reaching and holding Chuignolles while on the left wing Byng occupied Ervillers and was getting far to the east as well as to the south of Arras. On the Allied right wing, Humbert and Mangin continued to progress, the former getting beyond Noyon and hence threatening to flank it from the north while the latter was preparing to flank it on the south. It was evident that the German army was unable to make a stand until it had evacuated all the great Somme salient, for which it had paid so big a price and which had struck so vital a blow at the Allied cause, and until it had retired all the way east to the shortest lines, the Hindenburg position.

The Allies were now back in the region of the First Battle of the Somme in 1916, and were passing the lines which Ludendorff had abandoned in March, 1917, when he had retreated to the Hindenburg Line. The retreat of the previous year had been largely voluntary and unhindered; the present retreat was forced and harassed. Nevertheless, the enemy was fighting bravely, holding on to Miraumont until it was practically surrounded. Bray had already been taken by the Australians while Welsh divisions were capturing the Thiepval Ridge. Byng reached the outskirts of Bapaume and easily rendered the town untenable. Heavy German reinforcements had arrived on the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth, but had not been able to realize the expectations of the German General Staff by halting the British, and the withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line had to continue.

On August 26, the Allies struck in a new quarter, north of the Somme salient and just south of the salient won by the Germans along the Lys River. In this region, there had been no German advance in 1918, and when the British First Army under Horne broke through the German lines, it was breaking through lines which the Germans had held since 1914. Scotch and Canadian troops advanced on a five mile front and captured the Monchy plateau, and on August 27 Fontaine-les-Croiselles fell. Along the lines of the Somme salient in these two days the Allies made few advances, being occupied chiefly in beating off heavy counter-attacks. There was still much fight left in the Germans.

But on August 28 Horne's thrust north of the Somme salient was

beginning to narrow the German positions to the danger point and Ludendorff accelerated his retreat in the Somme salient. On the following day both Bapaume and Noyon fell and in the evening Bullecourt was also evacuated. Foch then determined to close in even more closely on the north of the Somme salient, and Horne on August 30 turned to the south and made for Cambrai, while Byng aimed at it from the south. Cambrai was well into the original German lines, and Ludendorff had no intention of surrendering it, so for several days the struggle northwest and southwest of this important centre raged with an intensity which had not been equalled in the previous week of the war. For more than a day the British were held, but finally they broke through and reached Riencourt on September 1 and Quéant on the following day. Byng was getting close to the original Hindenburg position. On September 2, the Germans again broke badly and the British reached at the tip-end of the Somme salient the lines from which the Germans had sprung in the first day of their drive in March.

Throughout September 3 and 4, both the British First and Third Armies progressed, until by the evening of the latter day they were well beyond the original German lines and within six miles of Cambrai itself, on both the north and the south. The entire world was thrilled by the news that at last the Hindenburg Line had been pierced.

In the meantime, the British were driving ahead in the centre of what was left of the Somme salient and the French and Americans on the southern side. On August 30, Australian divisions captured Cléry and on the next day were on the heights overlooking and commanding Péronne, which fell to them on September first. Rawlinson then slowed up his advance, for his chief immediate objective had been gained, the German centre had been driven well in and he had to await further gains on the wings of the salient. (See Map, page 706.)

During all this time, Débeney and Humbert also were still advancing along the south centre of the salient. On September 1 Débeney reached Nesle and, with his army touching that of Humbert, within the next days got closer and closer to the original German positions at the beginning of the year. On September 6 Humbert occupied

Chauny, less than five miles from the Hindenburg Line. On the next day both armies went forward with a rush. Humbert carried Tergnier by storm and Débeney passed through Ham and reached St. Simon, only several miles from the very end of the salient.

With this advance on his south, Rawlinson could now once more drive ahead in the centre. On September 11, he reached Vermand, less than three miles from the Hindenburg Line, and two days later he reached the line where Ludendorff was prepared to make a stand, at Holnon. But the Allies had no intention of allowing the war to re-degenerate into a deadlock—the complete defeat of the Central Powers seemed to be in sight. So for the next few days Rawlinson and Débeney made strenuous preparations to break through the Hindenburg Line, and on September 18 their attempt was launched. On a fifteen mile front from Gouzeaucourt to Holnon they broke through the outer lines of the German positions to a depth of several miles. The Allies showed a marked superiority and bagged many prisoners and guns. The determination of the German General Staff to hold their position without retreating beyond the end of the Somme salient was shown in the afternoon of the same day, when terrific German counter-attacks tried to win back the ground lost. But the German counter-attacks were stopped and the Allies maintained their new positions within the German lines.

The Marne Salient Again—But the Allies were not confining their advance to the Somme salient and hence it is necessary to turn at this juncture to the triangle between the Oise and Aisne, which connected the Somme salient with the Marne salient. We have already seen that Mangin had been steadily making headway in this region and the Germans succeeded in stopping him no better than in stopping the Allied leaders farther north. After waiting some days after August 23 for the progress of his colleagues to equal his own, Mangin began to exert pressure on the German lines again at the end of the month. On August 29 he crossed the Ailette, thus beginning to get well to the northwest of Soissons. On the same day, Dégoutte's army at the western tip of what was left of the Marne salient, still containing American divisions, began to break through the German lines some distance to the northeast of Soissons. Cuffies and Crouy were cap-

tured on August 30 and here also the Germans were being forced back to their original lines. On the first day of September, Crécy and Juvigny were in Allied possession and with the advance continuing, Ludendorff began to withdraw his forces from the west of the Marne salient. Thus all of the Marne salient was going as well as all of the Somme salient. On September 4, the Germans began to withdraw from the Vesle back toward the Aisne, whereupon the French and Americans occupied the north bank of the Vesle. On the next day the Franco-Americans occupied Longueval and Clennes. Two days later, they reached Fort Condé and it seemed as though it would not be many days before the Chemin des Dames were once more free of Germans. On the next day, Vauxillion fell.

On September 10 and 11, German counter-attacks tried to drive back Mangin's troops from their advance toward the western end of the Chemin des Dames, but without avail. On the fourteenth, Mangin drove ahead and carried Allemant. On the next day, he occupied Mont des Singes (Monkey Mountain) and hence held a commanding position overlooking the western extremity of the Chemin des Dames. On the same day, Dégoutte to the east took Vailly, only four miles frontally from this famous position.

IN THE LYS SALIENT

The Allies were not satisfied with obliterating the two great salients which the Germans had carved out in 1918. They had determined to reduce also the minor salient along the Lys, which was the product of the German drive in April. (See Map, page 717.)

Even after the end of the great Lys offensive on April 29, that front had been by no means inactive. On the first three days in May the French made a minor advance northeast of Locre and the British made a similar minor advance northeast of Hinges. On the next day there was a heavy German bombardment all along the line, but its effects were weakened by the Allied return bombardment and by untoward weather, so that a German attack north of Mont Kemmel got nowhere. Indeed, on May 10 and 11, the French gained positions in the neighborhood of Mont Kemmel. In the middle of May, the British made a slight gain near Merville and at the end of the month the Germans attacked at the apex of the salient for some gains. But they could not maintain them on the following day against the British counter-attacks—the chief interest of the German General Staff was now along the Aisne.

On June 28, a British division under General Haking won some German front line positions near Merville and on July 4 some American detachments (with an Australian corps) celebrated their Independence Day by recapturing Hamel and advancing a slight distance beyond it. With the final repulse of the Germans across the Marne, General Plumer became more active in flattening out the Lys salient, and on July 18 he captured Meteren. In the middle of August Oulstersteene was carried and by constant hacking away at one point of strategical advantage after another the Germans were being driven back to the base of the Lys salient at the same time that they were being driven back to the base of the Somme salient. On August 19 General Plumer took Merville and the entire salient was becoming smaller.

By the end of August the German need of troops was so intense that the evacuation of more of the Lys salient was begun by Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, who was the commander of the German forces holding the salient. By September 5, the Germans had retired to lines through Voormezeele (captured by Americans), through Ploegsteert, Nieppe and Givenchy, and skirting the Messines and Wyt-schaete ridges. Mont Kemmel had thus been abandoned, just before Haig was ready to attack it in force. There the line remained until the final great Allied advance along the entire battlefield from the North Sea to the Swiss border.

THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT

In the first German rush upon France in 1914, an army from Metz crossed the frontier between Verdun and Toul and reached the Meuse at St. Mihiel. Between these two great fortresses stretched a long and strong line of connecting forts, but these latter were so located as to use the Meuse as a moat and the Germans had little difficulty in reaching that river at St. Mihiel. At the same time, the army group under the Crown Prince of Germany endeavored to break through close to Verdun; and if these two armies had been enabled to join lines, Verdun would have been in grave danger of being surrounded from the south. But Sarrail at Verdun and Dubail at Toul sent detachments to prevent such a junction, with the result that the salient ending at St. Mihiel had remained an isolated salient in German hands from September, 1914 to September, 1918.

In the great German drive on Verdun, the St. Mihiel position had become a position of extreme importance, for its situation to the southwest of Verdun was a thorn in the side of the defenders of the French stronghold. But aside from its contiguity to Verdun, the salient represented a position of little offensive importance to the German army, for it was too far from Paris (about 150 miles due east) to serve as a base for a threatening drive into the French lines. Moreover, it lay between two great fortresses, so that it could not safely be deepened until those fortresses had been captured.

But its defensive importance to Germany was enormous. Back of the St. Mihiel salient lay the strongest of German fortresses, Metz, in the northwestern corner of Alsace-Lorraine. The war had shown that fortresses were helpless before the largest field guns and if Metz could be approached, it would have to be defended as the French had defended Verdun, beyond the fortifications. Moreover, at the back of the salient and defended by Metz, was the great coal and iron region on which Germany was drawing deeply for her war supplies,

and if the St. Mihiel salient should go, the most fertile source of Germany's coal and iron would be threatened.

The salient itself was extremely sharp and easily presented the most striking feature of a map of the eastern battle-front. It

THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT

seemed to project into French soil in an entirely unexpected and unaccountable fashion. But it contained many natural defences which had made possible German retention of it at the same time that a salient of its shape anywhere else in the lines from Verdun to the sea would probably have been either widened and deepened or else wiped out.

The St. Mihiel salient may be said to have had its western tip at Bezonvaux, some five miles northeast of Verdun. It sloped to the southeast for about ten miles to Les Eparges, whence it turned sharply southwest to the Meuse, about ten miles away. The apex of the salient was across the Meuse, where the river bends abruptly at St. Mihiel, and where the Romans had constructed an armed camp centuries before. Just beyond St. Mihiel, the salient touched the river again at Apremont Forest, bending to run east and slightly to the south to Apremont, where it curved upward to run slightly to the north through Xivray, passing just north of Seicheprey and reaching the Moselle about two miles north of Pont à Mousson, where it may be said to have terminated on the east. Its base was thus about thirty-five miles long and its maximum depth at St. Mihiel was about twelve miles—altogether it contained about two hundred square miles.

The first American troops to hold a section of the battle line in the Great War had been placed on the southern side of this salient months before, and it has already noted that these men had proved their mettle by the capture of Seicheprey. Early in September American troops quietly replaced the French troops on the northern side as well, for Pershing was planning to wipe out the St. Mihiel salient as the first major manoeuvre to be effected solely by the American army. For by this time there was no doubt that the Germans were quite unable to resist the pressure which the Allies were exerting all along the line, and the necessity for brigading American divisions with the French and British had passed, so that most of the American troops were once more under the command of their own officers and staffs.

The plans of the rival commanders-in-chief in September were transparent to any layman. Ludendorff hoped to be able to retreat in orderly fashion to the shortest lines he could hold in France and Belgium, so as once more to present a solid and impregnable front to the Allies. On the other hand, Foch had no intention of permitting such an orderly retreat and we have already seen how north of the Somme salient the Allied commander-in-chief had broken through the line the Germans hoped to hold even before Luden-

dorff had reached that line in the Somme salient. Foch's strategy was essentially the manoeuvre of keeping the entire line so busy that the enemy, with forces which were now hopelessly inferior in number to the forces under Foch, could not strengthen any part of it at the expense of another part. The Germans were to be attacked all along the front from the North Sea to Switzerland. Thus Foch had driven ahead both north and south of the Somme salient, and when in those regions the Germans had begun to show signs of stabilizing their lines, it was necessary to exert pressure on a new front. This time the duty was assigned to the Americans.

After Pershing's victory, the Berlin War Office claimed that the German General Staff had previously decided to evacuate the salient and that Pershing's forces had merely occupied a salient which the Germans had no intention of holding. There would seem to be a little truth in this claim, for Ludendorff was too desperately in need of men to hold a sharp salient like that of St. Mihiel, and with his positions crumbling about him in other sectors it was evidently necessary for him to shorten his lines by abandoning this salient as he was abandoning the others. Doubtless the German leaders were helped in arriving at this decision by information as to the extensive preparations which the Americans were making to wipe out the St. Mihiel salient. And there seems to be no denying the fact that before Pershing began his drive a considerable proportion of the German army on the north and south sides of the salient had been removed. But Pershing was to do much more than occupy the salient. He was to capture thousands of prisoners, many guns and much other war material and was to inflict heavy losses in the process; and prisoners, guns, shells and losses are evidence which cannot be refuted—Pershing struck before the Germans could retire in order. He struck sooner than they had expected. He struck with greater force than they had anticipated. He struck while the German lines, though possibly slightly weakened, were nevertheless strongly held. He struck so as to make impossible the German evacuation of the salient without loss and without the necessity of retreating beyond the line at the base of the salient. And he struck so as to weaken still further the whole strength of the German army and thus to play no incon-

siderable part in the final defeat of the forces of the Imperial German Government.

The method used by the American First Army in wiping out the St. Mihiel salient was the one generally employed in such drives—the so-called pincers method. This is to say, two separate forces were to break through at points of the line at some distance from each other, were to drive toward each other, and were to coalesce as far into the salient as possible, after which all the ground behind them, including the men and guns which remained, would have been gained.

The upper claw of the pincers was well up on the northern side of the salient, and was about eight miles in length. The lower claw was about half again as long and centered around Pont à Mousson at the salient's southern pivot. In the upper claw some French troops were brigaded with the Americans.

The attack opened at one o'clock on the morning of September 12 with a severe artillery bombardment which lasted for some four hours. The weather was foggy and hence favorable to the attackers when the American infantry advanced shortly after five o'clock on the lower side of the salient and an hour later on the upper. At the same time, some French detachments at St. Mihiel destroyed the bridges across the Meuse at the apex.

From the very moment of the attack, its success was fore-ordained. In many spots, the enemy retreated without resistance. In others he was driven to surrender, sometimes after resistance, sometimes without resistance. In a number of spots, however, both Germans and Austro-Hungarians fought fiercely and their opposition had to be beaten down by the sheer force of the American attack before the reduction of the salient could proceed.

The enemy's resistance was far weaker at the southern tip of the salient than at the northern, and the lower claw of the pincers advanced more rapidly in the first hours than did the upper. The American troops swept ahead with little delay and by noon had occupied Lahayville, Vilcey and St. Baussant, having thus in less than seven hours attained an average depth of more than two miles on a twelve mile front. In the afternoon, the advance was even more rapid, and

it continued throughout the night, so that by the end of the day the American First Army was in possession of Essey and of the especially important centre, Thiaucourt. Thiaucourt was at least five miles from the original front and its fall meant that the entire eastern corner of the salient had gone.

Meantime, the force on the upper side of the salient was meeting with greater difficulties. The German commander, General Fuchs, had determined to hold back the Americans here as long as possible so as to give his army sufficient time to retire from the salient before the claws of the pincers closed in upon it. In this section, the front was better adapted to defence than on the southern side of the salient. The ground was hilly, broken and covered with forests. Several Austro-Hungarian divisions were stationed on this front and they succeeded to a great extent in holding off the Americans until the Germans retreating through the centre of the salient could escape. But after being held to slight progress for several hours, the Americans finally broke through with a rush and the latter part of the day saw an advance of the upper claw of the pincers as precipitate as that of the first few hours had been slow. Finally taking by storm the heights of Les Eparges and Mountain Forest, the upper claw of the pincers passed through Herbeuville, Hattonchâtel, Hannonville, Thillot and Hattonville, thus having advanced to a depth of slightly more than five miles along the entire front of attack. By midnight the outskirts of Vigneulles had been taken and at dawn the entire town was in American hands. Vigneulles was the commanding town in the north of the salient as Thiaucourt was the commanding town in the south, and thus the upper corner of the salient had fallen as well as the lower.

The initial victories of the Americans had driven the Germans to realize the dangerous position of their centre, and in the afternoon General Fuchs had ordered a rapid retirement from the apex of the salient. St. Mihiel was abandoned and by midnight the Germans had retired in the centre a distance of some eight miles. The entire salient was disappearing.

Throughout the night the claws of the pincers came closer together while the Germans streamed hastily through the opening still remain-

ing. Finally, at eight o'clock in the morning of the following day, September 13, the two American forces met at Heudicourt, about half-way between the apex of the salient and its base. In the territory behind the American troops were thousands of opponents who had not succeeded in escaping, and who were thus taking prisoners; more than one hundred guns; military equipment of all kinds, including thousands of shells, hundreds of hand-grenades and four ammunition dumps; and valuable agencies of war such as food, clothing, locomotives, railroad cars, and wagons. More than one hundred miles of French soil had been liberated.

But the Germans were still refusing to give battle and were retreating beyond Heudicourt and Vigneulles to the lines which they had prepared at the base of the salient. Accordingly, soon after cutting off the lower half of the salient on September 12 and 13, the Americans moved forward to occupy it in its entirety and to engage the Germans once more, but this time on the latter's straightened lines leading from Bezonvaux through Fresnes, St. Benoit, Charey and Pont à Mousson.

Subsidiary but no means unimportant results of the capture of the St. Mihiel salient were the release to the Allies of the great railroad system leading from Verdun to Toul and Nancy; the endangering of the great German lateral railway system between Metz and Mézières; and the approach toward Metz and the invaluable German coal and iron regions in that vicinity.

ON OTHER FRONTS

CLOSING UP ZEEBRUGGE AND OSTEND

Zeebrugge and Ostend, along the Belgium sea-coast, were among the most important German submarine and destroyer bases. They were but slightly south of the Netherlands frontier, and if they should be made unavailable for the use of submarines and destroyers, Germany would be compelled to use her own ports, several hundred miles farther to the northeast, as her sole havens for these craft. In other words, German destroyers and U-Boats would be compelled to start out always from points well up on the shore of the North Sea, instead of often from points on the upper edge of the Straits of Dover, directly opposite the mouth of the Thames. By 1918, the submarine warfare of Germany, although not paralysing the Allies, was effectively hindering their prosecution of the War, and in addition the presence of German destroyers in the North Sea was making more difficult the pursuit of the German submarines by the Allied destroyers; so that an attempt to bottle up the harbors of Zeebrugge and Ostend, no matter how dangerous or how unpromising of success, was certainly worth making.

Zeebrugge is the sea-end, less than 450 feet wide, of the Bruges Canal. The harbor was protected from sand by a mole about a mile long and 250 feet wide, curving over the Canal from the west and connected with the shore by a viaduct. The mole was protected by machine guns and by long-range guns trained on it from many points along the adjoining shore.

On April 22, a British flotilla under Sir Roger Keyes set out to block Zeebrugge. It planned to reach the harbor at midnight and to complete its work within several hours, so as to depart well before dawn. As the flotilla approached the shore, it was to a great

extent concealed by smoke screens. At the same time, the shore defences, as often before, were being shelled from the sea.

A few minutes before the flotilla reached the mole, the wind shifted, the smoke screen was dissipated, the vessels were discovered, and a heavy fire was opened upon them. Three of the British vessels reached the side of the mole and landed men, who immediately assumed command of it and proceeded to blow up most of its buildings. At the same time, the viaduct was blown up by a detachment from another vessel, so that the vessels making for the opening of the Canal were free from attack from either the mole or the viaduct, and reinforcements from the batteries on the shore could not be rushed to the defence of the mole.

The first vessel making for the Canal, the *Thetis*, was stopped by a net and was sunk by shells from the shore before she reached the mouth of the Canal. But the second and third, the *Intrepid* and the *Iphigenia*, despite the heavy fire poured upon them from the German batteries on the shore, reached the Canal, entered it and were blown up by their crews, the former on the west bank and the latter on the east. The crews had put off in small boats just before the explosions took place and were picked up by the destroyers of the flotilla. At least for a time, Zeebrugge harbor had been blocked.

The entrance to Ostend harbor was a straight and unshielded channel about 500 feet wide and the British plan was merely to sink ships in it as far up as possible. The first operation on Ostend took place simultaneously with the operation upon Zeebrugge harbor, but less successfully. For the two vessels told off to be sunk in Ostend harbor were early discovered when the wind blew aside their smoke screens and were sunk by shell-fire some distance from the mouth of harbor.

The second attempt on Ostend was made on the night of May 9-10. The town and its defences were heavily bombarded both from the sea and from the air. Heavy smoke clouds were loosed upon the German batteries, the wind being favorable; and at the same time the German gunners were blinded by a heavy fog from the sea which came to the aid of the British. But the combination of smoke, fog and

darkness was almost as fatal to the British plans as to the German defence, for none of the ships told off to be sunk in the harbor was able to find its mouth. Finally, the *Vindictive* managed to enter the harbor, although because of her great draught she had not been intended as one of the blockade ships. With a heavy fire upon her, she entered the harbor of Ostend and was sunk by enemy fire near the entrance, although most of her crew put off in safety. There was a slight passage-way left in the harbor to the west of the *Vindictive*, but it could be used only by the smaller submarines; and hence once more a sharp blow had been struck at the effectiveness of the German submarine warfare.

ON THE ITALIAN FRONT

By the summer of 1918, Austria-Hungary was on her last legs. The Dual Monarchy was prostrated industrially and agriculturally. Food was scarce and the cost of living had risen to prohibitive figures. The aged Francis Joseph had died, and was succeeded by the Emperor Charles; and the personal tie holding the Empire together had been weakened. Subject nationalities, such as the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Slavs (Croats, Serbs, Slovenes) were becoming as mutinous as they were becoming powerful. President Wilson's attention to Austria-Hungary in his public addresses on the war seemed to be successful in disrupting the land, and the Allies' official recognition of the belligerency of Czecho-Slovak forces on other fronts was an example which boded ill for the future of Charles's kingdom. Suffering was intense, debts were heavy, the German cause was on the wane in Austria, and Austria-Hungary had to become active or go to pieces. And it was necessary to prevent the dispatch of large numbers of Italians to the relief of the hard-pressed Allies in France.

Throughout the winter and spring of 1918, there was little activity on the Italian front, but by the end of May it was evident that the Austro-Hungarian offensive was almost ready. The Italian position was still weak, inasmuch as it bent back sharply among the mountains at the left, so that the danger of a flanking movement from this quarter was always present.

On June 13, the Austrians attacked in force at the extreme Italian left, at the Tonale Pass, northwest of Lake Garda. But the Pass was strong in natural defences, and although the first attack gained some of the more advanced Italian positions, the second attack failed miserably.

On June 15, shortly after midnight, Diaz, anticipating the imminence of the Austrian assault along the Piave, forestalled it by opening the bombardment himself. He was copying Foch's tactics in hindering the Austrian concentration for the attack, which opened with an intense artillery fire at 3 A. M. After some four hours of bombardment, the Austrian infantry advanced in the plains at the left centre of the line and in the hills to the left.

We have seen that the vital point of the battle-front was on the left and the Italians had been strengthened there by some British and French divisions. These divisions, with the Italians, on the whole held firm, although the Austrians managed to gain some of the front-line positions, and by nightfall the Austrians had signally failed to weaken the Italian left to any appreciable extent. Their gains were far disproportionate to the extent of their preparations and to their losses.

In the south, however, the Austrians met with better fortune. In a number of places they crossed the Piave and threatened to break up the Italian lines. They achieved also a number of commanding positions which could be readily enlarged into extensive gains. Diaz was able at the close of the day to launch counter-attacks, which to some extent halted the Austrian advance, but nevertheless the honors of the first day in the left centre were as decidedly with the Austrians as on the left they were with the Allies.

On the following day, the Austrians were signally defeated in the drive on the Italian left wing. The Italians, British and French not only stopped all further enemy advances, but also regained all the positions lost on the previous day and even penetrated into the original Austrian lines, capturing some prisoners and guns.

Along the Piave, however, the Austrians continued to make progress. They captured many more important positions, they crossed the river in new localities and they consolidated their previous acquisitions.

On June 17, their gains were represented by a strip of land, mostly across the Piave, with a length of almost twenty miles and with a depth of from two to thirteen miles.

But on the following day Diaz's reinforcements arrived and began to hold the Austrians. And at the same time, the Piave River itself came to the rescue of the Italians. It had rained during the preceding days and on July 18 the Piave was in flood. Many of the bridges thrown across the stream by the Austrian engineers were swept away and it was difficult for the Austrian forces on the opposite banks to keep in touch with each other. On that day and the next, Diaz was ready with his counter-attacks. Step by step he relentlessly exerted his pressure and step by step the enemy was driven back toward the Piave. By June 21, the Austrian left had been turned and the entire line on the south bank of the Piave was in danger; and the Austrian commander, Boroevitch, ordered a general retreat back across the stream. Throughout the twenty-second and the twenty-third, the Italians pushed on, capturing many prisoners and guns, and the Austrians re-crossed the river in great numbers, although in most places in good order. On June 24, the western bank of the Piave was completely free of the enemy, the great offensive had completely failed, and Caporetto was at least partially avenged.

IN ALBANIA

On July 6, an Allied force composed chiefly of Italians crossed the Voyosa River in Albania and began to advance to the north. At the same time, a French force started down the Devoli River. The two bodies converged on Berat and captured it on July 11. They then made for Durazzo itself, but the Austrians had occupied positions behind the Skumbi River, where their lines were too strong to be taken. Indeed, the Austrians themselves soon regained the initiative and drove the French and Italians back to the Berat lines.

IN RUSSIA

After the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk, a large force of discharged Czecho-Slovak prisoners, probably some 50,000 strong, began to cross

Siberia to join the Allied forces in the west in order to continue their struggle against Austria-Hungary and Germany. For some time, the Bolsheviks aided the Czecho-Slovaks in this attempt, but in May, possibly through the insistence of Germany, relations between this Czecho-Slovak band and the Bolshevik regime of Russia became strained, and the differences between them finally resulted in open hostilities.

During this time, anti-Bolshevist, anti-Socialist, anti-revolutionary and pro-Tsarist elements in Russia were heading military attempts to put down the Bolshevik regime. The most important of these attempts were those under Admiral Kolchak and General Semenov, but they failed to penetrate the heart of Russia, although they wrested much territory from Bolshevik rule on the outskirts of central Russia and Siberia.

By the summer of 1918, there had arisen a strong demand for intervention in Russia on the part of the Allies. The advocates of intervention maintained that Bolshevik Russia was in essence an ally of Germany, that the rule of Lenin had become a regime of anarchy which called for action by all the civilized Powers, that the Czecho-Slovaks in Russia had to be aided or otherwise would be overwhelmed by the Bolshevik troops, that without military intervention Germany could exploit Russia without hindrance, and that in particular military stores and supplies landed by the Allies at Vladivostok, Archangel and other seaports would fall into German hands. On the other hand, intervention in Russia was firmly opposed by many influential forces in the Allied countries, notably the French and Italian Socialists and British Labor, with the support of many liberal elements who otherwise were supporters of their Governments. These dissenters maintained that no country has the right to dictate the form of government of another country, that a nation which desires to remain neutral should not be invaded and its neutrality mocked, that the plight of Russia was due largely to the blunders of the Allies, that only the Russian people had the right to overthrow the Bolshevik regime, that the evils of that regime had been grossly exaggerated and falsified, that the result of a successful Allied intervention in Russia would be to end the effects of the Revolution and to place Russia again in the hands of the monarchists and other supporters of the regime of

Upper Left-Hand Corner—Winston Spencer Churchill, British First Lord of the Admiralty, 1911-May 20, 1915; Minister of Munitions, July 17, 1917-January 10, 1919; Secretary of War and Air Ministry, January 10, 1919.

Upper Right-Hand Corner—Viscount (Sir Edward) Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1905-December 5, 1916.

Center—Arthur James Balfour, British Prime Minister, 1902-5; First Lord of the Admiralty, May 25, 1915-December 7, 1916; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, December 7, 1916—; Head of British Mission to the United States, 1917; British Delegate, Peace Conference at Paris, 1919.

Lower Left-Hand Corner—Baron Northcliffe, Chairman, British War Mission to the United States, 1917; Director, Propaganda in Enemy Countries, February 17, 1918-November 13, 1918.

Lower Right-Hand Corner—Baron Weir, British Director General, Aircraft Production, April 26, 1917—.

the Tsar, that the military supplies at ports could be seized and removed without marching into Russia, and that the hidden purpose back of intervention was to guarantee the debts to the Allies contracted by Russia before and during the war and to provide for the economic exploitation of Russia.

It is generally believed, although up to the signing of peace there was no definite knowledge on the subject, that President Wilson opposed intervention in Russia and that he finally consented to it only under pressure from the chief associates of the United States in the war. (His statements with respect to Russia will be quoted later.) At all events, Allied intervention in Russia occurred in July, 1918 and continued well into 1919. It was in two sections—into Siberia on the east, chiefly with Japanese, and into Russia from the north along the Murman coast and south of Archangel.

It cannot be denied that Allied intervention in Russia was unsuccessful in the main purposes it hoped to achieve. Some military stores were seized, but the Allies continued in Russia after these stores had been transferred to the western front. Invasion by foreign foes rallied much of Russia to the support of Lenin's government and on the whole the Bolsheviki were undoubtedly strengthened rather than weakened by the fact that they were being attacked by armed forces from ostensibly friendly countries although those countries had never officially proclaimed war on Russia. Especially bitter is the hatred of all classes of Russians toward Japanese, and with Japanese marching across Siberia to take control of the country, even bitter anti-Bolsheviki felt that all middle ground had disappeared and that they must decide to protect their land against Japanese invasion. Public opinion in the great Allied Powers would not have countenanced a campaign on an elaborate scale, with much loss of life, in Russia, especially since the War had begun to go against Germany. For the Bolshevik army was no mean force, and succeeded in resisting the advance of the Allies, although the latter managed to win their way some distance south from Archangel and to gain control of most of Siberia. There were a number of pitched battles, although none of an elaborate nature. Some of the engagements resulted in Allied victories, others in Allied defeats. Intervention in Russia did not end with the signing of the

armistice with the Central Powers, but continued well into the summer of 1919. By that time, the Allies had taken steps to withdraw. They officially gave assistance to the Russian force under Admiral Kolchak operating against the Bolsheviki and continued their imposition of the blockade which was instrumental in preventing the Bolsheviki from obtaining food and general industrial supplies.

A strict censorship was imposed on most of the events surrounding intervention in Russia even after the end of hostilities with the Central Powers and by the time of the signing of the peace there was little knowledge of the exact effects of intervention. It is known, however, that opposition to the Allied policy in Russia was rife in all the Allied countries, and in the summer of 1919 the Labor and Socialist movements of Great Britain, France and Italy determined upon vigorous demonstrations against interference with Russia. It is known also that French and Italian sailors openly mutinied rather than attack the Bolsheviki and among the American troops in Russia dissatisfaction almost approached the point of insubordination.

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

On September 15, 1918, the Austro-Hungarian Government made a definite overture in the direction of an armistice. True, the overture was only a tentative one, but its significance was undeniable. The Central Powers were breaking up—they recognized their inability to stave off defeat—they were anxious to make as good terms as possible—but at all events they were on the point of surrendering. Between September 15, 1918 and November 11, 1918, military events became subordinate in importance to diplomatic moves. During those fifty-eight days, the Allies were to win new and unprecedented victories, the decisiveness of which filled with rejoicing all those in the Allied countries who had waited in vain from the summer of 1914 to the summer of 1918 for such news; but nevertheless those victories served chiefly to accentuate the final German defeat. That defeat had already been accomplished—it had been accomplished between July 15 and September 15, and the remaining hostilities were in the nature of an epilogue. Germany's further military efforts were merely a stop-gap to tide over the period of diplomatic negotiations, and therefore attention in the final two months of the hostilities should be centred upon the diplomatic rather than upon the military stage. It is difficult not to expand upon successes so signal as those of the American army in the Argonne Forest, but the situation after September 15 does not permit as extended treatment of battles as the situation before September 15 demanded; and the account of the actual hostilities must be shortened to permit of treatment of the diplomatic manoeuvres.

THE COLLAPSE OF BULGARIA

The first of the four members of the Central Powers to fall by the wayside was Bulgaria. She had joined them in the hope of achieving her own purposes by their victory, and when not victory, but defeat, was staring them in the face, it was natural that Bulgaria should

desert, in the hope of obtaining some salvage from the wreck. But the chief factor in the collapse of Bulgaria was the campaign launched against her on September 14.

The Allied forces assembled for the blow in the Balkans were under the supreme command of the French General d'Esperey. Under him were French, Italian, British, Serbian, Greek, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak forces. This was the first step in isolating Austria-Hungary and Germany on the east as well as on the west and in thus dissipating the grandiose Mittel-Europa conception; and similarly it was a blow which tightened the economic cordon drawn around Germany and Austria-Hungary.

When the Allies struck, the battle-line on the 200 mile front in the Balkan Peninsula was, from west to east, as follows:—From the Adriatic at the mouth of the river Vojosa, just south of Fieri and Berat and north of Valona; across Albania to the Serbian frontier between Lakes Ochrida and Presba; across Servia near and parallel to the southern Serbian border, passing just north of Monastir; crossing the Vardar river at the Greek border north of Saloniki; through Lake Dorain to the Aegean along the Struma River. On the extreme Allied right were Greek forces. Next came some British troops, between Lake Dorain and the Vardar River; and thence were more Greeks to the centre east of Monastir, where French were stationed. From this point to a point west of Monastir were Serbians, who were joined at Lake Presba by more French, after whom were stationed Italian troops reaching through Albania to the Adriatic. The battle front was by no means continuous, the forces being centred around the strategic points and trusting to communications to bridge over the gaps. On the opposite side, the Bulgarians held the line from the Aegean to Lake Presba, where Austrians took up the burden.

The attack was prefaced by a severe artillery bombardment on September 14. On the following day, Serbian troops broke through in the east centre of the enemy lines in the Dobropolje Mountains, along the boundary line between Greece and Servia, and between the Cerna and Vardar Rivers. The advance continued on the next day along a wider front and the Serbs completely routed the Bulgarians, gaining thousands of prisoners and many guns. On the seventeenth, the

Serbian forces worked even farther into the Bulgarian positions; with the result that they were driving a wedge between the two Bulgarian armies. To preserve their communications, the Bulgarians retired rapidly along the whole centre and on September 18 the Serbians were almost twenty miles from the lines where the advance had originated. On that day, d'Esperey drove forward his Greco-British forces on the Allied right. By this time, the French between the Serbians and the Greeks had also advanced and were uniting with the Serbians in the latter's advance along the Vardar River, which separated the First from the Second Bulgarian Army. This thrust in the centre continued throughout September 19, 20 and 21, until on the following day, after one week's efforts, the Franco-Serbian advance had driven a wedge forty miles deep between the Bulgarian armies. On the west, the Serbian advance had cut off the Second Bulgarian Army from the Austrians and on the east the Franco-Serbian advance had cut it off from the First Army.

This latter wedge was driven so skilfully that the two Bulgarian forces were compelled to retreat in divergent directions. The First Bulgarian Army, on the east of the Vardar, retreated into Bulgaria through the Strumnitza and the Belashitza Passes, while the Second Bulgarian Army, on the west of the river, drifted toward Albania in the hope of joining the Austrian forces. The communications of the Bulgarians had been intercepted by the rapid Allied advance and the Bulgarian retreat was an unadulterated rout. The Bulgarians were well aware that the war was lost and had little intention of risking death or mutilation in order to hold off the Allies any longer. The Second Army broke up completely into separate bodies, each pursuing its own way—some of them dispersing in the Albanian mountains, others joining the Austrians, others surrendering to the Serbians. For the pursuit showed no signs of slackening and the Allies were advancing as rapidly as the Bulgarians were retreating. On September 23, the French reached Prilep and on the same day the Serbians reached Ishtip. At the same time, the British on the right had entered Bulgaria itself. Three days later the Strumnitza Pass was in British hands and by the end of the month Uskub, the most important centre of communications in south central Serbia and almost seventy-five

miles from the original battle-front, was occupied by the Franco-Serbian.

Bulgaria, of course, had importuned Germany for assistance. We have seen how striking had been the German response in the past to calls of distress from Germany's allies. But now Germany had no reinforcements to spare for her allies—she needed more than were available for her own retiring battle-lines. Bulgaria hence lay exposed to invasion. There was only one method by which it could be avoided, and that method Bulgaria adopted. On September 25, the commander-in-chief of the Bulgarian armies, under orders from his king and Government, officially requested the British commander, General Milne, for an armistice of forty-eight hours in which to arrange for a suspension of hostilities. The request was refused, but three days later General Milne received Bulgarian envoys under a flag of truce. On the last day of the month, Bulgaria signed terms of an armistice which had the effect of unconditional surrender.

By the terms of the armistice, the Bulgarian armies were disarmed and demobilized. All of Greek and Serbian territory occupied by Bulgaria was surrendered. Bulgaria agreed to grant the Allies transportation across her territory for any and all military purposes. Bulgaria surrendered to the Allies also all her military equipment and supplies and all her means of transportation. The Allies assumed possession of the strategic points on Bulgarian soil and of transportation on the Danube as well. The terms were thus military, rather than political, and were meant to be only temporary, in anticipation of the general peace which the weakness of the Central Powers was bringing nearer and nearer. On October 4, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria abdicated.

With the retirement of Bulgaria from the war, the Austrians on the Albanian front were exposed to flanking movements from the east and were compelled to retire. The Italians followed hard on the heels of the Austrians and by the middle of October had occupied Durazzo. By that time, the collapse of Austria-Hungary was impending and the further liberation of Albania from Austro-Hungarian influence was a matter of but several weeks more.

THE COLLAPSE OF TURKEY

After the fall of Jerusalem in December, 1917, the British in Palestine continued to prepare for a complete victory over the Turks. In February, 1918, Allenby strengthened his right wing by capturing Jericho and occupying the valley of the Jordan for some miles north of the Dead Sea. In the following month, he prepared to work his way east of the Jordan to capture an important railway line used by the Turks and also to cooperate with an Arab army under the King of the Hedjaz, (see page 679) who was operating against the Turks in that region. But the further British advance was hindered both by the rainy season and also by the plight of the Allies in France and Belgium. To beat back the German drive at Paris, Foch was calling upon all Allied reinforcements that could be spared and Allenby dispatched much of the flower of his army to France in the spring and summer of 1918. To some extent, these troops were replaced by Indian divisions, but nevertheless Allenby was not again in sufficient force to strike a strong blow until September, especially since the heat of the summer in the Holy Land made military operations practically impossible.

In the middle of September, the battle-front in Palestine reached north from the Dead Sea for about fifteen miles along the east bank of the Jordan. It then curved to the west, passing some ten miles north of Jericho and about thirty miles north of Jerusalem, crossing the Damascus Railroad just below Jiljulieh, and reaching the Mediterranean ten miles north of Joppa. The British were supported by a small force of French.

Allenby struck on September 18. He struck along the entire fifty mile front, although his plan was to break through on his left near the sea. After his right had occupied the road leading from the Jordan north to Nablus, and his centre had busied the Turks to an extent which prevented them from sending reinforcements from the centre to the left, the Franco-British struck with all their strength on the fifteen miles from the Mediterranean to Fafat. At the same time, the enemy was bombarded from the coast by an Allied fleet.

Allenby's success was instantaneous, the Turkish resistance collaps-

ing with much the same completeness as had the Bulgarian, several days previously. The Allied forces broke through the Turkish right to a depth of some twelve miles, and into this gap Allenby sent his cavalry. The cavalry turned east, after having progressed far to the north, and occupied Nazareth. The Haifa-Jerusalem Railway was thus cut, and as it was the sole line of communications for the enemy, his plight was desperate. At the same time, the Allied infantry poured through the gap on the Turkish right and closed in on the Turkish centre, while the cavalry to the north began to drive back the remnants of the retreating Turkish right.

The entire Turkish army broke up. Most of it surrendered and the remainder, fleeing to the north, was in no condition to be reorganized so as to hinder the Allied progress northward through Palestine. The Arab forces east of the Jordan prevented the Turks from retiring to the east. In four days, Allenby advanced some sixty miles, occupying Nazareth. On September 23, he was at Haifa and several days later he was above the Sea of Galilee, having occupied Tiberias and Amman. At the same time the Allied fleet in the Mediterranean occupied Beirut. There was no further Turkish resistance and the Allied advance was practically unopposed. Having been joined by the Arab forces under the King of the Hedjaz, the British were in Damascus by October 1 and had thus occupied all of Palestine. By October 6, Beirut had been reached and a week later, Tripoli; and Aleppo fell before the end of the month. Aleppo was more than the great Turkish supply centre off the northeastern tip of the Mediterranean—it was as well the chief supply base, along with Kaleh Shergat (which had also been taken by the Allies) for the Turkish forces operating in Mesopotamia. And with the advance of Allenby northward, the Allies in Mesopotamia began to move toward Aleppo from the southeast. The Turkish forces in Mesopotamia were thus not only cut off from their supply base; they were also surrounded. The only Turkish army left to resist the Allied advance was a force around Constantinople, and prudence obviously dictated a Turkish surrender before the two Allied armies should combine and march upon the Turkish capital, probably at the same time that another Allied force would be advancing upon Constantinople on the west from Bulgaria.

The Turks therefore sued for an armistice. As early as October 15, the Turkish government had informed President Wilson that it was willing to accept the terms of peace as formulated by him; and on being referred by the American President to the commander of the Allied fleet in the Aegean, the British Admiral Calthorp, the Turks on October 30 officially accepted terms of armistice, amounting to complete surrender. The terms went into effect on October 31.

As in the case of the armistice with Bulgaria, the terms were military and temporary. The Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, the Bosphorus and the Black Sea were opened to the Allies, the Turkish fleet and army being naturally demobilized. Turkey agreed to sever diplomatic relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany and to expel from Turkish territory within thirty days all citizens of these countries. Turkey surrendered all prisoners of war held by her, and the Allies were to assume control of all Turkish systems of transportation and communication and to occupy the points of military importance.

THE COLLAPSE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

The final military blow at Austria-Hungary was not delivered until the negotiations for an armistice between Austria-Hungary and Germany on the one side and the Allies on the other side were so far under way that there was little doubt that the end of actual hostilities was in sight.

Diaz struck on October 24, the anniversary of Caporetto. With the Italians were three British divisions, two French divisions and one Czecho-Slovak division, and the 332d American infantry Regiment. The attack was begun by a Franco-British advance in the mountains of the Trentino, in the vicinity of the Asiago Plateau and Monte Grappa. Diaz's plan was thus to drive a wedge between the Austro-Hungarians in the plains and the Austro-Hungarians in the mountains and to compel them to retreat in divergent directions. At the same time, Italian troops crossed the Ornic River. The advance had been preceded by the customary heavy artillery fire; and although the enemy resisted bravely, he was compelled to withdraw, and the Italians began to break through the Austrian positions along the valley of the Upper Piave.

On the next day, Italian and British forces in the plains below captured several islands in the Piave of great strategic value, while the advance in the mountains was still proceeding unabated. On October 26, the Allies began to cross the lower Piave and within two days all the Allied armies in the plains were across. The Austrians had resisted the crossing of the river with persistence, so that their losses in both men and guns were heavy; but with the crossing of the river and especially with the news of the impending armistice the enemy lost heart, broke and fled. In the meantime, he had practically abandoned resistance in the mountains also, so that all of the great Austro-Hungarian army had broken up and as an army had disappeared before the end of the month. The Austrians were making little effort even to destroy their supplies as they retreated and the booty captured by the Italians was enormous. By October 30, the pursuers in the mountains had reached Vittorio, twenty-five miles from the original battle-front; and on the next day they occupied Vadal Pass in the region of the Pontenelle Alps, which divided the enemy in the mountains from the enemy in the plains.

Diaz's manoeuvre had thus succeeded, and the Austrians in the mountains were being driven toward the west while those in the plains were being driven toward the east. For in the plains the rapidity of the pursuit was almost as great as in the mountains—by November 1, Diaz had reached the Livenza and was nearing the Tagliamento itself. On the extreme east wing near the mouth of the Piave the enemy had maintained his lines, while at the extreme west in the Trentino he had also held steadfast; but the depression in the centre of the enemy lines was so extensive that the retreat of the Austrians on the wings was being cut off. On October 31, Austria-Hungary sued for an armistice and the Italians swept on with no opposition until the armistice went into effect on November 3. On this last day, Trent, Udine and Trieste were occupied. The Italian victory was the greatest Allied success of the war, judging by the number of prisoners taken. Diaz reported that no less than 300,000 prisoners and 5,000 guns had fallen into his hands in the process of completely demolishing the armed force of the Dual Monarchy. Caporetto had been more than avenged.

By the terms of the armistice, the Austro-Hungarian army and navy were demobilized. All invaded and occupied territory was surrendered. Half of the enemy's artillery and equipment was delivered to the Allies. Austria-Hungary was required to evacuate also all the territory claimed by the South Slavs and by Italy. The Allies were given the right to assume control over strategic points and over the Austro-Hungarian system of transportation and communications. Austria-Hungary was to release all prisoners of war. Much of the Austro-Hungarian navy was turned over to the Allies, but the blockade of Austria-Hungary by the Allies continued in force.

THE COLLAPSE OF GERMANY

BREAKING THE HINDENBURG LINE

After the British north of the Somme salient on September 18 had broken through the lines which the Germans had hoped to hold without further retreat, Foch prepared to deliver the *coup de grâce*. The Allied superiority in man-power was overwhelming, and the Allied commander-in-chief was determined to use it to good effect. For more than a week the Allies made no further advance of note, but prepared diligently to smite the weakening Germans hip and thigh. And on September 26, they drove forward from Verdun to the sea.

The attack was opened by the American First Army, which had been shifted from the base of the old St. Mihiel salient to the west side of the Meuse. Pershing struck on a front of no less than twenty miles, from the Meuse through the Argonne Forest to the Aisne. Once more the Germans were no match for the Americans. Out-numbered and disheartened, they resisted as best they were able, but before the end of the day had been forced back four and one-half miles before the vigor of the American attack. Three miles were added on the next day, by which time the Americans had also some 5,000 prisoners and the important towns of Varennes and Montfauçon to show for their efforts.

In the meantime, the French on the west of the Americans had also broken through, under the leadership of Gouraud, whose command had been shifted to the west with the American First Army. The French also advanced on the following day, until they had reached a penetration equaling that of the Americans and had occupied points of the railroad between Challerange and St. Masnes, one of the all-important German systems of lateral communication. On September 28, both the French and the Americans continued to advance, the former capturing Somme-Py and St. Marie à Pie, while the latter occupied Brioules and Apremont.

On September 27, while the Franco-Americans were breaking through on the eastern end of the battle-front, the British began to break through on the western end. All along the British lines, Haig's men progressed closer to Cambrai. They crossed the Canal du Nord, which was some eight miles west of Cambrai and behind which the defenders of the town had taken strong positions. Both northwest and southwest of and opposite Cambrai, the British drove through the German resistance for gains of from three to four miles. On the next day, the British reached Marcoing, only four miles southwest of Cambrai on the Scheldt Canal, on which the town is located. At the same time, La Folie Wood, only three miles due west of Cambrai, was taken, while to the north of the town British troops captured Arteux and Palleul and reached the Sensée River.

On the twenty-ninth, Haig struck on a front to the south, just above St. Quentin, and captured Bellenglise. At the same time, an American division crossed the Scheldt Canal to the north of this front and captured the tunnel of the canal at Bellicourt and advanced through Nauroy. And in the region of Cambrai the British worked their way some three miles due south of the town, while its outskirts were being stormed on the west. To the north of Cambrai, along the Sensée River, however, the Germans put up a plucky resistance and by counter-attacks drove the British out of positions which they had occupied on the preceding day. On September 30, the British lines drew closer and closer to Cambrai.

During this time, the French in the centre also had been getting ahead and had been driving at St. Quentin from both the north and the south, and on October 1 this important German point was in French hands.

IN BELGIUM

The Champagne offensive of the French and Americans at the west of the battle-front between Verdun and the sea was serious for the Germans, and Ludendorff hastened to rush up reinforcements to prevent Pershing and Gouraud from continuing their advance northward along the valley of the Meuse. The Franco-American on-

slaught in Champagne therefore died down for some days. But by reinforcing his left wing, Ludendorff had been compelled to weaken his right; and while the British on the west centre were closing in on Cambrai and the French on the east centre were consolidating their occupation of St. Quentin, the British and the Belgians struck at the weakened German right.


The Belgians under King Albert attacked north of the Ypres salient and the British Second Army under General Plumer south of it. On September 28, the Belgians broke through the German lines on a wide front to a depth of four miles. On the next day the famous Passchendaele Ridge was captured, and the Belgians continued to drive ahead until Dixmude also was in their hands. At the same time, the Belgians were aided by a bombardment of the German lines near the coast by an Allied fleet. By September 30, Roulers, after being taken and re-taken, remained safe in Belgian possession. It was the first great Belgian achievement since the Belgian army had been driven from Antwerp in 1914, and it paved the way for greater things.

Meantime, the British Second Army had steadily advanced on a 10-mile front to the east of the Belgians and by the end of September had reached a line stretching through Ploegsteert and Dadizelle.

IN CHAMPAGNE AGAIN

The reinforcements dispatched by Ludendorff to bolster up his lines in Champagne had been numerous and the French and Americans east of the Oise were held until the first days of October. On October 4, Gouraud, finding it impossible to break through on his present battle-front, shifts his blow westward along the Suippe River, capturing Vaudesincourt and Dontrien. On the same day, Foch adds to Ludendorff's anxieties by throwing in the French Fifth Army under Berthelot north of Rheims. With Gouraud pushing west along the Suippe and Berthelot pushing east along the Aisne, the Germans in this sector are flanked on both wings and are compelled to withdraw, thus creating a sharp salient into their lines, one which opens up an avenue of approach deep into the German positions.

Meanwhile, the Americans to the east of Gouraud have been patiently preparing to beat down the German resistance and on October 8 they are once more able to break through the opposing lines, capturing Brabant and Haumont.



THE GERMAN COLLAPSE

The battle-line in France and Belgium on July 18 and on October 18

By October 11 the Germans have completed arrangements for abandoning their lines between the armies of Gouraud and Berthelot, and their retreat in that region becomes more rapid. On October 12, Gouraud enters Vouziers and Berthelot reaches the Retourne River. On the same day, pressure to the west of this sector compels the Ger-

mans to evacuate the Chemin des Dames position in its entirety and Mangin's forces occupy La Fère. The all-important centre, Laon, also falls on this latter day.

It must not be forgotten that by this time the German Government has opened diplomatic negotiations for peace and that the German soldiers accordingly are fighting for a cause which they know to be already lost. The German lines are everywhere fluid and it is apparent that the Allied forces will slowly but surely reach the German border and proceed to enter the dominions of Kaiser William II, unless an armistice is declared first. Wherever the Allies strike, they gain—and when Ludendorff blocks a gain at one point, he suffers an Allied gain at another point.

In the month between September 18 and October 18, the Allies have gained a rectangle between St. Quentin and Verdun approximately one hundred miles long and twenty-five miles wide.

IN THE CENTRE OF THE ALLIED ADVANCE

During all this time, the attack on the centre of the battle-front has raged with great intensity. On October 3 and 4 the British break through the German positions behind the Scheldt Canal north of St. Quentin, cross the canal and drive ahead to capture Montbre'hain and Le Catelet. On the eighth the British attack along the entire front between Cambrai and St. Quentin and drive back the Germans almost five miles more. On the next day, Cambrai itself is occupied and on October 10 Le Cateau also falls. The depth of the rectangle punched out between St. Quentin and the sea is everywhere becoming more than twenty miles. Not only has the strongest line of German defence, the Hindenburg Line, been completely shattered, but also the chief German points of communication, stores and transportation, such as Cambrai, St. Quentin, La Fère, and Laon have gone.

The sharp British advance in the centre is threatening the very existence of the German armies and the Germans throw in all their available forces and succeed in stopping Haig's further advance in the open country around Le Cateau.

On October 17, therefore, Sir Douglas Haig shifts his attack to the

south. On that day, the British Fourth Army, with the support of American troops, breaks through the German lines northeast of Bohain, which is some ten miles northeast of St. Quentin. At the same time, French troops under Dèbeney below the British break through along the Oise in the neighborhood of Guise. Within three days, the Allied salient which is developing between Cambrai and St. Quentin has penetrated into the German lines to a point only forty miles from Maubeuge.

THE GERMAN WITHDRAWAL FROM BELGIUM

On October 14, the Allied troops in Belgium attack in great force around Roulers. East of Roulers are the Belgians, with French opposite the town, then Belgian troops again, with Plumer's British on the right. The Germans are quite unable to hold their lines and the Allies drive a deep wedge headed in three directions into their positions. With the capture of Roulers, the Allies turn toward the coast and make all speed to get in the rear of the German lines between Roulers and the sea. By this time the attack has spread all along the line. It is surrender or retreat and on October 16 the Germans hastily fall back from the coast up to and including Ostend. On the next day, the Belgians are once more in possession of Ostend, while just below the Belgian border in France the French are occupying Lille, which the Germans have practically evacuated some days before. On the next day, the victorious Belgians continue their advance along the coast and occupy Zeebrugge and Bruges. Despite the rapidity of the German retreat, the Allied forces driving northward succeed in cutting off a number of detachments and thus in taking many prisoners.

We have already seen that the territory of Holland cuts sharply into Belgium along the seacoast and the wedge driven by the Allies is aimed at the nearest point of the Dutch frontier. It is accordingly necessary for the Germans to abandon all of Belgium between the wedge and the coast, and with that evacuation the Allies have turned the entire west wing of all the German forces. Between October 20 and 25 the Allies cross the Lys Canal and approach Ghent, and

before the end of the month the Belgians have reached the Dutch frontier and are advancing along it. In the first days of November, the Allies continue to re-occupy Belgium practically without opposition. When actual hostilities end on November 11, the Allies have regained all of Belgium west of a line drawn between Ghent and Mons, including the whole Belgian seacoast.

THE END

With one wedge being driven into their lines along the Lys and another north of Cambrai, the Germans caught between the jaws of the pincers, in the lines around La Bassée and Lille, are perforce compelled to retire. So that the Allies' line south of the Franco-Belgian border is being pushed steadily toward Germany and the flanking movement on the west of the entire German armed force becomes extensive.

The entire German army is thus steadily withdrawing toward the German border with all the haste compatible with maintaining battle-lines and a military formation. Despite the perilous and feeble position in which von Hindenburg and Ludendorff now find themselves while their Government is dickering for peace, they conduct their retreat with a skill, a masterliness and a foresight which minimize their losses and which promptly call forth ungrudging praise from the Allied leaders. But with all the agility of the German commanders, the front is fast disappearing and the number of prisoners falling into the hands of the Allies every day is so large that if an armistice had not been signed before the beginning of 1919 it is extremely problematical if von Hindenburg and Ludendorff would have had sufficient forces remaining even to dispute the Allied invasion of Germany by the time the Allies approached the Rhine.

The further military events of the War may be chronicled briefly. The advance all along the line is now continuous and one can name only a few of the more prominent points occupied by the Allies as they drive ahead.

In the middle of the Allied advance, between and along the Oise and the Aisne, Mangin presses on rapidly after having captured Laon and La Fère. On Mangin's left are Débeney and Berthelot, and on his

right, Gouraud, with some Italian and Czecho-Slovak forces. On October 24, the Allies capture Terron; on October 25, Mortiers, and with little difficulty approach the German frontier. The Germans are able to stop the Allied progress at certain points, so that the advance is in sections, one section waiting for the other to catch up before proceeding again. By the end of October, the Allies are well beyond the Oise. When the entire German right flank is turned in Belgium in November, the retreat becomes more rapid. On November 8 the French have reached Mézières, on the next day Maubeuge falls, and before the end of hostilities, Hirson; and the Allies have entered upon Belgian soil beyond Hirson.

On the right of the Allied advance, between and along the Meuse and the Aisne, the French and Americans keep pace with the advance on the left in France and through Belgium. On October 19, the Americans capture Bourrot and on the next day, Brioules, but they are meeting with stern opposition and do not again get ahead for appreciable gains until the twenty-third. On October 26, they bombard the railroad line between Mézières, Sedan and Metz; and at the end of October they storm Ancreville Ridge and are on the road to Sedan and the German frontier. On November 6 one branch of the Americans captures Sedan and another branch rolls over the Heights of the Woeuvre and brings Metz itself within range of the heaviest American guns. When hostilities cease, the American First Army is preparing to march upon and to reduce Metz while the second is about to march through Lorraine.

When hostilities are ended by the signing of the armistice at eleven o'clock (French time) on the morning of November 11, 1918, the battle-line in the west, the sole battle-line remaining, stretches from the frontier between the Netherlands and Belgium north of Ghent, passes just west of Ghent, bends to the southeast through Grammont, through Mons, enters slightly upon French soil below the Sambre, is again upon Belgian territory east of Hirson, into France again through Rocroi, Mézières, Sedan, Stenay, northeast of Verdun, crossing the Moselle half-way between Toul and Nancy, into the Vosges east of Lunéville, and thence to the border between Alsace and France, whence it impinges slightly upon German soil down to the Swiss frontier.

THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

THE FIRST STEP

On September 15, 1918, Austria-Hungary addressed to President Wilson a request for a conference to discuss peace. The Central Powers were to direct their communications referring to an armistice to President Wilson because the lofty and thorough character of the American President's pronouncements on the question of war aims and peace terms had made him the unofficial diplomatic leader of the Allies. He had also convinced the Central Powers that his purposes and the purposes of his country were freer from self-seeking and the spirit of revenge, and were more fully directed toward realizing a better world order in the future instead of perpetuating the hatreds of the past, than were the purposes of the other Allied leaders and countries. The Austro-Hungarian note was merely an indefinite request for a conference, with nothing to indicate that such a conference would be binding. The text was as follows:

The peace offer which the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance addressed to their opponents on December 12, 1916, and the conciliatory basic ideas which they have never given up, signify, despite the rejection which they experienced, an important stage in the history of this war. In contrast to the first two and a half war years, the question of peace has from that moment been the centre of European, aye, of world discussion, and dominates it in ever increasing measure.

Almost all the belligerent states have in turn again and again expressed themselves on the question of peace, its prerequisites and conditions. The line of development of this discussion, however, has not been uniform and steady. The basic standpoint changed under the influence of the military and political position, and hitherto, at any rate, it has not led to a tangible general result that could be utilized.

It is true that, independent of all these oscillations, it can be stated that the distance between the conceptions of the two sides has, on the whole, grown somewhat less; that despite the indisputable continuance of decided and hitherto unbridged differences, a partial turning from many of the

most extreme concrete war aims is visible and a certain agreement upon the relative general basic principles of a world peace manifests itself. In both camps there is undoubtedly observable in wide circles of the population a growth of the will to peace and understanding. Moreover, a comparison of the reception of the peace proposal of the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance on the part of their opponents with the later utterances of responsible statesmen of the latter, as well as of the non-responsible but, in a political respect, nowise uninfluential personalities, confirms this impression.

While, for example, the reply of the Allies to President Wilson made demands which amounted to the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, to a diminution and a deep internal transformation of the German Empire, and the destruction of Turkish European ownership, these demands, the realization of which was based on the supposition of an overwhelming victory, were later modified in many declarations from official Entente quarters, or in part were dropped.

Thus, in a declaration made in the British House of Commons a year ago, Secretary Balfour expressly recognized that Austria-Hungary must itself solve its internal problems, and that none could impose a constitution upon Germany from the outside. Premier Lloyd George declared at the beginning of this year that it was not one of the Allies' war aims to partition Austria-Hungary, to rob the Ottoman Empire of its Turkish provinces, or to reform Germany internally. It may also be considered symptomatic that in December, 1917, Mr. Balfour categorically repudiated the assumption that British policy had ever engaged itself to the creation of an independent state out of the territories on the left bank of the Rhine.

The Central Powers leave it in no doubt that they are only waging a war of defense for the integrity and the security of their territories.

Far more outspokenly than in the domain of concrete war aims has the rapprochement of conceptions proceeded regarding those guiding lines upon the basis of which peace shall be concluded and the future order of Europe and the world built up. In this direction President Wilson in his speeches of February 12 and July 4 of this year has formulated principles which have not encountered contradiction on the part of his allies, and the far-reaching application of which is likely to meet with no objection on the part of the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance also, presupposing that this application is general and reconcilable with the vital interests of the States concerned.

It is true, it must be remembered that an agreement on general principles is insufficient, but that there remains the further matter of reaching an accord upon their interpretation and their application to individual concrete war and peace questions.

To an unprejudiced observer there can be no doubt that in all the belligerent states, without exception, the desire for a peace of understanding has been enormously strengthened; that the conviction is increasingly spreading that the further continuance of the bloody struggle must transform Europe into ruins and into a state of exhaustion that will mar its development for decades to come, and this without any guarantee of thereby bringing about that decision by arms which has been vainly striven after

by both sides in four years filled with enormous sacrifices, sufferings, and exertions.

In what manner, however, can the way be paved for an understanding, and an understanding finally attained? Is there any serious prospect whatever of reaching this aim by continuing the discussion of the peace problem in the way hitherto followed?

We have not the courage to answer the latter question in the affirmative. The discussion from one public tribune to another, as has hitherto taken place between statesmen of the various countries, was really only a series of monologues. It lacked, above everything, directness. Speech and counterspeech did not fit into each other. The speakers spoke over one another's heads.

On the other hand, it was the publicity and the ground of these discussions which robbed them of the possibility of fruitful progress. In all public statements of this nature a form of eloquence is used which reckons with the effect at great distances and on the masses. Consciously or unconsciously, however, one thereby increases the distance of the opponents' conception, produces misunderstandings which take root and are not removed, and makes the frank exchange of ideas more difficult. Every pronouncement of leading statesmen is, directly after its delivery and before the authoritative quarters of the opposite side can reply to it, made the subject of passionate or exaggerated discussion by irresponsible elements.

But anxiety lest they should endanger the interests of their arms by unfavorably influencing feeling at home, and lest they prematurely betray their own ultimate intentions, also causes the responsible statesmen themselves to strike a higher tone and stubbornly to adhere to extreme standpoints.

If, therefore, an attempt is made to see whether the basis exists for an understanding calculated to deliver Europe from the catastrophe of the suicidal continuation of the struggle, then, assuredly, another method should be chosen which renders possible a direct, verbal discussion between the representatives of the Governments, and only between them. The opposing conceptions of individual belligerent States would likewise have to form the subject of such a discussion, for mutual enlightenment, as well as the general principles that shall serve as the basis for peace and the future relations of the States to one another, and regarding which, in the first place, an accord can be sought with a prospect of success.

As soon as an agreement were reached on the fundamental principles, an attempt would have to be made in the course of the discussions concretely to apply them to individual peace questions, and thereby bring about their solution.

We venture to hope that there will be no objection on the part of any belligerents to such an exchange of views. The war activities would experience no interruption. The discussions, too, would only go so far as was considered by the participants to offer a prospect of success. No disadvantages would arise therefrom for the States represented. Far from harming, such an exchange of views could only be useful to the cause of peace.

What did not succeed the first time can be repeated, and perhaps it has already at least contributed to the clarification of views. Mountains of old misunderstandings might be removed and many new things perceived.

Streams of pent-up human kindness would be released, in the warmth of which everything essential would remain, and, on the other hand, much that is antagonistic, to which excessive importance is still attributed, would disappear.

According to our conviction, all the belligerents jointly owe it to humanity to examine whether now, after so many years of a costly but undecided struggle, the entire course of which points to an understanding, it is possible to make an end to the terrible grapple.

The Royal and Imperial Government would like, therefore, to propose to the Governments of all the belligerent States to send delegates to a confidential and unbinding discussion on the basic principles for the conclusion of peace, in a place in a neutral country and at a near date that would yet have to be agreed upon—delegates who were charged to make known to one another the conception of their Governments regarding those principles and to receive analogous communications, as well as to request and give frank and candid explanations on all those points which need to be precisely defined.

The answer of the President was as incisive as it was curt, and was dispatched almost immediately upon the receipt of the Austrian note:

The Government of the United States feels that there is only one reply which it can make to the suggestion of the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Government. It has repeatedly and with entire candor stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace, and can and will entertain no proposal for a conference upon a matter concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain.

Contemporaneously with the Austro-Hungarian peace offer, the German Government officially offered peace to Belgium, with certain concessions, but met with no better success than its ally.

PRESIDENT WILSON SPEAKS OUT

With Germany's chief vassal thus tacitly confessing that the war was lost, great significance was given to the speech of President Wilson delivered a few days later in New York City. It was believed that the President would again pursue his policy of addressing his world-audience semi-officially through the medium of a local audience and that his remarks would constitute a comprehensive announce-

ment to the Central Powers as to the sort of peace they might expect if they should surrender without further pursuing the hopeless struggle. This belief was justified. President Wilson in his address in New York on September 27 discussed the foundations of peace with a thoroughness which made his remarks take rank at once as one of the most notable documents of the War. The ostensible occasion for the speech was the Fourth Liberty Loan, but it was evident that the military victories of the Allies and the peace overture from Austria-Hungary had set in motion forces far more significant than even a great American popular war loan.

The President's address was as follows:

. At every turn of the war we gain a fresh consciousness of what we mean to accomplish by it. When our hope and expectation are most excited we think more definitely than before of the issues that hang upon it and of the purposes which must be realized by means of it. For it has positive and well-defined purposes which we did not determine and which we cannot alter. No statesman or assembly created them; no statesman or assembly can alter them. They have arisen out of the very nature and circumstances of the war. The most that statesmen or assemblies can do is to carry them out or be false to them. They were perhaps not clear at the outset; but they are clear now. The war has lasted more than four years and the whole world has been drawn into it. The common will of mankind has been substituted for the particular purposes of individual states. Individual statesmen may have started the conflict, but neither they nor their opponents can stop it as they please. It has become a peoples' war, and peoples of all sorts and races, of every degree of power and variety of fortune, are involved in its sweeping processes of change and settlement. We came into it when its character had become fully defined and it was plain that no nation could stand apart or be indifferent to its outcome. Its challenge drove to the heart of everything we cared for and lived for. The voice of the war had become clear and gripped our hearts. Our brothers from many lands, as well as our own murdered dead under the sea, were calling to us, and we responded, fiercely and of course.

The air was clear about us. We saw things in their full, convincing proportions as they were; and we have seen them with

steady eyes and unchanging comprehension ever since. We accepted the issues of the war as facts, not as any group of men either here or elsewhere had defined them, and we can accept no outcome which does not squarely meet and settle them. Those issues are these:

Shall the military power of any nation or group of nations be suffered to determine the fortunes of peoples over whom they have no right to rule except the right of force?

Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations and make them subject to their purpose and interest?

Shall peoples be ruled and dominated, even in their own internal affairs, by arbitrary and irresponsible force or by their own will and choice?

Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all peoples and nations or shall the strong do as they will and the weak suffer without redress?

Shall the assertions of right be haphazard and by casual alliance or shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights?

No man, no group of men, chose these to be the issues of the struggle. They *are* the issues of it; and they must be settled—by no arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests, but definitely and once for all and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest.

This is what we mean when we speak of a permanent peace, if we speak sincerely, intelligently, and with a real knowledge and comprehension of the matter we deal with.

We are all agreed that there can be no peace obtained by any kind of bargain or compromise with the Governments of the Central Empires, because we have dealt with them already and have seen them deal with other Governments that were parties to this struggles, at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. They have convinced us that they are without honor and do not intend justice. They observe no covenant, accept no principle but force and their own interest. We cannot “come to terms” with them. They have made it impossible. The German people must by this time be fully aware that we cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us. We do not think the same thoughts or speak the same language of agreement.

It is of capital importance that we should also be explicitly agreed that no peace shall be obtained by any kind of compromise or abatement of the principle we have avowed as the principles for which we are fighting. There should exist no doubt about that. I am, therefore, going to take the liberty of speaking with the utmost frankness about the practical implications that are involved in it.

If it be indeed and in truth the common object of the Governments associated against Germany and of the nations whom they govern, as I believe it to be, to achieve by the coming settlements a secure and lasting peace, it will be necessary that all who sit down at the peace table shall come ready and willing to pay the price, the only price, that will procure it; and ready and willing, also, to create in some virile fashion the only instrumentality by which it can be made certain that the agreements of the peace will be honored and fulfilled.

That price is impartial justice in every item of the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed; and not only impartial justice, but also the satisfaction of the several peoples whose fortunes are dealt with. That indispensable instrumentality is a League of Nations formed under covenants that will be efficacious. Without such an instrumentality, by which the peace of the world can be guaranteed, peace will rest in part upon the word of outlaws, and only upon that word. For Germany will have to redeem her character, not by what happens at the peace table but by what follows.

And, as I see it, the constitution of that League of Nations and the clear direction of its objects must be a part, in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself. It cannot be formed now. If formed now, it would be merely a new alliance confined to the nations associated against a common enemy. It is not likely that it could be formed after the settlement. It is necessary to guarantee the peace; and the peace cannot be guaranteed as an afterthought. The reason, to speak in plain terms again, why it must be guaranteed is that there will be parties to the peace whose promises have proved untrustworthy, and means must be found in connection with the peace settlement itself to remove that source of insecurity. It would be folly to leave the guarantee to the subsequent voluntary action of the Governments we have seen destroy Russia and deceive Roumania.

But these general terms do not disclose the whole matter. Some

details are needed to make them sound less like a thesis and more like a practical program. These, then, are some of the particulars, and I state them with greater confidence because I can state them authoritatively as representing this Government's interpretation of its own duty with regard to peace.

First, the impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned;

Second, no special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all;

Third, there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations;

Fourth, and more specifically, there can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the League and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control;

Fifth, all international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.

Special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war. It would be an insincere as well as an insecure peace that did not exclude them in definite and binding terms.

The confidence with which I venture to speak for our people in these matters does not spring from our traditions merely and the well-known principles of international action which we have always professed and followed. In the same sentence in which I say that the United States will enter into no special arrangements or understandings with particular nations let me say also that the United States is prepared to assume its full share of responsibility for the maintenance of the common covenants and understandings upon which peace must henceforth rest. We still

read Washington's immortal warning against "entangling alliances" with full comprehension and an answering purpose. But only special and limited alliances entangle; and we recognize and accept the duty of a new day in which we are permitted to hope for a general alliance which will avoid entanglements and clear the air of the world for common understandings and the maintenance of common rights.

I have made this analysis of the international situation which the war has created, not, of course, because I doubted whether the leaders of the great nations and peoples with whom we are associated were of the same mind and entertained a like purpose, but because the air every now and again gets darkened by mists and groundless doubtings and mischievous perversions of counsel and it is necessary once and again to sweep all the irresponsible talk about peace intrigues and weakening morale and doubtful purpose on the part of those in authority utterly, and if need be, unceremoniously, aside and say things in the plainest words that can be found, even when it is only to say over again what has been said before, quite plainly if in less unvarnished terms.

As I have said, neither I nor any other man in governmental authority created or gave form to the issues of this war. I have simply responded to them with such vision as I could command. But I have responded gladly and with a resolution that has grown warmer and more confident as the issues have grown clearer and clearer. It is now plain that they are issues which no man can pervert unless it be willfully. I am bound to fight for them, and happy to fight for them as the time and circumstances have revealed them to me as to all the world. Our enthusiasm for them grows more and more irresistible as they stand out in more and more vivid and unmistakable outline.

And the forces that fight for them draw into closer and closer array, organize their millions into more and more unconquerable might, as they become more and more distinct to the thought and purpose of the peoples engaged. It is the peculiarity of this great war that while statesmen have seemed to cast about for definitions of their purpose and have sometimes seemed to shift their ground and their point of view, the thought of the mass of men, whom statesmen are supposed to instruct and lead, has grown more and more unclouded, more and more certain of what it is that they are fighting for. National purposes have fallen more and more into the background and the common purpose of en-

lightened mankind has taken their place. The counsels of plain men have become on all hands more simple and straightforward and more unified than the counsels of sophisticated men of affairs, who still retain the impression that they are playing a game of power and playing for high stakes. That is why I have said that this is a peoples' war, not a statesmen's. Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought or be broken.

I take that to be the significance of the fact that assemblies and associations of many kinds made up of plain workaday people have demanded, almost every time they came together, and are still demanding, that the leaders of their Governments declare to them plainly what it is, exactly what it is, that they are seeking in the war, and what they think the items of the final settlement should be. They are not yet satisfied with what they have been told. They still seem to fear that they are getting what they ask for only in statesmen's terms,—only in the terms of territorial arrangements and divisions of power, and not in terms of broad-visioned justice and mercy and peace and the satisfaction of those deep-seated longings of oppressed and distracted men and women and enslaved peoples that seem to them the only things worth fighting a war for that engulfs the world. Perhaps statesmen have not always recognized this changed aspect of the whole world of policy and action. Perhaps they have not always spoken in direct reply to the questions asked because they did not know how searching those questions were and what sort of answers they demanded.

But I, for one, am glad to attempt the answer again and again, in the hope that I may make it clearer and clearer that my one thought is to satisfy those who struggle in the ranks and are, perhaps above all others, entitled to a reply whose meaning no one can have any excuse for misunderstanding, if he understands the language in which it is spoken or can get someone to translate it correctly into his own. And I believe that the leaders of the Governments with which we are associated will speak, as they have occasion, as plainly as I have tried to speak. I hope that they will feel free to say whether they think that I am in any degree mistaken in my interpretation of the issues involved or in my purpose with regard to the means by which a satisfactory settlement of those issues may be obtained. Unity of purpose and of counsel are as imperatively necessary in this war as was unity of command in the battlefield; and with perfect unity of

purpose and counsel will come assurance of complete victory. It can be had in no other way. "Peace drives" can be effectively neutralized and silenced only by showing that every victory of the nations associated against Germany brings the nations nearer the sort of peace which will bring security and reassurance to all peoples and make the recurrence of another such struggle of pitiless force and bloodshed forever impossible, and that nothing else can. Germany is constantly intimating the "terms" she will accept; and always finds that the world does not want terms. It wishes the final triumph of justice and fair dealing.

THE TWILIGHT OF GERMAN MILITARISM

After the end of September, even the official propaganda of the Imperial German Government could no longer conceal from the German people the conviction that their cause was lost. For, as we have seen, Bulgaria unconditionally surrendered to the Allies on September 30, and even the most docile German "patient Michel" could realize that at last the German war machine had cracked. On this same day, the German Government of Chancellor von Hertling and Foreign Secretary von Hintze resigned, and was succeeded by a Government formed by Prince Max of Baden, with Doctor Solf as the new foreign secretary. At the same time, revolutionary democratizing changes were made in the constitution of the German Empire, with the result that for the first time the Majority or pro-war Socialists officially entered the Government. The majority Socialist leader, Scheidemann, entered the cabinet, as did the leader of the Catholic Centrists, Erzberger, whose influence for many months had been exerted in favor of moderation and understanding with the Allies.

It was evident that the new Government had taken office only with the understanding that it would enter upon peace negotiations at once, since Austria-Hungary had signally failed in her assignment of opening peace discussions. The world was not surprised, therefore, when on October 5 the German Government of Prince Max addressed the following note (received in Washington on October 6) to President Wilson:

The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take steps for the restoration of peace; to

notify all belligerents of this request, and to invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries for the purpose of taking up negotiations. The German Government accepts, as a basis for the peace negotiations, the program laid down by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent pronouncements, particularly in his address of September 27, 1918. In order to avoid further bloodshed, the German Government requests you to bring about the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on water, and in the air.

ANOTHER PEACE OFFER FROM AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

On the same day, the Austro-Hungarian Government joined with its ally in asking peace, in the following note (received in Washington on October 7):

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which has waged war always and solely as a defensive war and repeatedly given documentary evidence of its readiness to stop the shedding of blood and to arrive at a just and honorable peace, hereby addresses itself to His Lordship the President of the United States of America and offers to conclude with him and his Allies an armistice on every front on land, at sea, and in the air, and to enter immediately upon negotiations for a peace for which the fourteen points in the Message of President Wilson to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the four points contained in President Wilson's address of February 12, 1918, should serve as a foundation and in which the viewpoints declared by President Wilson in his address of September 27, 1918, will also be taken into account.

THE AMERICAN QUERY

Before replying directly to the German note, the American Government addressed the following query to the German:

Before making reply to the request of the Imperial German Government, and in order that that reply shall be as candid and straightforward as the momentous interests involved require, the President of the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact meaning of the note of the Imperial Chancellor. Does the Imperial Chancellor mean that the Imperial German

Government accepts the terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January last and in subsequent addresses, and that its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application?

The President feels bound to say with regard to the suggestion of an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of those Powers are upon their soil. The good faith of any discussion would manifestly depend upon the consent of the Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territory.

The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the answer to these questions vital from every point of view.

But the above note was more than a query. It was a subtle but transparent suggestion to the German people as to the requirements which would have to be met by Germany itself before peace should be possible.

A RESPONSIBLE GERMAN GOVERNMENT AT LAST

The reply of the German Government to the American query was as follows:

In reply to the question of the President of the United States of America the German Government hereby declares:

The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by President Wilson in his address of January the eighth and in subsequent addresses as the foundations of a permanent peace of justice. Consequently, its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon practical details of the application of these terms.

The German Government believes that the governments of the Powers associated with the United States also accept the position taken by President Wilson in his addresses.

The German Government, in accordance with the Austro-

PERSHING AND BAKER IN FRANCE

The civilian head of the War Department of the United States and the military leader of the American Expeditionary Forces are shown in the accompanying picture in the act of reviewing on Independence Day some of the American troops first to reach France.

Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about an armistice declares itself ready to comply with the propositions of the President in regard to evacuation.

The German Government suggests that the President may occasion the meeting of a mixed commission for making the necessary arrangements concerning the evacuation.

The present German Government which has undertaken the responsibility for this step towards peace has been formed by conferences and in agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. The chancellor, supported in all of his actions by the will of this majority, speaks in the name of the German Government and of the German people.

AN AMERICAN PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On October 14, therefore, the following statement was issued concerning the German note of October 5:

The unqualified acceptance by the present German Government and by a large majority of the German Reichstag of the terms laid down by the President of the United States of America in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January, 1918, and in his subsequent addresses justifies the President in making a frank and direct statement of his decision with regard to the communications of the German Government of the 8th and 12th of October, 1918.

It must be clearly understood that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments, and the President feels it his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field. He feels confident that he can safely assume that this will also be the judgment and decision of the Allied Governments.

The President feels that it is also his duty to add that neither the Government of the United States nor, he is quite sure, the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent will consent to consider an armistice so

long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhumane practices which they still persist in. At the very time that the German Government approaches the Government of the United States with proposals of peace its submarines are engaged in sinking passenger ships at sea, and not the ships alone, but the very boats in which their passengers and crews seek to make their way to safety; and in their present enforced withdrawal from Flanders and France the German armies are pursuing a course of wanton destruction which has always been regarded as in direct violation of the rules and practices of civilized warfare. Cities and villages, if not destroyed, are being stripped of all they contain not only but often of their very inhabitants. The nations associated against Germany can not be expected to agree to a cessation of arms while acts of inhumanity, spoliation, and desolation are being continued which they justly look upon with horror and with burning hearts.

It is necessary also, in order that there may be no possibility of misunderstanding, that the President should very solemnly call the attention of the Government of Germany to the language and plain intent of one of the terms of peace which the German Government has now accepted. It is contained in the address of the President delivered at Mount Vernon on the Fourth of July last. It is as follows: "The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it can not be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotency." The power which has hitherto controlled the German nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the German nation to alter it. The President's words just quoted naturally constitute a condition precedent to peace, if peace is to come by the action of the German people themselves. The President feels bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judgment, depend upon the definiteness and the satisfactory character of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter. It is indispensable that the Governments associated against Germany should know beyond a peradventure with whom they are dealing.

The President will make a separate reply to the Royal and Imperial Government of Austria-Hungary.

REPLY TO AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

The United States was naturally fully aware that Austria-Hungary was under the complete domination of Germany, and therefore the negotiations with the Austro-Hungarian Government assumed a position secondary to the negotiations with Germany. It was not until October 18 that the following reply was made to the Austro-Hungarian note of October 5:

The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian Government that he can not entertain the present suggestions of that Government because of certain events of utmost importance which, occurring since the delivery of his address of the 8th of January last, have necessarily altered the attitude and responsibility of the Government of the United States. Among the fourteen terms of peace which the President formulated at that time occurred the following:

"X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development."

Since that sentence was written and uttered to the Congress of the United States, the Government of the United States has recognized that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires and that the Czecho-Slovak National Council is a de facto belligerent government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks. It has also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs for freedom.

The President is, therefore, no longer at liberty to accept the mere "autonomy" of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations.

GERMANY YIELDS

Under date of October 20, 1918, the German Government, in the following communication, answered the points raised in the American statement of October 14:

In accepting the proposal for an evacuation of the occupied territories, the German Government has started from the assumption that the procedure of this evacuation and of the conditions of an armistice should be left to the judgment of the military advisers, and that the actual standard of power on both sides in the field has to form the basis for arrangements safeguarding and guaranteeing the standard. The German Government suggests to the President to bring about an opportunity for fixing the details. It trusts that the President of the United States will approve of no demand which would be irreconcilable with the honor of the German people, and with opening a way to a peace of justice.

The German Government protests against the reproach of illegal and inhuman actions made against the German land and sea forces, and thereby against the German people. For the covering of a retreat, destructions will always be necessary, and are, in so far, permitted by international law. The German troops are under the strictest instructions to spare private property and to exercise care for the population to the best of their ability. Where transgressions occur in spite of these instructions, the guilty are being punished.

The German Government further denies that the German navy in sinking ships has ever purposely destroyed lifeboats with their passengers. The German Government purposes with regard to all these charges that the facts be cleared up by neutral commissions. In order to avoid anything that might hamper the work of peace the German Government has caused orders to be dispatched to all submarine commanders precluding the torpedoing of passenger ships, without, however, for technical reasons, being able to guarantee that these orders will reach every single submarine at sea before its return.

As the fundamental conditions for peace the President characterizes the destruction of every arbitrary power that can separately, secretly and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world.

To this the German Government replies: Hitherto the representation of the people in the German Empire has not been endowed with an influence on the formation of the government. The constitution did not provide for a concurrence of the representation of the people in decision on peace and war. These conditions have just now undergone a fundamental change. The new Government has been formed in complete accord with the wishes

of the representation of the people, based on the equal, universal, secret, direct franchise. The leaders of the great parties of the Reichstag are members of this Government.

In the future no government can take or continue in office without possessing the confidence of the majority of the Reichstag. The responsibility of the Chancellor of the empire to the representation of the people is being legally developed and safeguarded.

The first act of the new Government has been to lay before the Reichstag a bill to alter the constitution of the empire so that the consent of the representation of the people is required for decisions on war and peace. The permanence of the new system is, however, guaranteed not only by constitutional safeguards, but also by the unshakable determination of the German people, whose vast majority stands behind these reforms and demands their energetic continuance.

The question of the President, with whom he and the Governments associated against Germany are dealing, is therefore answered in a clear and unequivocal manner by the statement that the offer of peace and an armistice has come from a Government which, free from arbitrary and irresponsible influence, is supported by the approval of the overwhelming majority of the German people.

AMERICA IS SATISFIED

On October 23, therefore, the following reply to the original German note on the question of peace was dispatched:

Having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his address to the Congress of the United States on the eighth of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses, particularly the address of the twenty-seventh of September, and that it desires to discuss the details of their application, and that this wish and purpose emanate, not from those who have hitherto dictated German policy and conducted the present war on Germany's behalf, but from ministers who speak for the majority of the Reichstag and for an overwhelming majority of the German people; and having received also the explicit promise of the present German Government that the humane rules of civilized warfare will be ob-

served both on land and sea by the German armed forces, the President of the United States feels that he can not decline to take up with the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated the question of an armistice.

He deems it his duty to say again, however, that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible. The President has, therefore, transmitted his correspondence with the present German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those Governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and ensure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view. Should such terms of armistice be suggested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete evidence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of peace from which the whole action proceeds.

The President would deem himself lacking in candor did he not point out in the frankest possible terms the reason why extraordinary safeguards must be demanded. *Significant and important as the constitutional changes seem to be which are spoken of by the German Foreign Secretary in his note of the 20th of October, it does not appear that the principle of a Government responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out or that any guarantees either exist or are in contemplation that the alterations of principle and of practice now partially agreed upon will be permanent. Moreover, it does not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has been reached. It may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the German people, but the present war has not been; and it is with the present war that we are dealing. It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the

military authorities of the Empire in the popular will; that the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired; that the determining initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany.

Feeling that the whole peace of the world depends now on plain speaking and straightforward action, the President deems it his duty to say, without any attempt to soften what may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do not and can not trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy; and to point out once more that in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war the Government of the United States can not deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany. If it must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid.

GERMANY BEGS FOR AN ARMISTICE

With all the preliminaries to an armistice thus removed, on October 27 the German Government made the following request for the cessation of hostilities:

The German Government has taken cognizance of the answer of the President of the United States.

The President is aware of the far-reaching changes which have been carried out and are being carried out in the German constitutional structure, and that peace negotiations are being conducted by a people's Government, in whose hands rests, both actually and constitutionally, the power to make the deciding conclusions. The military powers are also subject to it.

The German Government now awaits proposals for an armistice, which shall be the first step toward a just peace, as the President has described it in his proclamation.

AUSTRIA AGREES

On October 28, the following communication was received from the Austro-Hungarian Government in reply to the American note of October 18:

In reply to the note of President Wilson of the nineteenth of this month, addressed to the Austro-Hungarian Government on the question of an armistice and of peace, the Austro-Hungarian Government has the honor to declare that equally with the preceding proclamations of the President, it adheres also to the same point of view contained in the last note upon the rights of the Austro-Hungarian peoples, especially those of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs.

Consequently, Austria-Hungary accepting all the conditions the President has laid down for the entry into negotiations for an armistice and peace, no obstacle exists, according to the judgment of the Austro-Hungarian Government, to the beginning of those negotiations.

The Austro-Hungarian Government declares itself ready, in consequence, without awaiting the result of other negotiations, to enter into negotiations upon peace between Austria-Hungary and the States in the opposing group and for an immediate armistice upon all Austro-Hungarian fronts.

It asks President Wilson to be so kind as to begin overtures on this subject.

TURKEY ALSO SURRENDERS

On October 31, the Secretary of State of the United States dispatched the following note to the Turkish Government:

I did not fail to lay before the President the note which you addressed him on the 14th instant, and handed to me on that date.

Acting under the instructions of your Government, you enclosed with that note the text of a communication received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, from the Chargé d'Affaires of Turkey at Madrid, on October 12, in which the good offices of the Government of Spain were sought to bring to the attention of the President the request of the Imperial Ottoman Government

that he take upon himself the task of the reestablishment of peace, and that he notify all belligerent states of the request and invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries to initiate negotiations; the Imperial Ottoman Government accepting as a basis for the negotiations the programme laid down by the President in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent declarations, especially his speech of September 27. It is further requested by the Imperial Ottoman Government that steps be taken for the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on sea, and in the air.

By direction of the President, I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the Government of the United States will bring the communication of Turkish Chargé d'Affaires to the knowledge of the Governments at war with Turkey.

THE ALLIES ARE SATISFIED

On October 30, a further statement was received from the German Government, describing in detail the steps which Germany had taken toward democratizing its form of government, but this statement the Government of the United States refused to make public.

On November 4, the following reply to the German request for an armistice was transmitted:

In my note of October 23, 1918, I advised you that the President had transmitted his correspondence with the German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent with the suggestion that, if those Governments were disposed to accept peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as would fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and insure the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view.

The President is now in receipt of a memorandum of observations by the Allied Governments on this correspondence, which is as follows:

“(22) The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses.

They must point out, however, that Clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference.

Further, in the conditions of peace, laid down in his address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.”

I am instructed by the President to say, that he is in agreement with the interpretation set forth in the last paragraph of the memorandum above quoted. I am further instructed by the President to request you to notify the German Government that Marshal Foch has been authorized by the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments to receive properly accredited representatives of the German Government and to communicate to them terms of an armistice.

ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State.

[The number “22” attached to the memorandum from the Versailles conference, which is quoted in President Wilson's note to the German Government, is the index number of the statement, each of those adopted by the Allied conference being numbered.]

THE ARMISTICE

On November 7, the German representatives empowered to sign an armistice left for the headquarters of Marshal Foch, where they were received, and were given the armistice terms on the following day. The German Government and the German people complained long and bitterly at what they termed the unnecessary and brutal harshness of the armistice terms, so that a delay of a few days ensued before the terms were finally signed. But Germany was helpless, and on November 11, at 5 A. M. French time (11 A. M. Washington time) the document ending the hostilities of the Great War was signed by Marshal Foch, the British Admiral Wemyss and the German representatives—Erzberger, Oberndorff, Winterfeldt and von Salow.

On November 11, 1918, at one o'clock in the afternoon, the President of the United States announced to Congress and through Congress to the entire country, the official end of the actual hostilities of the Great War:

In these anxious times of rapid and stupendous change it will in some degree lighten my sense of responsibility to perform in person the duty of communicating to you some of the larger circumstances of the situation with which it is necessary to deal.

The German authorities who have, at the invitation of the Supreme War Council, been in communication with Marshal Foch have accepted and signed the terms of armistice which he was authorized and instructed to communicate to them. Those terms are as follows:

One—Cessation of operations by land and in the air six hours after the signature of the armistice.

Two—Immediate evacuation of invaded countries: Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, so ordered as to be completed within fourteen days from the signature of the armistice. German troops which have not left the above mentioned terri-

tories within the period fixed will become prisoners of war. Occupation by the Allied and United States forces jointly will keep pace with evacuation in these areas. All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated in accordance with a note annexed to the stated terms.

Three—Repatriation beginning at once and to be completed within fourteen days of all inhabitants of the countries above mentioned, including hostages and persons under trial or convicted.

Four—Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the following equipment: five thousand guns (two thousand five hundred heavy, two thousand five hundred field), thirty thousand machine guns. Three thousand minenwerfer. Two thousand aeroplanes (fighters, bombers—firstly D. Seventy-threes and night bombing machines). The above to be delivered *in situ* to the Allies and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the annexed note.

Five—Evacuation by the German armies of the countries on the left bank of the Rhine. These countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the Allied and United States armies of occupation. The occupation of these territories will be determined by Allied and United States garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine, Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne, together with bridge-heads at these points in a thirty kilometer radius on the right bank and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the regions. A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right of the Rhine between the stream and a line drawn parallel to it forty kilometers to the east from the frontier of Holland to the parallel of Gernsheim and as far as practicable a distance of thirty kilometers from the east of stream from this parallel upon Swiss frontier. Evacuation by the enemy of the Rhine lands shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of eleven days, in all nineteen days after the signature of the armistice. All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated according to the note annexed.

Six—In all territory evacuated by the enemy there shall be no evacuation of inhabitants; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants. No destruction of

any kind to be committed. Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact as well as military stores of food, munitions, equipment not removed during the periods fixed for evacuation. Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left *in situ*. Industrial establishments shall not be impaired in any way and their personnel shall not be removed. Roads and means of communication of every kind, railroad, waterways, main roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, shall be in no manner impaired.

Seven—All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain. Five thousand locomotives, fifty thousand wagons and ten thousand motor lorries in good working order with all necessary spare parts and fittings shall be delivered to the Associated Powers within the period fixed for the evacuation of Belgium and Luxemburg. The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within the same period, together with all pre-war personnel and material. Further material necessary for the working of railways in the country on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left *in situ*. All stores of coal and material for the up-keep of permanent ways, signals and repair shops left entire *in situ* and kept in an efficient state by Germany during the whole period of armistice. All barges taken from the Allies shall be restored to them. A note appended regulates the details of these measures.

Eight—The German command shall be responsible for revealing all mines or delay acting fuses disposed on territory evacuated by the German troops and shall assist in their discovery and destruction. The German command shall also reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken (such as poisoning or polluting of springs, wells, etc.) under penalty of reprisals.

Nine—The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allied and the United States armies in all occupied territory. The up-keep of the troops of occupation in the Rhine land (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

Ten—An immediate repatriation without reciprocity according to detailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all Allied and United States prisoners of war. The Allied Powers and the United States shall be able to dispose of these prisoners as they wish.

Eleven—Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by German personnel who will be left on the spot with the medical material required.

Twelve—All German troops at present in any territory which before the war belonged to Russia, Roumania or Turkey shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August first, 1914.

Thirteen—Evacuation by German troops to begin at once and all German instructors, prisoners, and civilian as well as military agents, now on the territory of Russia (as defined before 1914) to be recalled.

Fourteen—German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures and any other undertaking with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Roumania and Russia (as defined on August first, 1914).

Fifteen—Abandonment of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties.

Sixteen—The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontier either through Danzig or by the Vistula in order to convey supplies to the populations of those territories or for any other purpose.

Seventeen—Unconditional capitulation of all German forces operating in East Africa within one month.

Eighteen—Repatriation, without reciprocity, within a maximum period of one month, in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed, of all civilians interned or deported who may be citizens of other Allied or Associated States than those mentioned in clause three, paragraph nineteen, with the reservation that any future claims and demands of the Allies and the United States of America remain unaffected.

Nineteen—The following financial conditions are required: Reparation for damage done. While such armistice lasts no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies for the recovery or repatriation for war losses. Immediate restitution of the cash deposit, in the National Bank of Belgium, and in general immediate return of all documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money together with plant

for the issue thereof, touching public or private interests in the invaded countries. Restitution of the Russian and Roumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that Power. This gold to be delivered in trust to the Allies until the signature of peace.

Twenty—Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all German ships. Notification to be given to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

Twenty-one—All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of war of the Allied and Associated Powers in German hands to be returned without reciprocity.

Twenty-two—Surrender to the Allies and the United States of America of one hundred and sixty German submarines (including all submarine cruisers and mine laying submarines) with their complete armament and equipment in ports which will be specified by the Allies and the United States of America. All other submarines to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allied Powers and the United States of America.

Twenty-three—The following German surface warships, which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States of America shall forthwith be disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports, or, for the want of them, in Allied ports, to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America and placed under the surveillance of the Allies and the United States of America, only caretakers being left on board, namely: Six battle cruisers, ten battleships, eight light cruisers, including two mine layers, fifty destroyers of the most modern type. All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in German naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, and are to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America. All vessels of the auxiliary fleet (trawlers, motor vessels, etc.) are to be disarmed.

Twenty-four—The Allies and the United States of America shall have the right to sweep up all mine fields and obstructions

laid by Germany outside German territorial waters, and the positions of these are to be indicated.

Twenty-five—Freedom of access to and from the Baltic to be given to the naval and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers. To secure this the Allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy all German forts, fortifications, batteries and defense works of all kinds in all the entrances from the Categat into the Baltic, and to sweep up all mines and obstructions within and without German territorial waters without any question of neutrality being raised, and the positions of all such mines and obstructions are to be indicated.

Twenty-six—The existing blockade conditions set up by the Allies and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture.

Twenty-seven—All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in German bases to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America.

Twenty-eight—In evacuating the Belgian coasts and ports, Germany shall abandon all merchant ships, tugs, lighters, cranes and all other harbor materials, all materials for inland navigation, all aircraft and all materials and stores, all arms and armaments, and all stores and apparatus of all kinds.

Twenty-nine—All Black Sea ports are to be evacuated by Germany; all Russian war vessels of all descriptions seized by Germany in the Black Sea are to be handed over to the Allies and the United States of America; all neutral merchant vessels seized are to be released; all warlike and other materials of all kinds seized in those ports are to be returned and German materials as specified in clause twenty-eight are to be abandoned.

Thirty—All merchant vessels in German hands belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers are to be restored in ports to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America without reciprocity.

Thirty-one—No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender or restoration.

Thirty-two—The German Government shall formally notify the neutral Governments of the world, and particularly the Governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland, that all restrictions placed on the trading of their vessels with the Allied and Associated Countries, whether by the German Government or by private German interests, and whether in return for specific concessions such as the export of shipbuilding materials or not, are immediately canceled.

Thirty-three—No transfers of German merchant shipping of any description to any neutral flag are to take place after signature of the armistice.

Thirty-four—The duration of the armistice is to be thirty days, with option to extend. During this period, on failure of execution of any of the above clauses, the armistice may be denounced by one of the contracting parties, on forty-eight hours' previous notice.

Thirty-five—This armistice to be accepted or refused by Germany within seventy-two hours of notification.

The war thus comes to an end; for, having accepted these terms of armistice, it will be impossible for the German command to renew it.

It is not now possible to assess the consequences of this great consummation. We know only that this tragical war, whose consuming flames swept from one nation to another until all the world was on fire, is at an end and that it was the privilege of our own people to enter it at its most critical juncture in such fashion and in such force as to contribute in a way of which we are all deeply proud to the great result. We know, too, that the object of the war is attained, the object upon which all free men had set their hearts; and attained with a sweeping completeness which even now we do not realize. Armed imperialism such as the men conceived who were but yesterday the masters of Germany is at an end, its illicit ambitions engulfed in black disaster. Who will now seek to revive it? The arbitrary power of the military caste of Germany which once could secretly and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world is discredited and destroyed. And more than that—much more than that—has been accomplished. The great nations which associated themselves to destroy it have now definitely united in the

common purpose to set up such a peace as will satisfy the longing of the whole world for disinterested justice, embodied in settlements which are based upon something much better and much more lasting than the selfish competitive interests of powerful states. There is no longer conjecture as to the objects the victors have in mind. They have a mind in the matter, not only, but a heart also. Their avowed and concerted purpose is to satisfy and protect the weak as well as to accord their just rights to the strong.

The humane temper and intention of the victorious Governments has already been manifested in a very practical way. Their representatives in the Supreme War Council at Versailles have by unanimous resolution assured the peoples of the Central Empires that everything that is possible in the circumstances will be done to supply them with food and relieve the distressing want that is in so many places threatening their very lives; and steps are to be taken immediately to organize these efforts at relief in the same systematic manner that they were organized in the case of Belgium. By the use of the idle tonnage of the Central Empires it ought presently to be possible to lift the fear of utter misery from their oppressed populations and set their minds and energies free for the great and hazardous tasks of political reconstruction which now face them on every hand. Hunger does not breed reform; it breeds madness and all the ugly distempers that make an ordered life impossible.

For with the fall of the ancient governments which rested like an incubus upon the peoples of the Central Empires has come political change not merely, but revolution; and revolution which seems as yet to assume no final and ordered form but to run from one fluid change to another, until thoughtful men are forced to ask themselves, With what governments, and of what sort, are we about to deal in the making of the covenants of peace? With what authority will they meet us, and with what assurance that their authority will abide and sustain securely the international arrangements into which we are about to enter? There is here matter for no small anxiety and misgiving. When peace is made, upon whose promises and engagements besides our own is it to rest?

Let us be perfectly frank with ourselves and admit that these questions cannot be satisfactorily answered now or at once. But the moral is not that there is little hope of an early answer that will suffice. It is only that we must be patient and helpful and

mindful above all of the great hope and confidence that lie at the heart of what is taking place. Excesses accomplish nothing. Unhappy Russia has furnished abundant recent proof of that. Disorder immediately defeats itself. If excesses should occur, if disorder should for a time raise its head, a sober second thought will follow and a day of constructive action, if we help and do not hinder.

The present and all that it holds belong to the nations and the peoples who preserve their self-control and the orderly processes of their governments; the future to those who prove themselves the true friends of mankind. To conquer with arms is to make only a temporary conquest; to conquer the world by earning its esteem is to make permanent conquest. I am confident that the nations that have learned the discipline of freedom and that have settled with self-possession to its ordered practice are now about to make conquest of the world by the sheer power of example and of friendly helpfulness.

The peoples who have but just come out from under the yoke of arbitrary government and who are now coming at last into their freedom will never find the treasures of liberty they are in search of if they look for them by the light of the torch. They will find that every pathway that is stained with the blood of their own brothers leads to the wilderness, not to the seat of their hope. They are now face to face with their initial test. We must hold the light steady until they find themselves. And in the meantime, if it be possible, we must establish a peace that will justly define their place among the nations, remove all fear of their neighbors and of their former masters, and enable them to live in security and contentment when they have set their own affairs in order. I, for one, do not doubt their purpose or their capacity. There are some happy signs that they know and will choose the way of self-control and peaceful accommodation. If they do, we shall put our aid at their disposal in every way that we can. If they do not, we must await with patience and sympathy the awakening and recovery that will assuredly come at last.

CHANGES IN THE ARMISTICE TERMS

After the President had delivered the above address, it was announced that the terms of the armistice as given him had been changed immediately before signing, and too late to be

transmitted to him before he addressed Congress. The significance of the changes is noted below.

Article Three, fifteen days instead of fourteen are allowed for the repatriation, beginning at once, of all the inhabitants removed from invaded countries, including hostages and persons under trial or convicted.

Article Four, providing for the surrender of munitions and equipment, reduces the number of machine guns to be delivered from 30,000 to 25,000, the number of aeroplanes from 2,000 to 1,700.

Article Five, providing for the evacuation by the Germans of the countries on the left bank of the Rhine, stipulates that these countries shall be administered by "the local troops of occupation," instead of by the local authorities under the control of the Allied and United States armies, and the occupation is to be "carried out by" instead of "determined by" Allied and United States garrisons holding strategic points, and the principal crossings of the Rhine. Thirteen days instead of twenty-five are allowed for completion of the evacuation.

Article Six, providing that no damage or harm shall be done to persons and property in territory evacuated by the Germans, has a sentence added specifically stipulating that "no person shall be prosecuted for offences of participation in war measures prior to the signing of the armistice."

Article Seven, providing for the abandonment or delivery in good order to the Associated Powers of all roads and means of communication and transportation in evacuated territory, calls for 150,000 wagons (railroad cars), instead of 50,000; 5,000 motor lorries, instead of 10,000, and requires that all civil and military personnel at present employed on such means of communication and transportation, including waterways, shall remain. Thirty-one, instead of twenty-five, days are allowed for handing over the material. Thirty-six days are allowed for the handing over of the railways of Alsace-Lorraine, together with the pre-war personnel.

Article Eight, forty-eight hours is given the German command to reveal destructive measures, such as polluted springs and wells, and to reveal and assist in discovering and destroying mines or delayed action fuses on evacuated territory. No time limit was fixed originally.

Article Nine, providing for the right of requisition by the United States and Allied armies in occupied territory, has the clause added: "Subject to regulation of accounts with those whom it may concern."

Article Ten, providing for the repatriation without reciprocity of all Allied and United States prisoners of war, including persons under trial or convicted, has the following added: "This condition annuls the previous conventions on the subject of the exchange of prisoners of war, including the one of July, 1918, in course of ratification. However, the repatriation of German prisoners of war interned in Holland and in Switzerland shall continue as before. The repatriation of German prisoners of war shall be regulated at the conclusion of the preliminaries of peace."

Article Twelve, providing for the withdrawal of German troops from territory which belonged before the war to Russia, Roumania and Turkey, is rewritten. Territory which belonged to Austria-Hungary is added to that from which the Germans must withdraw immediately, and as to territory which belonged to Russia, it is provided that the German troops now there shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany "as soon as the Allies, taking into account the internal situation of those territories, shall decide that the time for this has come."

Article Fifteen, "Renunciation" is substituted for "abandonment" in stipulating that the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk are nullified.

Article Sixteen, providing free access for the Allies into territory evacuated through the German Eastern frontier, is changed so as to declare such access is for the purpose of conveying supplies to the populations "and for the purpose of maintaining order," instead of "or for any other purpose."

Article Seventeen, originally providing for the "unconditional capitulation" within one month of all German forces operating in East Africa, is substituted by a clause requiring only "evacuation by all German forces operating in East Africa within a period to be fixed by the Allies."

Article Eighteen, providing for the repatriation of all civilians belonging to the Allies or Associated Powers other than those enumerated in Article Three, is amended to eliminate a reser-

vation that any future claims or demands by the Allies and the United States shall remain unaffected.

Article Twenty-two, providing for the surrender of 160 German submarines, is changed to read "all submarines now existing," with the added stipulation that "those which cannot take the sea shall be disarmed of material and personnel, and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States." Further provisions are added requiring that all the conditions of the article shall be carried into effect within fourteen days; that submarines ready for sea shall be prepared to leave German ports immediately upon orders by wireless, and the remainder at the earliest possible moment.

Article Twenty-three, providing for the disposition of German surface warships, has additional clauses requiring that vessels designated for internment shall be ready to leave German ports within seven days, upon directions by wireless, and that the military armament of all vessels of the auxiliary fleet shall be put on shore.

Article Twenty-six, providing that the Allied blockade remains unchanged, has this sentence added: "The Allies and the United States should give consideration to the provisioning of Germany during the armistice to the extent recognized as necessary."

Article Twenty-eight, providing conditions of evacuation of the Belgian coast (from which the Germans actually had been driven before the armistice was signed), was changed in minor particulars.

Article Thirty-four, providing that the duration of the armistice shall be thirty days, and that if its clauses are not carried into execution it may be renounced upon forty-eight hours' warning, has the following added:

"It is understood that the execution of Article Three and Eighteen shall not warrant the denunciation of the armistice on the ground of insufficient execution within a period fixed, except in the case of bad faith in carrying them into execution. In order to assure the execution of this convention under the best conditions, the principle of a permanent international armistice commission is admitted."

We have already seen that the military collapse of Austria-Hungary had outrun her diplomatic manoeuvres for peace and that she had previously accepted on November 3 terms of an armistice which amounted to complete surrender.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PEACE

On December 2, 1918, the Sixty-Fifth Congress assembled for its last session and on the same day was addressed in joint session by President Wilson. The more significant passages of the President's address were as follows:

Gentlemen of the Congress: The year that has elapsed since I last stood before you to fulfill my constitutional duty to give to the Congress from time to time information on the state of the Union has been so crowded with great events, great processes, and great results that I cannot hope to give you an adequate picture of its transactions or of the far-reaching changes which have been wrought in the life of our nation and of the world. You have yourselves witnessed these things, as I have. It is too soon to assess them; and we who stand in the midst of them and are part of them are less qualified than men of another generation will be to say what they mean, or even what they have been. But some great outstanding facts are unmistakable and constitute, in a sense, part of the public business with which it is our duty to deal. To state them is to set the stage for the legislative and executive action which must grow out of them and which we have yet to shape and determine.

A year ago we had sent 145,918 men overseas. Since then we have sent 1,950,513, an average of 162,542 each month, the number in fact rising, in May last to 245,951, in June to 278,760, in July to 307,182, and continuing to reach similar figures in August and September,—in August 289,570 and in September 257,438. No such movement of troops ever took place before, across three thousand miles of sea, followed by adequate equipment and supplies, and carried safely through extraordinary dangers of attack,—dangers which were alike strange and infinitely difficult to guard against. In all this movement only seven hundred and fifty-eight men were lost by enemy attack,—six hundred and thirty of whom were upon a single English transport which was sunk near the Orkney Islands.

I need not tell you what lay back of this great movement of

men and material. It is not invidious to say that back of it lay a supporting organization of the industries of the country and of all its productive activities more complete, more thorough in method and effective in result, more spirited and unanimous in purpose and effort than any other great belligerent had been able to effect. We profited greatly by the experience of the nations which had already been engaged for nearly three years in the exigent and exacting business, their every resource and every executive proficiency taxed to the utmost. We were their pupils. But we learned quickly and acted with a promptness and a readiness of cooperation that justify our great pride that we were able to serve the world with unparalleled energy and quick accomplishment.

But it is not the physical scale and executive efficiency of preparation, supply, equipment and despatch that I would dwell upon, but the mettle and quality of the officers and men we sent over and of the sailors who kept the seas, and the spirit of the nation that stood behind them. No soldiers or sailors ever proved themselves more quickly ready for the test of battle or acquitted themselves with more splendid courage and achievement when put to the test. Those of us who played some part in directing the great processes by which the war was pushed irresistibly forward to the final triumph may now forget all that and delight our thoughts with the story of what our men did. Their officers understood the grim and exacting task they had undertaken and performed it with an audacity, efficiency, and unhesitating courage that touch the story of convoy and battle with imperishable distinction at every turn, whether the enterprise were great or small,—from their great chiefs, Pershing and Sims, down to the youngest lieutenant; and their men were worthy of them,—such men as hardly need to be commanded, and go to their terrible adventure blithely and with the quick intelligence of those who know just what it is they would accomplish. I am proud to be the fellow-countryman of men of such stuff and valour. Those of us who stayed at home did our duty; the war could not have been won or the gallant men who fought it given their opportunity to win it otherwise; but for many a long day we shall think ourselves “accurs’d we were not there, and hold our manhoods cheap while any speaks that fought” with these at St. Mihiel or Thierry. The memory of those days of triumphant battle will go with these fortunate men to their graves; and each

will have his favorite memory. "Old men forget; yet all shall be forgot, but he'll remember with advantages what feats he did that day!"

What we all thank God for with deepest gratitude is that our men went in force into the line of battle just at the critical moment when the whole fate of the world seemed to hang in the balance and threw their fresh strength into the ranks of freedom in time to turn the whole tide and sweep of the fateful struggle,—turn it once for all, so that thenceforth it was back, back, back for their enemies, always back, never again forward! After that it was only a scant four months before the commanders of the Central Empires knew themselves beaten; and now their very empires are in liquidation!

And throughout it all how fine the spirit of the nation was: what unity of purpose, what untiring zeal! What elevation of purpose ran through all its splendid display of strength, its untiring accomplishment. I have said that those of us who stayed at home to do the work of organization and supply will always wish that we had been with the men whom we sustained by our labor; but we can never be ashamed. It has been an inspiring thing to be here in the midst of fine men who had turned aside from every private interest of their own and devoted the whole of their trained capacity to the tasks that supplied the sinews of the whole great undertaking! The patriotism, the unselfishness, the thoroughgoing devotion and distinguished capacity that marked their toilsome labors, day after day, month after month, have made them fit mates and comrades of the men in the trenches and on the sea. And not the men here in Washington only. They have but directed the vast achievement. Throughout innumerable factories, upon innumerable farms, in the depths of coal mines and iron mines and copper mines, wherever the stuffs of industry were to be obtained and prepared, in the shipyards, on the railways, at the docks, on the sea, in every labor that was needed to sustain the battle lines, men have vied with each other to do their part and do it well. They can look any man-at-arms in the face, and say, We also strove to win and gave the best that was in us to make our fleets and armies sure of their triumph!

And what shall we say of the women,—of their instant intelligence, quickening every task that they touched; their capacity for organization and cooperation, which gave their action discipline and enhanced the effectiveness of everything they at-

tempted; their aptitude at tasks to which they had never before set their hands; their utter self-sacrifice alike in what they did and in what they gave? Their contribution to the great result is beyond appraisal. They have added a new lustre to the annals of American womanhood.

The least tribute we can pay them is to make them the equals of men in political rights as they have proved themselves their equals in every field of practical work they have entered, whether for themselves or for their country. These great days of completed achievement would be sadly marred were we to omit that act of justice. Besides the immense practical services they have rendered, the women of the country have been the moving spirits in the systematic economies by which our people have voluntarily assisted to supply the suffering peoples of the world and the armies upon every front with food and everything else that we had that might serve the common cause. The details of such a story can never be fully written, but we carry them at our hearts and thank God that we can say that we are the kinsmen of such.

And now we are sure of the great triumph for which every sacrifice was made. It has come, come in its completeness, and with the pride and inspiration of these days of achievement quick within us, we turn to the tasks of peace again,—a peace secure against the violence of irresponsible monarchs and ambitious military coterie and made ready for a new order, for new foundations of justice and fair dealing. . . .

While the war lasted we set up many agencies by which to direct the industries of the country in the services it was necessary for them to render, by which to make sure of an abundant supply of the materials needed, by which to check undertakings that could for the time be dispensed with and stimulate those that were most serviceable in war, by which to gain for the purchasing departments of the government a certain control over the prices of essential articles and materials, by which to restrain trade with alien enemies, make the most of the available shipping, and systematize financial transactions, both public and private, so that there would be no unnecessary conflict or confusion,—by which, in short, to put every material energy of the country in harness to draw the common load and make of us one team in the accomplishment of a great task. But the moment we knew the armistice to have been signed we took the harness off. Raw materials upon which the Government had kept its hand for fear there should not be enough for

the industries that supplied the armies have been released and put into the general market again. Great industrial plants whose whole output and machinery had been taken over for the uses of the Government have been set free to return to the uses to which they were put before the war. It has not been possible to remove so readily or so quickly the control of foodstuffs and of shipping, because the world has still to be fed from our granaries and the ships are still needed to send supplies to our men overseas and to bring the men back as fast as the disturbed conditions on the other side of the water permit; but even there restraints are being relaxed as much as possible and more and more as the weeks go by.

Never before have there been agencies in existence in this country which knew so much of the field of supply, of labor, and of industry as the War Industries Board, the War Trade Board, the Labor Department, the Food Administration, and the Fuel Administration have known since their labors became thoroughly systematized; and they have not been isolated agencies; they have been directed by men which represented the permanent Departments of the Government and so have been the centers of unified and cooperative action. It has been the policy of the Executive, therefore, since the armistice was assured (which is in effect a complete submission of the enemy) to put the knowledge of these bodies at the disposal of the business men of the country and to offer their intelligent mediation at every point and in every matter where it was desired. It is surprising how fast the process of return to a peace footing has moved in the three weeks since the fighting stopped. It promises to outrun any inquiry that may be instituted and any aid that may be offered. It will not be easy to direct it any better than it will direct itself. The American business man is of quick initiative.

The ordinary and normal processes of private initiative will not, however, provide immediate employment for all of the men of our returning armies. Those who are of trained capacity, those who are skilled workmen, those who have acquired familiarity with established businesses, those who are ready and willing to go to the farms, all those whose aptitudes are known or will be sought out by employers will find no difficulty, it is safe to say, in finding place and employment. But there will be others who will be at a loss where to gain a livelihood unless pains are taken to guide them and put them in the way of work. There

will be a large floating residuum of labor which should not be left wholly to shift for itself. It seems to me important, therefore, that the development of public works of every sort should be promptly resumed, in order that opportunities should be created for unskilled labor in particular, and that plans should be made for such developments of our unused lands and our natural resources as we have hitherto lacked stimulation to undertake.

I particularly direct your attention to the very practical plans which the Secretary of the Interior has developed in his annual report and before your Committees for the reclamation of arid, swamp, and cut-over lands which might, if the States were willing and able to cooperate, redeem some three hundred million acres of land for cultivation. There are said to be fifteen or twenty million acres of land in the West, at present arid, for whose reclamation water is available, if properly conserved. There are about two hundred and thirty million acres from which the forests have been cut but which have never yet been cleared for the plow and which lie waste and desolate. These lie scattered all over the Union. And there are nearly eighty million acres of land that lie under swamps or subject to periodical overflow or too wet for anything but grazing which it is perfectly feasible to drain and protect and redeem. The Congress can at once direct thousands of the returning soldiers to the reclamation of the arid lands which it has already undertaken, if it will but enlarge the plans and the appropriations which it has entrusted to the Department of the Interior. It is possible in dealing with our unused land to effect a great rural and agricultural development which will afford the best sort of opportunity to men who want to help themselves; and the Secretary of the Interior has thought the possible methods out in a way which is worthy of your most friendly attention.

I have spoken of the control which must yet for a while, perhaps for a long while, be exercised over shipping because of the priority of service to which our forces overseas are entitled and which should also be accorded the shipments which are to save recently liberated peoples from starvation and many devastated regions from permanent ruin. May I not say a special word about the needs of Belgium and northern France? No sums of money paid by way of indemnity will serve of themselves to save them from hopeless disadvantage for years to come. Something more must be done than merely find the money. If they

had money and raw materials in abundance to-morrow they could not resume their place in the industry of the world to-morrow,—the very important place they held before the flame of war swept across them. Many of their factories are razed to the ground. Much of their machinery is destroyed or has been taken away. Their people are scattered and many of their best workmen are dead. Their markets will be taken by others, if they are not in some special way assisted to rebuild their factories and replace their lost instruments of manufacture. They should not be left to the vicissitudes of the sharp competition for materials and for industrial facilities which is now to set in. I hope, therefore, that the Congress will not be unwilling, if it should become necessary, to grant to some such agency as the War Trade Board the right to establish priorities of export and supply for the benefit of these people whom we have been so happy to assist in saving from the German terror and whom we must not now thoughtlessly leave to shift for themselves in a pitiless competitive market. . . .

I welcome this occasion to announce to the Congress my purpose to join in Paris the representatives of the Governments with which we have been associated in the war against the Central Empires for the purpose of discussing with them the main features of the treaty of peace. I realize the great inconveniences that will attend my leaving the country, particularly at this time, but the conclusion that it was my paramount duty to go has been forced upon me by considerations which I hope will seem as conclusive to you as they have seemed to me.

The Allied Governments have accepted the bases of peace which I outlined to the Congress on the eighth of January last, as the Central Empires also have, and very reasonably desire my personal counsel in their interpretation and application, and it is highly desirable that I should give it in order that the sincere desire of our Government to contribute without selfish purpose of any kind to settlements that will be of common benefit to all the nations concerned may be made fully manifest. The peace settlements which are now to be agreed upon are of transcendent importance both to us and to the rest of the world, and I know of no business or interest which should take precedence of them. The gallant men of our armed forces on land and sea have consciously fought for the ideals which they knew to be the ideals of their country; I have sought to express those ideals; they have accepted my statements of them as the substance of their own thought and purpose, as the Associated Governments have

accepted them; I owe it to them to see to it, so far as in me lies, that no false or mistaken interpretation is put upon them, and no possible effort omitted to realize them. It is now my duty to play my full part in making good what they offered their life's blood to obtain. I can think of no call to service which could transcend this.

I shall be in close touch with you and with affairs on this side the water, and you will know all that I do. At my request, the French and English Governments have absolutely removed the censorship of cable news which until within a fortnight they had maintained and there is now no censorship whatever exercised at this end except upon attempted trade communications with enemy countries. It has been necessary to keep an open wire constantly available between Paris and the Department of State and another between France and the Department of War. In order that this might be done with the least possible interference with the other uses of the cables, I have temporarily taken over the control of both cables in order that they may be used as a single system. I did so at the advice of the most experienced cable officials, and I hope that the results will justify my hope that the news of the next few months may pass with the utmost freedom and with the least possible delay from each side of the sea to the other.

May I not hope, Gentlemen of the Congress, that in the delicate tasks I shall have to perform on the other side of the sea, in my efforts truly and faithfully to interpret the principles and purposes of the country we love, I may have the encouragement and the added strength of your united support? I realize the magnitude and difficulty of the duty I am undertaking; I am poignantly aware of its grave responsibilities. I am the servant of the nation. I can have no private thought or purpose of my own in performing such an errand. I go to give the best that is in me to the common settlements which I must now assist in arriving at in conference with the other working heads of the Associated Governments. I shall count upon your friendly countenance and encouragement. I shall not be inaccessible. The cables and the wireless will render me available for any counsel or service you may desire of me, and I shall be happy in the thought that I am constantly in touch with the weighty matters of domestic policy with which we shall have to deal. I shall make my absence as brief as possible and shall hope to return with the happy assurance that it has been possible to translate into action the great ideals for which America has striven.

THE STATISTICS OF THE WAR

THE CASUALTIES OF THE WAR

The following table shows the number of battle-deaths in the Great War—that is, the number of men who died in action or directly as a result of wounds:

ENTENTE ALLIES

Russia	1,700,000
France	1,366,000*
British Empire	900,000†
Italy	462,000
Servia and Montenegro.....	125,000
Belgium	102,000
Roumania	100,000
United States	49,000
Greece	7,000
Portugal	2,000
Total	4,813,000

CENTRAL POWERS

Germany	1,620,000‡
Austria-Hungary	800,000
Turkey	250,000
Bulgaria	100,000
Total	2,770,000
Grand Total	7,583,000

* Of this number, 271,014 are listed as "missing." Both Army and Navy losses are included.

† Including 58,000 Australians; 52,000 Canadians.

‡ The German Government claims that in addition some 600,000 German civilians died during the war because of the food shortage.

Upper Left-Hand Corner—Vice-Admiral William S. Sims, Captain, Battleship Nevada, 1915-1917 ; Commander, American Naval Operations in European Waters, April 28, 1917—.

Upper Right-Hand Corner—Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, 1917—.

Center—Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, March 17, 1913—.

Lower Left-Hand Corner—Rear-Admiral William S. Benson, Chief of Naval Operations, May 11, 1915—.

Lower Right-Hand Corner—Rear-Admiral Hugh Rodman, Commander United States Battleship Squadron, April, 1918—.

It is more difficult to present accurate figures as to the total casualties of the war. Many soldiers originally reported as missing are later found to have been killed or captured, many were wounded more than once, and many killed were previously included in the wounded column. The following figures, however, are compiled from official reports of some of the belligerents, with the figures for the other belligerents acquired by using the ratio of total casualties to deaths obtaining among these official reports:

ENTENTE ALLIES			
	<i>Dead</i>	<i>Wounded</i>	<i>Total Casualties</i>
Russia	1,700,000	3,500,000	7,500,000
France	1,366,200	3,000,000	5,000,000
British Empire	900,000	2,800,000	4,200,000
Italy	462,000	950,000	2,700,000
Servia, Montenegro	125,000	290,000	575,000
Belgium	102,000	235,000	450,000
Roumania	100,000	230,000	440,000
United States	49,000	230,000	286,000
Greece	7,000	16,000	30,000
Portugal	2,000	4,000	7,000
Total	4,813,000	11,255,000	21,188,000
CENTRAL POWERS			
Germany	1,620,000	3,700,000	6,000,000
Austria-Hungary	800,000	2,000,000	4,100,000
Turkey	250,000	575,000	800,000
Bulgaria	100,000	400,000	700,000
Total	2,770,000	6,675,000	11,600,000
Grand Total	7,583,000	17,930,000	32,788,000

Estimates of the losses in wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are as follows, although the data are extremely meagre and

unreliable, except in the case of the Union forces in the Civil War, where the figures may be regarded as official:

Civil War—

Union Army:

Forces Engaged	2,320,272
Killed or Dead of Wounds.....	110,070
Dead of Disease.....	199,720
Dead of Other Causes.....	49,837

Total Deaths	359,528
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Wounded	275,175
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Confederate Army:

Forces Engaged	600,000
Killed and Dead of Wounds.....	95,000
Deaths from Disease.....	60,000
Wounded	70,000

Casualties

War of 1812.....	50,000
Mexican War	50,000
Napoleonic Wars	6,000,000
Crimean War	285,000
Russo-Turkish War	225,000
Russo-Japanese War	550,000
British-Boer War	175,000

THE COST OF THE WAR

The following figures show the cost of the war to the spring of 1919, almost half a year after the cessation of hostilities. Naturally, the expenses of the Great War will continue for many years after the final ratification of the peace treaties.

ENTENTE ALLIES

British Empire	\$38,000,000,000
France	26,000,000,000

United States	22,000,000,000
Russia	18,000,000,000
Italy	13,000,000,000
Other Entente Allies.....	6,000,000,000
<hr/>	
Total	\$123,000,000,000

CENTRAL POWERS

Germany	\$39,000,000,000
Austria-Hungary	21,000,000,000
Turkey and Bulgaria.....	3,000,000,000
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Total	\$63,000,000,000
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Grand Total	\$186,000,000,000

THE WAR DEBTS

The following table shows the pre-war and post-war national debts of the belligerent nations.

	<i>Before the War</i>	<i>After the War</i>
Germany	\$1,200,000,000	\$39,000,000,000
United Kingdom.....	3,500,000,000	34,000,000,000
France	6,600,000,000	27,000,000,000
United States.....	1,300,000,000	24,000,000,000
Austria-Hungary	4,000,000,000	23,000,000,000
Italy	2,900,000,000	11,000,000,000
Russia	5,100,000,000	25,000,000,000
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Total	\$24,600,000,000	\$183,000,000,000

THE RESULTS OF SUBMARINE WARFARE

The following table shows the merchant tonnage of the world on July 1, 1914, the tonnage lost through acts of war (chiefly submarine attacks), the tonnage built during the war, and the tonnage of the world on January 1, 1919. The figures are in gross tons.

	<i>July</i> 1, 1914	<i>Lost in</i> <i>War</i>	<i>Built in</i> <i>War</i>	<i>January</i> 1, 1919
United Kingdom....	20,100,000	7,757,000	4,557,000	16,900,000
United States.....	1,875,000	395,000	4,239,000	5,719,000
Other Allies.....	7,675,000	2,592,000	1,757,000	6,840,000
Central Powers.....	6,325,000	3,000,000	750,000	*4,360,000
Neutral Nations.....	6,640,000	1,998,000	1,144,000	5,786,000
Total	42,615,000	15,742,000	12,447,000	39,605,000

The losses of the leading maritime nations as a result of acts of war were as follows:

	<i>Gross Tons</i>
Great Britain	7,757,000
Norway	1,100,000
France	889,000
Italy	846,000
United States	395,000
Greece	346,000
Denmark	241,000
Holland	203,000
Sweden	201,000
Germany	187,000
Russia	183,000
Spain	168,000
Japan	120,000
Portugal	93,000
Belgium	84,000
Brazil	25,000
Austria-Hungary	15,000
All others	16,000
Total	12,946,000

The net loss of merchant shipping due to the war, that is, the difference between the tonnage lost and the tonnage constructed, may be placed at 4,250,000. But under normal conditions it is estimated that there would have been constructed from August, 1914 to November,

* 2,400,000 tons of Central Powers' shipping were seized at the outbreak of the War and during the War.

1918 some 12,000,000 tons of shipping, so that the total shortage in world shipping as a result of the war may be placed at 16,250,000.

It is estimated that Germany lost 200 submarines during the War.

WAR STRENGTH OF THE BELLIGERENTS AT THE ARMISTICE

The following table shows the number of men in the armies of the main belligerents on the western battle-front when the armistice was signed on November 11, 1918.

Germany	3,562,180
France	2,559,000
United States	1,950,000
Great Britain (including Portuguese troops)	1,718,000
Belgium and Italy.....	200,000
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Total, Entente Allies.....	6,427,100

The rifle strength of the German and the Allied forces on the western battle-front from April to November, 1918, was as follows. ("rifle strength" indicates the number of riflemen immediately available for front-line service):

	<i>German</i>	<i>Allied</i>
April	1,569,000	1,245,000
May	1,600,000	1,343,000
June	1,639,000	1,496,000
July	1,412,000	1,556,000
August	1,395,000	1,672,000
September	1,339,000	1,682,000
October	1,223,000	1,594,000
November	866,000	1,485,000

THE ALLIED BATTLE LINE

The following table shows the proportion of the Allied battle-front in France and Belgium held by French, British (including Portuguese),

Belgian and American troops. The figures are given for the first days of the month mentioned.

<i>Date</i>	<i>French</i>	<i>British</i>	<i>Belgian</i>	<i>American</i>
February, 1918.....	69%	25%	5%	1%
March	67 "	25 "	5 "	3 "
April	72 "	19 "	5 "	4 "
May	72 "	17 "	5 "	6 "
June	75 "	16 "	4 "	5 "
July	69 "	16 "	4 "	11 "
August	63 "	18 "	5 "	14 "
September	56 "	19 "	5 "	20 "
October	58 "	18 "	6 "	18 "
November*	55 "	18 "	6 "	21 "

The table shows graphically the necessity for making the British front less extended after the first great German drive in 1918. The decrease in the American percentage between May and June is due to the fact that in the face of the menace of the great German victories in 1918 General Pershing's men were brigaded with the French and British.

GUN STRENGTH OF THE ALLIES AT THE ARMISTICE

The following table shows the number of guns organized in batteries when the armistice with Germany was signed on November 11, 1918.

French	11,638
Italian	7,709
British	6,993
American	3,008

AIRPLANE STRENGTH OF THE BELLIGERENTS AT THE ARMISTICE

The following table shows the number of battle airplanes on November 11, 1918.

* Eleventh.

Entente Allies

French	3,321
British	1,758
Italian	812
American	740
Belgian	153
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Total	6,784

Central Powers

German	2,730
Austro-Hungarian	622
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Total	3,352

AMERICA'S ACHIEVEMENTS

THE STRENGTH OF THE AMERICAN ARMY

The following table shows the strength of the army of the United States in Europe and as a whole during the participation of the United States in the Great War.

1917—	<i>In Europe</i>	<i>As a Whole</i>
April	200,000
May	290,000
June	390,000
July	20,000	500,000
August	35,000	551,000
September	45,000	691,000
October	65,000	948,000
November	102,000	1,100,000
December	139,000	1,189,000
1918—		
January	176,000	1,315,000
February	225,000	1,425,000
March	153,000	1,639,000
April	320,000	1,796,000
May	424,000	1,953,000
June	722,000	2,112,000
July	996,000	2,380,000
August	1,293,000	2,658,000
September	1,576,000	3,001,000
October	1,843,000	3,433,000
November	1,971,000	3,634,000

THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE ARMY

The following table shows the proportion of the Army as among the Regulars, National Guard and National Army when America entered the war and when the armistice was signed.

	<i>Regulars</i>	<i>National Guard</i>	<i>National Army</i>
April, 1917.....	133,000	*67,000
November, 1918.....	527,000	382,000	3,091,000

* Previously called into national service.

THE ARMY BY STATES

The following table shows the number of men furnished the Army by states.

New York.....	367,864	Nebraska	47,805
Pennsylvania	297,891	Maryland	47,054
Illinois	251,074	Washington	45,154
Ohio	200,293	Montana	36,293
Texas	161,065	Colorado	34,393
Michigan	135,485	Florida	33,331
Massachusetts	132,610	Oregon	30,116
Missouri	128,544	S. Dakota.....	29,686
California	112,514	N. Dakota.....	25,803
Indiana	196,581	Maine	24,252
New Jersey.....	105,207	Idaho	19,016
Minnesota	99,116	Utah	17,361
Iowa	98,781	Rhode Island.....	16,861
Wisconsin	98,211	Porto Rico.....	16,538
Georgia	85,506	District of Columbia...	15,930
Oklahoma	80,169	New Hampshire.....	14,374
Tennessee	75,825	New Mexico	12,439
Kentucky	75,043	Wyoming	11,393
Alabama	74,678	Arizona	10,492
Virginia	73,062	Vermont	9,338
N. Carolina.....	73,033	Delaware	7,484
Louisiana	65,998	Hawaii	5,644
Kansas	63,428	Nevada	5,105
Arkansas	61,027	Alaska	2,102
W. Virginia.....	55,777	A. E. F.....	1,499
Mississippi	54,295	Not allocated.....	1,318
S. Carolina.....	53,482	Philippines	255
Connecticut	50,069		
		Total	3,757,624

THE DIVISIONS

The following table shows the classification of the American Army by divisions, with the places of training and the states from which recruited.

<i>Division</i>	<i>Camp</i>	<i>States from which drawn</i>
<i>Regulars:</i>		
First	France	Regulars
Second	France	Regulars
Third	Greene, N. C.....	Regulars
Fourth	Greene, N. C.....	Regulars
Fifth	Logan, Tex.....	Regulars
Sixth	McClellan, Ala.....	Regulars
Seventh	MacArthur, Tex.....	Regulars
Eighth	Fremont, Calif.....	Regulars
Ninth	Sheridan, Ala.....	Regulars
Tenth	Funston, Kans.....	Regulars
Eleventh	Meade, Md.....	Regulars
Twelfth	Devens, Mass.....	Regulars
Thirteenth	Lewis, Wash.....	Regulars
Fourteenth	Custer, Mich.....	Regulars
Fifteenth	Logan, Tex.....	Regulars
Sixteenth	Kearny, Calif.....	Regulars
Seventeenth	Beauregard, La.....	Regulars
Eighteenth	Travis, Tex.....	Regulars
Nineteenth	Dodge, Iowa.....	Regulars
Twentieth	Sevier, S. C.....	Regulars
<i>National Guard:</i>		
Twenty-sixth	Devens, Mass.....	New England
Twenty-seventh	Wadsworth, S. C.....	New York
Twenty-eighth	Hancock, Ga.....	Pennsylvania
Twenty-ninth	McClellan, Ala.....	New Jersey, Delaware, Vir- ginia, Maryland, District of Columbia
Thirtieth	Sevier, S. C.....	Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, District of Columbia
Thirty-first	Wheeler, Ga.....	Georgia, Alabama, Florida
Thirty-second	MacArthur, Tex.....	Michigan, Wisconsin
Thirty-third	Logan, Tex.....	Illinois
Thirty-fourth	Cody, N. Mex.....	Nebraska, Iowa, South Dakota, Minnesota
Thirty-fifth	Doniphan, Okla.....	Missouri, Kansas
Thirty-sixth	Bowie, Tex.....	Texas, Oklahoma
Thirty-seventh	Sheridan, Ohio.....	Ohio
Thirty-eighth	Shelby, Miss.....	Indiana, Kentucky, West Vir- ginia

Thirty-ninth	Beauregard, La.	Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana
Fortieth	Kearny, Calif.	California, Colorado, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico
Forty-first	Fremont, Calif.	Washington, Oregon, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming
Forty-second	Mills, N. Y.	Various States

National Army:

Seventy-sixth	Devens, Mass.	New England, New York
Seventy-seventh	Upton, N. Y.	New York City
Seventy-eighth	Dix, N. J.	Western New York, New Jersey, Delaware
Seventy-ninth	Meade, Md.	Northeastern Pennsylvania, Maryland, District of Columbia
Eightieth	Lee, Va.	Virginia, West Virginia, Western Pennsylvania
Eighty-first	Jackson, S. C.	North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Porto Rico
Eighty-second	Gordon, Ga.	Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee
Eighty-third	Sherman, Ohio	Ohio, Western Pennsylvania
Eighty-fourth	Zachary Taylor, Ky.	Kentucky, Indiana, Southern Illinois
Eighty-fifth	Custer, Mich.	Michigan, Eastern Wisconsin
Eighty-sixth	Grant, Ill.	Chicago, Northern Illinois
Eighty-seventh	Pike, Ark.	Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Southern Alabama
Eighty-eighth	Dodge, Iowa	North Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, Western Illinois
Eighty-ninth	Funston, Kans.	Kansas, Missouri, South Dakota, Nebraska
Ninetieth	Travis, Tex.	Texas, Oklahoma
Ninety-first	Lewis, Wash.	Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Nebraska, Montana, Wyoming, Utah
Ninety-second	Funston, Kans.	Colored, various States
Ninety-third	Stuart, Va.	Colored, various States

The following table shows when the various divisions reached France, entered the battle-line and saw active battle service.

<i>Division</i>	<i>Reached France</i>	<i>Entered Line</i>	<i>Battle Service</i>
First	June, 1917	October, 1917	April, 1918
Second	October	March, 1918	June
Twenty-sixth	November	February	July
Forty-second	November	February	July

<i>Division</i>	<i>Reached France</i>	<i>Entered Line</i>	<i>Battle Service</i>
Forty-first	December		
Thirty-second	February, 1918....	May	July
Third	April	June	June
Seventy-seventh	April	June	August
Fifth	May	June	September
Twenty-seventh	May	July	July
Thirty-fifth	May	June	September
Eighty-second	May	June	September
Fourth	May	July	July
Twenty-eighth	May	July	July
Thirtieth	July	July	July
Thirty-third	May	September	September
Eightieth	May	September	September
Seventy-eighth	June	September	September
Eighty-third	May	November	November
Ninety-second	June	August	November
Eighty-ninth	June	August	September
Ninetieth	June	August	September
Thirty-seventh	June	August	September
Twenty-ninth	June	July	October
Ninety-first	July	September	September
Seventy-sixth	July	November	November
Seventy-ninth	July	September	September
Sixth	July	October	November
Thirty-sixth	July	November	October
Eighty-fifth	August	November	November
Seventh	August	September	November
Eighty-first	August	October	November
Eighty-eighth	August		
Fortieth	August		
Thirty-ninth	August		
Eighty-seventh	September		
Eighty-sixth	September		
Eighty-fourth	September		
Thirty-fourth	September		
Thirty-eighth	October		
Thirty-first	October		
Eighth	November		

The following table shows the achievements of the American Army by divisions. The time spent on inactive and on active sectors, the advances achieved, the prisoners captured and the casualties suffered are shown in separate columns.

Division	Days Spent Inactive	on Sectors Active	Miles Advanced	Prisoners Captured	Battle Deaths	Total Casualties
First	127	93	31.9	6,469	4,204	19,141
Twenty-sixth	148	45	23.1	3,148	2,186	13,000
Forty-second	125	39	34.4	1,317	2,713	13,292
Second	71	66	37.5	12,026	4,419	20,657
Seventy-seventh	47	66	44.7	750	1,990	9,966
Fifth	71	32	18.2	2,356	1,908	7,975
Eighty-second	70	27	11.3	845	1,338	6,890
Thirty-fifth	92	5	7.8	781	960	6,894
Thirty-second	60	35	22.5	2,153	2,898	10,986
Third	86	25.6	2,240	3,102	15,052
Eighty-ninth	55	28	30	5,061	1,419	7,394
Twenty-ninth	59	23	4.4	2,187	940	5,219
Twenty-eighth	31	49	6.3	921	2,531	13,746
Ninetieth	42	26	17.9	1,876	1,387	6,623
Thirty-seventh	50	11	18.8	1,495	992	4,931
Thirty-third	32	27	22.5	3,987	1,002	8,251
Twenty-seventh	57	7.5	2,357	1,791	9,427
Thirtieth	56	18.5	3,848	1,652	9,429
Ninety-second	51	2	5	38	185	1,495
Seventy-ninth	28	17	12.2	1,077	1,396	6,194
Fourth	7	38	15.4	2,756	2,587	11,596
Sixth	40	12	97	479
Seventy-eighth	17	21	13.8	432	1,359	6,800
Seventh	31	2	.6	69	302	1,516
Eighty-first	31	...	3.5	101	250	801
Ninety-first	15	14	21.3	2,412	1,390	5,106
Eighty-eighth	28	3	27	63
Thirty-sixth	23	13.8	549	591	2,119
Eightieth	1	17	23.7	1,813	1,141	5,622
Totals	1,329	905	485	63,079	46,739	230,664
Other Units	2,170	6,471
Grand Total	48,909	237,135

The average length of training was six months in the United States, two months in France and one month on an inactive sector before entering battle. In all, forty-two divisions were sent to France. The average infantry unit consisted of 27,000 men and 1,000 officers.

TRANSPORT

The following table shows the tonnage of vessels obtained from various countries for the *American* transport fleet.

United States—

New (Emergency Fleet Corp.)	935,274
Trades	140,972
Army	18,000
Navy	16,700
Germany	460,737
Holland	374,817
Japan	173,041
Sweden	93,603
Great Britain	88,379
Norway	81,460
Austria-Hungary	39,258
Denmark	16,917
China	15,610
Cuba	10,500
Brazil	8,500
Russia	5,100
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Total	2,478,886

The nationality of the tonnage which transported American troops abroad was as follows:

British	1,047,000
American	927,000
Italian	65,000
French	47,000
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Total	2,086,000

The cargo fleet was almost exclusively American. It amounted to 2,600,000 deadweight tons by November 1, 1918. By May 1, 1919, some 7,500,000 short tons of supplies had been transported to Europe. Only 200,000 deadweight tons were lost at sea, 142,000 by submarine attack; and not one American troop transport was lost on its way to Europe.

AMERICAN SHIPPING BUILT DURING HOSTILITIES

Between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918, 2,985 ships were built in United States shipbuilding plants. The total tonnage repre-

sented was 3,091,695 gross, an average of 1,035 gross tons each. Of the total built, 506 were ocean-going steel vessels, aggregating 2,056,814 tons, an average of slightly more than 4,000 gross tons each. Ocean-going wooden vessels aggregated 403, with a gross tonnage of 753,156.

Month by month the number of ships built in the United States was as follows:

Months—	Seagoing						Nonseagoing		Grand Total	
	Steel		Wood		Total					
	Number	Gross Tons	Number	Gross Tons	Number	Gross Tons	Number	Gross Tons	Number	Gross Tons
1917										
April	7	34,364	9	17,233	16	51,597	123	9,201	139	60,798
May	11	36,086	19	33,004	30	69,090	162	22,137	192	91,227
June	22	97,908	9	31,216	31	129,124	196	22,877	227	152,001
July	14	54,891	7	14,113	21	69,004	184	20,148	205	89,152
August	9	46,716	14	12,155	23	58,871	152	27,171	175	86,042
September	9	35,073	12	12,513	21	47,586	80	28,999	101	76,585
October	13	44,420	22	35,879	35	80,299	87	10,386	122	90,685
November	19	53,660	11	10,872	30	64,532	87	15,736	117	77,268
December	17	85,917	16	20,611	33	106,528	52	16,053	85	122,581
1918										
January	12	53,748	6	6,468	18	60,216	39	4,579	57	64,795
February	17	94,242	14	17,874	31	112,116	53	5,485	84	117,601
March	29	115,040	12	20,776	41	135,816	97	11,329	138	147,145
April	31	130,637	15	21,017	46	151,654	119	11,396	165	163,050
May*	*40	157,598	13	16,453	53	174,051	132	20,413	185	194,464
June	42	163,034	16	26,985	58	190,019	130	11,406	188	201,425
July†	37	146,981	38	72,727	75	219,708	118	†10,223	193	229,931
August	49	191,102	39	91,997	88	283,099	89	12,750	177	295,849
September	46	177,765	54	123,668	100	301,433	70	7,037	170	308,470
October	57	228,203	53	117,165	110	345,368	91	12,164	201	357,532
Nov. 1 to Nov. 11	25	112,429	24	53,430	49	162,859	15	2,235	64	165,094
Grand Total	506	2,056,814	403	753,156	909	2,809,970	2,076	281,725	2,985	3,091,695

* Includes 1 cement vessel of 3,427 gross tons.
† Includes 1 cement vessel of 325 gross tons.

AMERICA FEEDS THE WORLD

In connection with the war, it is of vital interest to understand to how enormous an extent the world was dependent upon the food products of America throughout the period of the war. The Allies needed for their final victory our food no less than our men, so that the following figures of our food exports acquire great significance:

	Three-year pre-war average	Fiscal Year 1916-17	Fiscal Year 1917-18	July-Sept. 1917	July-Sept. 1918
Beef, lbs.	186,375,372	405,427,417	565,462,445	93,962,477	171,986,147
Pork, lbs.	996,230,627	1,498,302,713	1,691,437,435	196,256,750	540,946,324
Dairy Products, lbs.	26,037,790	351,958,336	593,796,274	130,071,165	161,245,029
Vegetable Oils, lbs.	332,430,537	206,708,490	151,029,893	27,719,553	26,026,701
Grains, bush.	183,777,331	395,140,238	349,123,235	66,383,084	121,668,823
Sugar, lbs.	621,745,507	3,084,390,281	2,149,787,050	1,108,559,519	1,065,398,247

In connection with the grain exports of 1917-18, it must be remembered that the wheat crop of the year was more than 200,000 bushels below the average.

AMERICAN FORCES IN BATTLE

The number of American soldiers to reach France was 2,084,000. Of these, some 1,390,000 saw active service in the front battle-lines. The number of divisions dispatched overseas was 42, and in addition some 200,000 troops were sent in auxiliary services. Of the 42 divisions sent to France, only 29 took active part in hostilities as such, the remainder being utilized as replacement troops or arriving in France just before the termination of hostilities. Of these 29 divisions, whose record comprises the greater part of the battle record of the United States, 7 were of the Regular Army, 11 were of the National Guard and 11 were of the National Army.

During the 200 days of battle in which American troops were engaged, they performed 13 major operations, of which 11 were performed in conjunction with French, British and Italian troops and 2 were distinctively American undertakings.

The period of greatest activity of the American Army was in the second week of October, when all the 29 divisions were in line, holding 101 miles, or 23%, of the western battle-front. A resumé of the American record is as follows:

Total Battle Advances, miles.....	485
Prisoners Captured	63,000
Artillery Captured, Pieces	1,378
Trench Mortars Captured	708
Machine Guns Captured	9,650

The thirteen major operations in which American troops were engaged were as follows, together with the number of American troops involved:

West Front—Campaign of 1917:	
Cambrai Nov. 20 to Dec. 4.....	2,200

West Front—Campaign of 1918:

German offensives, Mar. 21 to July 18—

Somme, Mar. 21 to Apr. 6.....	2,200
Lys, Apr. 9 to 27.....	500
Aisne, May 27 to June 5.....	27,500
Noyon-Montdidier, June 9 to 15.....	27,000
Champagne-Marne, July 15 to 18.....	85,000

Allied offensives, July 18 to Nov. 11—

Aisne-Marne, July 18 to Aug. 6.....	270,000
Somme, Aug. 8 to Nov. 11.....	54,000
Oise-Aisne, Aug. 18 to Nov. 11.....	85,000
Ypres-Lys, Aug. 19 to Nov. 11.....	108,000
St. Mihiel, Sept. 12 to 16.....	550,000
Meuse-Argonne, Sept. 20 to Nov. 11.....	1,200,000

Italian Front—Campaign of 1918:

Vittorio-Veneto, Oct. 24 to Nov. 4.....	1,200
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CASUALTIES

Battle casualties in the American Expeditionary Forces were as follows:

Dead	48,909
Killed in Action.....	34,180
Died of Wounds.....	14,729
Wounded	230,074
Severely	80,130
Slightly	110,544
Degree Undetermined	39,400
Missing in Action.....	2,913
Prisoners	4,434
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Total	286,339

The comparative mortality in battle and from disease in recent wars of the United States has been as follows:

<i>War</i>	<i>Battle Rate</i>	<i>Disease Rate</i>
Mexican, 1846-48	12%	88%
Civil (Union forces), 1861-5.....	34%	66%
Spanish, 1898	16%	84%
European (Sept., 1917-June, 1918).....	50%	50%

EXPENDITURES

For the 25 months from April 1, 1917 to May 1, 1919, the Treasury disbursements of the United States were \$23,363,000. Charging \$2,069,000,000 as normal peace expenses, the direct cost of the War to the United States for 25 months may be placed at \$21,294,000,000. In addition, there was loaned to our Allies the sum of \$8,850,000,000. Of the total war expenditure, there was expended on the Army \$14,244,061,000. The *daily cost* of the War to the United States at different periods was as follows:

May 15, 1917.....	\$2,000,000
February 1, 1918.....	22,500,000
January 1, 1919.....	44,700,000

The expenditures in the Army from April 1, 1917 to May 1, 1919 were divided as follows:

Quartermaster Corps*	\$6,242,745,000
Ordnance Department	4,087,347,000
Pay of the Army.....	1,831,273,000
Air Service	859,291,000
Engineer Corps	638,974,000
Medical Department	314,544,000
Signal Corps	128,920,000
Chemical Warfare Service.....	83,299,000
Provost Marshal General.....	*24,301,000
Secretary of War and Miscellaneous....	†33,367,000

* Exclusive of pay of the Army.

† December 31, 1918.

The total cost of the War to the United States averaged well above \$1,000,000 *an hour* for more than two years.

THE VICTORY LOAN

The fifth and last of the great popular war loans floated by the United States during the war was known as the Victory Loan. Subscriptions were obtained in a campaign which lasted from April 21,

1919 to May 10, both inclusive. The amount of the loan was \$4,500,000,000; and although the total subscriptions amounted to \$5,250,000,000 none of the oversubscription was allotted. Two sets of notes were offered—one at $4\frac{3}{4}\%$, maturing on May 20, 1923; and one at $3\frac{3}{4}\%$, free from the Federal income tax, maturing on May 20, 1922.

The total number of subscribers was approximately 12,000,000, and about 60% of the loan was taken by persons who subscribed less than \$10,000 each.

The subscriptions were as follows:

<i>Federal Reserve</i> <i>District</i>	<i>Quota</i>	<i>Subscriptions</i>	<i>Per</i> <i>Cent</i>	<i>Subscribers</i>
New York	\$1,350,000,000	\$1,762,684,900	130.57	2,484,532
Chicago	652,500,000	772,046,550	118.32	2,267,411
Boston	375,000,000	425,159,950	113.38	817,822
Philadelphia	375,000,000	422,756,100	112.73	984,975
Minneapolis	157,500,000	176,114,850	111.82	931,767
Cleveland	450,000,000	496,750,650	110.39	1,253,834
St. Louis	195,000,000	210,431,950	101.91	367,444
Richmond	210,000,000	225,146,850	107.21	500,000
San Francisco	301,500,000	319,120,800	105.84	994,944
Kansas City	195,000,000	197,989,100	101.53	680,967
Atlanta	144,000,000	143,062,050	99.34	320,699
Dallas	94,500,000	87,504,250	92.60	200,000
Treasury	11,140,300	185,000
Grand Total.....	\$4,500,000,000	\$5,249,908,300	116.66	11,987,395

SUPPLIES

An idea of the vast extent of the supplies needed by the American Army may be gleaned from the following list of the clothing furnished our soldiers in the less than fourteen months from April 6, 1917 to June 1, 1918.

Wool Stockings, pairs.....	131,800,000
Undershirts	85,000,000
Underdrawers	83,600,000
Shoes, pairs	30,700,000
Flannel Shirts	26,500,000
Blankets	21,700,000
Wool Breeches	21,700,000
Wool Coats	18,900,000
Overcoats	8,300,000

In the year 1918, the American Army purchased 18,000,000 blankets, whereas in the year 1914 the entire American production of blankets amounted to only 8,000,000.

The following table shows the tonnage of motor trucks manufactured for the American Expeditionary Forces in France.

February, 1918	5,000
May	15,000
July	30,000
September	40,000
November 11	60,000
February, 1919	85,000

The number of motor trucks received by the American Expeditionary Forces prior to the armistice was 33,000.

The capacity of the various cantonments and other housing accommodations erected for the American Army in the United States was 1,800,000. The total expenditures for these accommodations by the day of the armistice had reached \$800,000,000, or more than twice the cost of the Panama Canal.

During the six months of active American belligerency, the average enlisted men in the American Expeditionary Forces received a slicker and overcoat every five months, a blanket every two months, a coat every eighty days, a flannel shirt every two months, a pair of shoes and puttees every fifty days, a pair of breeches every two months, a suit of underclothing every thirty-five days, and a pair of woolen socks every twenty-three days.

American Engineers constructed in France 1,000 miles of standard gauge railroad track, 540 miles of narrow-gauge track, and 83 new ship berths at the ports of unloading. The Signal Corps constructed about 100,000 miles of telegraph and telephone wire.

RIFLES

The following table shows the number of rifles available to the War Department during the course of hostilities.

April 6, 1918.....	587,000
August	611,000
December	994,000
March, 1918	1,635,000
June	2,084,000
September	2,784,000
January, 1919	3,490,000

With the entrance of the United States into the War, it was found that it would be impossible to manufacture in sufficient quantities the Springfield rifle which the War Department considered the best rifle for war purposes. But several large plants in the United States had been manufacturing for the British Government large quantities of Enfield rifles, and the Enfield was hence the rifle manufactured in greatest quantities for the American Army. The British model was altered so as to use in its chamber the same ammunition as used in the Springfield. Deliveries of this modified Enfield were begun in September, 1917 and thereafter, as shown in the preceding table, increased rapidly.

MACHINE GUNS

The impetus given the use of machine guns by the Great War may be gleaned from the fact that in 1912 Congress authorized the use of 4 machine guns per regiment, whereas the allowance of the War Department in 1919 provided for 336 machine guns per regiment.

In December, 1916, 4,000 machine guns of the Vickers type had been ordered, and by December, 1917, some 2,000 of them had been delivered. But technical difficulties in the manufacture of the Vickers gun prevented its manufacture in quantity production. A new type, the heavy Browning, was hence designed for machine guns, with the light Browning for automatic rifles. The Lewis gun was used chiefly for air work, with the Marlin gun used in airplanes for the synchronized firing which passes between the propeller blades. A modified form of the heavy Browning was later used for synchronized air firing. The needs of the first troops landed in France were met by French guns, but after July 1 American divisions sailing abroad were

fully equipped with Brownings, although it was not until September that the Browning guns were used in battle by the American Expeditionary Forces. The growth of the supply of machine guns of American make available for the Army is shown in the following table.

January, 1918	13,000
February	19,000
March	26,000
April	35,000
May	48,000
June	61,000
July	86,000
August	121,000
September	143,000
October	178,000
November	201,000

Before the end of the War, American production of rifle ammunition amounted to 350,000,000 rounds, of which some 150,000,000 rounds had been shipped overseas. But it had been necessary to secure some 100,000,000 rounds from the French and British.

HEAVY ARTILLERY

When the United States entered the War, it had on hand some 900 pieces of heavy artillery, of which about 550 were the 3-inch field piece. The greatest needs of the American troops were met by France and Great Britain. The following table shows the supply on hand of the complete units of artillery made in the United States, exclusive of artillery made for the Navy and for the Allies; and the rounds of American artillery ammunition accepted to date.

January, 1918	54	1,803,000
February	135	2,389,000
March	215	3,231,000
April	302	4,361,000
May	391	5,555,000

June	490	6,896,000
July	590	7,981,000
August	752	10,072,000
September	1,049	12,630,000
October	1,469	15,702,000
November	1,826	18,294,000
December	2,078	20,326,000

In all, the American Expeditionary Forces had received by the signing of the armistice 3,499 pieces of artillery, of which 477 were of American manufacture. The total number of pieces used on the firing line was 2,251, of which 130 were of American manufacture. The rounds of ammunition expended were 8,000,000, of which 200,000 were of American make. The number of rounds of American-made ammunition expended in battle was 8,500.

The total tons of *toxic gas* manufactured in the United States for the use of the American Army was in the neighborhood of 11,000. Most of this production was done at the Proving Ground at Aberdeen, Maryland (Edgewood Arsenal).

About 1,100 *medium-sized tractors* were shipped to the American Expeditionary Forces and 300 *large-sized tractors*. About 350 of the latter type were obtained from France and Great Britain. Of *tanks*, 64 had been produced in this country, although by March, 1919, the production had risen to 775. The burden of the A. E. F. tank work in France was met chiefly by the 225 tanks received from France.

The total number of days in line of American combat divisions was 2,232. Of this time, 75% was with the support of American artillery; 5%, of British artillery; 1½%, of French; and 18½% unsupported (18% of the days were along inactive sectors).

The cost of the food of each soldier has increased more than 350% since 1899. Naturally, the cost of the rations in France was higher than the cost in the United States because of the added expense for packing of commodities to go overseas. The average cost of one day's meals for one soldier in the United States has been as follows in recent years:

	Cents		Cents
1890	13.18	1914	24.39
1895	14.42	1915	25.32
1900	16.97	1916	26.87
1905	16.18	1917	33.03
1910	21.44	1918*	40.46
1912	23.78	1918†	50.
* January.		† November.	

AIRPLANES AND BALLOONS

By months, the number of flying officers in the entire army and in France was as follows:

	<i>In the Army In the A. E. F.</i>	
April, 1917	75
May	105
June	139
July	189
August	229	26
September	301	31
October	603	31
November	876	45
December	1,146	157
January, 1918	1,897	321
February	2,197	485
March	2,898	650
April	4,363	1,800
May	6,041	2,200
June	6,784	2,840
July	7,666	2,692
August	8,976	3,060
September	9,756	3,450
October	10,423	4,252
November	11,425	4,307

At the date of the armistice there were 34 flying fields in operation, with more than 1,000 instructors; 8,602 men had been graduated from elementary training and 4,028 from advanced training.

The following table shows the number of American air squadrons in action by months.

	<i>Pursuit</i>	<i>Obser- vation</i>	<i>Bombing</i>	<i>Total</i>
April, 1918	1	2	..	3
May	4	4	1	9
June	7	6	1	14
July	7	7	1	15
August	12	12	1	25
September	12	14	4	30
October	18	18	6	42
November	20	18	7	45

When the United States entered the European War, only 55 air-planes were available for war purposes and all of these were inadequate for the purposes of the European War.

To the date of the armistice, 5,300 *primary training* planes had been produced, including 1,600 abandoned because of faulty engines; and 2,500 *advanced training* planes had been delivered. Altogether, 9,500 *training* planes (8,000 of American manufacture) and 18,000 *training engines* (16,650 of American manufacture) were produced.

The total production of service planes to the end of each month is shown in the following table:

	<i>From America</i>	<i>From the Allies</i>	<i>Total</i>
September, 1917	6	6
October	75	75
November	258	258
December	266	266
January, 1918	304	304
February	9	402	411
March	13	552	565
April	30	695	725
May	106	969	1,165
June	542	1,345	1,886
July	1,028	1,975	3,003
August	1,184	2,536	3,720
September	1,892	3,047	4,939
October	3,014	3,483	6,497
November	4,089	3,800	7,889

The total number of *service engines* produced for the American Expeditionary Forces by the armistice was 22,104, of which 16,425 came from American sources and 5,779 from foreign sources.

Altogether, 2,698 planes were sent to the advanced zones for the use of the American forces. Of this number, 667 were of American manufacture.

Before the armistice, 13,754 twelve-cylinder *Liberty Motors* had been completed, 4,435 had been shipped to Pershing and 1,025 had been shipped to the Allies.

It was agreed with the Allies that America should specialize in air-plane production on the observation and bombing machines. To this end, four different types were selected—the British Handley-Page observation and day-bombing; the British Handley-Page night bomber; the British Bristol two-seated fighter; and the Italian Caproni night bomber. Only the former was being made in quantity production by the time of the armistice. A total of 3,227 had been completed, 1,885 had been shipped to France and 667 to the advanced zones.

Of observation balloons, 642 were manufactured in America and of these, 369 were shipped abroad.

During hostilities, American aviators brought down 755 enemy air-planes and 71 balloons, whereas the enemy brought down 357 American planes and 43 American balloons.

UNITED STATES NAVY ACTIVITIES

Owing to the fact that the German naval campaign after the United States entered the War was confined to its submarine operations, the United States navy played a purely defensive and protective part in the conflict. Without its protection, however, combined with the protection of the navies of the Allies, not only could few American troops have been dispatched to Europe, but also there would have been a lack of the supplies wherewith to support them there. The United States Navy assisted materially in the transportation of more than 2,000,000 United States troops to Europe without the loss of a single American troopship sailing east and with the loss of only a few hundred soldiers altogether on the high seas.

At the close of the War, the United States naval forces in European waters comprised 338 vessels with a personnel of some 75,000—representing a force larger than the entire navy before the entrance of the United States into the War.

Four naval vessels were lost in the War as a result of submarine attacks—the destroyer *Jacob Jones*; the converted yacht *Alcedo*; the Coast Guard cutter *Tampa*; and the cruiser *San Diego* (sunk by mine). The collier *Cyclops* was also lost in a fashion which made its disappearance a complete mystery.

One definite achievement of the United States Navy was the laying of a mine barrage against submarines in the North Sea. For this purpose 100,000 mines were manufactured and more than 85,000 shipped abroad.

On July 1, 1918, the enlisted and commissioned personnel of the naval aviation forces of the United States included 823 trained naval aviators, 2,052 student officers, 400 ground officers, 7,300 trained mechanics, and 5,400 mechanics in training. The total naval aircraft personnel was in the neighborhood of 30,000.

When war was declared between the United States and Germany the navy comprised 66,000 men. At the signing of the armistice, this number had increased to 497,000. When war was declared, the navy had 197 ships in commission; at the signing of the armistice, this number had increased to more than 2,000. During the same period the Naval Reserve increased from 85,000 to 290,000.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE DURING THE ARMISTICE

THE GERMAN REVOLUTION

When the Imperial German Government declared war on Russia on August 1, 1914, there were 111 members of the Social Democratic Party in the German Reichstag. These 111 Socialist delegates comprised 28% of the total membership of the Reichstag, having been elected by some 4,500,000 votes—indeed, the popular Socialist vote in Germany before the war amounted to 35% of the total vote.

As we have seen, the Reichstag enjoyed little control over the destinies of Germany, but its one check upon the Kaiser and upon his Government lay in its power over the purse-strings of the Treasury. On August 4, the Reichstag voted upon the war budget submitted to it by the Government. Like the Socialist parties of most countries, the Social Democratic Party of Germany was bound by a rule which compelled its elected representatives to vote as a unit, and on August 3 a party caucus had been held to obtain a show of hands. At this caucus, only fourteen members were at first in favor of rejecting the Government's budget, and at the end of the caucus only three persisted in advocating opposition to the war—Liebknecht, Haase and Ledebour. The entire vote of the Social Democratic delegates in the Reichstag on August 4 was therefore cast in favor of supporting the Imperial Government in its prosecution of the war.

On December 2, 1914, however, Karl Liebknecht voted against the second war budget, only to be officially censured by his party for disregarding its unit rule in order to cast the only vote of opposition to Germany's further prosecution of the war. On the vote for the third war budget, on March 20, 1915, Liebknecht and another Social

Democratic delegate voted in the negative and 30 Social Democratic delegates absented themselves from the Reichstag chamber when the vote was taken.

In the summer of 1915, the Social Democratic Party definitely split into two camps on the question of aiding the Imperial Government's war program. The majority, under the leadership of Scheidemann, Ebert, David, Noske and Landsberg, continued to support the Government, whereas the seceding minority (the "Independent Socialists"), under the leadership of Liebknecht, Haase, Dittmann, Luxemburg, Zetkin, Kautsky, Ledebour and Bernstein, took an attitude of firm opposition. On the whole, the German people enthusiastically followed their leaders in the first years of the war, and the only hostility to the war to be discerned among them arose from these Independent Socialists, sadly in the minority among even the Socialists of Germany. But outside of Germany, the Independent Socialists were strengthened in their stand by a congress of Socialists of the more radical type, held in Zimmerwald, Switzerland, in 1915.

The meagre information at hand concerning affairs within Germany during the war seems to warrant the statement that there was little serious opposition, outside of that of the Independent Socialists, to the German Government until the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in March, 1917. The Independent Socialists, although among their leaders were minds long recognized as the deepest and most brilliant among the German Socialists, were weak both in numbers and in influence. But with the downfall of the Tsarist regime, there began to arise in Germany a definite feeling, of increasing, if still slight, power, of opposition to the Government. We have seen that the ministers of the Kaiser had adroitly played upon his people's fear and dislike of Tsarist Russia in the days when the issue of peace and war was being decided. If the menace of Tsarist Russia had been a real menace, even German Socialists might have been pardoned for preferring the rule of the Kaiser to the rule of the Tsar. But with the downfall of the Tsarist regime, many of the radical elements in Germany who had been advocating the continued prosecution of the war began to agitate for peace overtures. The sufferings of the German people as a result of the war were becoming more and more ter-

rible, and were affecting even the docile German acquiescence in the decrees of the Imperial Government—and victory seemed more and more remote. For the first time, labor disputes and strikes became numerous in industries of vital importance in the prosecution of the war, although they were still far from the point where great difficulty was to be experienced in ending them. A compelling bit of evidence as to the growth of peace feeling in Germany at this time is furnished by the fact that in July, 1917, a combination of the Socialists and the Centrists (Catholics) forced through the Reichstag, despite strong Governmental opposition, a resolution declaring that the Reichstag and the German people endorsed the Russian peace formula of "No punitive indemnities, no forcible annexations and the right of self-determination for all nationalities," and that the Reichstag and the German people were ready to make peace upon those terms, provided that the integrity of the German Empire should be safeguarded.

Although the peace feeling within Germany had thus become active by the summer of 1917, it must not be understood as having shaken the support given the German Government by the great majority of the German people. The hand of the Independent Socialists was strengthened and the people were eager for peace, possibly even for peace without victory; but the motto of the great mass of the German people was still "My country, right or wrong," and they were still ready to stand by their armies while the war continued. And before the end of the summer of 1917, even the desire for peace seems to have lost ground. Doubtless there were many cogent reasons for this weakening of the peace feeling. In the first place, the Russia of Lvoff and of Kerenski had continued the struggle against the Kaiser's forces and had thus dissipated to a great extent whatever of a new attitude of cordiality toward Russia had begun to rise in Germany, similarly resurrecting much of the pristine German hatred of Russia. In the second place, the Allies treated with silence the passage of the July peace resolution in the Reichstag. In the third place, the Allies and the United States refused to permit Labor and Socialist delegates to attend the projected Socialist conference to be held at Stockholm in June. (Great Britain was willing to grant passports, but under restrictions which were tantamount to refusing them.)

Even the German Socialists were accordingly compelled to realize that the Allies were determined to continue the war until Germany's military might had been decisively and irredeemably overcome, and even the German Socialists, with the possible exception of the Independents, preferred a final German victory to a final German defeat.

Indeed, until the very end of hostilities, the German Majority Socialists wholeheartedly supported the Kaiser's Government on every issue of first-rank importance, dissenting merely upon issues of a more or less superficial nature. The Majority Socialists were anxious to liberalize the German constitution and refused to take office in the Government until that end had been achieved; but they were definitely averse to effecting a revolution during the period of hostilities, lest the military power of Germany be weakened; and hence the fruition of the German Revolution was from seeds other than those sown by the Majority Socialists.

But with the Bolshevist Revolution of November, 1917, and the consequent formal withdrawal of Russia from the War, the desire for peace in Germany grew apace. There could no longer be successful pretext on the part of the rulers of Germany that their land was threatened from the east, and suffering from lack of necessities was constantly accelerating. During the winter of 1917-1918, the many strikes throughout industrial Germany reached alarming proportions, and in January and February, 1918, even the workers in the munitions factories went out on strike. The situation could be met only by practically placing the industrial sections of the country under martial law and Ludendorff was given authority so wide in scope as to constitute him to all purposes an uncontrolled dictator. From March to October, 1918, the story of Germany is the story of the will of Ludendorff.

As we have seen, Germany met her internal and external difficulties by a supreme military effort. And with the beginning of the German victories in the west in March, the discontent with the Kaiser's Government seems to have immediately waned. The story is unpleasant but is irrefutable—the German people would turn against their rulers only when their rulers were faced by defeat; in the heyday of its glory and with victory in sight, the Imperial Government could

count upon the almost unqualified support of the German people. At all events, it is not until the German defeats in July and August that a widespread spirit of revolt again begins to rear its head in the Kaiser's dominions. And yet perhaps it is more than a mere coincidence that on July 24, 1918, when Paris seemed surely destined to fall before the guns and phalanxes of Ludendorff and von Hindenburg, the German secretary for foreign affairs, von Kühlmann, should have openly proclaimed that the Fatherland could not achieve final victory by the weight of her armies alone—a statement which compelled him to resign two weeks later in favor of von Hintze.

With the German check at the Marne on July 18 and the withdrawal from the great Marne salient in the following days, many Germans must have begun to suspect that defeat was almost at hand. With the evacuation of the Somme salient in the following month, the numbers of such doubters must have swelled, and when the Allies began to break through the Hindenburg Line, the disillusion must have been almost complete. With the unconditional surrender of Bulgaria, all hope was lost; and on September 30, the Government of von Hertling collapsed. The succeeding administration of Prince Max was a straw which indicated unmistakably the direction in which the political wind was blowing in the German Empire. Not only was Max a liberal, instead of a devotee of Junkerism; not only was his Government a liberal Government; not only did the Majority Socialists at length consent to take seats in the Cabinet; not only were they probably the most influential members in it; not only was the mediaeval, outworn German constitution altered in conformity with many, if not most, of the principles of political democracy preached and followed by Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States; but also the accession of Prince Max to the chancellorship saw at last the predominance of the civil power in Germany over the military, saw the eclipse of the Junkers and the militarists, saw Ludendorff's wings clipped and the Kaiser reduced to a pathetic figure-head.

It is generally believed that toward the end of September Ludendorff had officially informed the Kaiser, von Hertling and other leaders that the German armies were facing complete disaster and that Germany must immediately sue for peace. At all events, there

AMERICAN DOUGHBOYS IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM

The upper panel reveals a company of American soldiers resting on a road in France along which they are marching toward the battle-front. The central picture is one of the first received in this country showing American soldiers in France. They are passing through a village in Picardy on their way to the front. In the lower panel several members of an American machine-gun battalion are airing their clothing. Holes made in their shelter-tent by shrapnel are plainly visible.

was no opposition, even from the military party, to the peace overtures which were begun, as we have seen, by Max's government early in October. During the armistice negotiations, the German people more and more became acquainted with facts, such as the conduct of the German army in Belgium, which had been zealously kept from their knowledge by their Government. The bitterness of the people against their rulers increased by leaps and bounds and talk of revolution became more and more prevalent. Only the hope of maintaining an unbroken front against the enemy in the last days of hostilities in order to gain some salvage from the wreck seems to have postponed the revolution almost until the armistice terms had been formulated by the Allies and handed to the German delegates on November 8.

By October 20, even the majority Socialists were openly demanding in the Reichstag that the Kaiser abdicate. Ludendorff resigned as head of the German General Staff, and the Kaiser accepted his resignation on October 26. Political prisoners, including Liebknecht, were released from jail. And on November 5 the German Revolution got definitely under way with a revolt of sailors at Kiel. Control of the German fleet fell practically at once to sailors' councils, much like the soldiers' councils which sprang up in Russia soon after the Russian Revolution, and within several days most of the great German naval strongholds, including Kiel, Helgoland and Wilhelmshaven, were in the power of the revolting sailors. A number of the German states, including Bavaria, officially seceded from the German Empire and set up independent Governments of their own, some of them Socialist. And on November 9, Kaiser William II fled to Holland and at last Germany was a republic. On the same day, Prince Max announced that he would turn over the chancellorship to Ebert, of the Majority Socialists. On November 28, the Kaiser formally abdicated.

Nevertheless, it is probable that, as in Russia, the Revolution was largely unplanned and unexpected. At least, even the Socialists seem to have been as unprepared for it and as little responsible for it as the liberal group in the Duma had been for the Russian Revolution. And, as in Russia, it was only after the Revolution was an accomplished fact that the anti-Government leaders among the people's representatives assumed the leadership of the Revolution. Indeed, for the first

days of the Revolution, most of the large cities of Germany, including Berlin, were virtually under the direction of councils of soldiers and workmen's delegates similar to the Russian soviets. But soon parliamentary government reasserted itself, under the chancellorship of Friedrich Ebert, the Socialist leader and former harness-maker, and the Ebert Government had little difficulty in gaining control, so that Germany was saved from Bolshevism.

But there soon arose in Germany, under the leadership of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, a party with a creed closely approaching the creed of the Bolsheviki. Its members were known as the Spartacides. They openly repudiated the processes of political democracy and urged their followers to gain control of the country by force and to set up a Soviet form of government in Germany. Under Spartacist agitation, many crippling strikes broke out and armed forces tried to upset the new ministry. There were a number of clashes in the barricaded streets of Berlin and there was much bloodshed. But on the whole the army stood by the Ebert Government, and the Spartacides failed; and with the violent deaths of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg in January, 1919, the Spartacist movement gradually died out, at least temporarily.

With the success of the Revolution, the Minority or Independent Socialists had supported the Ebert Government, taking seats in the Cabinet. The Independents are far more radical than the Majority Socialists, but on the whole accept the principles of political democracy and of control by the majority, and thus are not to be considered Bolshevists. But before the beginning of 1919, the Minority Socialists had again split with the followers of Ebert and Scheidemann, and had withdrawn from the Government, taking a position of opposition.

This break between the Minority and the Majority Socialists further weakened the latter, and Ebert was forced to cooperate more and more with non-Socialist parties in Germany. The Government maintained its authority only by employing vigorously the force of soldiers recruited for national safety and controlled by the minister of national defence, Noske. The chief anxiety of the country concerned the peace terms to be granted Germany, and thus the full realization of the Socialist state was postponed. However, many

sweeping reforms were introduced, such as full woman suffrage and the eight-hour day.

On February 6, 1919, the elected delegates to the German Constituent Assembly met at Weimar. On February 9, a temporary constitution was adopted for the new German Republic, and on February 11 Ebert was elected President. But the position of the German President had been given by the Constitution a status much like that of the French President—the real Government is selected through and is responsible to the national legislature and the true head of the Government is the chancellor, or prime minister. The first chancellor was Phillip Scheidemann, for many years the head of the moderate and patriotic wing of the German Socialists. The elections to the Reichstag after the ratification of the Constitution gave the majority Socialists a larger number of representatives than any other single party, but not a majority.

However, toward the end of the armistice period, there were indications that the Majority Socialists were becoming weaker. Many elements in Germany had supported them only in the hope of acquiring for the Fatherland the easiest possible peace; but when the severity of the terms which were imposed upon them was realized, the Government lost much of its support. Unquestionably, the Independent Socialists had become stronger toward the end of the armistice period, but their ability to gain control was sharply conditioned by the fact that most of their prominent leaders were too old to assume the burdens of office. Kurt Eisner, the brilliant Socialist head of the new Bavarian state, had been assassinated by a royalist, and, on the whole, the Independent Socialists remained under the leadership of Hugo Haase.

So fiery was the opposition within Germany to the peace terms forced on Germany by the Allies that the Scheidemann Government resigned rather than take responsibility for signing it, although the National Assembly at Weimar had finally ratified the treaty. The new Government was headed by Bauer, but there was every indication that it would not continue in office long and that Scheidemann would again guide the destinies of the new German Republic.

FRANCE

In France, the censorship was maintained almost unabated during the period between the end of hostilities with Germany and the final ratification of the main peace treaties. Furthermore, most of the other war-time restrictions imposed by the French Government, such as control over meetings and over labor disputes, were also continued during this period; so that it is difficult to ascertain the power of the various forces seething below the surface in French political life. Much information, such as news of strikes and political labor movements in Great Britain, was kept from the French people, in the interests of the safety of the French Government; and it was therefore possible that with the end of the governmental censorship there would occur a re-alignment of the political parties in the country, as the French people became familiar with information denied them until the signing of peace.

There could be no doubt, however, of the great popularity of Georges Clemenceau, the premier under whom France had emerged victorious from the war and probably the Allied political leader most responsible for the military defeat of the Central Powers. Clemenceau belonged to the more conservative type of European statesman, and his recent political record in France had been one of constant opposition to radical innovations. He was cordially disliked by the Labor and Socialist movements in France, and these movements hence led a strong opposition to his Government during all the days of the armistice.

Much of the opposition to the Clemenceau Government vented itself in economic and industrial rather than in political action. For French Labor has always been more prone to realize its ends by strikes, especially by the general strike, than British labor, for instance. However, the great French non-political labor organization, the *Confédération générale du travail*, is usually in warm cooperation with the political party of the French Socialists. As we have seen, the pro-War section of the French Socialists, under the leadership of Thomas and Renaudel, had been outnumbered as the war progressed by the anti-War Socialists, under the leadership of Longuet and Cachin; but with

the conclusion of hostilities both branches of the Socialist Party joined once more in opposition to the Government. The Socialists were especially bitter concerning the policy of intervention in Russia pursued by France; but, although for the greater part they defended the Russian Bolsheviki against intervention and blockade, there would seem to have been little desire to establish Bolshevism in France. Even more influential in causing unrest than dissatisfaction with the political policies of Clemenceau was anger at the high cost of living and at delay in demobilization.

There were numerous strikes, of an extremely serious nature—such as strikes on the railways and on the Paris systems of communication—throughout the armistice period. Nevertheless, the Clemenceau Government maintained itself securely against all attacks levelled upon it, and came through several test votes in the French Chamber of Deputies with a substantial majority. The presence of the Peace Conference in Paris, with the belief that Clemenceau was opposing much of the international program insisted upon by President Wilson and, to some extent, by Premier Lloyd-George, served to strengthen Clemenceau's hand in France. The losses of France in the War had been far severer than those of any other nation, and the French hatred of the Germans was far too deep to be vitiated more than slightly by the cessation of hostilities. During the peace conferences, it was felt that lack of unity in France would accrue to the benefit of Germany; and as it was known that Clemenceau was demanding greater punishment of the German people than was any other of the "Big Four" in the peace negotiations, the anti-German feeling in France rallied faithfully and enthusiastically around the aged but vigorous French premier.

It was admitted that Clemenceau was no firm believer in the efficacy of a League of Nations and that the foreign policy of the French Government was one of assuring the safety and power of France through channels other than those of the League. In addition, the Clemenceau Government was ever anxious to redeem the French loans in Russia lost as a result of the downfall of the Tsar and the rise to power of the Bolsheviki. Similarly, the conservative nature of the French Government turned it strongly against all forms of Socialist states, and hence the policy of France during the armistice was to

bring all possible force to bear to overthrow the Bolshevist regimes in both Russia and Hungary. France therefore whole-heartedly supported, financed and practically controlled the new states of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, using them as buffer-states to isolate Russia, Hungary and Germany; and seems also to have played off Jugo-Slavia as far as possible against the growing strength of Italy.

GREAT BRITAIN

In Great Britain, a general election was held in December, 1918, and resulted in an overwhelming victory for Premier Lloyd-George and his coalition Unionist Government. The Government obtained 471 seats, the Labor Party, 65, Unionists, 46, and the Liberal Party, but 37. Ireland went solidly for Sinn Fein, returning 73 Sinn Feiners to 7 Nationalists. But as the Sinn Feiners refused to take their seats in Parliament in protest against the Government's refusal to grant freedom to Ireland and as the non-coalition Unionists could be counted upon to support the Government, it will be seen that Lloyd-George had little opposition worthy of the name. The leader of the Liberals, ex-Premier Asquith, was defeated, along with most of his lieutenants, as was the leader of the Labor Party, Arthur Henderson, along with the prominent Labor pacifists, Macdonald and Snowden. This was the first general election in England in which women voted, the franchise having been extended to all women over the age of thirty; but nevertheless the total vote cast was very small.

In his pre-election campaign, the premier took full advantage of the current bitterness against Germany, promising that, if returned, he would compel Germany to pay the costs of the war and would bring the ex-Kaiser to trial. The results of the election were hence a complete vindication of the Government and a testimonial of gratitude for victory over the Central Powers.

Nevertheless, Lloyd-George's position was insecure. In the first place, he himself was a radical, especially in the field of social legislation, and hence it was not to be expected that his program could long satisfy the Unionists, who for the time being had become his party. For the Unionist Party was the great conservative party in England,

being composed chiefly of the aristocracy, the landed interests and the employing classes. Indeed, in the many years in which Lloyd-George had served as chancellor of the exchequer in the Liberal Government of Mr. Asquith, none of the other Liberal leaders had been the anathema to the Unionists that Mr. Lloyd-George had been.

In the second place, the difficulties of the Irish problem increased rather than lessened. The postponement in the application of Home Rule as a result of the outbreak of the war; the execution and imprisonment of some of the Irish leaders in the abortive Irish revolt for independence in 1916; the high influence wielded in the Government by the leader of the anti-Nationalist forces, Sir Edward Carson; the Government's inability to punish Ulster for actions for which Nationalists and Sinn Feiners were being punished; the efficiency of the organization of the Sinn Fein movement; and the general impetus given, especially in the addresses and papers of President Wilson, to the "rights of minor nationalities" to be free from a rule distasteful to them and to achieve liberty as one of the major aims of the War—all these factors had served to bring about what was virtually open revolt throughout most of Ireland. Before the peace treaties were finally signed, Ireland was in essence an armed camp and was held to the British Empire only by virtue of the large military forces maintained there by the Government. Martial law was proclaimed and put into effect, and there were many indications that even a large section of the British Army would no longer suffice to avert revolt on a scale sufficiently large to cause much bloodshed.

Lloyd-George had been Asquith's leading lieutenant when the Liberal ministry of the latter had passed the bill providing Home Rule for Ireland, so it must be surmised that Lloyd-George personally sympathized with Ireland's hopes for at least self-government. But the Unionist Party had long been opposed to even Home Rule, and hence Lloyd-George could make no move toward Home Rule without sacrificing his support in Parliament and hence either resigning or going to the country in another general election.

Meantime, the situation was complicated by the strong support in the United States for the movement for Irish freedom. The Irish elements in the United States were both numerous and powerful, and to

a very large degree were strongly hostile to Great Britain and just as strongly in favor of Irish independence. Accordingly, there was political strength in championing the cause of the Irish which did not adhere in championship of the cause of the Indian or the Egyptian or the Korean or other nationalities. Both the United States Senate and House of Representatives passed resolutions asking for Irish freedom and to that end much political pressure was brought to bear upon President Wilson in his conferences in Europe on the peace treaties. A delegation from the United States visited Ireland during the Peace Conference and returned with a report of brutalities and repressions in Ireland which occasioned, even in many sections of English public opinion not enthusiastic at the prospect of a free Ireland, protest against the British Government's Irish policy. The British Government was compelled also to face the fact that a free Ireland would be anti-British and in later years might form an offensive and defensive alliance with Germany.

In the third place, Labor troubles in England were increasing. British Labor is, perhaps, better organized and more ably led than Labor in any other country. A strike of the coal miners, of the railwaymen, of the dock-workers, of the seamen, would bring the Government to terms. Moreover, British Labor was coming more and more, under the arguments of Robert Smillie, the miners' leader, to depend upon industrial rather than merely upon political action to achieve even political ends. Many of the British unions were threatening to strike in order to effect the nationalization of such natural resources as the coal mines; and as the owners of such natural resources were high in the councils of the Unionist Party, the Government was caught between two fires.

In the fourth place, as the peace conferences developed, it was seen that the British premier would be unable to compel Germany to pay all the cost of the war. Germany was so thoroughly prostrated both financially and industrially that it was evident that the imposition of even the greatest possible indemnities upon her would fall far short of meeting the Allies' war bills. Furthermore, it was doubtful if Holland would surrender the person of the ex-Kaiser of Germany, on the ground that a political refugee was entitled to the rights of political

asylum; and furthermore there had arisen a strong feeling, even in England, against strengthening the hands of the royalist factions in Germany by making a martyr of the late German ruler.

Accordingly, it was not surprising that practically all the bye-elections in England after the general election in December, 1918, showed a marked decrease in the Government's vote.

ITALY

Italy was divided by two great currents during the armistice. One was the current of nationalistic ambitions, centering around the acquisition not only of the territory promised Italy in the secret Pact of London but also of Fiume and of other regions. The other was the current of revolution among the lower classes.

Italian nationalistic ambitions were intensified by the open break with President Wilson at the peace conferences in Paris on the question of Fiume. With the President's open declaration that Fiume must go to the South Slavs, Italian patriotic fervor increased and for a time overshadowed the feeling for revolution. Nevertheless, riots and uprisings were common throughout Italy during the period of the armistice. The high cost of living was a particular object of grievance in Italy, and on a number of occasions food rioters robbed and pillaged, until by the middle of the summer of 1919 the Government was compelled to fix considerably lower prices for food as the only method of maintaining order. The majority of the Italian Socialists were more favorably inclined to Bolshevism than the majority of the Socialists of other Entente countries, and they were supported in their demonstrations against the Government by many members of the syndicalist and anarchist groups.

In Italy, as in France, a strict censorship upon all news was imposed by the Government, so that, doubtless, during the armistice many events in Italy of prime importance were not known to the outside world. It is known, however, that feeling against Allied intervention in Russia was so strong that Italian sailors mutinied rather than ship munitions to the forces warring against the Bolshevik army; and the charges were many that the Italian Government feared to demobilize

the army more rapidly because of the number of the soldiers who had been inculcated with the Bolshevist virus. But the evidence up to the signing of peace all served to show that patriotism would be able to conquer the revolutionary movement.

Failure to obtain the concession of Fiume from the Peace Conference at Paris was largely responsible for the downfall of the Orlando ministry in June, 1919. The new cabinet was headed by Nitti, with Sonnino succeeded as minister of foreign affairs by Tittoni.

Throughout the armistice period, there were frequent conflicts between Italian troops and troops of other nations in Dalmatia, Albania and other sections of the Adriatic littoral.

AUSTRIA

In Austria, one of the six component parts into which the old Austro-Hungarian Empire resolved itself at the end of the War, there was strong feeling for annexation to Germany. As we have seen, Austria is inhabited chiefly by the German nationality, and Germany reciprocated Austria's feeling for annexation. However, the Peace Conference decided that both Austria and Germany should remain separate independent states. Austria did not follow Hungary in assuming an attitude of defiance toward the Entente Allies during the armistice, but endeavored to obtain by good conduct whatever concessions might be obtained from the Allies' representatives at Paris. Austria's endeavors were concerned especially with the partition of the old debts and new indemnities of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy among all the countries which had arisen from its ruins, and left no stone unturned to compel Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Ukraine, Roumania and Jugo-Slavia to meet their proportionate share of this financial burden.

Bolshevism made little headway in Austria during the armistice, although both moderate and radical Socialists were influential in the Government. But radicalism was being strengthened by the indescribable misery of the population as a result of food shortage. The number of those who died of starvation and malnutrition in Austria during the armistice period ran into the thousands daily, and the entire popu-

lation was reliably reported to be living on the edge of direst want. Children of four years of age had never learned to walk or to talk, and those of fifteen had the appearance of children of ten. Clothing was inadequate to protect against the cold of winter, and pestilence raged practically unchecked. It is believed that hundreds of thousands died directly and indirectly of starvation during the armistice period alone, and many were the assertions that practically the entire coming generation of Austria had been lost.

The terms of peace included in the new borders of Italy several hundred thousands of Austrians in what had been the Austrian Tyrol.

FINLAND

After the downfall of the Tsar of Russia, Finland was torn by strife between Socialist (Red Guard) and non-Socialist (White Guard) factions. Each group was merciless in its persecution of the other, and in comparison with the populations involved, the atrocities and the distress in Finland overshadowed the atrocities and distress in Bolshevik Russia. Germany had given strong support to the White Guard and had materially aided it in gaining control of the country. But with the military downfall of Germany, Finland was once more without a stable government. During the Peace Conference at Paris, however, General Mannerheim, the White Guard leader, succeeded in obtaining the ascendancy and his Government was finally recognized by the Allies, including the United States.

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

Under the able presidency of Professor Masaryk, the new European state arising in what had been known as Bohemia gave indications of a vigorous growth. It was strongly allied with France, and was protected by France in various disputes with its neighbors regarding the new territorial boundaries to be drawn in south central Europe. The Czecho-Slovaks showed few signs of radical tendencies, and the conduct of the Government of Czecho-Slovakia, in contrast with those of most of her neighbors, was following conservative principles.

POLAND

In Poland, the Paderewski Government was strongly supported by the Allies, especially by France, and gave every promise of stability. However, disputes with Czecho-Slovakia concerning the boundaries between the two countries were serious. In addition, Germany was bitterly truculent in charging that in some of the territory to be incorporated in the new Polish state the majority of the population was German rather than Polish; and the German elements in that territory were loud in their assertions that they would resist to the bitter end, by force, if need be, inclusion within Poland.

The Poles proved to be of overwhelmingly conservative convictions, and their country was hence regarded as a bulwark against Bolshevism. The majority of the inhabitants were Roman Catholic and many of the difficulties of the new state, both internally and externally, were due to religious prejudices.

THE BALKAN NATIONS

The new nations arising in the Balkans as a result of the War followed roughly the lines of nationality indicated in Volume I. Jugo-Slavia absorbed what had been Serbia and Montenegro. It was evident that Turkey would be deprived of her last foothold in Europe. During almost the entire period of the armistice, there were constant disputes and even armed clashes between Jugo-Slavia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Greece and Italy concerning the new boundaries of the Balkan states, and the political machinations of the leaders of these countries were numerous and complicated. Misery, due to lack of food and economic paralysis, was omnipresent and thousands upon thousands died of sheer deprivation. The threat of Bolshevism was an ever-increasing one, especially in Roumania and Bulgaria; but it was hoped that the threat would disappear with the proclamation of peace and the resumption of normal agricultural and industrial activities.

HUNGARY

When the old Austro-Hungarian kingdom split among the six states of German Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, Roumania, Ukraine and Hungary, the political management of Hungary came into the hands of a government headed by Count Karolyi. Although of the nobility, Karolyi had drifted into the liberal, almost into the radical, camp; and despite the position of political prominence and power which he had enjoyed in Hungary before 1914, he had refused to support Austria-Hungary in the war. Hungary became a republic, with a democratic constitution and democratic modes of government.

But before many months, Karolyi complained that the Allies had not only imposed armistice terms upon Hungary which made it impossible for that country to exist as a political democracy, but also that the Allies were violating the terms of this very armistice. The Allies countered by charging that Karolyi's Government was predatory and was attacking without cause several of Hungary's neighbors. Whatever the truth of the charges and the counter-charges, in March, 1919, Karolyi suddenly handed over the control of Hungary to the Communist group of Hungary. Karolyi maintained that his Government could not hope to endure under the restrictions imposed upon it; that he would not follow in the steps of Lvoff and attempt to give a liberal government to a country in which liberalism was bound to fail; that neither could any attempt to emulate Kerenski, giving Hungary a moderate Socialist government, hope to succeed; and that therefore it was better that Hungary should go Bolshevist at once, without disorder, than drift aimlessly to Bolshevism through many weary months of chaos.

The relations between Bolshevist Hungary and the Allies soon became similar to those between Bolshevist Russia and the Allies. Hungary was subjected to a strict economic blockade, although in Hungary, as in Russia, the suffering of the people from lack of food, clothing and other necessities beggared description. Hungary was soon at open war with most of the surrounding states, which were supported in these conflicts by the resources of the Allies and by the direct aid of detachments from the French armies. The Allies refused

to treat with the Bolshevist Government of Hungary until the latter was faithful to the armistice conditions which had been agreed upon; but the Bolshevist Government of Hungary was in close touch with the Government of Lenin and Trotski, and even after the official and final text of the peace treaty with Austria had been handed to the Austrian delegates at Versailles, it was impossible for the Peace Conference to settle problems in which Hungary was concerned while the Allies were virtually at war with Hungary.

In some important features, the Bolshevism of Hungary was less orthodox and sweeping than the Bolshevism of Russia, but in the essential aspects of Bolshevist rule the two countries were governed similarly. The foreign minister and virtual head of the Hungarian Bolshevist state was Bela Kun; but his road was a rocky one throughout the summer of 1919 and by August, 1919, he had been forced to resign and Hungary fell under a non-Bolshevist Socialist Government.

BOLSHEVIST RUSSIA

Lack of Authentic Information—Any account, no matter how elementary, of the course of events in Russia since the Bolshevist Revolution of November 7, 1918, must be provisional only. For from that day through the entire period of the armistice between the Allies and the Central Powers, Russia was hidden from view by a cloud of distorted facts, distorted by Bolshevist as well as by anti-Bolshevist factions. During that time, hardly a word was spoken or written about Russia which did not serve propaganda purposes. Moreover, during the armistice period the Allies were either engaged in actual hostilities against the Bolshevist regime or were supporting campaigns of native Russian leaders against that regime; and, in addition, Russia was being subjected to a strict blockade which effectively cut her off from the other countries of Europe. The new states of Poland, Ukraine, Finland, Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia surrounded Russia with a cordon of territories over which information could travel from Russia no more readily than supplies. And the Allied blockade of Germany similarly prevented correct information about Bolshevist Russia

from reaching the remainder of Europe through the land which had been the Kaiser's.

The fact that in effect, if not in theory, the Allies were at war with Russia also served to color accounts of the Bolshevist regime. For, obviously, whatever accounts of Russia were submitted by Allied observers were unavoidably tempered by the knowledge that the countries of those observers were engaged in a struggle against the Government headed by Lenin. Most Russians who gained the ears of the press of the Allied countries had been at least tacit supporters of the Tsar's regime or had been adherents to either the Lvoff or the Kerenski Governments; and their statements must in all fairness be understood as interpreting facts too unfavorably to the Bolshevist regime. On the other hand, most of the native Russian observers who came to know Russia after the overthrow of Kerenski were sympathizers with, or, at least defenders of, Bolshevist rule in Russia, and hence their statements must be considered as interpreting facts too favorably to it. Thus, to give but two examples, the pro-Bolshevist claim that 90 per cent of Russia supported the Bolshevist Government would seem to be contradicted by the fact that that Government found it necessary to resort to a stringent application of conscription in order to keep its armies up to full strength; and, conversely, a sub-committee of the United States Senate discovered that there was no basis for the often-repeated charge that the Bolshevist Government had resorted to a practise which became known as the nationalization of women.

Class Government—Bolshevism is a frank repudiation of the cardinal principle of political democracy. That principle is founded on the rule of the majority, as expressed at the ballot-box, with relentless protection of the minority in its right as a minority to agitate without let or hindrance in its campaign of winning the majority over to its point of view. But Bolshevism regards the modern structure of society as dominated by a ceaseless struggle between the non-owning class (proletariate) and the owning class (bourgeoisie). The Bolshevist hope is to compel all men to subsist through either manual or mental labor, so that the proletariate will become the only class. But, in the meantime, while the proletariate is functioning so as to eliminate the possibility of the existence of the bourgeoisie ("No work, no eat" is the

Bolshevist creed), the bourgeoisie is to be deprived of its rights, either as a majority or as a minority. For it would seem that Bolshevism proclaims the ascendancy of the working-class whether the working-class is in the minority or the majority. The Bolsheviks themselves accurately describe their government as the Dictatorship of the Proletariate. Thus in January, 1918, the Bolshevik Government not only refused to permit the elected Constituent Assembly to meet, because a majority of it was anti-Bolshevist, but also refused to call another Constituent Assembly.

When the Bolsheviks first grasped the reins of power in Russia, their disqualification from the franchise of all non-proletariate elements was quite uncompromising. All those who were employers of labor were thereby automatically disfranchised. But with the continued predominance of the Bolsheviks, that practise was mitigated to an extent. Thus, one of the most earnest endeavors of Lenin has been to attract modern industrial efficiency engineers to Russia and even to pay them high salaries.

It must not be forgotten that the Bolsheviks rank mental labor as high as manual labor, and writers and artists occupy positions of prominence in the Bolshevik state. Thus in the summer of 1919 one of the most eminent of French scientists reported that under Bolshevism scientific research in Russia had been enormously stimulated. Similarly, the Bolsheviks have exerted themselves to open hundreds of new schools, both elementary and advanced, although they forbid in those schools the dissemination of anti-Bolshevist doctrines as rigidly as the Tsar's government had forbidden the dissemination of pro-Bolshevist doctrines. Naturally, the Bolsheviks have removed from women all restrictions due to sex; and similarly have ended all official relations between the Greek Catholic Church and the state, and all religious disabilities.

Bolshevism Neither Socialism Nor Anarchism, but Communism— Most Socialists, both moderate and radical, insist upon the realization of their ideals by converting the majority—that is, by the application of the principle of democracy; so that, however zealously they may defend the Bolsheviks against attackers, most Socialists still deny to Bolshevism the right to call itself "Socialistic." Thus at the great

Socialist Conference at Berne, Switzerland, during the armistice with the Central Powers, many moderate and radical Socialist leaders of all lands united in attacking the Bolshevist principles, although most of these leaders pleaded that Russia would be happier under the rule of the Bolsheviki than under the rule of those former supporters of the Tsar's regime who would once more control Russia if the Bolsheviki should be overthrown. Even the strong Bolshevist sympathizers, Longuet, of France, and Macdonald, of England, disclaim intentions of attempting to establish a Bolshevist government in their respective countries. It should be added, however, that influential sections of the Socialists in countries outside of Russia, as in Switzerland and in the United States, have repudiated the conventional Socialist program in favor of the Bolshevist creed, and that the Bolsheviki themselves maintain that Bolshevism is good Socialism.

Similarly, the Bolsheviki insist upon the need of a heavily-centralized and all-powerful federal government, and thus are in direct opposition to the Anarchists, who deny to the state the right to dictate the conduct of the individual against the latter's consent and whose program calls for a society managed primarily by co-operative bodies voluntarily joined by the individual.

The more exact term to be applied to Bolshevism would seem to be Communism. For instance, the official title of the Bolshevist Government of Russia is "The Russian Federal Soviet Socialist Republic." The Bolshevist plan calls for the equality of payment for services, in contrast to the plan of most Socialists, who would pay different rewards to different workers according to the different values of the services rendered by them. The salaries of Lenin and Trotski are merely those of the day-laborer in the Moscow streets. Lenin himself has stated that the idea of the Soviet form of government was first developed by Daniel De Leon, a pioneer American Socialist.

However, it is difficult to describe accurately and impartially the principles of Bolshevism because of the ever-changing character of the Bolshevist program in Russia. However dogmatic the Bolsheviki may be in their theorizing, they are opportunism personified in their actual conduct of government, and are willing to use any and all means to accomplish their ends. Thus documents issued by the American Com-

mittee on Public Information during the War tend to prove that with the overthrow of the Tsar, Lenin accepted aid from Germany in returning to Russia from Switzerland. For to the Bolsheviki all nationalistic boundaries are artificial and harmful—the true alignment is that of the international working-class against the international capitalist class. They are convinced that all the non-Socialist countries of the world, whether politically autocratic or politically democratic, are the inevitable foes of any Socialist state and that therefore no single Socialist state can survive—all states must be Socialist or none can be Socialist. The Bolsheviki are hence aiming at the success of the Social Revolution in all lands rather than merely at the successful administration of a Bolshevik state in Russia. And in this aim they are compelled—from their point of view, temporarily—to violate their own principles in order to maintain their power. Accordingly, only a first-hand acquaintance with the rule of the Bolsheviki enables one to describe it in detail, for by their own confession their practise deviates more and more sharply from their principles and many of the documents issued by them are confessedly propaganda. The main features of the Bolshevik platform have been previously discussed under “The Russian Revolution.”

The Soviet—The Soviet is a council. In Bolshevik Russia, local government is in the hands of the local soviets. Local soviets select delegates to district soviets, which govern districts of varying sizes; and these district soviets in turn select delegates to the Central Soviet at Moscow. The Central Soviet at Moscow is the chief governing body of Russia, and Lenin and Trotski and the other Soviet leaders are at all times subject to the decisions of the Central Soviet. Elections to the local soviets are by workers' groups or trade unions. The delegates to the local soviets are usually elected by their fellow-workers in the factories or on the farms, so that in many respects the local soviets are not unlike the local trades assemblies or local federated unions with which most American cities are familiar. The manner of election to the soviets and the restrictions upon their membership thus serve to bar from a share in the government all those persons who are not workers in the Bolshevik sense of the term. Soviet delegates are at all times subject to recall by their constituencies, and the heads of

the Central Government, whose official title is "Commissioners," may be at any time recalled by the Central Soviet.

Nikolai Lenin—The leader of Bolshevist Russia, whose name at birth was Vladimir Ilyitch Uulyanoff, is about fifty years old. It is probable that without his leadership the Bolshevist rule in Russia would have succumbed many months ago to the attacks levelled upon it from all quarters. For, whatever one may think of his social and political theories and practises, there can be no denying that his administrative ability is of the highest order; and whatever one may think of his reasoning, there can be no denying that for practical problems he has a rarely firm grip on realities. Indeed, in many circles in both Europe and the United States which are heartily opposed to the Bolshevist regime, the statement is often made that Lenin is the most brilliant political leader produced by the Great War.

Lenin was born at Simbirsk, Russia. By birth he was a member of one of the oldest branches of the Russian nobility, in a land where noble birth was of greater significance than in almost any other European country. Before he reached the age of twenty, he had completely broken with his class and had become an ardent disciple of revolutionary leaders, firmly resolving to devote his life to the overthrow of the Tsarist regime and to establish a Socialist state in Russia. Soon after 1890 Lenin became one of the leaders of the orthodox Marxian group of Russian Socialists, achieving reputation at first as an economist and statistician. He played a part in the Revolution of 1905, and was elected to the Second Duma, only to be exiled shortly afterward. Lenin's revolutionary campaign from 1908 to 1917 was conducted from Switzerland, where he published a newspaper, wrote pamphlets and directed the management of the Bolshevist wing of the Social Democratic Party. He is the author of a number of historical and sociological works of high scholarly value, including "The Development of Capitalism," and of a Russian translation of Sidney and Beatrice Webb's "Industrial Democracy."

Bolshevist Repression—By their own confession, the Bolsheviki deny their opponents many of the rights of free press, free speech, freedom of assemblage and freedom from conscription. This denial

follows naturally from the Bolshevist philosophy. Since by the Bolshevist creed any Socialist or communist state must inevitably be at war with all capitalist states, any person under Bolshevist rule who supports attempts to overthrow that rule is guilty of treason and is punished accordingly. The decrees of the Bolshevist regime in Russia have virtually constituted a state of martial law and the essence of martial law is the unqualified and unquestioned control by the authorities. The Bolsheviki maintained that armed intervention by the Allies, including the Japanese, justified the issuance of such decrees. Personal attacks, of even the bitterest nature, upon the Bolshevist leaders are permitted, as are attacks upon the policies of the Bolshevist Government; but any attempt to overthrow Bolshevism by force is followed by ruthless repression. To the Bolsheviki, any publication which is anti-Bolshevist appears in the same light as any publication in the United States which might have advocated the cause of Germany during the War would have appeared to patriotic Americans. The Bolsheviki themselves publish official lists of persons executed by them for what they consider treason, and by the official end of the War against the Central Powers some 5,000 names were on those lists. Among those executed or imprisoned by the Bolsheviki were many Socialist and revolutionary leaders of non-Bolshevist or anti-Bolshevist persuasion. In addition, there have been many and extensive executions by Bolshevist bodies in parts of Russia, such as Siberia, which are not under the control of the Central Soviet Government and in which a virtual condition of anarchy obtains. It must be added, however, that the greatest number of executions occurred within a period of about three months when the Bolsheviki felt themselves slipping from power, and that with the beginning of the year 1919 the executions seem to have become fewer and fewer, although the policy of suppressing periodicals and meetings preaching the overthrow of Bolshevism was continued. Conscription was applied to raise the troops necessary to keep the Bolshevist armies in sufficient strength to withstand the military attacks of the western Allies and the United States, of the Japanese, and of the anti-Bolshevist armies under Admiral Kolchak, General Denikin and other Russian leaders.

The Well-Being of Russia under the Bolsheviki—There can be no doubt that to a great extent Russia has been industrially prostrated under Bolshevist rule. But with the lack of reliable information bearing upon Russian affairs it is impossible to determine to what extent the economic distress of Russia is due to forces over which the Bolshevist regime had no control and to what extent it is due to the character of Bolshevism in both theory and practise. It is known, however, that Russian industries were at a standstill long before the Bolshevist Revolution—indeed, we have seen that one of the causes for the downfall of the Tsar was the lack of food throughout Russia. It is known, furthermore, that many of the regions from which the old Russia had drawn heavily for its most valuable supplies of raw materials and of food—such as Ukraine, the Caucasus and Siberia—are without the sphere of Bolshevist influence and cannot be drawn upon for materials. It is known, again, that the blockade imposed upon Russia by the Allies was of the strictest possible nature; that foodstuffs, machinery and other invaluable supplies for which the Bolsheviki were willing to pay in gold could not be shipped into Russia; and that without such supplies from other countries even the old Russia would have suffered greatly. And it is known, finally, that the economic distress after the War in countries under non-Bolshevist rule, such as Roumania, Bulgaria, Poland, was acute.

Nevertheless, official reports of the British government have indicated that certain industries in Bolshevist Russia were running at a high proportion of their previous output. The Bolsheviki have all but disestablished private property, and the state attempts to direct most undertakings of social value. The practise of the Bolshevist Government seems to be to feed and clothe the army at the expense of the civilian population, both to keep the soldiers strong enough to repel the military attacks of the Allies and of the forces under Kolchak and Denikin, and to attract new recruits to the army; and the suffering of the great mass of the Russian people is literally indescribable. Indeed, some of the estimates of the deaths in Russia because of malnutrition run as high as 300,000 monthly.

The Strength of the Bolsheviki—It would be folly to generalize upon the strength of the Bolshevist regime in Russia. One fact, however,

seems to be evident—the Bolsheviki are supported by many sections of the Russian people who would withdraw that support with the end of Allied intervention and blockade of Russia and with the end of military expeditions, such as that of Admiral Kolchak, which derive support from the Allies. Above all, the Japanese are hated and distrusted throughout Russia and many persons of anti-Bolshevist creeds support the Bolshevist armies as against the Japanese. At all events, it is highly significant that in the early summer of 1919 the force under Admiral Kolchak, although it derived all possible military support from the Allies, was not supported by the Russian people to any great extent, but was again and again compelled to retire before the Bolshevist armies.

Outside of Russia, the philosophy of Bolshevism is an ever-present force to be reckoned with in countries where the people are desperate because of the material and immaterial suffering due to the War. Thus, we have seen that Hungary adopted a modified form of Bolshevist rule; and there are rumors, reliable or unreliable, that only the censorship of news from Europe withholds the knowledge that certain large cities in Spain and Ireland are virtually governed by soviets and that Bolshevism is spreading in Roumania and Bulgaria. However, there is little or no support for attempts to form a Bolshevist government in countries like Great Britain, France and the United States, even among those radical elements who insist that Bolshevism is the best form of government for Russia.

The Allies and the Bolsheviki—As has been seen, President Wilson, in his War Address to Congress on April 2, 1917, spoke in glowing terms of the new moral strength given the Allied cause by the Russian Revolution. On June 8, 1917, he dispatched the following message to the Lvoff-Miliukoff Government:

In view of the approaching visit of the American delegation to Russia to express the deep friendship of the American people for the people of Russia and to discuss the best and most practical means of co-operation between the two peoples in carrying the present struggle for the freedom of all peoples to a successful consummation, it seems opportune and appropriate that I should state again in the light of this new partnership

the objects the United States has had in mind in entering the war. Those objects have been much beclouded during the past few weeks by mistaken and misleading statements, and the issues at stake are too momentous, too tremendous, too significant for the whole human race to permit any misinterpretations or misunderstandings, however slight, to remain uncorrected for a moment.

The war has begun to go against Germany, and in their desperate desire to escape the inevitable, ultimate defeat those who are in authority in Germany are using every possible instrumentality, are making use even of the influence of groups and parties among their own subjects to whom they have never been just or fair or even tolerant, to promote a propaganda on both sides of the sea which will preserve for them their influence at home and their power abroad, to the undoing of the very men they are using.

The position of America in this war is so clearly avowed that no man can be excused for mistaking it. She seeks no material profit or aggrandizement of any kind. She is fighting for no advantage or selfish object of her own, but for the liberation of peoples everywhere from the aggressions of autocratic force.

The ruling classes in Germany have begun of late to profess a like liberality and justice of purpose, but only to preserve the power they have set up in Germany and the selfish advantages which they have wrongly gained for themselves and their private projects of power all the way from Berlin to Bagdad and beyond. Government after government has by their influence, without open conquest of its territory, been linked together in a net of intrigue directed against nothing less than the peace and liberty of the world. The meshes of that intrigue must be broken, but cannot be broken unless wrongs already done are undone; and adequate measures must be taken to prevent it from ever again being rewoven or repaired.

Of course, the Imperial German Government and those whom it is using for their own undoing are seeking to obtain pledges that the war will end in the restoration of the status quo ante. It was the status quo ante out of which this iniquitous war issued forth, the power of the Imperial German Government within the empire and its widespread domination and influence outside of that empire. That status must be altered in such fashion as to prevent any such hideous thing from ever happening again.

We are fighting for the liberty, the self-government and the

undictated development of all peoples, and every feature of the settlement that concludes this war must be conceived and executed for that purpose. Wrongs must first be righted and then adequate safeguards must be created to prevent their being committed again. We ought not to consider remedies merely because they have a pleasing and sonorous sound. Practical questions can be settled only by practical means. Phrases will not achieve the result. Effective readjustments will; and whatever readjustments are necessary must be made.

But they must follow a principle, and that principle is plain. No people must be forced under sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted on except those that constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples.

And then the free peoples of the world must draw together in some common covenant, some genuine and practical co-operation, that will in effect combine their force to secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another. The brotherhood of mankind must no longer be a fair but empty phrase; it must be given a structure of force and reality. The nations must realize their common life and effect a workable partnership to secure that life against the aggressions of autocratic and self-pleasing power.

For these things we can afford to pour out blood and treasure. For these are the things we have always professed to desire, and unless we pour out blood and treasure now and succeed we may never be able to unite or show conquering force again in the great cause of human liberty. The day has come they will overcome us; if we stand together, victory is certain to conquer or submit. If the forces of autocracy can divide us, and the liberty which victory will secure. We can afford then to be generous, but we cannot afford then or now to be weak or omit any single guarantee of justice and security.

Even after the Bolsheviks had obtained the upper hand in the Russian Government, the American President spoke not unsympathetically of the Russian people in his address to Congress on December 4,

1917; and in the address on January 8, 1918, in which the "Fourteen Points" were promulgated, the President spoke in high terms of the courage and stubbornness revealed by the Russian delegates at the parlies at Brest-Litovsk. Prominent among the Fourteen Points was the Sixth, which insisted that the territory of Bolshevist Russia must be evacuated by the foreign forces which had invaded it. In this point, the President insisted that the "treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy."

On March 11, 1918, President Wilson dispatched the following message to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, meeting at Moscow:

May I not take advantage of the meeting of the Congress of the Soviets to express the sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Russian people at this moment when the German power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn back the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the wishes of Germany for the purpose of the people of Russia?

Although the Government of the United States is, unhappily, not now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render, I beg to assure the people of Russia through Congress that it will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs and full restoration to her great rôle in the life of Europe and the modern world.

The whole heart of the people of the United States is with the people of Russia in the attempt to free themselves forever from autocratic government and become the masters of their own life.

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets replied to the President's message by demanding that he end the exploitation of the working-class in the United States by the capitalist class.

And in the President's address in New York City on May 18, 1918, on the occasion of the opening of the Second Red Cross "drive" for \$100,000,000, he explicitly repudiated any thought of concluding peace with Germany at the expense of Russia, and asserted that he intended to stand by Russia as by France.

It is commonly believed that President Wilson was firmly opposed to armed intervention in Russia, that that intervention was long delayed because of his opposition, and that he finally consented to it and co-operated with it only in order not to create a schism among the Allies and in order to keep alive a spirit of co-operation with France and Japan without which the creation of an effective League of Nations after the War would have been impossible. At all events, the statement of the President on intervention in Russia, issued through the Department of State on August 3, 1918, which speaks for itself, was as follows:

In the judgment of the Government of the United States—a judgment arrived at after repeated and very searching considerations of the whole situation—military intervention in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion there than to cure it, and would injure Russia, rather than help her out of her distresses. Such military intervention as has been most frequently proposed, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, would, in its judgment, be more likely to turn out to be merely a method of making use of Russia than to be a method of serving her. Her people, if they profited by it at all, could not profit by it in time to deliver them from their present desperate difficulties, and their substance would meantime be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own or to feed their own men, women and children. We are bending all our energies now to the purpose, the resolute and confident purpose, of winning on the western front, and it would, in the judgment of the Government of the United States, be most unwise to divide or dissipate our forces.

As the Government of the United States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them, and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and

to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense.

With such objects in view, the Government of the United States is now co-operating with the Governments of France and Great Britain in the neighborhood of Murmansk and Archangel. The United States and Japan are the only powers which are just now in a position to act in Siberia in sufficient force to accomplish even such modest objects as those that have been outlined. The Government of the United States has, therefore, proposed to the Government of Japan that each of the two Governments send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok, with the purpose of co-operating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safeguarding, so far as it may, the country to the rear of the westward-moving Czecho-Slovaks, and the Japanese Government has consented.

In taking this action, the Government of the United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that it contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia—not even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military force may be obliged to occupy—and no impairment of her territorial integrity, either now or hereafter, but that what we are about to do has as its single and only object the rendering of such aid as shall be acceptable to the Russian people themselves in their endeavors to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny. The Japanese Government, it is understood, will issue a similar assurance.

These plans and purposes of the Government of the United States have been communicated to the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy, and those Governments have advised the Department of State that they assent to them in principle. No conclusion that the Government of the United States has arrived at in this important matter is intended, however, as an effort to restrict the actions or interfere with the independent judgment of the Governments with which we are now associated in the war.

It is also the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering edu-

cation help of a modest kind in order in some systematic way to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which an opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow and will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered to the Czecho-Slovaks.

It is the hope and expectation of the Government of the United States that the Governments with which it is associated will, wherever necessary or possible, lend their active aid in the execution of these military and economic plans.

The change which was occasioned in President Wilson's attitude toward Russia by the course pursued by the Bolshevist Government was well revealed by the following note dispatched in September, 1918, to all American diplomatic representatives in other countries, asking them to urge the countries to which they were assigned to take action against the atrocities being committed in Russia by the Bolsheviks:

This Government is in receipt of information from reliable sources revealing that the peaceable Russian citizens of Moscow, Petrograd, and other cities are suffering from an openly avowed campaign of mass terrorism and are subject to wholesale executions. Thousands of persons have been shot without even a form of trial; ill-administered prisons are filled beyond capacity, and every night scores of Russian citizens are recklessly put to death; and irresponsible bands are venting their brutal passions in the daily massacres of untold innocents.

In view of the earnest desire of the people of the United States to befriend the Russian people and lend them all that is possible of assistance in their struggle to reconstruct their nation upon principles of democracy and self-government, and acting therefore solely in the interest of the Russian people themselves, this Government feels that it cannot be silent or refrain from expressing its horror at this state of terrorism. Furthermore, it believes that in order to check the further increase of the indiscriminate slaughter of Russian citizens all civilized nations should register their abhorrence of such barbarism.

You will inquire, therefore, whether the Government to which you are accredited will be disposed to take some immediate action, which is entirely divorced from the atmosphere of belligerency and the conduct of war, to impress upon the perpetra-

tors of these crimes the aversion with which civilization regards their present wanton acts.

The reason officially assigned for the continuance of Allied forces in Russia during the armistice with Germany was the necessity of not deserting the Russians who had supported the Allies and who would be in danger of execution from the Bolsheviki after the withdrawal of Allied troops. However, opposition to the continued maintenance of Allied armies in Russia was so strong in most of the Allied countries, especially among the Labor and Socialist ranks, that by the summer of 1919 most of those armies were withdrawn, with the exception of the Japanese.

During the Peace Conference at Paris, the Allied representatives officially projected a conference of all Russian groups at the Prinkipo Islands, in order to evolve a definite policy for the sadly-harassed land of the Bolsheviki; but most of the anti-Bolshevist elements refused to meet with the Bolshevist representatives, and it was claimed that the Bolsheviki also laid down as preliminary to such a conference conditions which could not be met by the Allies, with the result that the plan for the conference came to naught. In June, 1919, the Allies announced that they had decided to grant aid in every possible way to Admiral Kolchak and to furnish him with supplies. This announcement was not tantamount to a recognition of Kolchak, but it was evident that such recognition waited chiefly upon the latter's success in overthrowing the Bolsheviki. But many influential sections of public opinion in the Allied countries were bitter in denouncing Kolchak as a ruthless Tsarist type of ruler and in charging that he was supported chiefly by previous henchmen of the Tsar, and in addition Kolchak suffered soon afterward a series of decisive military defeats at the hands of the Bolshevist armies; so that toward the end of the armistice with Germany the Allied policy toward Russia was again in doubt.

THE PEACE CONFERENCE

On December 4, 1918, the President of the United States set sail for France to share in the deliberations at Paris out of which were to take shape the terms of the peace which sealed the Great War. This was the first time that a president was to enter a European country during his incumbency of office, although previous presidents had left the borders of the states which comprise the Union. President Wilson arrived at Brest, France, on December 13 and immediately found himself greeted with almost unparalleled enthusiasm by the great mass of Europeans.

Even the bitterest opponents of President Wilson admit that, at the time of his arrival in Europe, among the statesmen of the world he was the one great popular idol. Clemenceau was the idol of France, and was not without his following in the other Allied countries; and the December general election in Great Britain had shown that Lloyd-George was to England as Clemenceau to France. But the great mass of the common people of Europe had looked upon Clemenceau and Lloyd-George chiefly as the men to win the war—they were looking upon the American President as the man to win the peace. It was believed that President Wilson had devoted more effort to analyses of the essential organization of the world after the war than had the other Allied statesmen; and the processes of his thought, as evidenced in his papers and addresses on the War, had found a spontaneous echo in the hearts of the European masses. Even in the enemy countries Wilson had finally come to be regarded with more faith and less cynicism than any of the other delegates to the Allies' conferences at Paris. The warmth of the President's reception in France, in England and in Italy passed far beyond the bounds of convention.

But even the warmest supporters of President Wilson were forced

to admit that his popularity sadly waned before the end of the Peace Conference. There were a number of reasons for this slackening of the President's hold upon the heart of Europe. In the first place, there was the psychological fickleness of the crowd, which in the twentieth century is no less prone than the populace of ancient Athens to become weary at hearing a leader constantly called "just."

In the second place, at its very inception the Peace Conference decided to surround most of its meetings with secrecy. This secrecy may or may not have been necessary, even desirable; and it may or may not have been in violation of the first of the "Fourteen Points"—Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at; the fact remains that greater publicity for the deliberations at Paris had been expected, and the procedure of the Peace Conference gave rise to a cry that the President had abandoned the first plank in his platform and could not be counted upon not to abandon the remainder of it.

In the third place, it was soon apparent that Wilson found himself in opposition to Clemenceau; and the inevitable spirit of nationalistic rivalry which ensued turned most of Clemenceau's admirers against the President.

In the fourth place, President Wilson steered in the peace deliberations a moderate course. He sided with neither the radicals nor the conservatives. But by the end of the war most of Europe was either radical or conservative—there were few moderates. The conservatives rallied behind Clemenceau and the radicals abandoned Wilson, claiming that Wilson had abandoned them. Especially hostile to Wilson was the later attitude of such radical groups as the British Labor Party and the French syndicalists and Socialists. And the patent fact that the final results of the peace deliberations, outside of the covenant of the League of Nations, showed plainly the hand of Clemenceau rather than the hand of Wilson gave rise to violent and widespread charges that President Wilson had been defeated in his stand at Paris.

Finally, President Wilson at no time—except possibly in his public statement regarding Fiume—appealed to the people over the heads of their rulers. It had been predicted that, if confronted by unjust demands, he would turn from the decision of the diplomats to the

verdict of the people; and his determination to gain his ends by his private conferences at Paris weakened him in much of his European popular following. Early in April, the President sent suddenly for his transport, the *George Washington*, but his failure to leave the Peace Conference on the arrival of the *George Washington* indicated that he had been appeased sufficiently to avoid an open break. Possibly Wilson was fearsome that if any of the Governments of the great Powers were overthrown, not another Government, but Bolshevism, would replace it; but his course cost him much support.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S GUARD OF HONOR IN PARIS

The soldiers in the picture, 250 strong, were picked to be the guard of honor around the residence of the President of the United States during his stay at the Paris Peace Conference. Eighty-one of these men had qualified for officers' commissions, only to be thwarted in their hopes by the signing of the armistice.

THE RESULTS

The first formal session of the Conference of the Allied and Associated Powers in Paris was held on January 18, 1919. The Conference was opened by President Poincaré of France and Premier Clemenceau of France was elected the permanent chairman. All the nations which had joined in the war against the Central Powers had sent delegates to Paris and, in addition, most of the neutral nations had representatives at Paris who were called into consultation on many occasions when their interests were affected. Besides President Wilson, the delegates of the United States were Secretary of State Robert Lansing; General Tasker H. Bliss, former chief of staff of the United States Army; Mr. Edward M. House, for some years the main adviser of President Wilson; and Mr. Henry White, formerly ambassador to France and Italy. The British delegation was headed by Premier Lloyd-George—the other members were Secretary of Foreign Affairs Arthur J. Balfour; Mr. George N. Barnes, representing British Labor; Mr. A. Bonar Law, Lord of the Privy Seal and leader of the House of Commons; and Sir W. F. Lloyd, Premier of Newfoundland. Besides Premier Clemenceau, the French delegates were Secretary of Foreign Affairs Stephen Pichon; M. L. L. Klots, Minister of Finance; Captain André Tardieu, former French High Commissioner to the United States; and M. Jules Cambon, former French ambassador to Germany.

The Italian delegation was headed by Premier Orlando and Baron Sonnino, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Japanese delegation was headed by Baron Makino. Other delegates who played a leading part in the deliberations were Premier Venizelos of Greece; General Smuts, of South Africa; Premiers Hughes and Massey, of Australia and New Zealand, respectively; M. Vandervelde, the Belgian Socialist leader and Minister of Justice; M. Pachitch, the Serbian Premier, and M. Vesnitch, of Servia; and M. Dmowski, of Poland.

However, the five great Powers—the United States, France, Great

Britain, Italy and Japan immediately took complete control of the Conference. Wilson, Lloyd-George, Orlando, Clemenceau and Makino met as a Council of Five and the deliberation of the Peace Conference became the deliberations of the "Big Five." But Japan was interested only in settlements concerning the Far East, so that the Council of Five soon became the Council of Four; and for a period, when the Italian delegation withdrew in protest at President Wilson's statement upon the question of the disposition of Fiume, the "Big Four" were succeeded by the "Big Three." The membership of the Peace Conference was divided into many committees, and the pressing problems were referred to these committees for investigation, decision and report.

The lack of publicity given the deliberations of the Council of Five prevents general information upon them. The following statements, however, seem to be warranted:

1. The Conference's decisions in a number of the most important problems placed before it were dictated by the "secret treaties," which, as we have seen, were signed between Italy and Japan and Russia, Great Britain and France when or soon after Italy and Japan joined the ranks of the Allies. These treaties covered points so debatable as the disposition of Kiao-Chau (on the Shantung Peninsula) and Fiume, the land to be annexed from Austria-Hungary by Italy, protectorates or spheres of influence to be established in Asia Minor by France and Great Britain, etc. Many of the dispositions arranged in these secret treaties were obviously contrary to the principles regarding the peace which had been expounded by President Wilson, and which had been accepted as the basis of the armistice; but the countries involved in the treaties defended them on the ground that at the time they were signed they were necessary to bring and to keep Italy and Japan in the war, and that in the matter of defeating Germany the end had justified the means. At all events, at the Peace Conference France and Great Britain maintained that their honor was involved in the signatures to the secret treaties and agreed to the demand of Japan and Italy that the provisions of the treaties be carried out.

2. When the secret treaties were not involved, Great Britain supported the United States on most issues. But this Anglo-American

combination was usually outvoted by France, Italy and Japan. Thus the country to dominate the peace discussions was France, and for the final form of the treaties of peace France was more responsible than any other one country.

3. As France was the country to dominate the peace table, the French premier was the individual to dominate the sittings of the Council of Five. Clemenceau dictated at Paris almost as Bismarck had dictated at the Congress of Berlin.

4. Only the British shared the American delegates' enthusiasm for the League of Nations. Clemenceau had long been openly, almost brutally, cynical about the concept, and Japan and Italy would support no international arrangement which threatened to curtail their own nationalistic expansions. In order to effect the League of Nations, therefore, Wilson and Lloyd-George were compelled to make many disagreeable concessions, insisted upon, especially by Clemenceau, as the price for adherence to the League of Nations.

5. Great Britain and America thus gave their consent to many settlements of which they disapproved, only in the hope that those settlements would eventually be re-arranged by the League.

6. In most respects, the terms of peace were of a nature similar to the terms of peace effected at the end of previous great wars. Accordingly, they represented on the whole a triumph for the conservative rather than for the radical, for the nationalist rather than for the internationalist, point of view. The chief claim of the Treaties of Versailles to be considered as establishing a new order among the nations lay in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

7. President Wilson's stand on the problem of the disposition of Fiume was endorsed by both Great Britain and France. The full text of the President's announcement on Fiume, together with the explanatory statement issued several days later, is as follows:

In view of the capital importance of the questions affected, and in order to throw all possible light upon what is involved in their settlement, I hope that the following statement will contribute to the final formation of opinion and to a satisfactory solution:

When Italy entered the war she entered upon the basis of a

definite private understanding with Great Britain and France, now known as the Pact of London. Since that time the whole face of circumstances has been altered. Many other Powers, great and small, have entered the struggle, with no knowledge of that private understanding.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire, then the enemy of Europe, and at whose expense the Pact of London was to be kept in the event of victory, has gone to pieces and no longer exists. Not only that, but the several parts of that empire, it is agreed now by Italy and all her associates, are to be erected into independent States and associated in a League of Nations, not with those who were recently our enemies, but with Italy herself and the Powers that stood with Italy in the great war for liberty.

We are to establish their liberty as well as our own. They are to be among the smaller States whose interests are henceforth to be safeguarded as scrupulously as the interests of the most powerful States.

The war was ended, moreover, by proposing to Germany an armistice and peace which should be founded on certain clearly defined principles which set up a new order of right and justice. Upon those principles the peace with Germany has been conceived, not only, but formulated. Upon those principles it will be executed.

We cannot ask the great body of Powers to propose and effect peace with Austria and establish a new basis of independence and right in the States which originally constituted the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in the States of the Balkan group on principles of another kind. We must apply the same principles to the settlement of Europe in those quarters that we have applied in the peace with Germany. It was upon the explicit avowal of those principles that the initiative for peace was taken. It is upon them that the whole structure of peace must rest.

If those principles are to be adhered to, Fiume must serve as the outlet of the commerce, not of Italy, but of the land to the north and northeast of that port, Hungary, Bohemia, Roumania, and the States of the new Jugo-Slav group. To assign Fiume to Italy would be to create the feeling that we have deliberately put the port upon which all those countries chiefly depend for their access to the Mediterranean in the hands of a Power of which it did not form an integral part and whose sovereignty, if set up there, must inevitably seem foreign, not domestic or identified with the commercial and industrial life of the regions which the

port must serve. It is for that reason, no doubt, that Fiume was not included in the Pact of London, but was there definitely assigned to the Croats.

And the reason why the line of the Pact of London swept about many of the islands of the eastern coast of the Adriatic and around the portion of the Dalmatian coast which lies most open to that sea was not only that here and there on those islands, and here and there on that coast, there are bodies of people of Italian blood and connection, but also, and no doubt chiefly, because it was felt that it was necessary for Italy to have a foothold amidst the channels of the Eastern Adriatic in order that she might make her own coasts safe against the naval aggression of Austria-Hungary.

But Austria-Hungary no longer exists. It is proposed that the fortifications which the Austrian Government constructed there shall be razed and permanently destroyed.

It is part also of the new plan of European order which centers in the League of Nations that the new States erected there shall accept a limitation of armaments which puts aggression out of the question. There can be no fear of the unfair treatment of groups of Italian people there, because adequate guarantees will be given, under international sanction, of the equal equitable treatment of all racial or national minorities.

In brief, every question associated with this settlement wears a new aspect—a new aspect given it by the very victory for right for which Italy has made the supreme sacrifice of blood and treasure. Italy, along with the four other great Powers, has become one of the chief trustees of the new order which she has played so honorable a part in establishing.

And on the north and northeast her natural frontiers are completely restored, along the whole sweep of the Alps from northwest to southeast to the very end of the Istrian Peninsula, including all the great watershed within which Trieste and Pola lie, and all the fair regions whose face nature has turned toward the great peninsula upon which the historic life of the Latin people has been worked out through centuries of famous story ever since Rome was first set upon her seven hills.

Her ancient unity is restored. Her lines are extended to the great walls which are her natural defense. It is within her choice to be surrounded by friends; to exhibit to the newly liberated peoples across the Adriatic that noblest quality of greatness, mag-

nanimity, friendly generosity, the preference of justice over interest.

The nations associated with her, the nations that knew nothing of the Pact of London or of any other special understanding that lies at the beginning of this great struggle, and who have made their supreme sacrifice also in the interest, not of national advantage or defense, but of the settled peace of the world, are now united with her older associates in urging her to assume a leadership which cannot be mistaken in the new order of Europe.

America is Italy's friend. Her people are drawn, millions strong, from Italy's own fair countrysides. She is linked in blood, as well as in affection, with the Italian people. Such ties can never be broken. And America was privileged, by the generous commission of her associates in the war, to initiate the peace we are about to consummate—to initiate it upon terms which she had herself formulated and in which I was her spokesman.

The compulsion is upon her to square every decision she takes a part in with those principles. She can do nothing else. She trusts Italy, and in her trust believes that Italy will ask nothing of her that cannot be made unmistakably consistent with those sacred obligations.

The interests are not now in question, but the rights of peoples, of States new and old, of liberated peoples and peoples whose rulers have never accounted them worthy of a right; above all, the right of the world to peace and to such settlements of interest as shall make peace secure.

These, and these only, are the principles for which America has fought. These, and these only, are the principles upon which she can consent to make peace. Only upon these principles, she hopes and believes, will the people of Italy ask her to make peace.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

President Wilson was recognized at the Peace Conference as the leading spirit in the desire to form a League of Nations and he was made the spokesman of the commission appointed by the Conference to draft a covenant for such a League. The meetings of the commission were not public, so that little is known of its deliberations. However, it is understood that the final draft was more of a British than an American product, and that the man whose ideas were incorporated within the final text more than the ideas of any other one man, not excluding President Wilson, was General Jan Christian Smuts, of South Africa. The President's address in officially bringing the question of the League of Nations before the Peace Conference on January 25, 1919, was as follows:

I consider it a distinguished privilege to be permitted to open the discussion in this conference on the League of Nations. We have assembled for two purposes, to make the present settlements which have been rendered necessary by this war, and also to secure the peace of the world, not only by the present settlements but by the arrangements we shall make at this conference for its maintenance. The League of Nations seems to me to be necessary for both of these purposes. There are many complicated questions connected with the present settlements which perhaps cannot be successfully worked out to an ultimate issue by the decisions we shall arrive at here. I can easily conceive that many of these settlements will need subsequent reconsideration, that many of the decisions we make shall need subsequent alteration in some degree; for, if I may judge by my own study of some of these questions, they are not susceptible of confident judgments at present.

It is, therefore, necessary that we should set up some machinery by which the work of this conference should be rendered complete. We have assembled here for the purpose of doing very much more than making the present settlements. We are assembled under very peculiar conditions of world opinion. I may say

without straining the point that we are not representatives of Governments, but representatives of peoples. It will not suffice to satisfy governmental circles anywhere. It is necessary that we should satisfy the opinion of mankind. The burdens of this war have fallen in an unusual degree upon the whole population of the countries involved. I do not need to draw for you the picture of how the burden has been thrown back from the front upon the older men, upon the women, upon the children, upon the homes of the civilized world, and how the real strain of the war has come where the eye of government could not reach, but where the heart of humanity beats. We are bidden by these people to make a peace which will make them secure. We are bidden by these people to see to it that this strain does not come upon them again, and I venture to say that it has been possible for them to bear this strain because they hoped that those who represented them could get together after this war and make such another sacrifice unnecessary.

It is a solemn obligation on our part, therefore, to make permanent arrangements that justice shall be rendered and peace maintained. This is the central object of our meeting. Settlements may be temporary, but the action of the nations in the interest of peace and justice must be permanent. We can set up permanent processes. We may not be able to set up permanent decisions. Therefore, it seems to me that we must take, so far as we can, a picture of the world into our minds. Is it not a startling circumstance, for one thing, that the great discoveries of science, that the quiet studies of men in laboratories, that the thoughtful developments which have taken place in quiet lecture rooms, have now been turned to the destruction of civilization? The powers of destruction have not so much multiplied as gained facility. The enemy whom we have just overcome had at his seats of learning some of the principal centers of scientific study and discovery, and he used them in order to make destruction sudden and complete; and only the watchful, continuous co-operation of men can see to it that science as well as armed men is kept within the harness of civilization.

In a sense the United States is less interested in this subject than the other nations here assembled. With her great territory and her extensive sea borders, it is less likely that the United States should suffer from the attack of enemies than that many of the other nations here should suffer; and the ardor of the United States—for it is a very deep and genuine ardor—for the

society of nations is not an ardor springing out of fear or apprehension, but an ardor springing out of the ideals which have come to consciousness in this war. In coming into this war the United States never for a moment thought that she was intervening in the politics of Europe or the politics of Asia or the politics of any part of the world. Her thought was that all the world had now become conscious that there was a single cause which turned upon the issues of this war. That was the cause of justice and of liberty for men of every kind and place. Therefore, the United States should feel that its part in this war had been played in vain if there ensued upon it merely a body of European settlements. It would feel that it could not take part in guaranteeing those European settlements unless that guaranty involved the continuous superintendence of the peace of the world by the associated nations of the world.

Therefore, it seems to me that we must concert our best judgment in order to make this League of Nations a vital thing—not merely a formal thing, not an occasional thing, not a thing sometimes called into life to meet an exigency, but always functioning in watchful attendance upon the interests of the nations—and that its continuity should be a vital continuity; that it should have functions that are continuing functions and that do not permit an intermission of its watchfulness and of its labor; that it should be the eye of the nations to keep watch upon the common interest, an eye that does not slumber, an eye that is everywhere watchful and attentive. . . .

You can imagine, gentlemen, I dare say, the sentiments and the purpose with which representatives of the United States support this great project for a League of Nations. We regard it as the keystone of the whole program which expressed our purposes and ideals in this war and which the associated nations have accepted as the basis of the settlement. If we returned to the United States without having made every effort in our power to realize this program, we should return to meet the merited scorn of our fellow citizens. For they are a body that constitutes a great democracy. They expect their leaders to speak their thoughts and no private purpose of their own. They expect their representatives to be their servants. We have no choice but to obey their mandate. But it is with the greatest enthusiasm and pleasure that we accept that mandate; and because this is the keystone of the whole fabric, we have pledged our every purpose to it, as we have to every item of the fabric. We would not dare abate a single part

of the program which constitutes our instruction. We would not dare compromise upon any matter as the champion of this thing—this peace of the world, this attitude of justice, this principle that we are the masters of no people but are here to see that every people in the world shall choose its own masters and govern its own destinies, not as we wish but as it wishes. We are here to see, in short, that the very foundations of this war are swept away. Those foundations were the private choice of small coteries of civil rulers and military staffs. Those foundations were the aggression of great powers upon the small. Those foundations were the holding together of empires of unwilling subjects by the duress of arms. Those foundations were the power of small bodies of men to work their will upon mankind and use them as pawns in a game. And nothing less than the emancipation of the world from these things will accomplish peace. You can see that the representatives of the United States are, therefore, never put to the embarrassment of choosing a way of expediency, because they have laid down for them the unalterable lines of principle. And, thank God, those lines have been accepted as the lines of settlement by all the high-minded men who have had to do with the beginnings of this great business.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that when it is known, as I feel confident it will be known, that we have adopted the principle of the League of Nations and mean to work out that principle in effective action, we shall by that single thing have lifted a great part of the load of anxiety from the hearts of men everywhere. We stand in a peculiar case. As I go about the streets here I see everywhere the American uniform. Those men came into the war after we had uttered our purposes. They came as crusaders, not merely to win a war, but to win a cause; and I am responsible to them, for it fell to me to formulate the purposes for which I asked them to fight, and I, like them, must be a crusader for these things, whatever it costs and whatever it may be necessary to do, in honor, to accomplish the object for which they fought. I have been glad to find from day to day that there is no question of our standing alone in this matter, for there are champions of this cause upon every hand. I am merely avowing this in order that you may understand why, perhaps, it fell to us, who are disengaged from the politics of this great continent and of the Orient, to suggest that this was the keystone of the arch and why it occurred to the generous mind of our president to call upon me to open this debate. It is not because we alone represent this idea, but because

it is our privilege to associate ourselves with you in representing it.

I have only tried in what I have said to give you the fountains of the enthusiasm which is within us for this thing, for those fountains spring, it seems to me, from all the ancient wrongs and sympathies of mankind, and the very pulse of the world seems to beat to the surface in this enterprise.

The President's address on February 14 in submitting to the Peace Conference the Covenant as at first drafted was as follows:

I have the honor and as I esteem it the very great privilege of reporting in the name of the commission constituted by this conference on the formulation of a plan for the League of Nations. I am happy to say that it is a unanimous report, a unanimous report from the representatives of 14 nations—the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Brazil, China, Czecho-Slovakia, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, and Serbia. I think it will be serviceable and interesting if I, with your permission read the document as the only report we have to make.

[The President then read the text of the Covenant.]

It gives me pleasure to add to this formal reading of the result of our labors that the character of the discussion which occurred at the sittings of the commission was not only of the most constructive but of the most encouraging sort. It was obvious throughout our discussions that, although there were subjects upon which there were individual differences of judgment, with regard to the method by which our objects should be obtained, there was practically at no point any serious difference of opinion or motive as to the objects which we were seeking. Indeed, while these debates were not made the opportunity for the expression of enthusiasms and sentiments, I think the other members of the commission will agree with me that there was an undertone of high resolve and of enthusiasm for the thing we were trying to do, which was heartening throughout every meeting; because we felt that in a way this conference had entrusted to us the expression of one of its highest and most important purposes, to see to it that the concord of the world in the future with regard to the objects of justice should not be subject to doubt or uncertainty; that the co-operation of the great body of nations should be assured from

the first in the maintenance of peace upon the terms of honor and of the strict regard for international obligation. The compulsion of that task was constantly upon us, and at no point was there shown the slightest desire to do anything but suggest the best means to accomplish that great object. There is very great significance, therefore, in the fact that the result was reached unanimously. Fourteen nations were represented, among them all of those Powers which for convenience we have called the great Powers, and among the rest a representation of the greatest variety of circumstance and interest. So that I think we are justified in saying that it was a representative group of the members of this great conference. The significance of the result, therefore, has that deepest of all meanings, the union of wills in a common purpose, a union of wills which cannot be resisted, and which I dare say no nation will run the risk of attempting to resist.

Now, as to the character of the document. While it has consumed some time to read this document, I think you will see at once that it is, after all, very simple, and in nothing so simple as in the structure which it suggests for the League of Nations—a body of delegates, an executive council, and a permanent secretariat. When it came to the question of determining the character of the representation in the body of delegates, we were all aware of a feeling which is current throughout the world. Inasmuch as I am stating it in the presence of official representatives of the various Governments here present, including myself, I may say that there is a universal feeling that the world cannot rest satisfied with merely official guidance. There reached us through many channels the feeling that if the deliberative body of the League was merely to be a body of officials representing the various Governments, the peoples of the world would not be sure that some of the mistakes which pre-occupied officials had admittedly made might not be repeated. It was impossible to conceive a method or an assembly so large and various as to be really representative of the great body of the peoples of the world, because, as I roughly reckon it, we represent as we sit around this table more than twelve hundred million people. You cannot have a representative assembly of twelve hundred million people, but if you leave it to each Government to have, if it pleases, one or two or three representatives, though only a single vote, it may vary its representation from time to time not only, but it may originate the choice of its several representatives, if it should have several, in different ways. Therefore, we thought that this was a proper and

a very prudent concession to the practically universal opinion of plain men everywhere that they wanted the door left open to a variety of representation instead of being confined to a single official body with which they might or might not find themselves in sympathy.

And you will notice that this body has unlimited rights of discussion—I mean of discussion of anything that falls within the field of international relationship—and that it is specially agreed that war or international misunderstandings or anything that may lead to friction and trouble is everybody's business, because it may affect the peace of the world. And in order to safeguard the popular power so far as we could of this representative body it is provided, you will notice, that when a subject is submitted, not to arbitration, but to discussion by the executive council, it can upon the initiative of either one of the parties to the dispute be drawn out of the executive council into the larger forum of the general body of delegates, because throughout this instrument we are depending primarily and chiefly upon one great force, and that is the moral force of the public opinion of the world—the cleansing and clarifying and compelling influences of publicity—so that intrigues can no longer have their coverts, so that designs that are sinister can at any time be drawn into the open, so that those things that are destroyed by the light may be properly destroyed by the overwhelming light of the universal expression of the condemnation of the world.

Armed force is in the background in this program, but it is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall. But that is the last resort, because this is intended as a constitution of peace, not as a league of war.

The simplicity of the document seems to me to be one of its chief virtues, because, speaking for myself, I was unable to foresee the variety of circumstances with which this League would have to deal. I was unable, therefore, to plan all the machinery that might be necessary to meet differing and unexpected contingencies. Therefore, I should say of this document that it is not a straitjacket, but a vehicle of life. A living thing is born, and we must see to it that the clothes we put upon it do not hamper it—a vehicle of power, but a vehicle in which power may be varied at the discretion of those who exercise it and in accordance with the changing circumstances of the time. And yet, while it is elastic, while it is general in its terms, it is definite in the one

thing that we were called upon to make definite. It is a definite guarantee of peace. It is a definite guarantee by word against aggression. It is a definite guarantee against the things which have just come near bringing the whole structure of civilization into ruin. Its purposes do not for a moment lie vague. Its purposes are declared and its powers made unmistakable.

It is not in contemplation that this should be merely a league to secure the peace of the world. It is a league which can be used for co-operation in any international matter. That is the significance of the provision introduced concerning labor. There are many ameliorations of labor conditions which can be effected by conference and discussion. I anticipate that there will be a very great usefulness in the bureau of labor which it is contemplated shall be set up by the league. While men and women and children who work have been in the background through long ages, and sometimes seemed to be forgotten, while Governments have their watchful and suspicious eyes upon the manoeuvres of one another, while the thought of statesmen has been about structural action and the large transactions of commerce and of finance, now, if I may believe the picture which I see, there comes into the foreground the great body of the laboring people of the world, the men and women and children upon whom the great burden of sustaining the world must from day to day fall, whether we wish it to do so or not; people who go to bed tired and wake up without the stimulation of lively hope. These people will be drawn into the field of international consultation and help, and will be among the wards of the combined Governments of the world. There is, I take leave to say, a very great step in advance in the mere conception of that.

Then, as you will notice, there is an imperative article concerning the publicity of all international agreements. Henceforth no member of the League can claim any agreement valid which it has not registered with the secretary general, in whose office, of course, it will be subject to the examination of anybody representing a member of the League. And the duty is laid upon the secretary general to publish every document of that sort at the earliest possible time. I suppose most persons who have not been conversant with the business of foreign offices do not realize how many hundreds of these agreements are made in a single year, and how difficult it might be to publish the more unimportant of them immediately—how uninteresting it would be to most of the world to publish them immediately—but even they must be pub-

lished just so soon as it is possible for the secretary general to publish them.

Then there is a feature about this Covenant which to my mind is one of the greatest and most satisfactory advances that have been made. We are done with annexations of helpless people, meant in some instances by some Powers to be used merely for exploitation. We recognize in the most solemn manner that the helpless and undeveloped peoples of the world, being in that condition, put an obligation upon us to look after their interests primarily before we use them for our interest; and that in all cases of this sort hereafter it shall be the duty of the League to see that the nations who are assigned as the tutors and advisers and directors of those peoples shall look to their interest and to their development before they look to the interests and material desires of the mandatory nation itself. There has been no greater advance than this, gentlemen. If you look back upon the history of the world you will see how helpless peoples have too often been a prey to Powers that had no conscience in the matter. It has been one of the many distressing revelations of recent years that the great Power which has just been happily defeated put intolerable burdens and injustices upon the helpless people of some of the colonies which it annexed to itself; that its interest was rather their extermination than their development; that her desire was to possess their land for European purposes, and not to enjoy their confidence in order that mankind might be lifted in those places to the next higher level. Now, the world, expressing its conscience in law, says there is an end of that. Our conscience shall be applied to this thing. States will be picked out which have already shown that they can exercise a conscience in this matter, and under their tutelage the helpless peoples of the world will come into a new light and into a new hope.

So I think I can say of this document that it is at one and the same time a practical document and a humane document. There is a pulse of sympathy in it. There is a compulsion of conscience throughout it. It is practical, and yet it is intended to purify, to rectify, to elevate. And I want to say that, so far as my observation instructs me, this is in one sense a belated document. I believe that the conscience of the world has long been prepared to express itself in some such way. We are not just now discovering our sympathy for these people and our interest in them. We are simply expressing it, for it has long been felt, and in the administration of the affairs of more than one of the great States

represented here—so far as I know, of all the great States that are represented here—that humane impulse has already expressed itself in their dealings with their colonies whose people were yet at a low stage of civilization. We have had many instances of colonies, lifted into the sphere of complete self-government. This is not the discovery of a principle. It is the universal application of a principle. It is the agreement of the great nations which have tried to live by these standards in their separate administrations to unite in seeing that their common force and their common thought and intelligence are lent to this great and humane enterprise. I think it is an occasion, therefore, for the most profound satisfaction that this humane decision should have been reached in a matter for which the world has long been waiting and until a very recent period thought that it was still too early to hope.

Many terrible things have come out of this war, gentlemen, but some very beautiful things have come out of it. Wrong has been defeated, but the rest of the world has been more conscious than it ever was before of the majesty of right. People that were suspicious of one another can now live as friends and comrades in a single family, and desire to do so. The miasma of distrust, of intrigue, is cleared away. Men are looking eye to eye and saying. "We are brothers and have a common purpose. We did not realize it before but now we do realize it, and this is our covenant of fraternity and of friendship."

The complete text of the League of Nations, as finally adopted by the Paris Conference, is as follows:

In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security, by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as to actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, the high contracting parties agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

Article One

The original members of the League of Nations shall be those of the signatories which are named in the annex to this Covenant

and also such of those other States named in the annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such accessions shall be effected by a declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other members of the League.

Any fully self-governing state, dominion or colony not named in the annex, may become a member of the League of Nations if its admission is agreed by two-thirds of the assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military and naval forces and armaments.

Any member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.

Article Two

The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an assembly and a council, with a permanent secretariat.

Article Three

The assembly shall consist of representatives of the members of the League.

The assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require, at the seat of the league, or at such other place as may be decided upon.

The assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the peace of the world.

At meetings of the assembly, each member of the league shall have one vote, and may have not more than three representatives.

Article Four

The council shall consist of representatives of the United States of America, of the British Empire, of France, of Italy, and of Japan, together with representatives of four other members of the league. These four members of the league shall be selected

by the assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the representatives of the four members of the league first selected by the assembly, representatives of (blank) shall be members of the council.

With the approval of the majority of the assembly, the council may name additional members of the league whose representatives shall always be members of the council; the council with like approval may increase the number of members of the league to be selected by the assembly for representation on the council.

The council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the seat of the league, or at other place as may be decided upon.

The council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the peace of the world.

Any member of the league not represented on the council shall be invited to send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that member of the league.

At meetings of the council, each member of the league represented on the council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one representative.

Article Five

Except where otherwise expressly provided in this covenant or by the terms of this treaty, decisions at any meeting of the assembly or of the council shall require the agreement of all the members of the league represented at the meeting.

All matters of procedure at meetings of the assembly or of the council, the appointment of committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the assembly or by the council and may be decided by a majority of the members of the league represented at the meeting.

The first meeting of the assembly and the first meeting at the council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.

Article Six

The permanent secretariat shall be established at the seat of the league. The secretariat shall comprise a secretariat general and such secretaries and staff as may be required.

The first secretary general shall be the person named in the annex; thereafter the secretary general shall be appointed by the council with the approval of the majority of the assembly.

The secretariat and the staff of the secretariat shall be appointed by the secretary general with the approval of the council.

The secretary general shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the assembly and of the council.

The expenses of the secretariat shall be borne by the members of the league in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.

Article Seven

The seat of the league is established at Geneva.

The council may at any time decide that the seat of the league shall be established elsewhere.

All positions under or in connection with the league, including the secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women.

Representatives of the members of the league and officials of the league when engaged on the business of the league shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

The buildings and other property occupied by the league or its officials or by representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable.

Article Eight

The members of the league recognize that the maintenance of a peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by the common action of international obligations.

The council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each state, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several governments.

Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

After these plans shall have been adopted by the several governments, limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the council.

The members of the league agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard

being had to the necessities of those members of the league which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

The members of the league undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military and naval programs and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes.

Article Nine

A permanent commission shall be constituted to advise the council on the execution of the provisions of Article One and Eight and on military and naval questions generally.

Article Ten

The members of the league undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Article Eleven

Any war or threat of war whether immediately affecting any of the members of the league or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole league, and the league shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise, the secretary general shall, on the request of any member of the league, forthwith summon a meeting of the council.

It is also declared to be the fundamental right of each member of the league to bring to the attention of the assembly or of the council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb either the peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

Article Twelve

The members of the league agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will

submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report of the council.

In any case under this article the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

Article Thirteen

The members of the league agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject matter to arbitration. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration. For the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration to which the case is referred shall be the court agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.

The members of the league agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered and that they will not resort to war against a member of the league which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award, the council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

Article Fourteen

The council shall formulate and submit to the members of the league for adoption plans for the establishment of a permanent court of international justice. The court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the council or by the assembly.

Article Fifteen

If there should arise between members of the league any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitra-

tion as above, the members of the league agree that they will submit the matter to the council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the secretary general, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof. For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the secretary general, as promptly as possible, statements of their case, all the relevant facts and papers; the council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

The council shall endeavor to effect a settlement of any dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and terms of settlement thereof as the council may deem appropriate.

If the dispute is not thus settled, the council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

Any member of the league represented on the council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.

If a report by the council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the league agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

If the council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the league reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.

If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

The council may in any case under this article refer the dispute to the assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the council.

In any case referred to the assembly all the provisions of

Article Twelve relating to the action and powers of the council shall apply to the action and powers of the assembly, provided that a report made by the assembly, if concurred in by the representatives of those members of the league represented on the council and of a majority of the other members of the league, exclusive in each case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.

Article Sixteen

Should any member of the league resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles Twelve, Thirteen or Fifteen, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the league, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the league or not.

It shall be the duty of the council in such case to recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military or naval forces the members of the league shall severally contribute to the armaments of forces to be used to protect the covenants of the league.

The members of the league agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this article, in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking state, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the members of the league which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the league.

Any member of the league which has violated any covenant of the league may be declared to be no longer a member of the league by a vote of the council concurred in by the representatives of all the other members of the league represented thereon.

Article Seventeen

In the event of a dispute between a member of the league and a state which is not a member of the league, or between states not members of the league, the state or states not members of the league shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the league for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles Twelve to Sixteen inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the council.

Upon such invitation being given, the council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

If a state so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the league for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a member of the league, the provisions of Article Sixteen shall be applicable as against the state taking such action.

If both parties to the dispute, when so invited, refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the league for the purpose of such dispute, the council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

Article Eighteen

Every convention or international engagement entered into henceforward by any member of the league, shall be forthwith registered with the secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

Article Nineteen

The assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the league of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

Article Twenty

The members of the league severally agree that this covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.

In case a member of the league shall, before becoming a member of the league, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this covenant, it shall be the duty of such member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

Article Twenty-One

Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace.

Article Twenty-Two

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this covenant.

The best method of giving practicable effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reasons of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the league.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic condition and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the

rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory.

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience or religion subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defense of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the league.

There are territories, such as Southwest Africa and certain of the South Pacific islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size or their remoteness from the centres of civilization or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the mandatory and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population. In every case of mandate, the mandatory shall render to the council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the member of the league, be explicitly defined in each case by the council.

A permanent commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the mandatories and to advise the council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

Article Twenty-Three

Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the members of the league (a) will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and children both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international or-

ganizations; (b) undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control; (c) will entrust the league with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs; (d) will entrust the league with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interests; (e) will make provisions to secure and maintain freedom of communication and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the league. In this connection the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall be borne in mind; (f) will endeavor to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease.

Article Twenty-Four

There shall be placed under the direction of the league all international bureaus already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaus and commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the league.

In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions but which are not placed under the control of international bureaus or commissions, the secretariat of the league shall, subject to the consent of the council and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable.

The council may include as part of the expenses of the secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the league.

Article Twenty-Five

The members of the league agree to encourage and promote the establishment and co-operation of duly authorized voluntary national Red Cross organizations having as purposes improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world.

Article Twenty-Six

Amendments to this covenant will take effect when ratified by the members of the league whose representatives compose the council and by a majority of the members of the league whose representatives compose the assembly.

No such amendment shall bind any member of the league which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a member of the league.

Original members of the League of Nations—

Signatories of the Treaty of Peace:

United States of America, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, British Empire, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, India, China, Cuba, Czecho-Slovakia, Ecuador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Servia, Siam, Uruguay.

States invited to accede to the covenant:

Argentine Republic, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela.

First Secretary General of the League of Nations.

The above final text of the Covenant of the League of Nations is different in a number of respects from the first draft of the Covenant, as adopted on February 14. The first draft called forth a storm of protest, with the result that changes were made. The changes are succinctly indicated by the following address of President Wilson to the Peace Conference on April 28, when the final draft of the Covenant was adopted:

Mr. Chairman: When the text of the Covenant of the league of nations was laid before you I had the honor of reading the Covenant in extenso. I will not detain you to-day to read the Covenant as it has now been altered, but will merely take the liberty of explaining to you some of the alterations that have been made.

The report of the commission has been circulated. You yourselves have in hand the text of the Covenant, and will no doubt have noticed that most of the changes that have been made

are mere changes of phraseology, not changes of substance, and that, besides that, most of the changes are intended to clarify the document, or, rather, to make explicit what we all have assumed was implicit in the document as it was originally presented to you. But I shall take the liberty of calling your attention to the new features, such as they are. Some of them are considerable, the rest trivial.

The first paragraph of Article I is new. In view of the insertion of the Covenant in the peace treaty, specific provision as to the signatories of the treaty, who would become members of the league, and also as to neutral states to be invited to accede to the Covenant, were obviously necessary. The paragraph also provides for the method by which a neutral state may accede to the Covenant.

The third paragraph of Article I is new, providing for the withdrawal of any member of the league on a notice given of two years.

The second paragraph of Article IV is new, providing for a possible increase in the council, should other powers be added to the league of nations whose present accession is not anticipated.

The two last paragraphs of Article IV are new, providing specifically for one vote for each member of the league in the council, which was understood before, and providing also for one representative of each member of the league.

The first paragraph of Article V is new, expressly incorporating the provision as to the unanimity of voting, which was at first taken for granted.

The second paragraph of Article VI has had added to it that a majority of the assembly must approve the appointment of the secretary general.

The first paragraph of Article VII names Geneva as the seat of the league and is followed by a second paragraph which gives the council power to establish the seat of the league elsewhere should it subsequently deem it necessary.

The third paragraph of Article VII is new, establishing equality of employment of men and women, that is to say, by the league.

The second paragraph of Article VIII is new, inasmuch as it undertakes to give instances of disputes which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration, instances of what have latterly been called "justifiable" questions.

The eighth paragraph of Article XV is new. This is the amendment regarding domestic jurisdiction, that where the council finds that a question arising out of an international dispute affects matters which are clearly under the domestic jurisdiction of one or other of the parties it is to report to that effect and make no recommendation.

The last paragraph of Article XVI is new, providing for expulsion from the league in certain extraordinary circumstances.

Article XXI is new.

The second paragraph of Article XXII inserts the words with regard to mandatories: "and who are willing to accept it," thus explicitly introducing the principle that a mandate cannot be forced upon a nation unwilling to accept it.

Article XXIII is a combination of several former articles and also contains the following: A clause providing for the just treatment of aborigines; a clause looking toward a prevention of the white slave traffic and the traffic in opium, and a clause looking toward progress in international prevention and control of disease.

Article XXV specifically mentions the Red Cross as one of the international organizations which are to connect their work with the work of the league.

Article XXVI permits the amendment of the Covenant by a majority of the states composing the assembly, instead of three-fourths of the states, though it does not change the requirements in that matter with regard to the vote in the council.

The second paragraph of Article XXVI also is new, and was added at the request of the Brazilian delegation, in order to avoid certain constitutional difficulties. It permits any member of the league to dissent from an amendment, the effect of such dissent being withdrawal from the league.

And the annex is added giving the names of the signatories of the treaty, who becomes members, and the names of the states invited to accede to the Covenant. These are all the changes, I believe, which are of moment.

Mr. President, I take the opportunity to move the following resolutions in order to carry out the provisions of the Covenant. You will notice that the Covenant provides that the first secretary-general shall be chosen by this conference. It also provides that the first choice of the four member states who are to be added to the five great Powers on the council is left to this conference.

I move, therefore, that the first secretary general of the coun-

cil shall be the Honorable Sir James Eric Drummond, and, second, that until such time as the assembly shall have selected the first four members of the league to be represented on the council in accordance with Article IV of the Covenant representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Greece and Spain shall be members; and, third, that the powers to be represented on the council of the league of nations are requested to name representatives who shall form a committee of nine to prepare plans for the organization of the league and for the establishment of the seat of the league and to make arrangements and to prepare the agenda for the first meeting of the assembly, this committee to report both to the council and to the assembly of the league.

I think it not necessary to call your attention to other matters we have previously discussed—the capital significance of this Covenant, the hopes which are entertained as to the effect it will have upon steadying the affairs of the world, and the obvious necessity that there should be a concert of the free nations of the world to maintain justice in international relations, the relations between people and between the nations of the world.

If Baron Makino will pardon me for introducing a matter which I absentmindedly overlooked, it is necessary for me to propose the alteration of several words in the first line of Article V. Let me say that in several parts of the treaty, of which this Covenant will form a part certain duties as assigned to the council of the league of nations. In some instances it is provided that the action they shall take shall be by a majority vote. It is therefore necessary to make the Covenant conform with the other portions of the treaty by adding these words. I will read the first line and add the words:

“Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant, or by the terms of this treaty, decisions at any meeting of the assembly or of the council shall require the agreement of all the members of the league represented at the meeting.”

“Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant” is the present reading, and I move the addition “or by the terms of this treaty.” With that addition, I move the adoption of the Covenant.

THE TREATY WITH GERMANY

The official summary of the terms of the treaty with Germany is as follows:

The preamble names as parties of the one part the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, described as the Five Allied and Associated Powers, and Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, Siam, Czecho-Slovakia, and Uruguay, who with the five above are described as the allied and associated powers, and on the other part, Germany.

It states that: bearing in mind that on the request of the then Imperial German Government an armistice was granted on November 11, 1918, by the principal allied and associated powers in order that a treaty of peace might be concluded with her, and whereas the allied and associated powers, being equally desirous that the war in which they were successively involved directly or indirectly and which originated in the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on July 28, 1914, against Serbia, the declaration of war by Germany against Russia on August 1, 1914, and against France on August 3, 1914, and in the invasion of Belgium, should be replaced by firm, just, and durable peace, the plenipotentiaries (having communicated their full powers found in good and due form) have agreed as follows:

From the coming into force of the present treaty the state of war will terminate. From the moment and subject to the provisions of this treaty, official relations with Germany, and with each of the German States, will be resumed by the allied and associated Powers.

SECTION I—LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The Covenant of the League of Nations constitutes Section I of the peace treaty, which places upon the League many specific, in addition to its general, duties. It may question Germany at

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CAMOUFLAGED GUNS

In the upper panel is shown one of the largest French guns as protected from the observation of German aviators. In the central panel is shown an American 8-inch long range gun, one of the giant weapons handled by the Coast Artillery. It presents an interesting contrast in methods of camouflage with the gun shown in the upper panel.

THE CROIX DE GUERRE

In the lower panel, French officers are shown awarding the greatly-prized French Croix de Guerre (war medal) to American soldiers who distinguished themselves for bravery in a raid early on the first day of March, 1918.

any time for a violation of the neutralized zone east of the Rhine as a threat against the world's peace. It will appoint three of the five members of the Sarre Commission, oversee its regime, and carry out the plebiscite. It will appoint the High Commissioner of Danzig, guarantee the independence of the free city, and arrange for treaties between Danzig and Germany and Poland. It will work out the mandatory system to be applied to the former German colonies, and act as a final court in part of the plebiscites of the Belgian-German frontier, and in disputes as to the Kiel Canal, and decide certain of the economic and financial problems. An International Conference on Labor is to be held in October under its direction, and another on the international control of ports, waterways, and railways is foreshadowed.

SECTION II—BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY .

Germany cedes to France Alsace-Lorraine, 5,600 square miles to the southwest, and to Belgium two small districts between Luxemburg and Holland, totaling 382 square miles. She also cedes to Poland the southeastern tip of Silesia beyond and including Oppeln, most of Posen, and West Prussia, 27,686 square miles, East Prussia being isolated from the main body by a part of Poland. She loses sovereignty over the northeastern tip of East Prussia, 40 square miles north of the river Memel, and the internationalized areas about Danzig, 729 squares miles, and the Basin of the Sarre, 738 square miles, between the western border of the Rhenish Palatinate of Bavaria and the southeast corner of Luxemburg. The Danzig area consists of the V between the Nogat and Vistula Rivers made a W by the addition of a similar V on the west, including the city of Danzig. The southeastern third of East Prussia and the area between East Prussia and the Vistula north of latitude 53 degrees 3 minutes is to have its nationality determined by popular vote, 5,785 square miles, as is to be the case in part of Schleswig, 2,787 square miles.

SECTION III

Belgium

Germany is to consent to the abrogation of the treaties of 1839, by which Belgium was established as a neutral State, and to agree

in advance to any convention with which the allied and associated Powers may determine to replace them. She is to recognize the full sovereignty of Belgium over the contested territory of Moresnet and over part of Prussian Moresnet, and to renounce in favor of Belgium all rights over the circles of Eupen and Malmédy, the inhabitants of which are to be entitled within six months to protest against this change of sovereignty either in whole or in part, the final decision to be reserved to the League of Nations. A commission is to settle the details of the frontier, and various regulations for change of nationality are laid down.

Luxemburg

Germany renounces her various treaties and conventions with the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, recognizes that it ceased to be a part of the German Zollverein from January first, last, renounces all right of exploitation of the railroads, adheres to the abrogation of its neutrality, and accepts in advance any international agreement as to it reached by the allied and associated powers.

Left Bank of the Rhine

As provided in the military clauses, Germany will not maintain any fortifications or armed forces less than fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine, hold any manoeuvres, nor maintain any works to facilitate mobilization. In case of violation, "she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers who sign the present treaty and as intending to disturb the peace of the world." "By virtue of the present treaty, Germany shall be bound to respond to any request for an explanation which the Council of the League of Nations may think it necessary to address to her."

Alsace-Lorraine

After recognition of the moral obligation to repair the wrong done in 1871 by Germany to France and the people of Alsace-Lorraine, the territories ceded to Germany by the Treaty of Frankfort are restored to France with their frontiers as before 1871, to date from the signing of the armistice, and to be free of all public debts.

Citizenship is regulated by detailed provisions distinguishing those who are immediately restored to full French citizenship,

those who have to make formal applications therefor, and those for whom naturalization is open after three years. The last named class includes German residents in Alsace-Lorraine, as distinguished from those who acquire the position of Alsace-Lorrainers as defined in the treaty. All public property and all private property of German ex-sovereigns passes to France without payment or credit. France is substituted for Germany as regards ownership of the railroads and rights over concessions of tramway. The Rhine bridges pass to France with the obligation for their upkeep.

For five years manufactured products of Alsace-Lorraine will be admitted to Germany free of duty to a total amount not exceeding in any year the average of the three years preceding the war and textile materials may be imported from Germany to Alsace-Lorraine and re-exported free of duty. Contracts for electric power from the right bank must be continued for ten years. For seven years, with possible extension to ten, the ports of Kehl and Strassbourg shall be administered as a single unit by a French administrator appointed and supervised by the Central Rhine Commission. Property rights will be safeguarded in both ports and equality of treatment as respects traffic assured the nationals, vessels, and goods of every country.

Contracts between Alsace-Lorraine and Germans are maintained save for France's right to annul on grounds of public interest. Judgments of courts hold in certain classes of cases while in others a judicial exequatur is first required. Political condemnations during the war are null and void and the obligation to repay war fines is established as in other parts of allied territory.

Various clauses adjust the general provisions of the treaty to special conditions of Alsace-Lorraine, certain matters of execution being left to conventions to be made between France and Germany.

The Sarre

In compensation for the destruction of coal mines in Northern France and as payment on account of reparation, Germany cedes to France full ownership of the coal mines of the Sarre Basin with their subsidiaries, accessories and facilities. Their value will be estimated by the Reparation Commission and credited against that account. The French rights will be governed by German law in force at the armistice excepting war legislation, France replacing the present owners, whom Germany undertakes to indem-

nify. France will continue to furnish the present proportion of coal for local needs and contribute in just proportion to local taxes. The basin extends from the frontier of Lorraine as re-annexed to France north as far as Stwendel including on the west the valley of the Sarre as far as Sarre Holzbach and on the east the town of Homburg.

In order to secure the rights and welfare of the population and guarantee to France entire freedom in working the mines the territory will be governed by a commission appointed by the League of Nations and consisting of five members, one French, one a native inhabitant of the Sarre, and three representing three different countries other than France and Germany. The League will appoint a member of the Commission as Chairman to act as executive of the commission. The commission will have all powers of government formerly belonging to the German Empire, Prussia and Bavaria, will administer the railroads and other public services and have full power to interpret the treaty clauses. The local courts will continue, but subject to the Commission. Existing German legislation will remain the basis of the law, but the Commission may make modification after consulting a local representative assembly which it will organize. It will have the taxing power but for local purposes only. New taxes must be approved by this assembly. Labor legislation will consider the wishes of the local labor organizations and the labor program of the League. French and other labor may be freely utilized, the former being free to belong to French unions. All rights acquired as to pensions and social insurance will be maintained by Germany and the Sarre Commission.

There will be no military service but only a local gendarmerie to preserve order. The people will preserve their local assemblies, religious liberties, schools, and language, but may vote only for local assemblies. They will keep their present nationality except so far as individuals may change it. Those wishing to leave will have every facility with respect to their property. The territory will form part of the French customs system, with no export tax on coal and metallurgical products going to Germany nor on German products entering the basin and for five years no import duties on products of the basin going to Germany or German products coming into the basin. For local consumption French money may circulate without restriction.

After fifteen years a plebiscite will be held by communes to ascertain the desires of the population as to continuance of the

existing regime under the League of Nations, union with France or union with Germany. The right to vote will belong to all inhabitants over twenty resident therein at the signature. Taking into account the opinions thus expressed the League will decide the ultimate sovereignty. In any portion restored to Germany the German Government must buy out the French mines at an appraised valuation. If the price is not paid within six months thereafter this portion passes finally to France. If Germany buys back the mines the League will determine how much of the coal shall be annually sold to France.

SECTION IV

German Austria

"Germany recognizes the total independence of German Austria in the boundaries traced."

Czecho-Slovakia

Germany recognizes the entire independence of the Czecho-Slovak State, including the autonomous territory of the Ruthenians south of the Carpathians, and accepts the frontiers of this State as to be determined, which in the case of the German frontier shall follow the frontier of Bohemia in 1914. The usual stipulations as to acquisition and change of nationality follow.

Poland

Germany cedes to Poland the greater part of Upper Silesia, Posen and the province of West Prussia on the left bank of the Vistula. A field Boundary Commission of seven, five representing the allied and associated powers and one each representing Poland and Germany, shall be constituted within fifteen days of the peace to delimit this boundary. Such special provisions as are necessary to protect racial, linguistic or religious minorities and to protect freedom of transit and equitable treatment of commerce of other nations shall be laid down in a subsequent treaty between the principal allied and associated powers and Poland.

East Prussia

The southern and the eastern frontier of East Prussia as touching Poland is to be fixed by plebiscites, the first in the regency of Allenstein between the southern frontier of East Prussia and the northern frontier, or Regierungsbezirk Allenstein from where it meets the boundary between East and West Prussia to its junction with the boundary between the circles of Oletsko and Augersburg, thence the northern boundary of Oletsko to its junction with the present frontier, and the second in the area comprising the circles of Stuhm and Rosenberg and the parts of the circles of Marienburg and Marienwerder east of the Vistula.

In each case German troops and authorities will move out within fifteen days of the peace, and the territories of five members appointed by the principal allied and associated powers, with the particular duty of arranging for a free, fair and secret vote. The commission will report the results of the plebiscites to the powers with a recommendation for the boundary, and will terminate its work as soon as the boundary has been laid down and the new authorities set up.

The principal allied and associated powers will draw up regulations assuring East Prussia full and equitable access to and use of the Vistula. A subsequent convention, of which the terms will be fixed by the principal allied and associated powers, will be entered into between Poland, Germany and Danzig, to assure suitable railroad communication across German territory on the right bank of the Vistula between Poland and Danzig, while Poland shall grant free passage from East Prussia to Germany.

Danzig

Danzig and the district immediately about it is to be constituted into the "free city of Danzig" under the guarantee of the League of Nations. A high commissioner appointed by the League and President of Danzig shall draw up a constitution in agreement with the duly appointed representatives of the city, and shall deal in the first instance with all differences arising between the city and Poland. The actual boundaries of the city shall be delimited by a commission appointed within six months from the peace and to include three representatives chosen by the

allied and associated powers, and one each by Germany and Poland.

A convention, the terms of which shall be fixed by the principal allied and associated powers, shall be concluded between Poland and Danzig, which shall include Danzig within the Polish customs frontiers, though a free area in the port; insure to Poland the free use of all the city's waterways, docks and other port facilities, the control and administration of the Vistula and the whole through railway system within the city, and postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication between Poland and Danzig; provide against discrimination against Poles within the city, and place its foreign relations and the diplomatic protection of its citizens abroad in charge of Poland.

Denmark

The frontier between Germany and Denmark will be fixed by the self-determination of the population. Ten days from the peace German troops and authorities shall evacuate the region north of the line running from the mouth of the Schlef, south of Kappel, Schleswig, and Friedrichstadt along the Eider to the North Sea south of Tønning; the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils shall be dissolved, and the territory administered by an international commission of five, of whom Norway and Sweden shall be invited to name two.

The commission shall insure a free and secret vote in three zones. That between the German-Danish frontier and a line running south of the Island of Alsen, north of Flensburg, and south of Tondern to the North Sea north of the Island of Sylt, will vote as a unit within three weeks after the evacuation. Within five weeks after this vote the second zone, whose southern boundary runs from the North Sea south of the Island of Fehr to the Baltic south of Sygum, will vote by communes. Two weeks after that vote the third zone running to the limit of evacuation will also vote by communes. The international commission will then draw a new frontier on the basis of these plebiscites and with due regard for geographical and economic conditions. Germany will renounce all sovereignty over territories north of this line in favor of the Associated Governments, who will hand them over to Denmark.

Helgoland

The fortifications, military establishments, and harbors of the Islands of Helgoland and Dune are to be destroyed under the supervision of the Allies by German labor and at Germany's expense. They may not be reconstructed, nor any similar fortification built in the future.

Russia

Germany agrees to respect as permanent and inalienable the independency of all territories which were part of the former Russian Empire, to accept the abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk and other treaties entered into with the Maximalist Government of Russia, to recognize the full force of all treaties entered into by the allied and associated powers with States which were a part of the former Russian Empire, and to recognize the frontiers as determined thereon. The allied and associated powers formally reserve the right of Russia to obtain restitution and reparation on the principles of the present treaty.

SECTION V—GERMAN RIGHTS OUTSIDE EUROPE

Outside Europe, Germany renounces all rights, titles, and privileges as to her own or her allies' territories to all the allied and associated powers, and undertakes to accept whatever measures are taken by the five allied powers in relation thereto.

Colonies and Overseas Possessions

Germany renounces in favor of the allied and associated powers her overseas possessions with all rights and titles therein. All movable and immovable property belonging to the German Empire, or to any German State, shall pass to the Government exercising authority therein. These Governments may make whatever provisions seem suitable for the repatriation of German nationals and as to the conditions on which German subjects of European origin shall reside, hold property, or carry on business. Germany undertakes to pay reparation for damages suffered by French nationals in Kamerun or its frontier zone

through the acts of German civil and military authorities and of individual Germans from the 1st of January, 1900, to the 1st of August, 1914. Germany renounces all rights under the convention of the 4th of November, 1911, and the 29th of September, 1912, and undertakes to pay to France in accordance with an estimate presented and approved by the Repatriation Commission all deposits, credits, advances, etc., thereby secured. Germany undertakes to accept and observe any provisions by the allied and associated powers as to the trade in arms and spirits in Africa as well as to the General Act of Berlin of 1885 and the General Act of Brussels of 1890. Diplomatic protection to inhabitants of former German colonies is to be given by the Governments exercising authority.

China

Germany renounces in favor of China all privileges and indemnities resulting from the Boxer Protocol of 1901, and all buildings, wharves, barracks for munitions of warships, wireless plants, and other public property except diplomatic or consular establishments in the German concessions of Tientsin and Hankow and in other Chinese territory except Kiao-Chau and agrees to return to China at her own expense all the astronomical instruments seized in 1900 and 1901. China will, however, take no measures for disposal of German property in the legation quarter at Peking without the consent of the Powers signatory to the Boxer Protocol.

Germany accepts the abrogation of the concessions at Hankow and Tientsin, China agreeing to open them to international use. Germany renounces all claims against China or any allied and associated Government for the internment of repatriation of her citizens in China and for the seizure or liquidation of German interests there since August 14, 1917. She renounces in favor of Great Britain her State property in the British concession at Canton and of France and China jointly of the property of the German school in the French concession at Shanghai.

Siam

Germany recognizes that all agreements between herself and Siam, including the right of extra-territoriality, ceased July 22, 1917. All German public property, except consular and diplomatic premises, passes without compensation to Siam. German private

property to be dealt with in accordance with the economic clauses. Germany waives all claims against Siam for the seizure and condemnation of her ships, liquidation of her property, or internment of her nationals.

Liberia

Germany renounces all rights under the international arrangements of 1911 and 1912 regarding Liberia, more particularly the right to nominate a receiver of the customs, and disinterests herself in any further negotiations for the rehabilitation of Liberia. She regards as abrogated all commercial treaties and agreements between herself and Liberia and recognizes Liberia's right to determine the status and condition of the re-establishment of Germans in Liberia.

Morocco

Germany renounces all her rights, titles, and privileges under the Act of Algeiras and the Franco-German agreements of 1909 and 1911, and under all treaties and arrangements with the Sherifian Empire. She undertakes not to intervene in any negotiations as to Morocco between France and other Powers, accepts all the consequences of the French protectorate and renounces the capitulations; the Sherifian Government shall have complete liberty of action in regard to German nationals, and all German protected persons shall be subject to the common law. All movable and immovable German property, including mining rights, may be sold at public auction, the proceeds to be paid to the Sherifian Government and deducted from the reparation account. Germany is also required to relinquish her interests in the State Bank of Morocco. All Moroccan goods entering Germany shall have the same privilege as French goods.

Egypt

Germany recognizes the British Protectorate over Egypt declared on December 18, 1914, and renounces as from August 4, 1914, the capitulation and all the treaties, agreements, etc., concluded by her with Egypt. She undertakes not to intervene in any negotiations about Egypt between Great Britain and other Powers. There are provisions for jurisdiction over German nationals and property and for German consent to any changes which may be made in relation to the Commission of Public Debt. Germany consents to the transfer to Great Britain of the powers given to

the late Sultan of Turkey for securing the free navigation of the Suez Canal. Arrangements for property belonging to German nationals in Egypt are made similar to those in the case of Morocco and other countries. Anglo-Egyptian goods entering Germany shall enjoy the same treatment as British goods.

Turkey and Bulgaria

Germany accepts all arrangements which the Allied and Associated Powers make with Turkey and Bulgaria with reference to any rights, privileges or interests claimed in those countries by Germany or her nationals and not dealt with elsewhere.

Shantung

Germany cedes to Japan all rights, titles, and privileges, notably as to Kiao-Chau, and the railroads, mines, and cables acquired by her treaty with China of March 6, 1897, by and other agreements as to Shantung. All German rights to the railroad from Tsing-tao to Tsinan-fu, including all facilities and mining rights and rights of exploitation, pass equally to Japan, and the cables from Tsing-tao to Shanghai and Che-foo, the cables free of all charges. All German State property, movable and immovable, in Kiao-Chau is acquired by Japan free of all charges.

SECTION VI—MILITARY, NAVAL AND AIR

Military Forces

The demobilization of the German Army must take place within two months of the peace. Its strength may not exceed 100,000, including 4,000 officers, with not over seven divisions of infantry and three of cavalry, and to be devoted exclusively to maintenance of internal order and control of frontiers. Divisions may not be grouped under more than two army corps headquarters staffs. The German General Staff is abolished. The army administrative service, consisting of civilian personnel not included in the number of effectives, is reduced to one-tenth the total in the 1913 budget. Employes of the German States, such as customs officers, first guards, and coast guards, may not exceed the number in 1913. Gendarmes and local police may be increased only

in accordance with the growth of population. None of these may be assembled for military training.

Armaments

All establishments for the manufacturing, preparation, storage, or design of arms and munitions of war, except those specifically excepted, must be closed within three months of the peace, and their personnel dismissed. The exact amount of armament and munitions allowed Germany is laid down in detail tables, all in excess to be surrendered or rendered useless. The manufacture or importation of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and all analogous liquids is forbidden as well as the importation of arms, munitions, and war materials. Germany may not manufacture such materials for foreign governments.

Conscription

Conscription is abolished in Germany. The enlisted personnel must be maintained by voluntary enlistment for terms of twelve consecutive years, the number of discharges before the expiration of that term not in any year to exceed 5 per cent of the total effectives. Officers remaining in the service must agree to serve to the age of 45 years, and newly appointed officers must agree to serve actively for twenty-five years.

No military schools except those absolutely indispensable for the units allowed shall exist in Germany two months after the peace. No associations such as societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs, educational establishments or universities may occupy themselves with military matters. All measures of mobilization are forbidden.

Fortresses

All fortified works, fortresses, and field works situated in German territory within a zone of fifty kilometers east of the Rhine will be dismantled within three months. The construction of any new fortifications there is forbidden. The fortified works on the southern and eastern frontiers, however, may remain.

Control

Inter-Allied commissions of control will see to the execution of the provisions for which a time limit is set, the maximum named

being three months. They may establish headquarters at the German seat of Government and go to any part of Germany desired. Germany must give them complete facilities, pay their expenses, and also the expenses of execution of the treaty, including the labor and material necessary in demolition, destruction or surrender of war equipment.

Naval

The German navy must be demobilized within a period of two months after the peace. Germany will be allowed 6 small battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, and no submarines, either military or commercial, with a personnel of 15,000 men, including officers, and no reserve force of any character. Conscription is abolished, only voluntary service being permitted, with a minimum period of 25 years' service for officers and 12 for men. No member of the German mercantile marine will be permitted any naval training.

All German vessels of war in foreign ports and the German high sea fleet interned at Scapa Flow will be surrendered, the final disposition of these ships to be decided upon by the allied and associated powers. Germany must surrender 42 modern destroyers, 50 modern torpedo boats, and all submarines, with their salvage vessels. All war vessels under construction, including submarines, must be broken up. War vessels not otherwise provided for are to be placed in reserve, or used for commercial purposes. Replacement of ships except those lost can take place only at the end of 20 years for battleships and 15 years for destroyers. The largest armored ship Germany will be permitted will be 10,000 tons.

Germany is required to sweep up the mines in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, as decided upon by the Allies. All German fortifications in the Baltic, defending the passages through the belts, must be demolished. Other coast defenses are permitted, but the number and calibre of the guns must not be increased.

Wireless

During a period of three months after the peace German high power wireless stations at Nauen, Hanover, and Berlin will not be permitted to send any message except for commercial purposes,

and under supervision of the allied and associated Governments, nor may any more such stations be constructed.

Cables

Germany renounces all title to specified cables, the value of such as were privately owned being credited to her against reparation indebtedness.

Germany will be allowed to repair German submarine cables which have been cut but are not being utilized by the allied powers, and also portions of cables which, after having been cut, have been removed, or are at any rate not being utilized by any one of the allied and associated powers. In such cases the cables, or portions of cables, removed or utilized remain the property of the allied and associated powers, and accordingly fourteen cables or parts of cables are specified which will not be restored to Germany.

Air

The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces except for not over 100 unarmed seaplanes to be retained till October 1 to search for submarine mines. No dirigible shall be kept. The entire air personnel is to be demobilized within two months, except for 1,000 officers and men retained till October. No aviation grounds or dirigible sheds are to be allowed within 150 kilometers of the Rhine, on the eastern or southern frontiers, existing installations within these limits to be destroyed. The manufacture of aircraft and parts of aircraft is forbidden for six months. All military and naval aeronautical material under a most exhaustive definition must be surrendered within three months, except for the 100 seaplanes already specified.

Prisoners of War

The repatriation of German prisoners and interned civilians is to be carried out without delay and at Germany's expense by a commission composed of representatives of the Allies and Germany. Those under sentence for offenses against discipline are to be repatriated without regard to the completion of their sentences. Until Germany has surrendered persons guilty of offenses against the laws and customs of war, the Allies have the right to retain selected German officers. The Allies may deal at their own dis-

cretion with German nationals who do not desire to be repatriated, all repatriation being conditional on the immediate release of any allied subjects still in Germany. Germany is to accord facilities to commissions of inquiry in collecting information in regard to missing prisoners of war and of imposing penalties on German officials who have concealed allied nationals. Germany is to restore all property belonging to allied prisoners. There is to be a reciprocal exchange of information as to dead prisoners and their graves.

Graves

Both parties will respect and maintain the graves of soldiers and sailors buried on their territories, agree to recognize and assist any commission charged by any allied or associated Government with identifying, registering, maintaining or erecting suitable monuments over the graves, and to afford to each other all facilities for the repatriation of the remains of their soldiers.

SECTION VII—RESPONSIBILITIES

“The allied and associated powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, not for an offense against criminal law, but for a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.”

The ex-Emperor's surrender is to be requested of Holland and a special tribunal set up, composed of one judge from each of the five great powers, with full guarantee of the right of defense. It is to be guided “by the highest motives of international policy with a view of vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international morality,” and will fix the punishment it feels should be imposed.

Persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war are to be tried and punished by military tribunals under military law. If the charges affect nationals of only one State, they will be tried before a tribunal of that State; if they affect nationals of several States, they will be tried before joint tribunals of the States concerned. Germany shall hand over to the associated Governments, either jointly or severally, all persons so accused and all documents and information necessary to insure full knowledge of the incriminating acts, the discovery of the offenders, and the just appreciation of the responsibility. The Judge presiding will be entitled to name his own counsel.

SECTION VIII—REPARATION AND RESTITUTION

"The allied and associated Governments affirm, and Germany accepts, the responsibility of herself and her allies, for causing all the loss and damage to which the allied and associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."

The total obligation of Germany to pay as defined in the category of damages is to be determined and notified to her after a fair hearing, and not later than May 1, 1921, by an interallied Reparation Commission.

At the same time a schedule of payments to discharge the obligation within thirty years shall be presented. These payments are subject to postponement in certain contingencies. Germany irrevocably recognizes the full authority of this commission, agrees to supply it with all the necessary information and to pass legislation to effectuate its findings. She further agrees to restore to the allies cash and certain articles which can be identified.

As an immediate step toward restoration Germany shall pay within two years one thousand million pounds sterling in either gold, goods, ships, or other specific forms of payment. This sum being included in, and not additional to, the first thousand million bond issue referred to below, with the understanding that certain expenses, such as those of the armies of occupation and payments for food and raw materials, may be deducted at the discretion of the Allies.

Germany further binds herself to repay all sums borrowed by Belgium from her allies as a result of Germany's violation of the treaty of 1839 up to November 11, 1918, and for this purpose will issue at once and hand over to the Reparation Commission 5 per cent gold bonds falling due in 1926.

While the allied and associated Governments recognize that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminution of such resources which will result from other treaty claims, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage, they require her to make compensation for all damages caused to civilians under seven main categories:

(a) Damages by personal injury to civilians caused by acts of war, directly or indirectly, including bombardment from the air.

(b) Damages caused by civilians, including exposure at sea,

resulting from acts of cruelty ordered by the enemy, and to civilians in the occupied territories.

(c) Damages caused by maltreatment of prisoners.

(d) Damages to the Allied peoples represented by pensions and separation allowances, capitalized at the signature of this treaty.

(e) Damages to property other than naval or military materials.

(f) Damages to civilians by being forced to labor.

(g) Damages in the form of levies or fines imposed by the enemy.

In periodically estimating Germany's capacity to pay, the Reparation Commission shall examine the German system of taxation, first to the end that the sums for reparation which Germany is required to pay shall become a charge upon all her revenues prior to that for the service or discharge of any domestic loan; and secondly, so as to satisfy itself that in general the German scheme of taxation is fully as heavy proportionately as that of any of the powers represented on the commission.

The measures which the allied and associated powers shall have the right to take, in case of voluntary default by Germany, and which Germany agrees not to regard as acts of war, may include economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals and in general such other measures as the respective Governments may determine to be necessary in the circumstances.

The commission shall consist of one representative each of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium, a representative of Servia or Japan taking the place of the Belgian representative when the interests of either country are particularly affected, with all other allied powers entitled, when their claims are under consideration, to the right of representation without voting power. It shall permit Germany to give evidence regarding her capacity to pay, and shall assure her a just opportunity to be heard. It shall make its permanent headquarters at Paris, establish its own procedure and personnel; have general control of the whole reparation problem; and become the exclusive agency of the Allies for receiving, holding, selling, and distributing reparation payments. Majority vote shall prevail, except that unanimity is required on questions involving the sovereignty of any of the Allies, the cancellation of all or part of Germany's obligations, the time and manner of selling, distributing, and negotiating bonds issued by Germany, and postponement between 1921 and 1926 of

annual payments beyond 1930 and any postponement after 1926 for a period of more than three years of the application of a different method of measuring damage than in a similar former case, and the interpretation of provisions. Withdrawal from representation is permitted on twelve months' notice.

The Commission may require Germany to give from time to time by way of guarantee, issues of bonds or other obligations to cover such claims as are not otherwise satisfied. In this connection and on account of the total amount of claims, bond issues are presently to be required of Germany in acknowledgment of its debt as follows: 20,000,000,000 marks gold, payable not later than May 1, 1921, without interest; 40,000,000,000 marks gold bearing $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent interest between 1921 and 1926, and thereafter 5 per cent, with a 1 per cent sinking fund payment beginning 1926; and an undertaking to deliver 40,000,000,000 marks gold bonds bearing interest at 5 per cent, under terms to be fixed by the Commission.

Interest on Germany's debt will be 5 per cent, unless otherwise determined by the Commission in the future, and payments that are not made in gold may "be accepted by the Commission in the form of properties, commodities, businesses, rights, concessions, etc." Certificates of beneficial interest, representing either bonds or goods delivered by Germany, may be issued by the Commission to the interested Powers, no Power being entitled, however, to have its certificates divided into more than five pieces. As bonds are distributed and pass from the control of the Commission, an amount of Germany's debt equivalent to their par value is to be considered as liquidated.

Shipping

The German Government recognizes the right of the Allies to the replacement, ton for ton and class for class, of all merchant ships and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to the war, and agrees to cede to the Allies all German merchant ships of 1,600 tons gross and upward; one-half of her ships between 1,600 and 1,000 tons gross, and one-quarter of her steam trawlers and other fishing boats. These ships are to be delivered within two months to the Reparations Commission together with documents of title evidencing the transfer of the ships free from encumbrance.

"As an additional part of reparation," the German Government further agrees to build merchant ships for the account of the

Allies to the amount of not exceeding 200,000 tons gross annually during the next five years.

All ships used for inland navigation taken by Germany from the Allies are to be restored within two months, the amount of loss not covered by such restitution to be made up by the cession of the German river fleet up to 20 per cent thereof.

Dyestuffs and Chemical Drugs

In order to effect payment by deliveries in kind, Germany is required, for a limited number of years, varying in the case of each, to deliver coal, coal-tar products, dyestuffs and chemical drugs, in specific amounts to the Reparations Commission. The Commission may so modify the conditions of delivery as not to interfere unduly with Germany's industrial requirements. The deliveries of coal are based largely upon the principle of making good diminutions in the production of the Allied countries resulting from the war.

Germany accords option to the Commission on dyestuffs and chemical drugs, including quinine, up to 50 per cent of the total stock in Germany at the time the treaty comes into force, and similar option during each six months to the end of 1924 up to 25 per cent of the previous six months' output.

Devastated Areas

Germany undertakes to devote her economic resources directly to the physical restoration of the invaded areas. The Reparations Commission is authorized to require Germany to replace the destroyed articles by the delivery of animals, machinery, etc., existing in Germany, and to manufacture materials required for reconstruction purposes; all with due consideration for Germany's essential domestic requirements.

Germany is to deliver annually for ten years to France coal equivalent to the difference between the annual pre-war output of the Nord and Pas de Calais mines and the annual production during the above ten-year period. Germany further gives options over ten years for delivery of 7,000,000 tons of coal per year to France in addition to the above of 8,000,000 tons to Belgium and of an amount rising from 4,500,000 tons in 1919 to 1920 to 8,500,000 in 1923 to 1924 to Italy at prices to be fixed as prescribed in the treaty. Coke may be taken in place of coal in the

ratio of three tons to four. Provision is also made for delivery to France over three years of benzol, coal tar, and of ammonia. The Commission has powers to postpone or annul the above deliveries should they interfere unduly with the industrial requirements of Germany.

Germany is to restore within six months the Koran of the Caliph Othman, formerly at Medina, to the King of the Hedjaz, and the skull of the Sultan Okwawa, formerly in German East Africa, to his Britannic Majesty's Government.

The German Government is also to restore to the French Government certain papers taken by the German authorities in 1870, belonging then to M. Reuher, and to restore the French flags taken during the war of 1870 and 1871.

As reparation for the destruction of the Library of Louvain Germany is to hand over manuscripts, early printed books, prints, etc., to the equivalent of those destroyed.

In addition to the above Germany is to hand over to Belgium wings, now in Berlin, belonging to the altar-piece of "The Adoration of the Lamb," by Hubert and Jan van Eyck, the center of which is now in the Church of St. Bavon at Ghent, and the wings, now in Berlin and Munich, of the altar-piece of "The Last Supper," by Dirk Bouts, the center of which belongs to the Church of St. Peter at Louvain.

Finance

Powers to which German territory is ceded will assume a certain portion of the German pre-war debt, the amount to be fixed by the Reparations Commission on the basis of the ratio between the revenue of the ceded territory and Germany's total revenues for the three years preceding the war. In view, however, of the special circumstances under which Alsace-Lorraine was separated from France in 1871, when Germany refused to accept any part of the French public debt, France will not assume any part of Germany's pre-war debt there, nor will Poland share in certain German debts incurred for the oppression of Poland. If the value of the German public property in ceded territory exceeds the amount of debt assumed, the States to which property is ceded will give credit on reparation for the excess, with the exception of Alsace-Lorraine. Mandatory powers will not assume any German debts or give any credit for German Government property. Germany renounces all right of representation on, or control of

State banks, commissions, or other similar international financial and economic organizations.

Germany is required to pay the total cost of the armies of occupation from the date of the armistice so long as they are maintained in German territory, this cost to be a first charge on her resources. The cost of reparation is the next charge, after making such provisions for payments for imports as the Allies may deem necessary.

Germany is to deliver to the allied and associated powers all sums deposited in Germany by Turkey and Austria-Hungary in connection with the financial support extended by her to them during the war, and to transfer to the Allies all claims against Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey in connection with agreements made during the war. Germany confirms the renunciation of the Treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk.

On the request of the Reparations Commission, Germany will expropriate any rights or interests of her nationals in public utilities in ceded territories or those administered by mandatories, and in Turkey, China, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria, and transfer them to the Reparations Commission, which will credit her with their value. Germany guarantees to repay to Brazil the fund arising from the sale of Sao Paulo coffee which she refused to allow Brazil to withdraw from Germany.

SECTION IX

This section provides for the enforcement of the international legislation against the opium trade and the safeguarding of the activities of the religious missions in the ceded territory, Germany renouncing all claims concerning such missions.

SECTION X—ECONOMIC CLAUSES

Customs

For a period of six months Germany shall impose no tariff duties higher than the lowest in force in 1914, and for certain agricultural products, wines, vegetable oils, artificial silk, and washed or scoured wool this restriction obtains for two and a half years more. For five years, unless further extended by the League of Nations, Germany must give most favored nation treatment to the allied and associated powers. She shall impose no customs

tariff for five years on goods originating in Alsace-Lorraine; and for three years on goods originating in former German territory ceded to Poland with the right of observation of a similar exception for Luxemburg.

Shipping

Shipping of the allied and associated powers shall for five years and thereafter under condition of reciprocity, unless the League of Nations otherwise decides, enjoy the same right in German ports as German vessels, and have most favored nation treatment in fishing, coasting trade, and towage even in territorial waters. Ships of a country having no seacoast may be registered at some one place within its territory.

Unfair Competition

Germany undertakes to give the trade of the allied and associated powers adequate safeguards against unfair competition, and in particular to suppress the use of false wrappings and markings, and on condition of reciprocity to respect the laws and judicial decisions of allied and associated States in respect of regional appellations of wines and spirits.

Treatment of Nationals

Germany shall impose no exceptional taxes or restrictions upon the nationals of allied and associated States for a period of five years and, unless the League of Nations acts, for an additional five years German nationality shall not continue to attach to a person who has become a national of an allied or associated State.

Multilateral Conventions

Some forty multilateral conventions are renewed between Germany and the allied and associated powers, but special conditions are attached to Germany's readmission to several. As to postal and telegraphic conventions Germany must not refuse to make reciprocal agreements with the new States. She must agree as respects the radio-telegraphic convention to provisional rules to be communicated to her, and adhere to the new convention when formulated. In the North Sea fisheries and North Sea liquor

traffic convention, rights of inspection and police over Allied and associated fishing boats shall be exercised for at least five years only by vessels of these Powers. As to the international railway union she shall adhere to the new convention when formulated. China, as to the Chinese customs tariff arrangement of 1905 regarding Whangpoo, and the Boxer indemnity of 1901; France, Portugal, and Roumania, as to The Hague Convention of 1903, relating to civil procedure, and Great Britain and the United States as to Article III of the Samoan Treaty of 1899, are relieved of all obligations toward Germany.

Bilateral Treaties

Each allied and associated State may renew any treaty with Germany in so far as consistent with the peace treaty by giving notice within six months. Treaties entered into by Germany since August 1, 1914, with other enemy States, and before or since that date with Roumania, Russia, and governments representing parts of Russia are abrogated, and concessions granted under pressure by Russia to German subjects are annulled. The allied and associated States are to enjoy most favored nation treatment under treaties entered into by Germany and other enemy States before August 1, 1914, and under treaties entered into by Germany and neutral States during the war.

Pre-War Debts

A system of clearing houses is to be created within three months, one in Germany and one in each allied and associated State which adopts the plan for the payment of pre-war debts, including those arising from contracts suspended by the war. For the adjustment of the proceeds of the liquidation of enemy property and the settlement of other obligations each participating State assumes responsibility for the payment of all debts owing by its nationals to nationals of the enemy States, except in cases of pre-war insolvency of the debtor. The proceeds of the sale of private enemy property in each participating State may be used to pay the debts owed to the nationals of that State, direct payment from debtor to creditor and all communications relating thereto being prohibited. Disputes may be settled by arbitration by the courts of the

debtor country, or by the mixed arbitral tribunal. Any ally or associated power may, however, decline to participate in this system by giving Germany six months' notice.

Enemy Property

Germany shall restore or pay for all private enemy property seized or damaged by her, the amount of damages to be fixed by the mixed arbitral tribunal. The allied and associated States may liquidate German private property within their territories as compensation for property of their nationals not restored, or paid for by Germany. For debts owed to their nationals by German nationals and for other claims against Germany, Germany is to compensate its nationals for such losses and to deliver within six months all documents relating to property held by its nationals in allied and associated States. All war legislation as to enemy property rights and interests is confirmed and all claims by Germany against the allied or associated Governments for acts under exceptional war measures abandoned.

Pre-war contracts between allied and associated nationals excepting the United States, Japan, and Brazil and German nationals are cancelled except for debts for accounts already performed.

Agreements

For the transfer of property where the property had already passed, leases of land and houses, contracts of mortgages, pledge or lien, mining concessions, contracts with governments and insurance contracts, mixed arbitral tribunals shall be established of three members, one chosen by Germany, one by the allied and associated States and the third by agreement, or, failing which, by the President of Switzerland. They shall have jurisdiction over all disputes as to contracts concluded before the present peace treaty.

Fire insurance contracts are not considered dissolved by the war, even if premiums have not been paid, but lapse at the date of the first annual premium falling due three months after the peace. Life insurance contracts may be restored by payments of accumulated premiums with interest, sums falling due on such contracts during the war to be recoverable with interest. Marine insurance contracts are dissolved by the outbreak of war except

where the risk insured against had already been incurred. Where the risk had not attached, premiums paid are recoverable, otherwise premiums due and sums due on losses are recoverable. Reinsurance treaties are abrogated unless invasion has made it impossible for the reinsured to find another reinsurer. Any allied or associated power, however, may cancel all the contracts running between its nationals and a German life insurance company, the latter being obligated to hand over the proportion of its assets attributable to such policies.

Industrial Property

Rights as to industrial, literary, and artistic property are re-established. The special war measures of the allied and associated powers are ratified and the right reserved to impose conditions on the use of German patents and copyrights when in the public interest. Except as between the United States and Germany, pre-war licenses and rights to sue for infringements committed during the war are cancelled.

SECTION XI—AERIAL NAVIGATION

Aircraft of the allied and associated powers shall have full liberty of passage and landing over and in German territory, equal treatment with German planes as to use of German airdromes, and with most favored nation planes as to internal commercial traffic in Germany. Germany agrees to accept allied certificates of nationality, airworthiness, competency or licenses and to apply the convention relative to aerial navigation concluded between the allied and associated powers to her own aircraft over her own territory. These rules apply until 1923, unless Germany has since been admitted to the League of Nations or to the above convention.

SECTION XII—FREEDOM OF TRANSIT

Germany must grant freedom of transit through her territories by mail or water to persons, goods, ships, carriages, and mails from or to any of the allied or associated powers, without customs or transit duties, undue delays, restrictions, or discriminations based on nationality, means of transport, or place of entry or

departure. Goods in transit shall be assured all possible speed of journey, especially perishable goods. Germany may not divert traffic from its normal course in favor of her own transport routes or maintain "control stations" in connection with transmigration traffic. She may not establish any tax discrimination against the ports of allied or associated powers; must grant the latter's sea-ports all factors and reduced tariffs granted her own or other nationals, and afford the allied and associated powers equal rights with those of her own nationals in her ports and waterways, save that she is free to open or close her maritime coasting trade.

Free Zones in Ports

Free zones existing in German ports on August 1, 1914, must be maintained with due facilities as to warehouses, packing, and shipping, without discrimination, and without charges except for expenses of administration and use. Goods leaving the free zones for consumption in Germany and goods brought into the free zones from Germany shall be subject to the ordinary import and export taxes.

International Rivers

The Elbe from the junction of the Ultava, the Ultava from Prague, the Oder from Oppa, the Niemen from Grodno, and the Danube from Ulm are declared international, together with their connections. The riparian states must ensure good conditions of navigation within their territories unless a special organization exists therefor. Otherwise appeal may be had to a special tribunal of the League of Nations, which also may arrange for a general international waterways convention.

The Elbe and the Oder are to be placed under international commissions to meet within three months, that for the Elbe composed of four representatives of Germany, two from Czecho-Slovakia, and one each from Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium; and that for the Oder composed of one each from Poland, Russia, Czecho-Slovakia, Great Britain, France, Denmark, and Sweden. If any riparian state on the Niemen should so request of the League of Nations, a similar commission shall be established there. These commissions shall upon request of any riparian state meet within three months to revise existing international agreement.

The Danube

The European Danube Commission reassumes its pre-war powers, but for the time being with representatives of only Great Britain, France, Italy and Roumania. The upper Danube is to be administered by a new international commission until a definitive statute be drawn up at a conference of the Powers nominated by the allied and associated governments within one year after the peace. The enemy governments shall make full reparation for all war damages caused to the European Commission; shall cede their river facilities in surrendered territory, and give Czecho-Slovakia, Servia and Roumania any rights necessary on their shores for carrying on improvements in navigation.

The Rhine and the Moselle

The Rhine is placed under the Central Commission to meet at Strassbourg within six months after the peace, and to be composed of four representatives of France, which shall in addition select the President, four of Germany, and two each of Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. Germany must give France on the course of the Rhine included between the two extreme points of her frontiers all rights to take water to feed canals, while herself agreeing not to make canals on the right bank opposite France. She must also hand over to France all her drafts and designs for this part of the river.

Belgium is to be permitted to build a deep draft Rhine-Meuse canal if she so desires within twenty-five years, in which case Germany must construct the part within her territory on plans drawn by Belgium, similarly the interested Allied governments may construct a Rhine-Meuse canal—both, if constructed, to come under the competent international commission. Germany may not object if the Central Rhine Commission desires to extend its jurisdiction over the lower Moselle, the upper Rhine, or lateral canals.

Germany must cede to the allied and associated governments certain tugs, vessels, and facilities for navigation on all these rivers, the specific details to be established by an arbiter named by the United States. Decision will be based on the legitimate needs of the parties concerned and on the shipping traffic during the five years before the war. The value will be included in the regular reparation account. In the case of the Rhine shares in the German navigation companies and property such as wharves and

warehouses held by Germany in Rotterdam at the outbreak of the war must be handed over.

Railways

Germany, in addition to most favored nation treatment on her railways, agrees to co-operate in the establishment of through ticket services for passengers and baggage; to ensure communication by rail between the allied, associated, and other States; to allow the construction or improvement within twenty-five years of such lines as necessary; and to conform her rolling stock to enable its incorporation in trains of the allied or associated powers. She also agrees to accept the denunciation of the St. Gothard convention if Switzerland and Italy so request, and temporarily to execute instructions as to the transport of troops and supplies and the establishment of postal and telegraphic service, as provided.

Czecho-Slovakia

To assure Czecho-Slovakia access to the sea, special rights are given her both north and south. Toward the Adriatic she is permitted to run her own through trains to Fiume and Trieste. To the north, Germany is to lease her for ninety-nine years spaces in Hamburg and Stettin, the details to be worked out by a commission of three representing Czecho-Slovakia, Germany, and Great Britain.

The Kiel Canal

The Kiel Canal is to remain free and open to war and merchant ships of all nations at peace with Germany, subjects, goods and ships of all States are to be treated on terms of absolute equality, and no taxes to be imposed beyond those necessary for upkeep and improvement for which Germany is to be responsible. In case of violation of or disagreement as to those provisions, any State may appeal to the League of Nations, and may demand the appointment of an international commission. For preliminary hearing of complaints Germany shall establish a local authority at Kiel.

SECTION XIII—INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

Members of the League of Nations agree to establish a permanent organization to promote international adjustment of labor conditions, to consist of an annual international labor conference and an international labor office.

The former is composed of four representatives of each State, two from the Government, and one each from the employers and the employed. Each of them may vote individually. It will be a deliberative legislative body, its measures taking the form of draft conventions or recommendations for legislation, which, if passed by two-thirds vote, must be submitted to the lawmaking authority in every State participating. Each Government may either enact the terms into law; approve the principle, but modify them to local needs; leave the actual legislation in case of a Federal State to local legislatures; or reject the convention altogether without further obligation.

The international labor office is established at the seat of the League of Nations as part of its organization. It is to collect and distribute information on labor throughout the world and prepare agenda for the conference. It will publish a periodical in French and English, and possibly other languages. Each State agrees to make to it for presentation to the conference an annual report of measures taken to execute accepted conventions. The governing body, in its Executive, consists of twenty-four members, twelve representing the Governments, six the employers, and six the employes, to serve for three years.

On complaint that any Government has failed to carry out a convention to which it is a party, the governing body may make inquiries directly to that Government, and in case the reply is unsatisfactory, may publish the complaint with comment. A complaint by one Government against another may be referred by the governing body to a committee with a possibility of economic action in the background.

The first meeting of the conference will take place in October, 1919, at Washington, to discuss the eight-hour day or forty-eight-hour week; prevention of unemployment; extension and application of the international conventions adopted at Berne in 1906, prohibiting night work for women, and the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches; and employment of women and children at night or in unhealthy work, of women before and

after childbirth, including maternity benefit, and of children as regards minimum age.

Nine principles of labor conditions were recognized on the ground that "the well-being, physical and moral, of the industrial wage earners is of supreme international importance." With exceptions necessitated by differences of climate, habits and economic development, they include: the guiding principle that labor should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce; the right of association of employers and employes; a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life; the eight-hour day or forty-eight-hour week; a weekly rest of at least twenty-four hours; which should include Sunday wherever practicable; abolition of child labor and assurance of the continuation of the education and proper physical development of children; equal pay for equal work as between men and women; equitable treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein, including foreigners; and a system of inspection in which women should take part.

SECTION XIV—GUARANTEES

As a guarantee for the execution of the treaty, German territory to the west of the Rhine, together with the bridgeheads, will be occupied by allied and associated troops for a fifteen years' period. If the conditions are faithfully carried out by Germany, certain districts, including the bridgehead of Cologne, will be evacuated at the expiration of five years; certain other districts, including the bridgehead of Coblenz, and the territories nearest the Belgian frontier will be evacuated after ten years, and the remainder, including the bridgehead of Mainz, will be evacuated after fifteen years. In case the Interallied Reparation Commission finds that Germany has failed to observe the whole or part of her obligations either during the occupation or after the fifteen years have expired, the whole or part of the area specified will be reoccupied immediately. If before the expiration of the fifteen years Germany complies with all the treaty undertakings, the occupying forces will be withdrawn immediately.

All German troops at present in territories to the east of the new frontier shall return as soon as the allied and associated governments deem wise. They are to abstain from all requisitions and are in no way to interfere with measures for national defense taken by the Government concerned.

All questions regarding occupation not provided for by the

treaty will be regulated by a subsequent convention or conventions which will have similar force and effect.

SECTION XV—MISCELLANEOUS

Germany agrees to recognize the full validity of the treaties of peace and additional conventions to be concluded by the allied and associated powers with the powers allied with Germany, to agree to the decisions to be taken as to the territories of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, and to recognize the new States in the frontiers to be fixed for them.

Germany agrees not to put forward any pecuniary claims against any allied or associated powers signing the present treaty based on events previous to the coming into force of the treaty.

Germany accepts all decrees as to German ships and goods made by any allied or associated prize court. The Allies reserve the right to examine all decisions of German prize courts. The present treaty, of which the French and British texts are both authentic, shall be ratified and the depositions of ratifications made in Paris as soon as possible. The treaty is to become effective in all respects for each Power on the date of deposition of its ratification.

Even those elements in Germany which feared the worst from the Peace Conference of the Allied and Associated Powers at Paris seem to have been stunned at the severity of the terms imposed. President Wilson himself designated the peace terms as "severe," and Lloyd-George called them "terrible in some respects." There was a strong movement in Germany for the indignant repudiation of the terms, despite the fact that Germany was powerless from a military point of view, and the armies of Foch were prepared at a moment's notice to advance further into Germany. Probably only dread of the further suffering to be imposed on the German people by the continuation of the blockade against Germany induced the National Assembly at Weimar to ratify the peace terms, as it did on June 23, 1919. Previously, the German delegation to Paris, under the leadership of Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, had managed to wring from the Peace Conference some concessions of great value.

ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY

Because of the fact that the Covenant of the League of Nations was inserted in the treaties of peace with Germany and Austria as an integral part of those treaties, it is necessary to consider the terms of the Covenant and the terms of the treaties under one head. Criticism of the peace terms may be divided, for convenience, into criticism from the conservative and nationalistic point of view, and criticism from the radical or internationalist point of view.

In the more conservative and nationalistic camp in the United States, there were undoubtedly many who were opposed to seeing this country enter into any international engagements such as those contained in the League of Nations. These persons were anxious to see the United States maintain its traditional attitude of aloofness from European political problems, save where American interests were directly concerned; and they regarded any such engagements as entangling alliances, against which the country had been vigorously warned by Washington and Jefferson. However, the fact that these persons were in a minority was proved by the absence of any movement of strength in the United States Senate altogether to reject the treaty with Germany on the ground that it contained the Covenant of the League of Nations. Even though the Republican Party had officially taken a stand of opposition to certain features of the Covenant, the Republican majority in the Senate at the time of the consideration of the treaty with Germany confined its efforts of opposition to attempts to amend or to interpret certain sections of the Covenant and the treaty.

One feature of the Covenant which called forth many sharp objections was the much-discussed Article X, which bound the members of the League of Nations to guarantee one another's territorial integrity. Many persons in the conservative and nationalistic camp maintained that the implications of this article compelled the United States to spend its blood and treasure in European quarrels over territorial boundaries, quarrels in which the United States was neither

BACK FROM FRANCE

The accompanying picture, taken from one of the largest British airplanes, shows the White Star liner, "Olympic," transporting American troops back to their native shores.

directly concerned nor interested. There was also fear that the wording of this article allowed Europe a share in maintaining the Monroe Doctrine and thus, in a sense, nullified the purposes for which the Doctrine had been originally proclaimed. The absence of any international Supreme Court with effective power to interpret international law and to enforce international decrees was also commented upon.

There was, in addition, fear that even the direct inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine within the Covenant was not sufficiently clear and explicit, and that the right of the United States to withdraw from the League at any time after two years' notice should not be dependent upon other Powers' decision as to whether at the end of those two years the United States had fully met its obligations under the League.

There was also much criticism of the disposition of Kiao-Chau and of economic and transportation rights on the Shantung Peninsula. This criticism maintained that this territory had been an integral part of China until seized by Germany in 1898 and that it therefore should be handed back to China at the conclusion of the war. There was a feeling that to give Japan even temporary possession of the Kiao-Chau district and even temporary privileges over the remainder of the Shantung Peninsula was to run counter to the traditional American policy of protecting the weak against the strong and to the latter-day American insistence upon the "Open Door" policy in China. And this criticism demanded to know why Japan refused to set a date by which she would fulfill her agreement to return Kiao-Chau to China. Indeed, in protest against this feature of the treaty with Germany, the Chinese delegates to the Peace Conference had refused to sign the treaty.

Against this criticism, the defenders of the Shantung award pointed out that the settlement had been previously made in the arrangements by which Japan entered and remained in the war, and that therefore this settlement could not be altered in the terms of peace. This agreement had been necessary to add Japan to Germany's foes and to secure Japanese inclusion within the League of Nations, and better one bad settlement than the entire disruption of the League.

Other criticism from the conservative and nationalist point of view centered around the powers of the League over certain domestic policies. Against this criticism, the defenders of the treaty pointed to the

fact that in the last analysis the power to declare war remained within the Congress of the United States and to the fact that the United States was one of the nine nations whose unanimous consent was necessary to give validity to all the important decisions of the League.

The conservative and nationalist camp, on the whole, seemed to approve unreservedly of the treatment directly meted out to Germany by the terms of the treaty of peace, and criticism on that score was reserved for the more radical and internationalist camp.

The radicals and internationalists, on the other hand, objected because the League of Nations did not have enough power. They pointed to the requirement of unanimity in the Council as proving that no genuine settlement of international problems of the utmost seriousness could arise through the League. For those problems obviously concerned the interests of most of the great Powers and none of the great Powers could be expected to vote against its own interests, so that it would be almost impossible to reach effective decisions except by the old method of bargaining and alliances out of which the Great War had sprung.

Similarly, from the radical and internationalist point of view the League took no effective steps toward disarmament; for in the days before the war even the most militarist of nations had insisted that their armaments were held only at the lowest point consistent with national safety, and by the terms of the Covenant the Powers agreed to nothing more definite than that.

It was further insisted upon that problems such as the freedom of Ireland were international problems, and that unless the entire world had the right to settle such problems, as the Federal power of the United States has the right to settle disputes between states, it would be impossible to settle future international differences with finality.

This point of view also condemned Article X, claiming that the peace terms placed alien nationalities under foreign rule and that from such violations of the right of nationality wars were bound to arise. Thus it was claimed that the terms of peace placed several hundred thousands of Austro-Germans and Slavs under Italian rule; that these Austro-Germans and Slavs would inevitably endeavor to revolt and to join their brethren in Austria and Jugo-Slavia; that in such revolts

Austria and Jugo-Slavia could be expected to come to the assistance of their brethren; that such assistance would constitute "external aggression," and that therefore Italy could call upon the other Powers, including the United States, to assist her in maintaining her rule over the revolting Austro-Germans and Slavs. Similarly, it was claimed, for another instance, that Article X would permit Japan to call for the assistance of the other great Powers against any attempt of the Koreans to regain their independence in case that attempt should be aided by China.

The radicals and internationalists, for the greater part, also criticized the omission of Germany from the League, not so much on grounds that Germany was ethically entitled to admission, as on the ground that any Powers left without the League, such as Germany, Russia and Hungary, would form another alliance which, if it were joined by any recalcitrant Power dissatisfied with the League of Nations, would again throw Europe into the constant acrimonies inevitably engendered by the balance of power system. The failure of the treaties and of the Peace Conferees to develop any consistent policy toward Bolshevist Russia also came in for much criticism.

The indefiniteness of many of the indemnities exacted from Germany was also criticized, on the ground that this indefiniteness made for unrest and lack of stability, both economic and political, throughout the world. Many radicals and internationalists complained further that the terms of peace imposed upon Germany were such as to do more than exact reparation and punishment from her—they were such as to attempt to keep her under perpetual bondage. These critics insisted that Germany should have been penalized by the greatest possible sum which could be exacted from her within some decades and that then the unborn generations of Germany should be freed from terrible burdens imposed because of sins and crimes over which they had had no control. Many of these critics charged also that the terms of peace gave France such unlimited economic power that she would become the impregnable mistress of all of Europe. These were among the reasons hinted at by General Smuts at the final signing of the terms of peace when he announced that he affixed his signature only under protest. In many quarters it was believed that even with the most

serious intent to live up to the terms of peace, Germany would be literally unable to do so.

The failure of the Covenant of the League of Nations to provide for the freedom of the seas also came in for severe strictures from this point of view. Similarly, there was much disappointment that the terms of peace and of the Covenant did nothing to end conscription.

Furthermore, from this avenue of approach, one of the most prolific causes of war, possibly the most prolific cause of war, was the attempt of large business units within the several countries to gain control over new markets and sources of raw materials in various undeveloped sections of the globe. Most of these regions were held by one or another of the great Powers, and hence friction was bound to arise which would not arise if countries like Morocco, Tripoli, Egypt, India, Korea, the Philippines, were administered by the countries which held them as mandatories for the League of Nations, with equal rights to the economic interests of all countries alike.

The disposition of the Sarre Valley was another sore point. It was generally admitted that France was entitled to the coal and iron of this region for a long time, but it was claimed that this right should not carry with it the right of sovereignty. It was asserted that since the population of this region was solidly German, it should remain under the sovereignty of the German Empire. With the sovereignty of this section in the hands of a League of Nations from which Germany was excluded and in which France was all-powerful, it was feared that the administration of this territory would be so manipulated that the referendum to be held after fifteen years would be made artificially to result in favor of France, and that as a result Europe would have on its hands another Alsace-Lorraine.

Again, it was claimed that not only had the Japanese and the Italians been given power over large sections of other nationalities, but also that the principle of nationality had been violated in the interests of Poland and that one more Alsace-Lorraine would arise on the eastern borders of what had been the Kaiser's dominions.

Other objections were to the creation of French and British protectorates or spheres of influence in Asia Minor and in Persia, Meso-

potamia, Syria and Egypt; to the refusal to permit the Austrian and the German sections of the German nationality to unite into one country; and to the separate private pacts within the League of Nations by which Great Britain and the United States guaranteed to protect France for a certain period of time against German aggression. It was claimed that if the League of Nations were to be effective, there was no need for such pacts; that if the League of Nations were not to be effective, it should not be organized; and that the nature of these pacts in essence violated the spirit of the League of Nations and might even give rise to similar pacts between other Powers within the League and thus disrupt the League.

Against this criticism, most of the defenders of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the peace treaties took the ground that the terms of the Covenant and of the treaties were all that were attainable at the present stage of the world's development, at the present stage of human nature and at the present stage of nationalistic pride and ambitions. With the justice of much of the above criticism, many of the most ardent defenders of the League and of the treaties were inclined to agree; but they claimed that the League was at least a step forward and a step in the right direction, and that it was a foundation on which a more pretentious structure could be builded in the future. These defenders pointed out that the League practically ended secret diplomacy and separate alliances between States, outside of such purely defensive pacts of a temporary nature as the proposed British and American agreements to come at once to the aid of France within a certain period of time in case of another unprovoked aggression against France on the part of Germany. These defenders pointed out that the threat of German domination had been effectively and for all time ended. They pointed out that, although no agency of supernationalism had been set up, at least a kind of international clearing-house for disputes had been established; that, with all its faults, the League was better than nothing; and that the choice before the world was not this League or a better League, but this League or no League at all.

President Wilson left Paris immediately after the delegates to the Peace Conference had officially signed, on June 28, 1919, the treaty

with Germany. He arrived at New York City on July 8, and two days later submitted the full draft of the peace treaty with Germany to Congress in the following words:

GENTLEMEN OF THE SENATE:

The treaty of peace with Germany was signed at Versailles on the 28th of June. I avail myself of the earliest opportunity to lay the treaty before you for ratification and to inform you with regard to the work of the conference by which that treaty was formulated. . . .

In one sense, no doubt, there is no need that I should report to you what was attempted and done at Paris. You have been daily cognizant of what was going on there,—of the problems with which the Peace Conference had to deal and of the difficulty of laying down straight lines of settlement anywhere on a field on which the old lines of international relationship, and the new alike, followed so intricate a pattern and were for the most part cut so deep by historical circumstances which dominated action even where it would have been best to ignore or reverse them. The cross currents of politics and of interest must have been evident to you. . . .

The United States entered the war upon a different footing from every other nation except our associates on this side the sea. We entered it, not because our material interests were directly threatened or because any special treaty obligations to which we were parties had been violated, but only because we saw the supremacy, and even the validity, of right everywhere put in jeopardy and free government likely to be everywhere imperiled by the intolerable aggression of a Power which respected neither right nor obligations and whose very system of government flouted the rights of the citizen as against the autocratic authority of his governors. And in the settlements of the peace we have sought no special reparation for ourselves, but only the restoration of right and the assurance of liberty everywhere that the effects of the settlement were to be felt. We entered the war as the disinterested champions of right and we interested ourselves in the terms of the peace in no other capacity.

The hopes of the nations allied against the Central Powers were at a very low ebb when our soldiers began to pour across the sea. There was everywhere amongst them, except in their stoutest spirits, a sombre foreboding of disaster. The war ended in

November, eight months ago, but you have only to recall what was feared in midsummer last, four short months before the armistice, to realize what it was that our timely aid accomplished alike for their morale and their physical safety. That first, never-to-be-forgotten action at Château-Thierry had already taken place. Our redoubtable soldiers and marines had already closed the gap the enemy had succeeded in opening for their advance upon Paris,—had already turned the tide of battle back towards the frontiers of France and begun the rout that was to save Europe and the world. Thereafter the Germans were to be always forced back, back, were never to thrust successfully forward again. And yet there was no confident hope. Anxious men and women, leading spirits of France, attended the celebration of the Fourth of July last year in Paris out of generous courtesy,—with no heart for festivity, little zest for hope. But they came away with something new at their hearts: they have themselves told us so. The mere sight of our men,—of their vigor, of the confidence that showed itself in every movement of their stalwart figures and every turn of their swinging march, in their steady comprehending eyes and easy discipline, in the indomitable air that added spirit to everything they did,—made everyone who saw them that memorable day realize that something had happened that was much more than a mere incident in the fighting, something very different from the mere arrival of fresh troops. A great moral force had flung itself into the struggle. The fine physical force of those spirited men spoke of something more than bodily vigor. They carried the great ideals of a free people at their hearts and with that vision were unconquerable. Their very presence brought reassurance; their fighting made victory certain.

They were recognized as crusaders, and as their thousands swelled to millions their strength was seen to mean salvation. And they were fit men to carry such a hope and make good the assurance it forecast. Finer men never went into battle; and their officers were worthy of them. This is not the occasion upon which to utter a eulogy of the armies America sent to France, but perhaps, since I am speaking of their mission, I may speak also of the pride I shared with every American who saw or dealt with them there. They were the sort of men America would wish to be represented by. the sort of men every American would wish to claim as fellow countrymen and comrades in a great cause. They were terrible in battle, and gentle and help-

ful out of it, remembering the mothers and the sisters, the wives and the little children at home. They were free men under arms, not forgetting their ideals of duty in the midst of tasks of violence. I am proud to have had the privilege of being associated with them and of calling myself their leader.

But I speak now of what they meant to the men by whose sides they fought and to the people with whom they mingled with such utter simplicity, as friends who asked only to be of service. They were for all the visible embodiment of America. What they did made America and all that she stood for a living reality in the thoughts not only of the people of France but also of tens of millions of men and women throughout all the toiling nations of a world standing everywhere in peril of its freedom and of the loss of everything it held dear, in deadly fear that its bonds were never to be loosed, its hopes forever to be mocked and disappointed.

And the compulsion of what they stood for was upon us who represented America at the peace table. It was our duty to see to it that every decision we took part in contributed, so far as we were able to influence it, to quiet the fears and realize the hopes of the peoples who had been living in that shadow, the nations that had come by our assistance to their freedom. It was our duty to do everything that it was within our power to do to make the triumph of freedom and of right a lasting triumph in the assurance of which men might everywhere live without fear.

Old entanglements of every kind stood in the way,—promises which Governments had made to one another in the days when might and right were confused and the power of the victor was without restraint. Engagements which contemplated any dispositions of territory, any extensions of sovereignty that might seem to be to the interest of those who had the power to insist upon them, had been entered into without thought of what the peoples concerned might wish or profit by; and these could not always be honourably brushed aside. It was not easy to graft the new order of ideas on the old, and some of the fruits of the grafting may, I fear, for a time be bitter. But, with very few exceptions, the men who sat with us at the peace table desired as sincerely as we did to get away from the bad influences, the illegitimate purposes, the demoralizing ambitions, the international counsels and expedients out of which the sinister designs of Germany had sprung as a natural growth.

It had been our privilege to formulate the principles which were accepted as the basis of the peace, but they had been accepted, not because we had come in to hasten and assure the victory and insisted upon them, but because they were readily acceded to as the principles to which honorable and enlightened minds everywhere had been bred. They spoke the conscience of the world as well as the conscience of America, and I am happy to pay my tribute of respect and gratitude to the able, forward-looking men with whom it was my privilege to co-operate for their unfailing spirit of co-operation, their constant effort to accommodate the interests they represented to the principles we were all agreed upon. The difficulties, which were many, lay in the circumstances, not often in the men. Almost without exception the men who led had caught the true and full vision of the problem of peace as an indivisible whole, a problem, not of mere adjustments of interests, but of justice and right action.

The atmosphere in which the Conference worked seemed created, not by the ambitions of strong governments, but by the hopes and aspirations of small nations and of peoples hitherto under bondage to the Power that victory had shattered and destroyed. Two great empires had been forced into political bankruptcy, and we were the receivers. Our task was not only to make peace with the Central Empires and remedy the wrongs their armies had done. The Central Empires had lived in open violation of many of the very rights for which the war had been fought, dominating alien peoples over whom they had no natural right to rule, enforcing, not obedience, but veritable bondage, exploiting those who were weak for the benefit of those who were masters and overlords only by force of arms. There could be no peace until the whole order of central Europe was set right. . . .

And out of the execution of these great enterprises of liberty sprang opportunities to attempt what statesmen had never found the way before to do; an opportunity to throw safeguards about the rights of racial, national, and religious minorities by solemn international covenant; an opportunity to limit and regularize military establishments where they were most likely to be mischievous; an opportunity to effect a complete and systematic internationalization of waterways and railways which were necessary to the free economic life of more than one nation and to clear many of the normal channels of commerce of unfair obstructions of law or of

privilege; and the very welcome opportunity to secure for Labor the concerted protection of definite international pledges of principle and practice.

These were not tasks which the Conference looked about it to find and went out of its way to perform. They were inseparable from the settlements of peace. They were thrust upon it by circumstances which could not be overlooked. The war had created them. In all quarters of the world old established relationships had been disturbed or broken and affairs were at loose ends, needing to be mended or united again, but could not be made what they were before. They had to be set right by applying some uniform principle of justice or enlightened expediency. And they could not be adjusted by merely prescribing in a treaty what should be done. New states were to be set up which could not hope to live through their first period of weakness without assured support by the great nations that had consented to their creation and won for them their independence. Ill-governed colonies could not be put in the hands of governments which were to act as trustees for their people and not as their masters if there was to be no common authority among the nations to which they were to be responsible in the execution of their trust. Future international conventions with regard to the control of waterways, with regard to illicit traffic of many kinds, in arms or in deadly drugs, or with regard to the adjustment of many varying international administrative arrangements could not be assured if the treaty were to provide no permanent common international agency, if its execution in such matters was to be left to the slow and uncertain processes of co-operation by ordinary methods of negotiation. If the Peace Conference itself was to be the end of cooperative authority and common counsel among the governments to which the world was looking to enforce justice and give pledges of an enduring settlement, regions like the Sarre basin could not be put under a temporary administrative regime which did not involve a transfer of political sovereignty and which contemplated a final determination of its political connections by popular vote to be taken at a distant date; no free city like Dantzig could be created which was, under elaborate international guarantees, to accept exceptional obligations with regard to the use of its port and exceptional relations with a State of which it was not to form a part; properly safeguarded plebescites could not be provided for where populations were at some future date to make choice what sovereignty they would live under; no cer-

tain and uniform method of arbitration could be secured for the settlement of anticipated difficulties of final decision with regard to many matters dealt with in the treaty itself ; the long-continued supervision of the task of reparation which Germany was to undertake to complete within the next generation might entirely break down ; the reconsideration and revision of administrative arrangements and restrictions which the treaty prescribed but which it was recognized might not prove of lasting advantage or entirely fair if too long enforced would be impracticable. The promises governments were making to one another about the way in which Labor was to be dealt with, by law not only but in fact as well, would remain a mere humane thesis if there was to be no common tribunal of opinion and judgment to which liberal statesmen could resort for the influences which alone might secure their redemption. A league of free nations had become a practical necessity. Examine the treaty of peace and you will find that everywhere throughout its manifold provisions its framers have felt obliged to turn to the League of Nations as an indispensable instrumentality for the maintenance of the new order it has been their purpose to set up in the world,—the world of civilized men.

That there should be a league of nations to steady the counsels and maintain the peaceful understandings of the world, to make, not treaties alone, but the accepted principles of international law as well, the actual rule of conduct among the governments of the world, had been one of the agreements accepted from the first as the basis of peace with the Central Powers. The statesmen of all the belligerent countries were agreed that such a league must be created to sustain the settlements that were to be effected. But at first I think there was a feeling among some of them that, while it must be attempted, the formation of such a league was perhaps a counsel of perfection which practical men, long experienced in the world of affairs, must agree to very cautiously and with many misgivings. It was only as the difficult work of arranging an all but universal adjustment of the world's affairs advanced from day to day from one stage of conference to another that it became evident to them that what they were seeking would be little more than something written upon paper, to be interpreted and applied by such methods as the chances of politics might make available if they did not provide a means of common counsel which all were obliged to accept, a common authority

whose decisions' would be recognized as decisions which all must respect.

And so the most practical, the most skeptical among them turned more and more to the League as the authority through which international action was to be secured, the authority without which, as they had come to see it, it would be difficult to give assured effect either to this treaty or to any other international understanding upon which they were to depend for the maintenance of peace. The fact that the Covenant of the League was the first substantive part of the treaty to be worked out and agreed upon, while all else was in solution, helped to make the formulation of the rest easier. The Conference was, after all, not to be ephemeral. The concert of nations was to continue, under a definite Covenant which had been agreed upon and which all were convinced was workable. They could go forward with confidence to make arrangements intended to be permanent. The most practical of the conferees were at last the most ready to refer to the League of Nations the superintendence of all interests which did not admit of immediate determination, of all administrative problems which were to require a continuing oversight. What had seemed a counsel of perfection had come to seem a plain counsel of necessity. The League of Nations was the practical statesman's hope of success in many of the most difficult things he was attempting.

And it had validated itself in the thought of every member of the Conference as something much bigger, much greater every way, than a mere instrument for carrying out the provisions of a particular treaty. It was universally recognized that all the peoples of the world demanded of the Conference that it should create such a continuing concert of free nations as would make wars of aggression and spoliation such as this that has just ended forever impossible. A cry had gone out from every home in every stricken land from which sons and brothers and fathers had gone forth to the great sacrifice that such a sacrifice should never again be exacted. It was manifest why it had been exacted. It had been exacted because one nation desired dominion and other nations had known no means of defense except armaments and alliances. War had lain at the heart of every arrangement of the Europe,—of every arrangement of the world,—that preceded the war. Restive peoples had been told that fleets and armies, which they toiled to sustain, meant peace; and they now knew that they had been lied to: that fleets and armies had been maintained to

promote national ambitions and meant war. They knew that no old policy meant anything else but force, force,—always force. And they knew that it was intolerable. Every true heart in the world, and every enlightened judgment demanded that, at whatever cost of independent action, every government that took thought for its people or for justice or for ordered freedom should lend itself to a new purpose and utterly destroy the old order of international politics. Statesmen might see difficulties, but the people could see none and could brook no denial. A war in which they had been bled white to beat the terror that lay concealed in every balance of power must not end in a mere victory of arms and a new balance. The monster that had resorted to arms must be put in chains that could not be broken. The united power of free nations must put a stop to aggression, and the world must be given peace. If there was not the will or the intelligence to accomplish that now, there must be another and a final war and the world must be swept clean of every Power that could renew the terror. The League of Nations was not merely an instrument to adjust and remedy old wrongs under a new treaty of peace; it was the only hope for mankind. Again and again had the demon of war been cast out of the house of the peoples and the house swept clean by a treaty of peace; only to prepare a time when he would enter in again with spirits worse than himself. The house must now be given a tenant who could hold it against all such. Convenient, indeed indispensable, as statesmen found the newly planned League of Nations to be for the execution of present plans of peace and reparation, they saw it in a new aspect before their work was finished. They saw it as the main object of the peace, as the only thing that could complete it or make it worth while. They saw it as the hope of the world, and that hope they did not dare to disappoint. Shall we or any other free people hesitate to accept this great duty? Dare we reject it and break the heart of the world?

And so the result of the Conference of Peace, so far as Germany is concerned, stands complete. The difficulties encountered were very many. Sometimes they seemed insuperable. It was impossible to accommodate the interests of so great a body of nations,—interests which directly or indirectly affected almost every nation in the world,—without many minor compromises. The treaty, as a result, is not exactly what we would have written. It is probably not what any one of the national delegations would have written. But results were worked out which on the whole

bear test. I think that it will be found that the compromises which were accepted as inevitable nowhere cut to the heart of any principle. The work of the Conference squares, as a whole, with the principles agreed upon as the basis of the peace as well as with the practical possibilities of the international situations which had to be faced and dealt with as facts.

I shall presently have occasion to lay before you a special treaty with France, whose object is the temporary protection of France from unprovoked aggression by the Power with whom this treaty of peace has been negotiated. Its terms link it with this treaty. I take the liberty, however, of reserving it for special explication on another occasion.

The rôle which America was to play in the Conference seemed determined, as I have said, before my colleagues and I got to Paris,—determined by the universal expectations of the nations whose representatives, drawn from all quarters of the globe, we were to deal with. It was universally recognized that America had entered the war to promote no private or peculiar interest of her own but only as the champion of rights which she was glad to share with free men and lovers of justice everywhere. We had formulated the principles upon which the settlement was to be made,—the principles upon which the armistice had been agreed to and the parleys of peace undertaken,—and no one doubted that our desire was to see the treaty of peace formulated along the actual lines of those principles,—and desired nothing else. We were welcomed as disinterested friends. We were resorted to as arbiters in many a difficult matter. It was recognized that our material aid would be indispensable in the days to come, when industry and credit would have to be brought back to their normal operation again and communities beaten to the ground assisted to their feet once more and it was taken for granted, I am proud to say, that we would play the helpful friend in these things as in all others without prejudice or favor. We were generously accepted as the unaffected champions of what was right. It was a very responsible rôle to play; but I am happy to report that the fine group of Americans who helped with their expert advice in each part of the varied settlements sought in every transaction to justify the high confidence reposed in them. . . .

America may be said to have just reached her majority as a world power. It was almost exactly twenty-one years ago that the results of the war with Spain put us unexpectedly in posses-

sion of rich islands on the other side of the world and brought us into association with other governments in the control of the West Indies. It was regarded as a sinister and ominous thing by the statesmen of more than one European chancellery that we should have extended our power beyond the confines of our continental dominions. They were accustomed to think of new neighbours as a new menace, of rivals as watchful enemies. There were persons amongst us at home who looked with deep disapproval and avowed anxiety on such extensions of our national authority over distant islands and over peoples whom they feared we might exploit, not serve and assist. But we have not exploited them. We have been their friends and have sought to serve them. And our dominion has been a menace to no other nation. We redeemed our honor to the utmost in our dealings with Cuba. She is weak but absolutely free; and it is her trust in us that makes her free. Weak peoples everywhere stand ready to give us any authority among them that will assure them a like friendly oversight and direction. They know that there is no ground for fear in receiving us as their mentors and guides. Our isolation was ended twenty years ago; and now fear of us is ended also, our counsel and association sought after and desired. There can be no question of our ceasing to be a world Power. The only question is whether we can refuse the moral leadership that is offered us, whether we shall accept or reject the confidence of the world.

The war and the Conference of Peace now sitting in Paris seem to me to have answered that question. Our participation in the war established our position among the nations and nothing but our own mistaken action can alter it. It was not an accident or a matter of sudden choice that we are no longer isolated and devoted to a policy which has only our own interest and advantage for its object. It was our duty to go in, if we were indeed the champions of liberty and of right. We answered to the call of duty in a way so spirited, so utterly without thought of what we spent of blood or treasure, so effective, so worthy of the admiration of true men everywhere, so wrought out of the stuff of all that was heroic, that the whole world saw at last, in the flesh, in noble action, a great ideal asserted and vindicated, by a nation they had deemed material and now found to be compact of the spiritual forces that must free men of every nation from every unworthy bondage. It is thus that a new rôle and a new responsibility have come to this great nation that we honor

and which we would all wish to lift to yet higher levels of service and achievement.

The stage is set, the destiny disclosed. It has come about by no plan of our conceiving, but by the hand of God who led us into this way. We cannot turn back. We can only go forward, with lifted eyes and freshened spirit, to follow the vision. It was of this that we dreamed at our birth. America shall in truth show the way. The light streams upon the path ahead, and nowhere else.

Before leaving Europe on July 13, 1919, to re-assume his duties as Secretary of State of the United States, Robert Lansing made public the following analysis of the import of the peace which followed the Great War. Mr. Lansing's statement was unusually clear and free from partisanship, giving an analysis notably incisive and lucid, although it is developments of the next few years which alone will write the final and authoritative verdict upon the arrangements which finally closed the last act of the greatest war of modern times. Mr. Lansing's statement was as follows:

Many thoughts rush to mind on leaving the Peace Conference after six months of effort. Never before has such an international gathering been held, for here has been the meeting ground of twenty-seven nations to liquidate a world war and establish a new order and a laboratory where already a system of world cooperation has been born out of necessity.

Out of it all has come the most important international document ever drawn—the treaty of peace with Germany—a document which not only meets the issues of the present war, but also lays down new agreements of the most helpful and most hopeful character. The nations are bound together to avert another world catastrophe; backward peoples are given a new hope for their future; several racial entities are liberated to form new States; a beginning is made toward removing unjust economic restrictions, and the great military autocracies of Central Europe are destroyed as the first step in a general disarmament.

The treaty is, of course, not all that we had hoped for. It could hardly be expected to be. Too many conflicting interests were involved, as well as too many legitimate documents which

would tax the most perfectly balanced mind. Nearly every one will find in it weaknesses both of omission and commission, provisions inserted which might better have been left out, and provisions left out which might better have been inserted.

Such a document must, however, be examined both against the background of its creation and in the large sweep of its spirit. From that point of view we may call it a stepping-stone from the old international methods to the new. If it still holds some of the distrusts and hatreds of the war, which Germany has full well earned for herself; if its construction has been hindered by memories of secret pacts and promises, it must be borne in mind that it carries with it the evident purpose to throw off the old methods of international intrigue and plotting.

But the present treaties are but the starting point of world reconstruction. Now that the general principles have been laid down it remains to execute them; and by that I mean, not so much retributive action against nations which have recently run amuck in the world but rather the cleansing and healing processes that shall really make good our hopes and aspirations.

Undoubtedly there is a great danger in the world to-day. Many people have thought that the mere signing of the treaty with Germany marks the ending of the world peril. Public opinion seems to have breathed a sigh of relief and lapsed back into apathy. Concentration of thought on world problems is weakening now, when it is most essential, and the forces of disintegration and reaction have been given a freedom of action far greater than when the world was on its guard.

The situation to-day is serious. Western civilization is still dazed by the shock of four and a half years of destruction. Industry and commerce are not yet restored. All of Europe is impoverished; parts of it are starving. Its whole political fibre has been shot through. Russia and Hungary are gripped by subversive political doctrines. Austria-Hungary and Turkey as empires have ceased to be. Poland and Czecho-Slovakia are struggling to their feet as members of the family of nations.

All that complicated machinery of society which took decades to elaborate and a world war to tear down cannot be replaced over night by a wholly different machinery.

Many problems remain unsettled. Territorial adjustments to secure the rights of people who live under their own flag as far as possible in the tangled skein of European nationalities may be effective. Attainment of the Polish frontiers on all

sides, particularly in East Prussia, is very difficult. The Teschen coal fields are still a source of contention between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. Hungary is interrupting the trade of all Europe. The Adriatic problem is still unsolved, as well as the fate of those large territories formerly under the Turk, including especially Asia Minor and Armenia.

World statesmanship will be sorely tried in the next few years. Two things are essential: First, an alert, intelligent, interested public opinion, and, second, co-operation of the nations. The former is needed both as a check on any sinister purposes that may crop up, and as the great support for common action. The second is essential unless the nations are to return to a selfish particularism which can only breed the most dangerous disputes.

The Peace Conference has been history's greatest instance of a unified world statesmanship directing the moral and material resources of the world's family of nations. To allow the spirit behind it to disintegrate at this moment of emergency when united action is imperative would be fatal to all the hopes of permanent peace with which we entered the war.

If it is true that one nation can destroy the equilibrium of all, it is all the more true that each nation is bound by its own law of self-preservation to co-operate with the others to check troubles before they get their headway.

So I leave for home to-night pleased, but not over-complacent, with the outcome of the past six months, and hopeful, but not in the least unmindful, of the problems of the next few years.

Errata

Page 5, Sixth Line—"Set into motion" should read "Kept in or set into motion."

Page 8, Twenty-fifth Line—"Naval attack against Trent and Trieste" should read "Naval attack against Trieste and land attack against Trent."

Page 25, Eleventh Line—"Russia" should read "Russian."

Page 403, Fourth Line—"1917" should read "1918."

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The following bibliography is meant to be comprehensive, rather than exhaustive. That is to say, the author has attempted to include only the works which seem to treat most adequately of the topics under discussion, rather than all the works bearing upon those topics. Because of the fact that this bibliography is intended for the general reader, only books written in English or translated into English have been included, with one exception. Similarly, it has been attempted to confine the list to books of recent publication and to exclude propaganda, with the exception of several of the books on Bolshevist Russia. And, for the greater part, the books listed are such as appeal to the general reader, and many which would appeal only to the specialist have been purposely omitted.

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